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Despite a growing body of research that investigates the actions of “grass roots” perpetrator units of 
the Holocaust the general outcomes of this research, particularly regarding the police battalions, still 
appear to veer towards “ordinary men” versus “ideological warriors” arguments. This thesis 
attempts to transcend this somewhat polemical condition by investigating the structures and actions 
of these units by further differentiating between the profiles of the groups and individuals that 
formed the police battalions.  
This thesis investigates the role of a group of junior officers as part of Police Battalions 314 and 304 
and their influence on the actions of the battalions in Poland and Ukraine. Police Battalions 314 and 
304 were at the forefront of carrying out Nazi racial policies in Poland and were in the vanguard of 
SS units that perpetrated the mass murders of the Ukrainian Jewish population in 1941 and 1942. 
This study uses SS and police personnel records in combination with the records of post-war trial 
investigations to analyse the impact of individual junior officers on the mass murder process within 
the context of the actions of the Police Battalions. 
Most of the junior officers were former Hitler Youth leaders and were recruited then trained as SS 
officers to perform a pivotal role as the organisers, educators and role models of their subordinates 
in the companies and platoons of the police battalions. In performing this role these young SS men 
had a prominent influence on the mobilisation of their subordinates to carry out mass murder. This 
study illustrates that some perpetrators possessed considerable agency at the ground level and 
shows that a vanguard group occupied key positions and had a disproportionate influence on the 
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The aim of this study is to identify a vanguard group within Police Battalions 304 and 314 and assess 
the impact of this group on the actions of the battalions as whole units. I will argue that a distinct 
group of young junior officers that occupied the positions of company and platoon leaders in Police 
Battalions 314 and 304 had a disproportionate influence not only on the culture and behaviour of 
their sub-units, but also collectively a disproportionate influence on the actions of the battalions as 
whole units. An argument will be made that these men formed a relatively homogenous group that 
was distinct in a number of factors from the other members of the police battalions and were 
specially selected and trained to fill the roles of the platoon and company leaders. In these pivotal 
positions this group of young officers were acting as order givers as well as order receivers and were 
considered by the SS-police hierarchy to represent the future generation of SS leaders and an 
ideological vanguard of the police battalions. As a group these men can be considered to be among 
the vanguard perpetrators of the Holocaust that had a disproportionate influence on the evolution 
and radicalisation of the mass murders in Eastern Europe. This group was fast-tracked into becoming 
officers and all attended the same police officer training school at Berlin-Köpenick. Immediately 
following the course these men, with an average age of 23 in 1941, were deployed to their 
battalions either in Poland where the battalions were involved in the enforcement of Nazi racial 
policies, or in Ukraine at a time when the battalions were engaged in the mass murder of Jewish 
civilians. The influence of this group of perpetrators on the killing process will be examined within 
the context of the actions of Police Battalions 314 and 304. This study seeks to contribute to the 
existing literature on perpetrators of the Holocaust by examining the profiles and actions of 
perpetrator groups that have not been examined to a sufficient extent: the junior officers of the 
police battalions and Police Battalions 314 and 304. The study of these groups of perpetrators is 
important because they were vanguard perpetrator units operating directly at the forefront of some 
key stages of the mass murder process in Eastern Europe. 
The theoretical framework for this study is taken from the work done by Michael Wildt on the 
leadership cadre of the RSHA.1 Wildt has identified a relatively homogenous group that was 
comprised of comparatively young, highly educated men of the war youth generation, who came 
from lower-middle or middle class backgrounds. A significant portion of their self-identity lay in a 
veneration of youth that represented a break from the past and focus on the future as they 
perceived themselves to be the natural future leadership elite. Wildt argues that the fundamental 
characteristic of this group was to translate ideas into active leadership, to turn theory into practice. 
                                                          
1 Michael Wildt, An Uncompromising Generation. The Nazi Leadership of the Reich Security Main Office; trans. 
Tom Lampert (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2009).  
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The dominant structure of identity for this group was the Nazi worldview which functioned as a 
release from regulatory norms, including moral and legal norms, an ideological stance that was to 
create the scope for leadership based on unrestrained initiative and dynamic radicalism. The group 
biography of the young junior officers of the police battalions resembles Wildt’s “uncompromising 
generation” in that they joined Nazi organisations at a young age, were all relatively well educated 
and came from lower-middle and middle class backgrounds. This study will demonstrate how the 
values based on active leadership, unbound by moral or legal norms, the same values that infused 
the leadership of the RSHA, were transferred through the ideological training of the young police 
officers who were intended to become the next generation of elite leaders of the SS and police 
ranks. It will then demonstrate how these values were translated into action in Poland and Ukraine 
by this vanguard group. 
This study recreates the profiles, preparations and actions of Police Battalions 314 and 304 in order 
to assess the ideological, organisational and situational factors that contributed to the behaviour of 
the men that made up the battalions. The Ordnungspolizei (Orpo) battalions were at the forefront in 
implementing Nazi racial policy in Poland following the Nazi invasion in 1939 and the battalions that 
were assigned to Eastern Europe during the early stages of the German invasion of the Soviet Union 
in 1941 proved to be the decisive factor in carrying out the campaign of mass murder. Battalions 314 
and 304 were two of the six Orpo battalions assigned to the HSSPF Russia South, Friedrich Jeckeln, 
which were collectively involved in the murder of considerably more Jews in Ukraine than 
Einsatzgruppen C and D combined. As Dieter Pohl has commented, the Orpo formed the “backbone 
of manpower” for “Jewish actions” in Ukraine.2 A number of studies have been published on the 
Orpo as an organisation and on individual battalions, but the overall picture is far from complete. No 
systematic study on Battalions 314 and 304 exists. In this way I will contribute to the emerging 
broader picture on the actions of the German police battalions. However, rather than analysing the 
battalions only as whole entities, this study focuses mainly on the junior officers. Both battalions 
were made up of distinct groups with differing biographical backgrounds and contrasts can be 
drawn, not only between the officer corps and the men of the rank and file, but also within the 
officer ranks themselves. I will also distinguish between the training received by the rank and file and 
that received by the junior officers at the Berlin-Köpenick school. During the recreation of the 
actions of the battalions, I show that the battalions were often separated into sub-groups, usually at 
company or platoon level, that were led by the junior officers. These situations afforded the young 
                                                          
2 Dieter Pohl, ‘The Murder of Ukraine’s Jews under German Military Administration and in the Reich 
Commissariat Ukraine’, in Ray Brandon and Wendy Lower (eds.) The Shoah in Ukraine. History, Testimony, 
Memorialization (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008), pp.40 and 60. 
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officers significant scope for initiative and opportunities to lead by example. By recreating the 
biographies and preparations of the battalions and showing how these relate to the behaviour of the 
units in Poland and Ukraine, I try to identify the emergence of radical elements within the battalions; 
elements that included the junior officer group, and how they influenced the actions of the 
battalions as whole units. 
The focus of this study is on the junior officers and how the young men as individuals meshed with 
their role as junior officers within the context of the actions of the battalions as whole units. It will 
be argued here that the role of the junior officers was multifaceted and combined important 
elements that made their role pivotal to the police battalions’ capacity to perpetrate mass murder. 
The role of company and platoon commander demanded that these young officers were responsible 
for: the ideological education and “cultivation” of their subordinates, the discipline and morale of 
their men, the organisation of official and social events of their units, the organisation of their 
subordinates’ participation in massacres and, on occasion, were the authors of massacres of Jewish 
civilians. In addition to these tasks, the junior officers were to be role models for their subordinates 
and were to provide ideologically grounded justifications for the actions of the police units. There 
was some crossover between the responsibilities of these officers and those of the battalion 
commanders and platoon NCOs. The battalion commanders had overall responsibility for the actions 
of the battalions as a whole and in areas such as overall discipline, morale and organisation. The 
NCOs worked directly under the junior officers and were also at times involved in training activities, 
were heavily involved in mustering participation of the rank and file during the massacres and in 
maintaining discipline and morale in the platoons and squads of the battalions. However, as will be 
shown, the battalion commanders of Battalions 314 and 304 were often remote from the sub-units 
of the battalions, were not always present at the massacres and were not in daily contact with the 
rank and file as were the junior officers. The NCOs while important to the killing process were 
directly subordinate to the junior officers and did not have the same role as educators or the same 
level of organisational responsibilities. Crucially, they did not have had the same level of autonomy 
of action as the junior officers. While they were not the only ones that formed a “crucial nucleus” of 
perpetrators that had a disproportionate influence on the killing process on the ground, the distinct 
role and position in the police hierarchy of the junior officers made them the backbone of the police 
battalions. 
This study is divided into three parts. The rest of this part will review some of the important studies 
on the lower-level, or “direct” perpetrators of the Holocaust with a particular focus on the German 
police, and will contextualise this study within the existing body of literature. I will identify here how 
this study makes an original contribution to the existing literature and how the thesis relates to 
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existing work in this area of study. In this part I also establish the research methodology that is 
employed for this study. This section begins with a closer examination of Wildt’s work on the RSHA 
and explains how and why this work is used as the methodological framework for this study. I then 
discuss the biographical approach that is used and the merits and limitations of using this approach 
for the study of perpetrators at the lower levels of the Nazi hierarchy and the method of 
reconstructing the movements and actions of the sub-groups that made up the battalions in addition 
to an evaluation of the behaviour of the battalions as whole units. Finally, there is a discussion of the 
main source material that is used for this study, post-war trial documents, and the limits and 
problems of using this type of material as a main source. 
The second part looks at the men of Police Battalions 314 and 304, how the units were trained and 
organised and analyses their experiences and actions in Poland before their involvement in mass 
killings in Ukraine. This part is comprised of chapters one, two and three. Chapter one examines the 
profiles of some individual officers and identifies the groups that made up the battalions. The main 
purpose of this chapter is to identify the subject group and distinguish this group from the rest of the 
battalion. I will show here that the police battalions were comprised of different groups from 
different backgrounds. The information presented in this chapter will be referred to throughout the 
following chapters and the biographical profiles that emerge from this section will be compared with 
profiles from other perpetrator groups. Most of the biographical information is drawn from the post-
war trial documents, SS and Orpo personnel files and the profiles of other police battalions from the 
secondary literature. Chapter two examines the training of the battalion members before their 
deployment in Poland and Ukraine and will identify the differences between the training of the rank 
and file and the officer ranks. The main focus is on the training of the junior officers at Berlin-
Köpenick. First, there will be a general overview of the training of the police after 1936, and an 
examination of the concepts of the ideal for the future SS and police officer corps. I then analyse the 
training of the rank and file of both battalions and the training of the officer candidates. I identify 
the main pedagogical concepts used at the Berlin officer school and the core themes of the training. 
Finally, I trace the arrival of the junior officers to the battalions and analyse the importance of the 
training of the junior officers and their influence as educators for their units. For the general 
information on the police training and the training of the rank and file, I have drawn on the work on 
police training by Jürgen Matthäus and Edward Westermann. For the training at Berlin-Köpenick, I 
use surviving documents from the training school held in the Bundesarchiv. In chapter three I 
recreate the experiences and actions of both battalions in Poland prior to their deployment into 
Ukraine. Here I assess the effects of the experiences on the culture and dynamics of the battalions 
with a focus on the emerging roles of the junior officers who were already with the battalions in 
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Poland. There will be a brief overview of some of the events in Poland immediately preceding the 
entry of the battalions and the historical context in which they were operating. I will then analyse 
the actions of Battalion 304 as a guard battalion at the Warsaw ghetto and the actions of Battalion 
314 in Zamość which was involved in deportations, guarding Jewish civilians and the rounding up of 
forced labour. Finally I examine the roles of the junior officers in “hunting platoons” and as 
“educators”. The actions and experiences of both battalions in Poland will be mostly drawn from the 
post-war trial records. 
This third part of this study recreates the roles of junior officers and their battalions in the mass 
murders of Jews in Ukraine from July 1941. This part is comprised of chapters four, five and six and 
the information for these chapters is drawn primarily from the post-war trial documents. Chapter 
four reconstructs the movements and actions of Police Battalion 314 in Ukraine during July and 
August 1941, a time when the battalion was operating in sub-units (company and platoon level) that 
were led by the junior officers. This chapter examines the early, smaller-scale killing actions in the 
Kovel area and identifies more precisely which individuals and sub-units did what, how and when. 
This chapter examines the behaviour of the junior officers operating in command positions of the 
sub-units and assesses how their actions relate to the theoretical and practical instruction they 
received during training and their experiences in Poland. Chapter five recreates the actions of the 
battalions during the larger-scale massacres in Ukraine from September 1941 to January 1942. In 
carrying out these massacres the battalions were mostly operating as whole units. In this chapter I 
demonstrate how the different groups and individuals behaved during these actions and identify 
patterns of behaviour within the groups. I show that although they were no longer in central 
command positions on the spot, the junior officers retained considerable influence on the actions of 
their subordinates. Chapter six identifies the actions involving the battalions, sub-groups and 
individuals after January 1942 until the end of the war, and the career progression of certain 
individuals. During the winter of 1941-42 the battalions were largely stationary and were involved in 
activities other than mass killing. This chapter examines SS ethics through the behaviour of some 
individual officers during this period. 
 
Historiography 
Scholars studying the genocidal activities perpetrated by the Nazis in Eastern Europe have sought to 
explain how people could possibly carry out these acts. What were the dominant factors that 
determined and motivated these perpetrators to authorise, organise and perpetrate the mass 
murder of unarmed civilians? Who were the killers and what type of people were they? Early 
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scholarly interest was devoted primarily to the workings and actions of the Nazi hierarchy with a 
particular focus on Hitler, the top tier Nazi leadership and the “criminal” agencies of the Gestapo 
and SS. Little attention was given to the Orpo, the Wehrmacht, and the “ordinary men” of these 
organisations.3 Only in the 1990s did the field of Holocaust studies see a decisive shift away from the 
more prominent members of the Nazi and SS hierarchy and overriding structures towards the 
actions of the lower-ranking perpetrators. Debates on the motivation of these “grass roots” 
perpetrators and perpetrator groups were started by Christopher Browning’s interpretations of the 
post-war trial records on members of Reserve Police Battalion 101, and developed following Daniel 
J. Goldhagen’s provocative response to Browning.4 Of these groups of low level killers, much of the 
scholarly attention on perpetrator studies in recent years has been devoted to the actions of the 
German Orpo. Writing almost a decade after the first publication of Ordinary Men in 1991 Browning 
noted that it “is no longer seriously in question that members of the German Order Police, both 
career professionals and reservists, in both battalion formation and precinct service or Einzeldienst 
were at the centre of the Holocaust and provided a major manpower source for carrying out 
numerous deportations, ghetto-clearing operations, and massacres”.5 It has been established that 
the manpower source provided by the Orpo during the invasion of Poland and the following 
occupation, the invasion of the Soviet Union and the following mass murders of Jewish civilians 
along with other victims in Eastern Europe, vastly outnumbered the more notorious Einsatzgruppen 
and therefore were directly responsible for a greater number of the murders.6 According to Gerhard 
Paul, the scholarly interest in the police formations that developed following the publication of the 
studies by Browning and Goldhagen is owed not only to the effect of the polarised explanatory 
positions adopted by the two authors that spurred the following debates, but also to the fact that 
among the functionaries of the Third Reich, one would be hard pressed to find a group in which 
“ordinary” citizens were turned into a pack of killers so quickly.7 However, it is not only the Orpo 
units that have drawn the attention of scholars in the wake of this debate. A significant portion of 
the literature on the “grass roots” perpetrators has been devoted to the members of the 
                                                          
3 Jürgen Matthäus, ‘Historiography and the Perpetrators of the Holocaust’, in Dan Stone (ed.), The 
Historiography of the Holocaust (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), pp.199-201. 
4 Christopher R. Browning, Ordinary Men. Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland 
(London: Penguin, 2001). Daniel J. Goldhagen, Hitler’s Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the 
Holocaust (London: Abacus, 1997).  
5 Browning, Nazi Policy, Jewish Workers, German Killers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p.143. 
6 For example see Peter Longerich, Holocaust. The Nazi Persecution and Murder of the Jews (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010), p.186, and Browning, The Origins of the Final Solution. The Evolution of Nazi Jewish 
Policy 1939-1942 (London: Arrow Books Ltd, 2005), p.229. Browning states that 21 police battalions entered 
the Soviet Union at the start of the invasion, and Longerich states 23.  
7 Gerhard Paul, ‘Die Täter der Shoah im Spiegel der Forschung’, in Paul (ed.), Die Täter der Shoah. Fanatische 
Nationalsozialisten oder ganz normale Deutsche? (Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2003), p.52. 
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Einsatzgruppen units and the ordinary soldiers of the Wehrmacht; an organisation whose 
involvement in the mass killings in Eastern Europe was not restricted to a supporting role, but which 
initiated and carried out independent mass killings.8 Following Browning’s and Goldhagen’s 
contributions, the debates have largely revolved around two models of explanation: group 
conformity and authority structures operating in small face-to-face groups, and the role of ideology.9 
Many (though not all) of the scholars addressing the issue of the motivations of the many “direct” 
killing groups, have constructed more complex explanations that attempt to integrate the two 
positions, but there are still differing views on which factor or factors to privilege above others. The 
emerging picture of the perpetrators within the literature has become more differentiated and 
heterogeneous, but also less clear.10 One reason for the disparity in explanations of individual and 
group perpetrators at the lower-levels of the killing process is the shortage and inherent problems of 
the primary sources. Regarding the Orpo, relatively few official documents, personal diaries or 
letters have emerged, and the documents on the post-war trials of former policemen that form the 
main type of source used by many of the studies on the police battalions, revolve around 
testimonies given by the former policemen themselves and must therefore be handled with care.11 A 
further reason for the wide disparity in explanations is the scope of focus, applied by the author in 
question. Some authors have concentrated on the moments of killing themselves or the immediate 
context of war, while others have broadened the chronological focus to the inter-war years to find 
meaning behind the actions of the perpetrators that occurred years later. Some authors have 
focused on one or a select few individuals, some on whole units or institutions and others on 
German society as a whole. This section reviews the more recent literature on the lower-level 
German perpetrators with a particular focus on how studies of the police battalions have evolved 
within this literature and highlights the contribution to the literature that this study makes. 
Browning and Goldhagen 
Browning’s ground breaking study was primarily an analysis of the “ordinary men” of Reserve Police 
Battalion 101 and their actions in the Lublin district of the Generalgouvernement (GG) in 1942 and 
1943. Browning argues that these men, who were operating within the broader context of a racist 
imperial war, were motivated primarily by group situational factors, including the effects of 
                                                          
8 Thomas Kühne, ‘Male Bonding and Shame Culture: Hitler’s Soldiers and the Moral Basis of Genocidal 
Warfare’, in Olaf Jensen and Claus-Christian W. Szejnmann (eds.), Ordinary People as Mass Murderers. 
Perpetrators in Comparative Perspectives (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), p.56. 
9 Kühne, ‘Male Bonding’, p.57. 
10 Paul, Täter, p.50. 
11 Claus-Christian W. Szejnmann, ‘Perpetrators of the Holocaust: a Historiography’, in Jensen and Szejnmann, 
(eds.), Ordinary People, p.46. 
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brutalisation, careerism, conformity to the group and obedience to authority. The men of the rank 
and file of Reserve Battalion 101 were mainly lower and lower-middle class whose average age in 
1942 was 39; a group considered to be too old for military service but heavily conscripted for reserve 
police duty. “These were men who had known political standards and moral norms other than those 
of the Nazis. Most came from Hamburg, by reputation one of the least Nazified cities in Germany, 
and the majority came from a social class that had been anti-Nazi in its political culture”.12 He 
concludes that “These men would not seem to have been a very promising group from which to 
recruit mass murderers on behalf of the Nazi version of a racial utopia free of Jews”.13 
The main point of criticism of Browning’s explanation has been of the way in which it downplays 
ideologically-based motivation; in particular the role of antisemitism. Goldhagen provided one of the 
first, and most prominent, challenges to Browning’s argument. In Hitler’s Willing Executioners 
(1996), Goldhagen agrees with Browning that Battalion 101 represented an approximate cross-
section of German (male) society and that the men, on the whole, represented a form of “negative 
selection” as far as their affiliations to Nazism were concerned.14 However, Goldhagen rejects the 
components of Browning’s multi-layered argument and instead employs a mono-causal explanation 
that it was a particular type of German antisemitism, “eliminationist antisemitism”, that was the sole 
motivating factor for the perpetrators. Browning’s more universal explanation is replaced by a more 
particular explanation in that it was only the Germans that wanted to eliminate the Jews, and did so 
when allowed to. Goldhagen’s thesis was roundly rejected by scholars in the main for being too 
simplistic an explanation. However, it did spark a number of following studies that sought to 
mediate between the polarised positions presented by Browning and Goldhagen on perpetrator 
motivation; that of the immediate situational context and more long-term ideological impulses. 
Ordinary Men 
Browning’s argument on the “ordinariness” of the men of Battalion 101 reacting to their immediate 
situational context was followed up by studies on the lower-level perpetrators by some social 
psychologists. In Becoming Evil (2002), James Waller has analysed the motivations of genocide 
perpetrators generally, but with a particular focus on the Holocaust from a social psychological 
perspective.15 His argument, similar to Browning’s, is that it is predominantly ordinary people that 
commit genocide and that they can be regarded as extraordinary only by their actions, not because 
                                                          
12 Browning, Ordinary Men, pp.44-8. 
13 Browning, Ordinary Men, p.48. 
14 Goldhagen, Willing Executioners, p.210. 
15 James Waller, Becoming Evil: How Ordinary People Commit Genocide and Mass Killing (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2002). 
12 
 
of who they were. The majority of the perpetrators, according to Waller, were not distinguished by 
background, in their previous political affiliation and behaviour, or in their personal traits, as having 
been unusually likely or fit to become genocidal executioners.16 Perpetrators then, do not have to 
have abnormal personalities or strongly ingrained tendencies towards violence, or indeed, 
tendencies towards obedience or conformity.17 Therefore, as with Browning’s provocative 
conclusion, anyone has the potential to become a mass murderer under certain conditions. Paul A. 
Roth makes an argument that perpetrator behaviour can, and has, been explained through social-
scientific experiments.18 Roth defends explanations on the prime importance of the situational 
context, arguing that experimental situations can be created (Roth cites the Asch experiments on 
group conformity in particular), that demonstrate the central importance of factors that derive from 
the immediate context, such as group conformity and obedience to authority.19 Roth argues that, 
“Nazi behaviour would have been predictable had it been known then what we know now about 
conformity, obedience, and roles”.20 The main criticism levelled at the social-psychological universal 
explanations revolving around the immediate situational context is that they relegate the 
importance of the broader historical context and particular institutional environments in which the 
immediate situational events take place, that is to say, they do not ask how the situations in which 
these people find themselves are created, or by whom. 
In a number of studies, including a micro-study on Reserve Police Battalion 45, Harald Welzer, like 
Waller and Roth, has also argued that most ordinary people have the potential to become mass 
killers under certain circumstances.21 However, Welzer argues that the process leading to mass 
killing was rooted within the context of the establishment of a particular Nazi morality. Goldhagen, 
Welzer argues, challenged assumptions that Germans under National Socialism were endowed with 
the same ethical and moral convictions that we ascribe to ourselves today. However, Welzer sees 
the motor that led to ordinary Germans being able to commit mass murder not in an “eliminationist 
antisemitism”, but in more general “preconceptions regarding the absolute inequality of people”.22 
Welzer’s explanation of perpetrator behaviour lies not in how the actors were able to overcome 
                                                          
16 Waller, Becoming Evil, pp.8-13. 
17 George C. Browder, ‘Perpetrator Character and Motivation: An Emerging Consensus?’, Holocaust and 
Genocide Studies (HGS), 17, 3 (2003), p.493. 
18 Paul A. Roth, ‘Heart of Darkness: “Perpetrator History” and Why There is No Why’, History of the Human 
Sciences, 17, 2/3 (2004), p.236. 
19 Roth, ‘Heart of Darkness’, p.217. 
20 Roth, ‘Heart of Darkness’, p.220. 
21 Harald Welzer, ‘Mass Murder and Moral Code: Some Thoughts on an Easily Misunderstood Subject’, History 
of the Human Sciences, 17, 2/3 (2004), pp.15-32; Welzer, ‘On Killing and Morality: How Normal People Become 
Mass Murderers’, in Jensen and Szejnmann, Ordinary People, pp.165-82; Welzer, Täter. Wie aus ganz 
normalen Menschen Massenmörder werden (Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer Verlag, 2013).  
22 Welzer, ‘Moral Code’, pp.17-18. 
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moral inhibitions, but how particular moral principles actually preserved a sense of “moral integrity”, 
including during the act of killing.23 
Following Browning’s study and the contributions to the study of the perpetrators from the social 
psychological perspective, there appears to be a strong level of agreement that the majority of the 
perpetrators did not have to be psychologically “abnormal” or virulently antisemitic in order to 
commit these crimes. However, the relative “normality” of these perpetrators has been challenged. 
Some historians consider that the immediate social and situational factors that fundamentally 
influenced the actions of these “ordinary men”, such as those related to obedience and conformity, 
in isolation from other motivational factors are not sufficient explanations either.24 Two important 
studies on the German police published in the wake of Goldhagen’s book by Jürgen Matthäus and 
Klaus-Michael Mallmann, sought to mediate between the two positions established by Browning and 
Goldhagen.25 Matthäus’ essay focuses on the actions of the rural Gendarmerie branch of the Order 
Police, a group that became more prominent in the killing process during the “second wave” of 
killings in Eastern Europe in 1942 and 1943.26 Matthäus criticises claims that the low-level 
perpetrators were motivated purely by antisemitism. Instead, he argues for a kind of prevailing 
“common sense” rooted in the idea that so long as “certain legitimising methods”, including post-
legitimisation, were applied, it mattered little to these men what was actually done.27 Longer-term 
factors, such as antisemitism and Nazi indoctrination along with established traditions of obedience 
to and identification with the state, should be considered as important factors, but need to be 
melded with the historical setting. In Matthäus’ view here, there is a gulf between broader 
ideological factors and the actual conditions that the men experienced on the ground.28 Mallmann 
has argued that the German policemen involved in the mass killings on the ground were not on the 
whole ideologically motivated. In his findings, the majority of the gendarmes and members of the 
police battalions that were sent into the East, should not be considered Nazi “elite troops”. In the 
Orpo officer corps alone, Mallmann found that in 1941 66 percent of regular officers were Party 
members (13 percent were classified as “old fighters”) and only 30 percent belonged to the SS. Of 
the reserve officers, 67 percent were Party members (12 percent old fighters) and only 7 percent 
                                                          
23 Welzer, ‘Moral Code’, p.30. 
24 Browder, ‘Perpetrator Character’, p.493. 
25 Jürgen Matthäus, ‘What About the “Ordinary Men”?: The German Order Police and the Holocaust in the 
Occupied Soviet Union’, HGR, 10, 2 (1996), pp.134-50; Klaus-Michael Mallmann, ‘Vom Fußvolk der 
“Endlösung”. Ordnungspolizei, Ostkrieg und Judenmord’, Tel Aviver Jahrbuch für deutsche Geschichte, XXVI 
(1997), pp.355-91. See also, Mallmann, ‘Der Einstieg in den Genozid. Das Lübecker Polizeibataillon 307 und das 
Massaker in Brest-Litowsk Anfang Juli 1941’, in Archiv für Polizeigeschichte, 10 (1999), pp.82-88. 
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were SS men. Including the rank and file, in 1941 only 25-33 percent of policemen were Party 
members.29 It can be assumed that the number of SS men among the lower ranks was considerably 
less than the officer corps. These figures correspond to Browning’s findings on Battalion 101 that 
only 25 percent of the men, including the rank and file, were Party members.30 Mallmann argues 
that the lack of NSDAP and SS membership demonstrates that the Orpo were the least integrated 
part of Himmler’s SS empire, as far as ideological commitment is concerned. However, the relatively 
low degree of political commitment, in terms of membership of party organs, does not mean that 
the majority of policemen were opposed to Nazism or that the Orpo was not a Nazi organisation as 
defined by the ideas of the regime. In fact, as Mallmann points out, there was a selection process for 
the police; an issue that Browning and Goldhagen pass over. The reservists were screened by the 
Gestapo, albeit at a relatively superficial level, and the views of the individuals towards Nazism were 
checked in consultation with local mayors and other officials.31 By the beginning of the war years 
then, the Orpo as an organisation was perhaps more “Nazified” than Browning’s account of Reserve 
Battalion 101 concedes. 
Organisational culture 
In his study of the police battalions Westermann shows that Himmler, Daluege and the HSSPFs 
“sought to create an organisational culture within the police corps that glorified the concept of 
uniquely defined military identity married with the precepts of an SS ethic that embraced National 
Socialist racial philosophy and stressed the special obligations of membership in an exclusive 
hallowed order”.32 This organisational culture was formed of increased efforts to militarise the 
police, incorporating military concepts of duty and absolute obedience and the physical and 
psychological merger of the ordinary police and the SS. The culture that embodied the organisation 
set the boundaries of acceptable behaviour and defined the standards of group membership thereby 
establishing Nazi ideological prerogatives, as embodied by SS ethics, as the institutional norm.33 With 
this study, Westermann has developed his earlier case study on Police Battalion 310 by broadening 
the scope to include the organisation of the Uniformed Police as a whole.34 Westermann’s argument 
remains essentially the same however, that the organisational culture of the police created 
“ideological soldiers” prepared for a war of atrocity. Westermann acknowledges that the 
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organisational culture was not all encompassing in that, as Browning shows, not all the policemen 
chose to kill, and some even attempted to prevent killing. However, the organisation as a whole 
ultimately meant that there were always enough volunteers to contribute to the killings.35 
Westermann’s study attempts to overlap organisational with ideological factors, and a significant 
point where the two intersect can be found in the ideological training given to the policemen.36 In 
Ordinary Men, Browning looks at the indoctrination efforts of the SS and police leadership and the 
effects of these efforts on the behaviour of the policemen in Battalion 101. Browning concludes that, 
like the rest of German society, the men of the battalion had experienced the incessant racist and 
antisemitic propaganda which, combined with the police indoctrination during basic training and the 
ongoing indoctrination lessons that each unit received, must have had an effect in “reinforcing 
general notions of Germanic racial superiority” and a “certain aversion” toward the Jews.37 However, 
Browning is unconvinced that the ideological training had any effect on the men’s preparedness to 
kill. Browning argues that the indoctrination material may have been more effective on younger 
policemen who had grown up during the Nazi dictatorship, but was “clearly not targeted at older 
reservists and in some cases was highly inappropriate or irrelevant to them”.38 Furthermore, 
Browning notes that little space in the indoctrination materials was devoted explicitly to 
antisemitism and the “Jewish question”. Therefore, primarily because Browning is unable to find any 
material that he feels was designed specifically to harden the men for the task of killing Jews, he 
doubts the effectiveness of the ideological training in preparing the men of the battalion to these 
ends.39 Mallmann agrees with Browning’s assessment of the ideological conditioning of the 
policemen in that the regular ideological “lessons” and complementary training materials 
undoubtedly reinforced existing antisemitic and racial ideals, but considers it problematic to draw 
conclusions on the actual effects of the lessons on the minds of the policemen directly from the 
training materials. Mallmann also points out that this type of instruction was not given a central role 
in the training of the police; the time devoted to ideological training was only about two hours per 
week. For Mallmann, the effectiveness of this type of training lies less in promoting stereotypes of 
the racial enemy (Feindbilder) than in denigrating values such as humanitarianism and traditional 
soldierly traditions of chivalry as unmanly “weakness”. These notions, Mallmann argues, lowered 
previous inhibitions and contributed to a “brutalisation of the psyche”.40 
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Westermann and Matthäus take somewhat different positions on the effectiveness of the 
ideological training given to the policemen from Browning and Mallmann. For Westermann, 
ideological training played a significant role in creating the organisational culture of the police. He 
argues that the Uniformed Police experienced the same racial indoctrination as the Security Police 
and SD and “did not prove immune from its effects”.41 Westermann states that the ambitions of 
Himmler and Daluege went further than conditioning the policemen as convinced antisemites, but 
extended to the moulding of “political soldiers” that were to become the future defence against 
racial and political enemies based on the creation of a martial identity embedded with Nazi 
ideological principles.42 It is in the more general application of Nazi ideology and SS ethics within the 
ranks of the police rather than purely antisemitic directives that Westermann places the 
effectiveness of the training on the impulse for committing mass murder. Matthäus argues that 
ideological education served as the principal tool for the merger of the SS and police in the attempts 
to create the future State Security Corps. From 1934, the main idea in formulating SS schooling lay 
less in purely conveying ideological and racist ideas than in creating a solid ideological state of mind, 
or Haltung, based on a concept of the primacy of the Nordic race.43 In order to achieve and maintain 
the Haltung of the policeman, Matthäus shows that along with the more formal ideological lessons, 
informal get-togethers and other social occasions were employed to immerse the individual within 
an ideological atmosphere.44 Matthäus’ findings correspond with the findings of Browning and 
Mallmann in that, quantitatively, antisemitic issues, though present, did not feature prominently in 
the training curricula of the SS and police. However, even if antisemitic messages were not 
reiterated at every opportunity, Matthäus argues that antisemitic imperatives, in particular the need 
to address the “Jewish question”, “formed an integral part of the esprit de corps in Himmler’s realm 
of influence”, through the institutional structures of the police, in peer adaptation and 
organisational culture.45 Therefore, the effectiveness of the training on turning the policemen into 
killers lies less in the relative volume of antisemitic pronunciations, or in blueprints for action with 
respect to the treatment of the Jews the policemen were encountering, or about to encounter, than 
offering rationalisations for what was happening in the minds of the killers and those contributing to 
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the killing actions.46 Matthäus concludes that leading up to and during the war, the principle that the 
Jews had to be treated as enemies, even if they were unarmed, was based on the basic training 
received by the policemen, the effectiveness of which, in turn, had foundations in existing 
antisemitic prejudices.47 
Westermann and Matthäus place ideological imperatives within an organisational context. However, 
the effects of the training, that played a major role in the creation of the “organisational culture” of 
the police and the Haltung of the individual policemen themselves, could not operate in isolation. It 
appears that the training of the police was intended to build on existing prejudices, such as 
antisemitism, but also these prejudices and mind set were intended to lead to action. According to 
Mallmann, the “ordinariness” of the policemen lies precisely in the fact that they were not drawn 
from the fringes, but from the heart of society and should be considered a “cross-section”, but of an 
increasingly Nazified society.48 
The Volksgemeinschaft 
Some recent studies have sought to move away from the study of institutional structures and have 
focused on German society as a whole under the Nazi dictatorship as providing the locus for the 
wartime actions of the perpetrators.49 Wildt has argued that the processes of bureaucratic 
discrimination, legal ordinances and violent anti-Jewish actions, so much of which were initiated at 
the “grass roots” level, transformed German society into an “aggressive and racist 
Volksgemeinschaft”.50 Alexander B. Rossino has argued that the Nazi efforts to reshape German 
society into a Volksgemeinschaft by formally categorising people along biological lines provided the 
context in which the young German men that formed the bulk of the rank and file of the Wehrmacht 
were raised. Rossino concludes that after years of exposure to active indoctrination by the Nazis that 
built on popular sentiments of racial devaluation and hatred, along with powerful militarist and 
revanchist sentiments, “it should come as no surprise that with the outbreak of war, military 
discipline quickly broke down and officers were generally unable to control the behaviour of their 
men”.51 Claudia Koonz has examined what she terms the “Nazi conscience”; an exclusionary, secular 
ethos “that extended reciprocity only to members of the Aryan community”, as defined by racial 
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scientists and cultivated by Nazi Party cadres that formed a genocidal consensus within Germany 
during the six years prior to the invasion of Poland in 1939. According to Koonz, the “Final Solution” 
took shape during this period, not on the Eastern Front during the war. The perpetrators, as 
members of this exclusive community, had internalised and understood the necessity of racial 
extermination which moved them to improvise and often exceed orders when offered the 
opportunity in Eastern Europe. In short, “Germans who in 1933, were ordinary western Europeans 
had become, in 1939, anything but”.52 Thomas Kühne has put forward a similar argument to Koonz 
in locating the importance for the motivation of the perpetrators in a widespread belief in the 
concept of a racial community, or Volksgemeinschaft. However, in contrast to Koonz and Wildt who 
focus on the exclusionary side of pre-war Nazi ethics, Kühne highlights the effects of a sense of 
belonging to the “in-group”.53 Kühne argues that there was an ideological foundation to the 
sentiments of comradeship among the soldiers and policemen formed by a combination of 
stereotypes of the “enemy”, prominently antisemitic stereotypes, and the experience of community 
that provided the motivation of the men in the units involved in mass killing. The police battalions 
and other killing units therefore, “provide evidence that the Volksgemeinschaft really existed on a 
daily basis” in strengthening the bonds between themselves by their shared involvement in 
genocidal violence. In committing violent and murderous acts, the men and women that formed 
these mini-communities experienced togetherness “by terrorising others and by transgressing moral 
conventions on behalf of the Volksgemeinschaft”.54 
These studies that examine the socialisation of German society during the pre-war period under the 
Nazi regime question the “normalcy” of the German perpetrators, when measured against assumed 
common ethics of modern “western” societies and ideological commitment on the part of the 
perpetrators move to the centre of their explanations. There have been some recent challenges to 
these arguments however. Sönke Neitzel and Harald Welzer are less convinced about the relevance 
of ideological motivation in explaining the murderous actions of the Wehrmacht arguing that, as a 
rule, German soldiers were apolitical and that abstract concepts such as a “global Jewish 
conspiracy”, a “Bolshevist promotion of genetic inferiority” and the Nazi Volksgemeinschaft remain 
concepts of limited explanatory value in explaining their actions.55 In fact, within the considerable 
number of transcripts of conversations between (predominantly Wehrmacht) POWs analysed by 
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Neitzel and Welzer, they were unable to find mention of the concept of a Volksgemeinschaft at all. 
Instead of ideological ideas, they contend that a military value system was far more important in 
influencing the soldiers’ perceptions, decisions and actions.56 To what degree then do the actual 
settings and circumstances that the men of the perpetrator units find themselves in influence their 
behaviour? 
War and colonialism 
Gerald Weinberg has argued that those who study the war and the demographic revolution that the 
Nazis planned and partially carried out, of which the murder of the European Jews was a central 
part, “need to see the two as two sides of the same coin”. “The failure to connect the war and the 
Holocaust makes both less comprehensible”.57 However, opinions differ as to how the context of 
being in a “war zone” influenced the behaviour of the perpetrators. 
In a study of soldiers’ letters home, Michaela Kipp has also questioned the role of ideological 
conviction in explaining the soldiers’ motivations for involvement in mass murder.58 Kipp has found 
that in the considerable number of letters analysed, only a minority drew on arguments common to 
National Socialist ideology of Jews as the creators of Bolshevism and worldwide Jewish conspiracies. 
Instead, in the absence of “blind, ideological hatred”, most of the soldiers were radicalised by more 
mundane concerns regarding their perceptions of the conditions in which they found themselves, 
such as factors relating to a lack of general “hygiene” and the need to impose “German order”.59 
Kipp agrees with Neitzel and Welzer that the reasons behind the actions of the soldiers lie less in 
abstract worldviews and more in “concrete places, purposes, and functions”, and especially in the 
smaller groups of which they were part.60 On the role of the gendarmerie during the “second sweep” 
in Belorussia, Eric Haberer argues that conformity to the group played an essential role in the 
cohesion and coercion of the German gendarmes operating in remote posts within a potentially 
deadly environment.61 However, Haberer points out that this small group, although reacting to one 
another, were also part of an environment in which patterns of barbarism had already been 
established by the Einsatzgruppen, police battalions and military creating a climate of 
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“unprecedented savagery”.62 This is a view shared by Browning in his later work on the Origins of the 
Final Solution, in which he argues that, as well as the members of the group reacting to each other, 
the broader context; the stage reached in the persecution of Jews and others (time) and the 
conditions in which they find themselves and their perceptions of them (space), plays a significant 
role in influencing the actions of the men on the ground.63 
Both Browning and Bartov have emphasised the role of the brutalisation of the perpetrators. 
Browning showed that the men of Battalion 101 became brutalised towards killing with repeated 
involvement in these acts. Bartov, on the other hand, argued that the soldiers on the Eastern Front 
became more brutalised, and more receptive to ideological ideas because of the dramatic conditions 
and hardships of warfare.64 Browning’s arguments on the brutalisation or acclimatisation to violence 
by repeated involvement appears to be justifiable in explaining how some perpetrators, once 
acclimatised, were able to continue killing. However, this argument possesses less explanatory 
power in explaining how many of the policemen were able to murder, or at least contribute to the 
murder actions, during the initial massacres. Bartov’s argument is lacking as an explanation for the 
many perpetrator units that were involved in mass killings and other atrocities before being involved 
in the extreme conditions on the Eastern Front. Is this a gap that can be filled by prior ideological 
conditioning? 
Alexander B. Rossino argues that the eradication of political and ideological enemies as defined by 
Nazi racial and biological terms, and as practiced by the German military, began not with the start of 
the war of annihilation in 1941, but in Poland in 1939.65 As opposed to Bartov’s argument on the 
brutalisation of attitudes, Rossino shows that the Wehrmacht was already functioning according to a 
modus operandi “that was largely compatible with the violent methods and ideological goals of 
National Socialism” in Poland in 1939.66 The outbreak of war then, provided the context for an 
explosion of attitudes that had already been “poisoned by prejudice, racism, and the exaltation of 
violence towards others”.67 Hannes Heer has argued that Bartov “underestimates the soldiers’ own 
capacity for moral assessment”, a moral reorientation that Heer argues began during the pre-war 
period and already “belonged to most soldiers’ basic frame of mind” during the early, successful 
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advances of the German army.68 Regarding the Orpo, Mallmann also argues that the context of 
ethnic cleansing, violent collective “reprisals” and racial persecution in Poland, in addition to the 
everyday experience of the dichotomy of the relationship of Herren- and Untermenschen, provided a 
“laboratory of race politics” and habitualisation of violence that formed the foundation for the 
genocidal explosion from 1941 in the former Soviet territories.69 Mallmann rejects arguments on the 
brutalising effects of war on the policemen as the men from the police battalions who became killers 
had just volunteered and had no time for a gradual acclimatisation to the violence.70 The fact that 
the violence of war has a brutalising and radicalising effect on the perceptions and actions of those 
involved is probably accepted by most scholars investigating the actions of the direct perpetrators. 
However, apart from exceptions such as Battalion 310, it appears that few of the policemen had 
experienced actual combat and significant losses prior to their involvement in killing and therefore 
could not have had a significant influence in explaining the actions of these perpetrators.71 Instead, 
arguments such as those offered by Rossino, Heer and Mallmann place more emphasis on the 
existing perceptions that the soldiers and policemen brought with them into the context of war and 
that already in Poland, before the brutalising effects of the war of annihilation against the Soviet 
Union, soldiers and policemen were acting in accordance with murderous Nazi racial policies. 
 For Mallmann the context of war is important in explaining the motivation of the police 
perpetrators, but this is based on a situational radicalisation of an ingrained image of the enemy in 
“Jewish Bolshevism”; a Feindbild that had developed since 1917. This ingrained stereotype 
radicalised and appeared to be verified when the policemen were confronted with the “alien” 
Ostjuden in enemy territory and developed a “virtual reality” that in the minds of the perpetrators 
legitimised the elimination of this “collective security risk” as an act of “self-defence”.72 The 
connection between the murder of Jewish civilians in the East and perceptions of the Jews as a 
collective security threat as a motivational factor for the perpetrators has been examined in a 
number of studies. Waitman Beorn has attempted to analyse how the connection between the anti-
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partisan war and the killing of Jewish civilians was implemented at unit-level on the ground.73 Beorn 
shows that a formulation was transmitted to Wehrmacht rear units in Belarus in September that 
stated that all Jews were Bolsheviks, all Bolsheviks were partisans, or at least partisan supporters, 
and therefore, all Jews were partisans or supporters.74 As demonstrated by Westermann, the 
militarisation of the police played a major role in the reorganisation of the institution and formed a 
key part of the organisational culture within the ranks of the policemen. Rossino has shown that this 
process went hand in hand with the legitimisation of the murder of civilians as military operations. 
The militarisation of the police had two main benefits: first, the SS-police units could operate more 
efficiently in the field in cooperation with the army and, second, due to the militarised nature of 
these units, commanders could couch orders for murder in terms of military necessity.75 However, 
this formula, especially when considering the murder of children, as a rationalisation for the direct 
perpetrators as well as the higher-ranking policy makers, leans heavily on fantastical perceptions. A. 
Dirk Moses has developed an argument that genocide “is governed more by fantastical security 
imperatives than by aesthetics of racial purity”. That whole Jewish communities were targeted pre-
emptively, suggests a significant level of paranoia as the basis for Nazi “security” measures.76 
However, the extent to which Himmler and his subordinates actually believed in the inherent threat 
behind each and every Jew is unclear.77  
An increasing number of studies over the past decade have looked at the colonial dimension to the 
war and Nazi population policies in Eastern Europe, particularly the relationship between Nazi 
colonial aspirations and the Holocaust.78 Some of these studies have looked beyond the role of 
colonialism in Nazi ideology and pronouncements of colonial aspirations by Hitler and Himmler and 
applied the colonial paradigm to the actions of the perpetrators. Wendy Lower has argued that the 
colonial setting of Nazi rule “provides an ideological framework for understanding German aims and 
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behaviour in Ukraine.”79 The mid-level German civilian administrators involved in organising the 
mass resettlement plans and mass murders in Ukraine, according to Lower, placed themselves 
within a longer tradition of a Germanic colonisation of the eastern territories.80 Elizabeth Harvey 
shares a similar view to Lower in that she argues that the Nazi settlement planners in Poland viewed 
their tasks as central to a colonial enterprise in the Nazi vision of expansion in Eastern Europe. This 
vision stood in long established traditions of a Germanic “cultural mission” in the “East”, but also an 
opportunity to apply modern research in various fields, including that of “racial theory” to the 
practice of population management.81  
Jürgen Zimmerer has been at the forefront of investigating the relevance of colonial history on the 
Holocaust.82 Zimmerer argues that the average German perpetrator perceived his actions to be 
standard behaviour in dealing with troublesome “natives” in the tradition of colonial war and 
conquest.83 “For the perpetrators, the fact that brutal guerrilla warfare, resettlement and a slave 
economy had always accompanied colonialism helped to inspire and legitimate their own 
participation”.84 Elissa Mailänder Koslov has applied this line of enquiry to the experience and 
actions of the male and female guards at the Majdanek camp.85 Koslov contends that the 
conjuncture of prior prejudices, the cultural colonial context as perceived by the perpetrators and 
the concrete experiences of working as a guard, led to the ready use of violence.86 Koslov cites the 
intoxicating effects of these ordinary Germans from modest backgrounds being immediately 
advanced to the highest social levels as German colonial masters, purely on the basis of their “racial” 
and cultural distinctions.87 Like Koslov, Lower has looked at the “psychological thrill” of lording over 
life and death and the effects on the behaviour of Reich women empowered as colonisers in the 
“East”.88 Browning has argued that a German gendarmerie unit became corrupted by the influence 
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of racial imperialism while “acting as a ‘master race’ on occupied territory”; notions and experiences 
that changed their attitudes and behaviour.89 
Whether the focus is on the context of a war zone, security imperatives or perceptions of a colonial 
environment guided by historical precedents, all of these paradigms invoke “zones of exception”, 
environments in which the parameters of permissible behaviour differed significantly from the 
soldiers’ and policemen’s experiences of domestic civilian life.90 Bloxham has argued that the 
“notion of Eastern Europe as a ‘land of exception’ was culturally determined and so determined in 
much broader swathes of German society (and that of other western societies) than the Nazi or 
Wehrmacht leadership”, and conditioned the behaviour of the lower-ranking, “direct” perpetrators 
at least as much as certain attitudes towards specific victim groups.91 In this way we can see the 
interaction between ideological imperatives, such as antisemitism, fear and hatred of Bolshevism, 
colonial perceptions of the “East”, or a more general Feindbild; whether culturally manifested or 
cultivated through institutional training, or indeed both, and these perceptions coloured the actual 
experiences of the soldiers and policemen in Eastern Europe within the context of war. 
Initiative 
Recent studies that investigate the events at unit level or in regional studies in Eastern Europe and 
the evolution towards genocide, while maintaining the primacy of ideology place considerable 
emphasis on decisions on the periphery and reveal considerable scope for initiative at the “grass 
roots” level.92 Two important studies by Wendy Lower and Jürgen Matthäus investigate the 
radicalising dynamic between the Nazi leadership and their subordinates on the periphery during the 
early stages of occupation of the former Soviet territories in Eastern Europe.93 In a case study of the 
mid-ranking Nazi local leaders stationed in Zhytomyr, Lower shows how these men on the periphery 
interacted with the central Nazi leadership through a mutually reinforcing and radicalising dynamic 
based on a consensus of antisemitism which she terms “anticipatory obedience”. Lower is critical of 
other regional studies that reduce the influence of higher-ranking Nazis in shaping the Holocaust on 
the ground and argues that that Hitler and Himmler retained their presence on the periphery 
through personal visits and intermediary agents embodied in the HSSPFs. In the case of Ukraine, the 
                                                          
89 Browning, Nazi Policy, p.150. 
90 For a discussion on the role of “licence” on agency, see Aristotle Kallis, Genocide and Fascism. The 
Eliminationist Drive in Fascist Europe (New York: Routledge, 2009). 
91 Bloxham, Final Solution, pp.285 and 294. 
92 Stone, Histories, pp.102-3. 
93 Lower, ‘”Anticipatory Obedience” and the Nazi Implementation of the Holocaust in the Ukraine: A Case 
Study of Central and Peripheral Forces in the Generalbezirk Zhytomyr, 1941-1944’, HGS, 16, 1 (2002), pp.1-22. 
Matthäus, ‘Controlled Escalation: Himmler’s Men in the Summer of 1941 and the Holocaust in the Occupied 
Soviet Territories’, HGS, 21, 2 (2007), pp.218-42. 
25 
 
HSSPF South until October 1941 was Friedrich Jeckeln who, as Himmler’s direct subordinate, 
represented the “intersection of center and periphery”.94 As the top leadership could not 
micromanage the hundreds of regional and district administrators, these local administrators were 
granted “substantial leeway” for action, giving way to opportunities to exceed or even disobey 
official policy. However, although local leaders planned and carried out these actions without explicit 
orders, according to Lower, these actions would follow the sanctioning of mass murder as a 
“solution” and “often only because it was tacitly understood or implied that this was expected from 
the higher-ups”.95 Matthäus also looks at the interaction between central and peripheral agents, but 
places more emphasis than Lower on the importance of initiative shown at the lower levels of the 
Nazi hierarchy acting on the periphery. Matthäus argues that Himmler and his immediate 
subordinates employed three main types of intervention to radicalise the treatment of Jews: by 
sanctioning after the fact, aggressive actions against Jews; by pushing for increased violence; and by 
reprimanding those who “deviated from the desired course of action either by showing too little 
initiative or by going too far beyond their orders”.96 However, Matthäus argues that the process of 
escalation, which he terms “controlled escalation”, was driven less by direct intervention by the SS 
leadership than by “the eagerness of subordinate officers to adopt new, more radical measures”; as 
long as their superiors provided the “support, encouragement, legitimisation or even tacit 
acceptance” for their actions, junior officers and even the rank and file policemen could take the 
initiative.97 By extending agency all the way down to the ordinary policemen who actually carried out 
the mass murder actions in Eastern Europe, Matthäus’ findings are particularly relevant to this study. 
If the killing process was shaped to a significant extent by the perpetrators on the ground, then it 
would seem necessary to know more about who these men were. 
Biography 
Michael Mann’s study of the biographical data of 1,581 perpetrators shows that the most of these 
men came from social-economic sectors of German society and regions, especially lost territories 
and border regions, which were most likely to be attracted to Nazism. Mann concludes that most of 
these perpetrators were probably ideologically driven killers and that they resembled “real Nazis” 
more than “ordinary Germans”.98 He also found that as a rule, the higher the rank of the individual 
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meant a greater level of commitment to Nazism; therefore, there were more committed Nazis in the 
higher ranks of core SS and NSDAP organisations than in the auxiliary police units such as Battalion 
101. However, the majority of Mann’s sample were of officer rank, leaving the rank and file 
perpetrators somewhat underrepresented.99 Because of this Mann is careful about drawing 
conclusions based on this sample concerning the ideological motivations of the lower-ranking 
members of the execution units. Younger perpetrators are also underrepresented in Mann’s sample; 
only 159 individuals from the sample were born after 1913. By far the largest age cohort in Mann’s 
sample is those who were born from 1901-1912 followed by the cohort born before 1901, men who 
filled the Nazi leadership positions.100 It is these two generations that have dominated scholarly 
interest of late as far as biographical profiles, particularly regarding the SS organisations are 
concerned. 
The generation that filled the early key positions in the SS leadership were mostly veterans of the 
First World War who struggled with their careers in the turbulent post-war period; embodied in the 
HSSPFs and the concentration camp commandants.101 The second generation, or “war youth 
generation” of SS- police leaders, has been the subject of a biographically based investigation by 
Michael Wildt.102 Building on Ulrich Herbert’s study of Werner Best, Wildt uses a sample of 221 
individuals who formed the leadership corps of the RSHA. In this sample, Wildt found a “strikingly 
homogenous generational group”, in that 77 percent were born after 1900, most were from lower-
middle class families and were relatively highly educated; 75 percent had university degrees, with 50 
percent of these achieving a doctoral degree. These men were part of the “war youth generation”, 
moulded by the experience of being denied the opportunity of “proving themselves” at the front 
and the economic difficulties and political radicalism that characterised the post-war situation in 
Germany.103 Rather than adopt a purely “deterministic biographical model”, with which the 
perpetrator’s motivations are deduced from the experiences of youth, Wildt employs a more 
complex model that places the individual biographies within historical context and particular 
institutional structures.104 Wildt argues that these men were recruited to the security police and SD 
because of their intellectual background, conceptual radicalism and ideological activism, but equally 
were radicalised themselves by these new type of Nazi institutions that had deliberately removed 
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themselves from traditional administrative boundaries; especially with the opportunities that came 
with the outbreak of war and conquest.105 The RSHA itself “effectively arose through the policies 
implemented by its actors, whose own practices were in turn influenced and structured by the 
institution they themselves had created”.106 Wildt has called for the need to distinguish between the 
different types of perpetrators, according to their positions and roles in the extermination process in 
addition to their background and training.107 Would this approach prove fruitful in the study of the 
lower-level, “direct” perpetrator groups? 
Andrej Angrick has recently shown how heterogeneous, in terms of personnel backgrounds, 
Einsatzgruppe D was. Below the level of the commanders from Wildt’s leadership cadre were: 90 
recent graduates of the Berlin-Charlottenburg Leadership School; four companies taken as whole 
units from Police Battalion 9; individuals from the Waffen-SS; translators from the USSR and a group 
of civilians deemed eligible for “emergency service”. This last group who would work as the lorry 
drivers and radio operators were recruited for their practical qualifications rather than ideological 
commitment. Einsatzgruppe D then, was a “motley group” of 600 men wearing a few different 
uniforms. Browning has established that a division of labour during the murder actions is important 
in understanding the dynamics of the execution process at the ground level; not everyone in the unit 
had to shoot continuously in order to fulfil the task. However, nearly a decade after Ordinary Men, 
Browning felt compelled to modify his earlier conclusions. Browning’s updated argument is that 
many of the minority of “eager killers” were “ideologically motivated men ready to kill Jews and 
other so-called enemies of the Reich from the start”; situational and organisational factors played 
little or no role in shaping their behaviour. These men, Browning states, had a disproportionate 
influence on the ground and formed a “crucial nucleus for the killing process”, in much the same way 
as the middle-echelon RSHA leaders and in the Nazi top ranks.108 Beorn and Haberer agree with 
Browning’s revision. Haberer argues that among the gendarmerie units there was a small group of 
ideologically driven active perpetrators who appear to have taken pride in their murderous actions, 
but this minority were not representative of the mind-set of the gendarmes generally.109 In Beorn’s 
panzer company, there was a small group of motivated perpetrators who repeatedly participated in 
atrocities.110 If there was a minority group of motivated men that had a disproportionate influence 
on the events on the ground, who then were they and how can they be differentiated from their 
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peers? In a recent study of the police battalions that served as the guard units of the Warsaw ghetto 
from 1940-1943, Stefan Klemp has focused on a number of individuals that appear to have killed on 
their own initiative.111 Klemp has looked at the biographies of some of the battalion and company 
commanders and argues that these were Exzeßtäter, men that were “convinced perpetrators” or 
psychopaths or both.112 These men, according to Klemp, were already fanatical Nazis in the 1930s 
and some had violent pasts. Therefore the war merely gave them the opportunity to do what they 
had been ready to do for a long time.113 Klemp argues that the officers of the police battalions were 
not the “Fußvolk” of the Final Solution or “ordinary men”. For Klemp, the personalities of the 
individuals play an important role, the institutional factors and situational context merely provided 
the opportunity for these men to kill. Klemp has shown that there were some men in the officer 
ranks that fit Browning’s revised argument of the existence of a “nucleus” of motivated perpetrators 
that may have had a disproportionate influence. Klemp’s focus on the behaviour of the guard 
battalions of the Warsaw ghetto is revealing in that, although the battalions were not required to 
carry out mass executions, the situation provided the opportunity for individuals so inclined to 
murder without orders to do so. It would appear unlikely that those who took advantage of the 
opportunity at Warsaw would not have been at the forefront of the mass killings elsewhere. 
However, it remains unclear how representative these few Exzeßtäter were of the officer corps of 
the police battalions and how these men influenced the sustained mass murder actions that 
required the involvement of larger groups. Klemp’s explanation offers little in the way of 
organisational and situational patterns, other than the fact that many of the higher officer ranks in 
the police battalions were filled by career Nazis. 
Junior Officers 
There have been a few recent indications in the literature that there was a younger, lower-level 
officer cohort that may have been more ideologically driven than the average German soldier. 
Evidence has been presented on the Wehrmacht that soldiers aged 21-25 who had become front-
line officers from the late-1930s “were more inclined than older, higher-ranking officers to accept 
the National Socialist worldview”.114 
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An overlooked part of Bartov’s early work on the Wehrmacht is that on the role of these junior 
officers.115 Bartov found that these young men played a significant role in the actions of the 
perpetrators of the Wehrmacht on the ground. The junior officers not only served as the connecting 
link between the order givers of Wehrmacht High Command and the rank and file, but also had the 
role of ideological instructors and were responsible for the conduct of the men under their 
command.116 In Soldaten, Neitzel and Welzer cited the work of a researcher who investigated the 
conversations between 621 captured German soldiers. Alexander Hörkens found that the vast 
majority of this number demonstrated a negative attitude towards Nazi racial policies and that only 
30 of these could be described as “ideological warriors”. Significantly, the majority of the 30 were 
junior officers.117 On Einsatzgruppe D, Angrick has shown that the 90 recent graduates of the SD 
training school were selected to form the real backbone of the unit and were to act as the 
commanders in the field with direct contact with the lower-ranking personnel while the higher 
leaders remained hierarchically remote. In practice, Angrick notes, these were the men who were 
designated to be the future leaders of the RSHA.118 The role of this young cadre of perpetrators on 
the killing process on the ground has not been fully considered in relation to the police battalions. 
Conclusion  
The literature on the involvement of the police battalions has clearly shown the Orpo to be one of 
the prime agencies involved in Nazi racial policies generally including the mass murder of Eastern 
European Jews. However, arguments revolving around the mechanisms and motivations that 
directed the actions of these units in the literature on these battalions as has emerged within the 
broader body of literature on the “direct” perpetrators remain contested. Following Browning’s 
influential study and reinforced by the studies from the field of social psychology, it appears to be 
universally accepted by scholars studying the lower-level perpetrators that the vast majority of these 
men were “ordinary” in the sense that they were not sadists or innately predisposed to violent 
behaviour. However, the extent to which the men of Battalion 101 should be considered ordinary or 
as representatives of the mass of “grass roots” perpetrators of the Holocaust has been disputed. In 
the aftermath of the debate sparked by Browning’s and Goldhagen’s polarised positions, Ideological 
considerations appear to be back in the foreground of historical discourse on the actions of the 
perpetrators. Studies such as those discussed by Welzer, Rossino, Koonz, Kühne and Wildt have 
highlighted the importance of the inter-war period and in particular the Nazi period from 1933 as 
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having a widespread radicalising effect on the German population. Collectively these studies 
challenge the assumptions that the perpetrators were acting within an “ordinary” ethical and moral 
compass and instead outline a widespread influence of Nazi ideology within German society; ideas 
that the later perpetrators of mass murder carried with them into Eastern Europe. Bartov and 
Westermann also highlight the influence of pre-war Nazi propaganda on the young soldiers and 
policemen involved in the mass murders, but place rather more emphasis on the importance of 
institutionally organised ideological training. There remains however no consensus on the relative 
importance of ideology on the actions of the perpetrators. The study by Neitzel and Welzer 
represents a recent challenge to arguments that privilege ideology, but their source sample relates 
primarily to the Wehrmacht and it remains unclear how representative their views are for the SS and 
Orpo units. Arguments raised by Wildt, Kühne and Koonz, among others, who attribute the actions 
of the perpetrators to a widespread acceptance of Nazi racial ideology by German society as a 
whole, extend “agency” to an extent that the roles of individual perpetrators disappear within the 
power of “collective trajectories” or values in the same way that they disappear within explanations 
revolving around institutional structures.119 Arguments such as those put forward by Westermann 
on the organisational structure and culture of the German police and those such as Browning’s in 
Ordinary Men on situational dynamics also, in different ways, subsume the individual agents within 
overriding explanations that seek to explain the actions of larger groups. Considering the complex 
and heterogeneous picture of the perpetrators and their motivations that has emerged from the 
literature, advances appear to be made in explanatory models that transcend the “classic 
dichotomies” of ordinary men versus ideological warriors, structures and group dynamics versus 
ideologically driven agents, and central versus peripheral agency.120 Westermann’s melding of the 
organisational structures of the police with ideological prerogatives, Matthäus’ work on police 
training that may provide links between prior prejudices, organisational structure, Nazi ideology and 
the actual experiences of the policemen in the “East”, and his work on connecting central policies 
with peripheral initiatives represent some of the more important recent advances in our 
understanding of the roles and actions of the police battalions. There are still some aspects that 
have been raised in the literature but appear to require more work. The actual effects of the police 
training on their actions remain, according to Matthäus, unclear. Also, the notion of “grass roots”, 
“vanguard” perpetrators and their disproportionate influence on the killing process on the ground 
has not been sufficiently developed. Aside from Wildt’s study on the RSHA leadership core, very little 
systematic work has been done in this vein on the lower-level, vanguard perpetrators. Arguments 
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such as those presented by Beorn on a Wehrmacht signals company and Browning and Haberer on 
gendarmerie units, have emanated from case studies of smaller groups, but have not been 
sufficiently explored in relation to the actions of the police battalions. Angrick has shown that 
Einsatzgruppe D was, as a whole, a heterogeneous unit, but insufficient attention has been paid to 
the biographical differentiation within the ranks of the police battalions. A contribution to the 
existing literature on the perpetrators will be made in two ways. First, this study will add to the 
growing catalogue of perpetrators two units, Police Battalions 314 and 304, that were at the 
forefront of the mass murders, the background and actions of which are yet to be systematically 
analysed. The second contribution will be to transcend the still dominant dichotomy of “ordinary 
men” or “ideological warriors” of homogenous units and follow up empirically the indications that 
there were individuals amongst the perpetrator groups that had a significant influence by identifying 
a particular group of vanguard perpetrators within the battalions. The main group in focus will be 
the cadre of junior officers that were fast-tracked into command positions and their actions as 
individuals and influence and roles as a group within Battalions 314 and 304. 
 
Research Methodology 
This study will investigate the subject group of junior officers in Police Battalions 314 and 304 by 
looking at their biographical profiles, training and their projected role in the police ranks as well as 
their actions in Poland and Ukraine. In order to test the hypothesis presented above concerning the 
role played by junior officers this study will attempt to answer the following research questions: 
Who were the vanguard perpetrators of the police battalions and what role did they play in the 
process of mass murder in Eastern Europe? How were the junior officers prepared for their role and 
what experiences preceded their involvement in mass killing? How did they influence the killing 
process on the ground? Were these men “normal” representatives of German society or a 
radicalised minority? These are all questions that have emerged from the existing literature on the 
perpetrators of the Holocaust and will be taken to the primary sources that will be employed for this 
study. 
The first question of who the vanguard perpetrators were forms the primary question of this study. 
This question has emanated from some of the more recent work on the perpetrators that indicates 
that there was a group of individuals within the units that had a disproportionate influence. 
However, it remains unclear who these men were. This study will examine whether differences 
between the vanguard group and the rest of the policemen of the battalions can be identified. 
Angrick has shown, that Einsatzgruppe D was a biographically heterogeneous group as well as being 
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operationally diffuse. The police battalions appear to have been organised structurally in a similar 
fashion to the Einsatzgruppen. This is particularly important when considering the division of labour 
that was employed at the sites of the mass killings as not every participant was required to perform 
the same tasks or even necessarily be present at the killing site; a method that would necessarily 
revolve around operationally designated roles as well as bringing the more enthusiastic contributors 
to the fore. This study will attempt to follow Wildt’s call for further differentiation between the 
perpetrators by identifying differences of the personnel within the battalions biographically and 
according to position and role. The question regarding the prior experiences of the junior officer 
group will be answered by looking at their biographical background and the training they received 
before joining the battalions in comparison with the other members of the battalions. Matthäus’ 
work on the training of the Orpo has explored possibilities of linking Nazi ideological prerogatives 
within an organisational setting and with the experiences (as perceived by the perpetrators) and 
actions of the perpetrators on the ground. This study will analyse the personal criteria that was used 
in the selection of the group in focus for their positions and the training they received in preparation 
for their projected roles. An attempt will be made to distinguish the training received by the young 
officers and the rank and file and I will explore the link between this specialised training and the 
actual roles they ended up playing after deployment. The final question of how this vanguard group 
actually influenced the killings will follow Matthäus’ argument that there was scope for initiative all 
the way down the hierarchy. This study will examine the extent to which this was actually the case 
with the company and platoon leaders of the police battalions and how the actions of these 
individuals influenced the actions of others involved in the mass murders including and beyond 
being at the forefront of the murder actions.  
These questions were shaped by issues raised by the secondary literature and will be taken to the 
primary sources, but the primary focus of the study has been moulded by the primary sources 
themselves. Police Battalions 314 and 304 were selected as case studies primarily because they had 
not yet been studied in any depth and there appeared to be sufficient material in the form of the 
trial documents on which to base an in-depth study on each. As regular battalions, they represent 
the significant majority of the police battalions involved at the forefront of the mass murders in 
Eastern Europe rather than the reserve battalions that formed a minority of the battalions involved 
in these activities. Also both units were involved in carrying out Nazi racial policies in Poland in 1940 
and 1941 before being deployed in Ukraine and then being involved in the early mass murders 
following the invasion of the Soviet Union. Rossino and Mallmann have demonstrated that Poland 
before June 1941 was a radicalising period that was experienced by many of the police battalions 
before being sent into the Soviet Union. In these two ways these battalions can be seen as 
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representative with respect to the formation and experiences of the battalions that were involved in 
the mass murders of 1941 and 1942, which opens up the possibility that some conclusions that can 
be drawn from the study of these two case studies may be relevant for a wider grouping of 
perpetrator units. Following examination of the documents collected for the post-war trials of some 
of the former members of the battalions it became clear that many of the men that filled the lower-
level officer positions within the battalions formed a strikingly homogeneous group as far as age, 
education and social background were concerned. Additionally, it became apparent that nearly all of 
this group attended the same police officer training school in Berlin over a span of two years before 
joining the battalions as officers. It also became clear that whilst in Poland and then Ukraine, both 
battalions very rarely travelled or operated as whole groups. Many of the movements and activities 
were performed in sub-groups; either at company or platoon strength that brought the young officer 
group to the fore in command positions. These factors indicated that these were distinct sub-groups 
which means they warrant closer inspection as groups within the larger battalion units. 
This study will be based methodologically on the model provided by Wildt and his study of the RSHA 
leadership. In An Uncompromising Generation, Wildt argues that the future of perpetrator research 
should be guided by further differentiation and analysis between actors and institutions, intention 
and structural conditions, including the dynamics of situational violence rather than a “single, 
predominant perpetrator type”. Wildt employs a collective biographical approach, but also examines 
the connection between the subject actors, their institution and their practices during the war.121 
This study will also take a collective biographical approach in an attempt to interpret the 
generational dimensions of the group and to determine the characteristics of the group through an 
analysis of the individuals and their experiences, although with a much smaller sample than the one 
used by Wildt.122 The sample for this study will be confined to the twelve junior officers that were 
part of the two police battalions that form the subject of this study. The collection of a larger and 
more representative sample would necessitate the thorough examination of documents on 
additional police battalions, which is beyond the scope of a doctoral thesis. So rather than expand 
the sample size, this study will attempt to compensate by a more thorough investigation of the roles 
and actions of this smaller group within the context of the structure and dynamics of their units. 
Methodologically, this decision follows the trend within Holocaust studies on the use of survivor 
testimony where the emphasis has moved more towards the use of smaller samples with an 
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emphasis on representation and statistically “reliable data”.123 There appears to be two further 
methodological issues regarding the employment of a biographical approach to the study of the 
police battalions. First, outside of the Nazi leadership the available biographical data is often limited, 
and generally appears to become more limited as the focus shifts further down the hierarchy. This is 
the case with the rank and file of the police battalions, most of whom came from the lower classes 
and, as a perpetrator group, were the least likely to be the subject of post-war trials.124 It appears to 
be really only possible to collect biographical data for a representative selection of the battalions as 
whole groups and this data, as used by Browning, Westermann and Mallmann, seems to be confined 
to age, place of birth and level of NSDAP affiliations. From this data alone it is very difficult for a 
historian to determine whether the majority were “ideological warriors”, “ordinary Germans” or 
“ordinary men”. However, further differentiation between the groups that made up the battalions 
shows a much more heterogeneous character than these labels imply. By focusing more narrowly on 
one of these groups, the individuals of this sub-group become more amplified and their roles and 
actions can be seen more clearly and can be compared with the other groups within the battalions, 
thus providing a more intrinsic examination of the internal dynamics and actions of the entire unit. 
The biographical data on the subject group for this study is also much richer than that of the rest of 
the groups that formed Battalions 314 and 304, mainly due to the fact that a larger proportion from 
the officer ranks became the subject of post-war trials than the rank and file and there are many 
Orpo personnel files from the officer corps held in the Bundesarchiv. There are potential problems 
with this and care needs to be taken that the roles and impact of the individuals that were the 
subject of post-war trials are not magnified purely because they were the focus of the proceedings. 
Second, there appears to be a dominant notion that the “direct” perpetrators were acting purely 
within the context of orders and groups and, partly because of this notion, they remain the least 
researched group of Nazi perpetrators.125 Mark Roseman is sceptical of the value of a biographical 
approach, particularly regarding the study of the lower-level perpetrator groups. These “grass roots” 
studies tend not to be written as biographies as the focus of interest is on the actions of larger 
groups rather than particular individual actors. Roseman argues that because the perpetrators at 
this level are following orders rather than formulating them, they are not the “makers of their own 
destiny”.126 If there appears to be a level of generational, social and career homogeneity among the 
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order givers, such as the HSSPFs, camp leaders and leadership corps of the RSHA, it has been stated 
that among the order receivers of the police battalions no particular generational or social type can 
be identified.127 The individuals that formed the lower ranks of the police battalions seem to 
disappear within arguments focused on the immediate, violent situational context and the 
attractions of comradeship, brutalisation through the experiences of a “war of annihilation”, 
widespread and long-term ideological dispositions and organisational structures. The position that 
the perpetrators at this level were merely “order receivers” has been challenged by Matthäus’ 
arguments that initiative could, and was, taken by individuals all the way down the hierarchy of the 
German police. Part of the purpose of this study is to test Matthäus’ findings by looking more closely 
at a group of individuals at the lower-level of the command structure to see how much scope for 
initiative these individuals were actually afforded. In this vein, a biographical approach appears to be 
warranted. The merit of biography resides primarily in that the perpetrators are accorded agency; 
actors are depicted as being aware of their actions, with options and even scope for initiative, rather 
than merely functionaries of faceless structures or the subjects of situational dynamics that erode 
the autonomy of individuals.128 The focus of this study is on a specific group that can be 
biographically distinguished from the other generational groups that made up the battalions, but can 
also be distinguished from the other policemen by their position and role within the organisation. In 
considering the wide range of motivational factors thus far identified by the literature on 
perpetrators, a biographical analysis of these men in isolation would not be sufficient and needs to 
be melded with other factors. A similar position to Wildt’s has been taken by Peter Longerich who 
has stated that one-dimensional explanations revolving around either structure or agency are lacking 
in explaining perpetrator participation, and argues that the perpetrators who carry out genocidal 
policy depend on structures, however, the structures themselves can only function according to 
human participation.129 In the same vein, the actions of the individuals and the organisation has to 
be considered in combination with the radicalising effects of the situational context. This can only be 
achieved by attempting to provide as “thick” a description of events as possible and assessing the 
motives of an individual by looking at their behaviour on the ground. This necessitates a closer 
analysis of the actions and roles of individuals in the killing actions, but will also attempt to recreate 
the broader actions, experiences and dynamics of the perpetrator groups beyond the violent 
moments. Following Wildt, this study will attempt to incorporate a biographical approach with an 
analysis of structural and contextual factors. In summary, a biographical approach can highlight the 
individual agents that too often disappear from accounts that focus on broader overriding influences 
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such as widespread ideology, institutional structures and group dynamics. What this study will show 
through this method is that the police battalions were not just mechanised organisations, but were 
comprised of different groups; operationally, they were not always acting as full units and the thesis 
will show that there were some individuals who formed a “vanguard” group of perpetrators at the 
lower levels of the Nazi hierarchies and who had a disproportionate influence on events. 
Collectively, the core subjects of this study, the junior officers, formed a homogenous group that 
was intended to act as a vanguard group within the battalions in key positions and proved 
themselves to be so in the field. A biographical approach, melded with considerations of the 
organisational and situational influences, is necessary in order to show these factors. 
This study is based primarily on the trial records held in German archives of trials held in East and 
West Germany on former members of Battalions 314 and 304. Studies that investigate the 
perpetrators involved in the bureaucratic and administrative aspects of the Holocaust can rely more 
heavily on contemporary documents produced by the perpetrators themselves. However, as 
Browning has argued, research on the massacres and ghetto clearings committed by units like the 
police battalions, units and perpetrators who appear to have left little in the way of a paper trail 
concerning these actions, has little alternative but to use post-war testimony produced for trial 
purposes.130 
The defendants in the West German post-war trials sat accused of regular murder as defined by the 
German Penal Code of 1871, a code that was in place throughout the Nazi period. Rebecca 
Wittmann has argued that this penal code was inadequate for the prosecution of Nazi crimes 
because it was hampered by the legal interpretations that were used. First, for the murder charge, 
the prosecution had to prove elements of intent, which tended to revolve around proving the 
existence of “base motives”; usually defined in these cases as racial hatred. Second, the code 
distinguished between perpetrators and accomplices. The state would therefore have to prove that 
the defendant had acted with individual initiative to be convicted of murder.131 Therefore, if it could 
be shown that the defendant held ill-will towards the victims or if he intended to kill them, he would 
receive a much harsher punishment than an “accomplice” who was merely following orders.132 The 
inadequacies of the Penal Code in combination with the absence of reliable witnesses and archival 
documentation left the defendants more confident of getting away with denial and distortion of the 
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facts.133 Earl has identified the five most common justifications used by defendants: the “superior 
orders” defence; “military necessity” with regards to the defence of a third party (for example, the 
German Reich); “personal necessity”, that they themselves would be severely punished or executed; 
that their actions were “legal”, that the victims were guilty of crimes such as theft, sabotage or of 
being a partisan; “futility and powerlessness”, to refuse to kill was futile as it couldn’t stop the 
process anyway.134 In addition to these excuses, the prosecution would have to prove that the 
individual was actually present at the time and at the place of the crime and appear to have spent a 
lot of time attempting to prove that the defendant wasn’t at home on leave, or in the sick bay or 
kitchen.135 There are also problems for the historian with the use of trial records produced by 
proceedings against former Nazis in the GDR. Like in West Germany, the East German judiciary 
turned to the code of 1871, but unlike West Germany, also applied, usually in high-profile cases, the 
UN statute on war crimes and crimes against humanity.136 In an essay on the post-war trials held in 
East Germany, Lower has shown that the investigators clearly applied far greater pressure on those 
being investigated, used Stasi methods (and the Stasi themselves) for collecting material and held 
significant sway in determining the verdicts, but in the process extracted more information and 
produced richer, detailed confessions.137 Differences in prosecution are evident in the various trials 
of former members of Battalion 304 where the Soviets and GDR judiciary imposed harsh penalties 
on a number of former battalion members. From 1945 to 1948, a total of 107 former members of 
304 were tried and prosecuted by the Soviets; two were sentenced to death. From 1975, eight 
former battalion members were sentenced by East German prosecutors; five of these received a life 
sentence.138 In contrast the first West German prosecution of a former officer of Battalion 304 by 
the Staatsanwaltschaft Dortmund closed proceedings after a year stating “it cannot be certain that 
Police Battalion 304 or the accused as a member of this Battalion participated in any way in the 
killing of Jews or other actions against the Jews in the East”.139 However, care must still be taken in 
analysing the East German trial records. Although the trials may appear to have produced richer 
testimony and documentation, as Lower has stated, often the trials only included witnesses who 
were likely to support a verdict that had already been made during the pre-trial investigations.140 
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There are significant problems in using these trial documents for historical purposes, particularly 
when focusing on the motivation of the perpetrators: many of the statements used for the trials 
came from the perpetrators themselves and the interrogators were not trying to produce a work of 
history. In Ordinary Men, Browning states that the prosecutors of the cases against former members 
of Battalion 101 asked questions relevant to their tasks of collecting evidence for connecting 
particular people with particular crimes, but “did not systematically investigate the broader, often 
more impressionistic and subjective facets of the policeman’s experience”.141 Haberer and Matthäus 
on the use of post-war trials for the historian have stated that generally, “the rule applies that the 
reliability of perpetrator testimony is greatest the further it is removed from the issue of personal 
guilt and the more it can be scrutinised against the background of other sources, such as witness 
testimonies, diaries, letters, or other wartime writings, rare as they are”.142 Clearly affidavits by the 
accused are problematic sources, so an analysis of the movements, actions and dynamics of the 
battalions should be based more on the witness statements accrued throughout the trial. Witness 
statements by non-battalion members appear to be generally more desirable as sources, but are 
fewer. The fact that some of the men that formed the group of junior officers that are the focus of 
this study were the subject of trials means that there is more evidence in the trial documents on 
these men than most of the other former battalion members. This is helpful for the reconstruction 
of their personal profiles and their roles within the units. However, care needs to be taken in order 
not to over-emphasise their influence on the actions of the other perpetrators. The aim of the trials 
was to establish personal guilt within the context of a legal framework and they tend to isolate the 
crimes and actions of these individuals. Therefore, although the purpose of this study is to 
somewhat isolate and assess the actions of a specific group, the actions of the subjects of this study 
should still be considered within the context of other factors, including the organisational structure 
of the units and the group dynamics.143 
Despite the problems with using post-war trial testimonies, historians have found them fruitful and 
have opened up new lines of enquiry on perpetrator motivation with studies based on these 
documents. Following her work on the SS-Einsatzgruppen trials, Hilary Earl has observed that even 
the most careful analysis of the information produced by post-war trials are unlikely to produce a 
definitive explanation of perpetrator behaviour regarding any particular unit or group, but they can 
aid in constructing reasonably complete profiles of the “men in the dock and opens up promising 
                                                          
141 Browning, Ordinary Men, p.xvi. 
142 Patricia Haberer and Jürgen Matthäus, ‘War Crimes Trials and the Historian’, in Haberer and Matthäus 
(eds.), Atrocities on Trial, p.xxii. 
143 Haberer and Matthäus, ‘War Crimes Trials’, p.xv. 
39 
 
avenues of investigation”.144 Constructing the profiles of the units and some individuals of the units 
is one of the main tasks of this study and the trial documents have proven to be very useful in this 
regard. However, this study also aims to reconstruct the actions, experiences and dynamics of the 
group and will have to make extensive use of the witness statements, most of which were provided 
by former battalion members, in combination with other sources in order to achieve this. Following 
his experiences of using trial documents, Browning outlined the tests of reliability that he felt should 
be used when consulting these documents and which I use for this study. 
1. The “self-interest test”: a statement that appears to go against self-interest, “or when a 
situation where telling the truth was in [their] self-interest” merits a closer look. 
2. The “vividness test”: events described with “an unusual attention to details of visual 
memory, the actual occurrence of those events should be seriously considered, even if 
[their] framing of those events, in other words, the meaning of his participation in them, 
should be viewed sceptically”. 
3. The “possibility test”: when the “claims are not contradicted or proven impossible even in 
light of the more extensive documentation now available, they should not be summarily 
rejected”. 
4. The “probability test”: when the “accounts coincide with or fit a pattern of events suggested 
or established by other documentation, they can be viewed not only as possible but also 
probable”.145  
The trial documents do form the main source for this study, but will be used in combination with 
other primary and secondary sources. In addition to recreating the movements, actions and 
dynamics of the units, information contained in the trial documents will also be used for creating a 
broader biographical outline of the units and the groups and some individuals that made up the 
units. Particular attention will be paid to the backgrounds of the junior officer group presented in 
the trial documents alongside information from personnel files where available. Some information 
was provided by witnesses and accused on the training they received in the police and this 
information will be used in collaboration with secondary material on police training, particularly by 
Westermann and Matthäus. Regarding the training of the junior officers, I have located a number of 
contemporary documents held by the Bundesarchiv on the training of aspiring officers at the Berlin-
Köpenick Officer Training School. The material includes some lesson plans, material on ideological 
and military training as well as name lists and rules. These documents will be the main source for 
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establishing the type of training this group received and for what role in the police battalions they 
were being prepared. The trial documents will be the main source in determining how these officers 
put their training into practice and regarding the movements and actions of the battalions in Poland 
and Ukraine. This information will be supplemented by the British Intelligence Reports, which 
contain reports concerning the movement and actions of the battalions and captured war 
documents held in the National Archive in Kew. These documents, in combination with the existing 
secondary work, particularly those on Ukraine in 1941 and 1942, should help to eliminate many of 
the gaps and inconsistencies that are evident in the trial records of the 1970s and 1980s. Wherever 
possible this study uses contemporary place-names and where the contemporary name differs 






Chapter 1. Biography 
The police battalions of the Orpo were not homogenous groups in that they consisted of a number 
of different sub-units that carried different functions and were made up of policemen from a range 
of different backgrounds and age-cohorts. In order to be able to investigate how the battalions 
functioned over a period of time, to analyse the actions of individuals within the ranks of the 
battalions and identify a “vanguard” group, it will be necessary to draw on biographical profiles of 
the groups and individuals that made up Battalions 314 and 304. This chapter will identify and 
contrast the different groups that collectively formed the battalions and some individuals that 
occupied key positions in these units.  
The sample of former policemen of Battalion 314 to be used here consists of men known to have 
been with the battalion in Ukraine in 1941 and are taken from the records of proceedings against 
former battalion members in West Germany from the 1960s to the 1980s. This sample consists of a 
total of 103 men: 91 from the rank and file and 12 from the officer ranks. Information beyond date 
of birth and place of origin for the rank and file is largely taken from 38 former battalion members 
who served as witnesses during the trials against former officers.1 The information for the rank and 
file sample for Battalion 304 used here is taken from the trial records of proceedings against former 
battalion members from West and East Germany from 1945 until the late-1980s. Only information 
on the men who are known to have been members of the battalion in Ukraine in 1941 has been 
used. The sample consists of 199 former battalion members including twelve officers.2 Biographical 
information for the officers of both battalions has been largely drawn from SS, RuSHA and Orpo 
personnel files held at the Bundesarchiv in Berlin. 
This chapter will use the notion of age cohorts or “generations”, meaning in this case those born 
within particular time periods, as a tool for analysing experiences and characteristics of age groups 
prior to their joining the police battalions.3 Battalions 314 and 304 were made up of three main age 
cohorts of German males: the “front generation”, those born approximately between 1880 and 1900 
who had some experience of the First World War in uniform; the “war youth generation”, born 
roughly from 1900 to 1914, those who experienced the war as adolescents but were not drafted, 
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and the cohort Mary Fulbrook has called the “first Hitler Youth generation”, those born from 1915 to 
1922.4 Fulbrook has argued convincingly that the Third Reich was led by self-proclaimed members of 
the “front generation”, was largely “carried” by the “war youth generation” and was most 
enthusiastically supported by the “first Hitler Youth generation”,5 a generation that has been called a 
“genuinely homogenous generation”.6 From this generational perspective, Battalions 304 and 314 
represent microcosms of male Nazi cadres. Both battalions were led by commanders that belonged 
to a “front generation”, the rank and file were formed of all three age cohorts but overwhelmingly 
the “war youth generation” and, as will be argued here, were enthusiastically led on the ground by a 
cohort of junior officers from the “first Hitler Youth generation”. In conjunction with the use of 
general age cohorts, where possible this chapter will examine the social and political backgrounds of 
individuals and small cadres. 
This chapter will outline the background and formation of the two battalions and will closely analyse 
who made up the officer ranks and the rank and file. The main focus of this chapter will be on the 
group of junior officers; the 2nd and 1st lieutenants that led the companies and platoons of the police 
battalions formed from the “social elite” of the “first Hitler Youth generation”, a group that will be 
argued formed a “vanguard” group of perpetrators. The data presented here will be drawn on 
throughout the study when examining the types of training received by members of the battalions 
and the actions and experiences of the policemen in Poland and Ukraine. It is the contention of this 
study that not all members of the battalions received the same training or were expected to perform 
the same roles while in Poland and Ukraine. The biographical profiles presented in this chapter will 
be drawn on in order to identify patterns of behaviour exhibited by certain distinct groups and 
individuals. 
The “300-Level” Battalions 
From 1933 militarised and barracked state police, Kasernierte Landespolizei (Lapo), were formed 
which were trained and equipped as infantry formations. With the introduction of conscription in 
March 1935 and the expansion of the army, the majority of the Lapo (approximately 60,000) were 
drafted directly into the army as well-trained and disciplined soldiers.7 These losses to the Orpo 
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were compounded by a further loss of 8,000 policemen to the army in 1939. Men born between 
1901 and 1909 had been allocated to the police reserve as initially the Wehrmacht had little interest 
in drafting men from these age-groups. In October 1939, following the Poland campaign during 
which the armed police companies were deemed to have played a noteworthy role, in order to 
replenish the younger ranks of “active” policemen and to form a militarised police division modelled 
on the Lapo, Hitler decreed that the Orpo could recruit 26,000 undrafted volunteers. 17,000 men 
could be recruited from the age-groups 1909-1912 and 9,000 from 1918-1920, in addition to 6,000 
“ethnic Germans”. A following decree extended the action to include the Abiturenten (those who 
had passed their high school diploma) of the age-groups 1918-1920 who were intended as aspirants 
for a career as an officer in the police.8 The recruitment was advertised through a special campaign 
and carried out at the local level by SS recruiting officers and local police authorities. The 
requirements for the volunteers were a minimum height of 1.70m, “suitability for the SS” and 
“political reliability”.9 According to a report by Daluege, only one in four of the applicants fulfilled 
the entry criteria; of the 160,000 applicants responding to the recruitment campaign in late-1939 
and early-1940, 51,000 were enrolled, but only approximately 7,100 from the older age group and 
about 6,000 from 1918-20 were enrolled as “fit for police duty” and taken on immediately.10 The 
successful applicants of the “26,000-man-campaign” from the 1909-1912 cohort committed to 
twelve years’ service in the police after which they could be offered a permanent position as a civil 
servant and the successful applicants from the younger cohort were taken on for four years as police 
aspirants. For many of the men who applied in response to this recruitment campaign, the prospect 
of serving in the police rather than the army seemed to be a safer way of completing their military 
service.11 
These new recruits were combined with drafted reservists to form the new battalions which brought 
the total number of police battalions to 101 by mid-1940. The reserve battalions were filled with 
older drafted reservists from the 1901-1909 year groups and were bolstered by career policemen 
and pre-war volunteers who had served in the police battalions during the Poland campaign. The 
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new “elite” formations were formed with career policemen and the volunteers from the recruiting 
campaign. These particular units were numbered 251-256 and 301-325.12 Most of the “200-level” 
battalions were deployed in Norway and the “300-level” split between the GG and Protectorate in 
1940. It was the 300-level battalions, called the Wachtmeister Bataillons, which were to play the 
major role in the areas formerly of the Soviet Union in 1941.13 
The 300-level battalions were initially formed as Ausbildungsbataillone (training battalions) that 
consisted of four companies. By the invasion of the Soviet Union each had been given a number and 
was reorganised into three companies. The battalions consisted of a total of approximately 540 men, 
divided into a battalion staff, signals unit, a transportation department (K-Staffel) and three 
companies of approximately 140 men each. For example, Police Battalion 322, formerly 
“Ausbildungsbataillon Wien-Kagram” entered the central sector of the Soviet Union with a battalion 
staff, signals platoon, K-Staffel and three companies: totalling 544 men, divided into 12 officers, a 
battalion doctor, 5 administrative staff, 101 NCOs and 425 ordinary ranks.14  This also appears to 
have been approximately the composition of Battalions 314 and 304. In total, the Orpo entered the 
Soviet Union with 23 battalions which by the end of 1941 had increased to 26. Of the 23 battalions 
that started the war, five were made up of experienced policemen, seven of older reservists and 
eleven consisted mainly of the younger recruits from the 26,000-man-campaign of 1939. Of the nine 
police battalions placed directly at the disposal of the three HSSPFs (those battalions not assigned to 
the army security divisions), seven were 300-level.15 
The rank and file of Battalions 314 and 304 
The rank and file of the 300-level battalions were younger than the middle-aged reservists who filled 
the reserve battalions and appear to have been recruited more selectively. The average age of the 
rank and file of Battalion 314 in 1941 was 32 years old, with the majority coming from the 1909-12 
year groups representing for the most part the volunteers from the recruiting campaign of 1939-40. 
Most of the men were Austrian with the majority of those coming from Vienna, the home-base of 
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Battalion 314.16 The minority of men that formed the rest of the rank and file born outside of the 
1909-1912 age groups are likely to have been reservists or the more experienced, career policemen 
who would make up the NCO positions. For Battalion 304 the average age for the men outside of the 
officer corps, including the battalion staff and K-Staffel was about 30 with again the majority coming 
from the 1909-12 year groups and the overwhelming majority of the company men came from the 
Saxony region, particularly Chemnitz, Dresden, Halle and Leipzig. Less than half of the known staff 
members came from this region and none of the K-Staffel. A former battalion member recalled that 
the K-Staffel was a self-contained unit of about 35 drivers; half of which were reservists and half 
career policemen, all originating from the Rhineland and Ruhr areas.17 The K-Staffel, therefore, was 
not made up of new volunteers and the staff unit appears to have been a mix of career policemen 
and reservists as well as some new volunteers. However, the vast majority of the men filling the 
three companies (and therefore the overall battalion majority), like Battalion 314, were likely to 
have been new volunteers recruited regionally during the 26,000-man-campaign.  
Little reliable information regarding NSDAP and SS membership for the rank and file members of 
Battalions 314 and 304 remains in the trial records, however data for other police battalions should 
give an approximate idea of these affiliations. Browning has argued that NSDAP and SS membership 
among the 300-level battalions was higher than their reserve counterparts.18 In January 1941 a 
report stated that in Police Battalion 310, 219 policemen were NSDAP members. If we take the 
average number of men comprising a 300-level battalion to be 540 and subtract the twelve officers 
from the total, 39 percent of the rank and file were Party members and, according to a report in 
October 1941, approximately 10 percent of the men from the three companies were SS members.19  
In contrast, of the rank and file in Reserve Battalion 101 (average age of 39 in 1942), only 25 percent 
were Party members.20 Wolfgang Curilla gives the combined averages for Reserve Police Battalions 
65 and 67 as 22 percent NSDAP members and six percent SS.21 In 1942, 22 percent of males over 18 
years old living within the pre-war German borders of 1939 (excluding Memelland) were Party 
members,22 therefore, the percentage of NSDAP members in the reserve police battalions was 
similar to the national average, but the percentage for Battalion 310 was significantly higher. 
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However, the extent to which this membership rate may represent an indication of the strict 
selection criteria of the 26,000-man-campaign, as far as “political reliability” is concerned, is 
somewhat unclear as the above calculations do not distinguish between NCOs and ordinary 
Wachtmeister. The rank and file of the 300-level battalions consisted of about 430 Wachtmeister 
and about 100 NCOs; the majority of the latter were career policemen who had joined the police 
before the large recruiting campaign. The career progression of those policemen without an officer’s 
commission was, on the whole, predicated on length of service and, after 1933, NSDAP affiliations. 
In Die Deutsche Polizei (1941), Werner Best detailed the standard career of the rank and file 
policeman.23 Ideally Schupo recruits were to be taken from the SS-Verfügungstruppen (SS-VT - the 
forerunner of the Waffen-SS) or the Wehrmacht. Before the war the recruit would have to satisfy a 
number of personal requirements that included: holding German citizenship; good health (wearers 
of glasses were rejected); be aged between 20 and 25, unmarried and at least 1.70m tall. The 
aspiring policeman would have to pass a physical and an intelligence test. The physical test required 
that the candidate could run 1,500m in under six minutes, long jump over 4.15m and throw a hand 
grenade 32m. Recruits from the army would have to have been a member of the NSDAP or an 
affiliation before their entrance into the army. Additionally, after 1936, the candidate would have to 
be considered suitable for membership in the SS. This meant satisfying medical examinations which 
were to be assessed alongside the findings of the racial experts in the RuSHA, and a further 
intelligence and “general knowledge” test.24 The latter test seems likely to have been intended to 
judge the ideological fitness of the candidate. 
That only one applicant in four of the 26,000 man campaign was initially deemed to have satisfied 
the entrance criteria indicates that some of the earlier police entry requirements were not 
abandoned altogether. However, it would seem very likely that the German police would have had 
to compromise these requirements somewhat for the purposes of replacing the loss of manpower. 
Many of the personal requirements were relaxed and the physical requirements would have been 
lowered considerably. SS-suitability, which remained a requirement for the campaign, seems likely 
to have been applied with a great deal more elasticity than perhaps before the war. Therefore, even 
if the pick of the crop from the recruitment campaign were used to form the “elite” 300-level police 
battalions, it seems unlikely that the new recruits could have been considered the equal of the 
career policemen in terms of Nazi or SS credentials and actually represented a dilution of what had 
become a progressively Nazified police force. 
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NSDAP membership appears to have been significantly more common among the senior NCOs of the 
police battalions than the general rank and file. Before the war a Wachtmeister with a good record 
could be promoted to Oberwachtmeister (sergeant) after six years and to Zugwachtmeister (platoon 
sergeant) after seven. Following twelve years of service a policeman could be promoted to 
Hauptwachtmeister (sergeant major) and be enrolled as a permanent police official. Crucially, prior 
NSDAP or affiliated memberships such as with the SA or SS could be added to the length of police 
service making up the twelve years.25 The average age of the thirteen senior NCOs who are known to 
have held platoon leader positions in Battalion 314 was 35 in 1941. The older of this group, 
especially those born in the 1890s (three of the thirteen) may well have owed their positions 
through length of police service, whereas the younger of the group, three of whom were born in 
1913 or later, seem more likely to have experienced a rapid rise through the ranks at least in part 
because of their Nazi affiliations. All but one of these NCOs were Austrian, eight of whom were, like 
the majority of the new recruits for Battalion 314, born in Vienna.26 Westermann calculated that 63 
percent of the career senior NCOs in Reserve Police Battalion 101 were members of the NSDAP and 
twenty percent were SS members, numbers significantly higher than the rest of the rank and file.27 It 
does not seem unlikely that it would also have been the case that the NCOs of Battalions 314 and 
304 were significantly more likely to have been NSDAP, SA or SS members than the new recruits.  
Most of the new recruits of Battalion 314 appear to have left manual jobs or skilled crafts in Vienna 
for a career in the police in 1939 and 1940.28 As appears to have been the case with the NCOs, the 
majority of whom were also from Vienna, they came from working-class backgrounds whose formal 
education would not have progressed beyond the Volksschule. This appears to have also been the 
case with the rank and file that filled the companies of Battalion 304. The majority had worked in 
manual labour or crafts. A few had joined the police or the Wehrmacht before the war, but the 
majority of these were born after 1912, so were not the new police volunteers of 1940. In the post-
war years, 35 percent continued careers in the police and justice services and only one former 
member had a managerial position. The majority were again working in manual jobs, with a 
significant number returning to the same jobs they had before 1940.29 
The post-war trial records generally provide sparse information regarding the backgrounds of the 
rank and file of Battalions 314 and 304. However, eight former rank and file members of Battalion 
304 who were the subject of trials in the GDR in the late-1970s and 1980s provide a smaller sample 
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of richer information against which some of the findings highlighted above can be compared. All 
eight were from Saxony, six joined as part of the 26,000 man campaign and two were younger 
career NCOs. Seven men described their background as working-class and one as lower middle-class. 
Three men had been NSDAP members, one also SS and one SA prior to joining the police. Six men of 
eight had finished a working apprenticeship before joining the police and two of these men had 
experienced long periods of unemployment during the early 1930s. Two of the six men who joined 
as a result of the recruiting campaign stated that they joined in order to avoid going to the front and 
one of these also stated that he wanted to secure a civil service position for the future.30 
Overall then, the average policeman from the rank and file of Battalions 314 and 304 was about 31 
years old, was born in Vienna or Saxony, was not formally educated beyond the Volksschule and had 
served a craftsman’s apprenticeship or worked in a manual job. Unlike the NCOs, the overwhelming 
majority of the recruits of the 26,000 man campaign appear not to have been a Party or SS members 
and had reported to their respective training battalions in July 1940 for 314 or March 1940 for 304 
with other young men of similar backgrounds. It appears that a significant number of the new 
recruits joined for career reasons. 
There does appear to have been a significant level of social, educational and generational 
homogeneity amongst the rank-and file of Battalions 314 and 304. The majority of the men were old 
enough to have experienced political norms other than the Nazis as adults and were too old for the 
Hitler Youth. These were members of the “war youth generation”, those born roughly from 1900 to 
1914, who were too young to have fought during the First World War but experienced the political 
and economic turmoil that followed in Germany. Fulbrook has argued that this cohort “took lessons 
from the Great War to mean radical commitment to new ideological causes” both on the left and 
right of the political spectrum, forming a highly politicized “but also highly divided generation”.31 
Although it could be argued that both groups belong to a “war-youth generation”, there are some 
differences between this group of volunteer policemen and Wildt’s leadership cadre of the RSHA. 
The majority of the rank and file of the 300-level battalions were not old enough to have 
experienced the First World War as adolescents or to have experienced the dislocation of the 
immediate post-war years as young adults. Perhaps more relevantly, the volunteers were not the 
hand-picked middle-class student activists that formed the leadership corps of the RSHA. The RSHA 
intellectuals then, could be perhaps more precisely labelled in Mannheim’s terms of a “generational 
unit” or sub-unit of the war-youth generation differentiated by their common social and educational 
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background.32 The men that formed the rank and file of Battalions 314 and 304 were not hand-
picked in the same way as the RSHA leadership. Most of these men were younger than Wildt’s 
group, but did not join NSDAP affiliations as youths. Most were from working-class backgrounds and 
may have had more leftist political leanings or prior political affiliations that did not emerge during 
the vetting of the recruits. Most of these men did not join because of their ideological beliefs, but 
would have been considered politically reliable. Overall, this is likely to have been a less 
homogeneous and politically active group than the RSHA leadership corps. 
Senior officers 
In 1941 the level of NSDAP and, amongst the regular officers, SS membership of the officer corps 
was considerably higher than that of the rank and file: 30 percent of regular police officers and seven 
percent of reserves were SS members and 65 percent of both groups were NSDAP members.33 The 
officers of Battalions 314 and 304, unlike the rank and file, came from all over Germany and were 
drawn from all three generational cohorts. 
The battalions were commanded by members of the “front generation” and former Freikorps 
members. Richard Bessel has argued that although the idea at the time of a “front generation” 
(roughly those born from 1880 to 1900, the last generation to have been socialised under the 
empire) coalesced around experiences of being in uniform during the war itself, there was no 
“typical” experience of the war. The idea of a single front generation experience “was a mythical 
creation of the post-war world”.34 Therefore, drawing conclusions for the actions and influence of 
individual police officers over twenty years later from the fact that they had some experience in 
uniform during the First World War would be problematic. However, the actions and choices made 
by members of this generation during the immediate post-war years, such as joining the Freikorps, 
should perhaps be considered stronger indications of individuals’ political dispositions than the 
constructed image of a “front generation”. It appears that a significant number of police officers in 
higher command positions at the level of regiment and battalion command were former Freikorps 
members, an indication of a common career path into the police. In a similar vein to Wildt, Bessel 
argues that the myth of the front generation appears actually to have been more potent in 
mobilising those from the war youth generation who had been adolescents during the war than 
those who had actually experienced the trenches in uniform. A strong indication of this is that 
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recruitment efforts for Freikorps units and local citizens’ militias were often more successful 
amongst recent school leavers still inspired by the image of the “heroic soldier”.35 
The battalion commanders appear to have been all high-ranking officers who had advanced through 
the ranks during long careers in the police, with military experiences of the First World War and the 
post-war civil and border conflicts.36  In 1940 the commander of Battalion 322 was 49-year old Major 
Nagel. Nagel was a war veteran who had joined the police in 1920, the NSDAP in 1933 and SS in 
1940.37 The commander of Reserve Battalion 101 shared a similar background to Nagel. Major Trapp 
was 53 years old in 1942, had also fought in the First World War, and was a career policeman and a 
Party member but not SS.38 Battalion 314 had five different commanders from the founding of the 
battalion in March 1940 to April 1943. The first battalion commander during the formation and 
training period in Vienna was a Major Schmidt. Schmidt was replaced in March 1941 by a Major Kahr 
who was himself replaced by Oberst Willy Dressler, born in 1891, just before the invasion of the 
Soviet Union in June 1941. Dressler was replaced by Oberst Otto Severt, a career policeman since 
1919 who was also born in 1891, in October 1941. In 1942 the battalion command was taken over by 
Walter Meisel, born in 1905, who had previously been the 3rd Company commander in Battalion 
314.39 
In Chemnitz and Warsaw the battalion commander of Battalion 304 was Major Willy Nickel. Nickel 
was replaced in August 1941 by Major Karl Deckert.40 The police and RuSHA personnel files of Nickel 
and Deckert give an idea of the type of career of the men that were appointed by Himmler and 
Daluege as battalion commanders. Born in 1896, Nickel was a former Freikorps member and long-
time Nazi who was given an accelerated career in the police under the National Socialists. Nickel 
served in the German army from 1914 to 1918, was then with the Freikorps “Gerth” from January 
1919 to May 1920 when he became part of the Reichswehr until he left as Oberfeldwebel (senior 
NCO rank) in 1927. Following his military career Nickel was an SA Colonel in Chemnitz, the city that 
would be the home base of Battalion 304. In 1935 Nickel did an officer training course and was made 
a police Major in 1936. In September 1941, immediately following his replacement by Deckert, 
Nickel was promoted to lieutenant-colonel.41 Clearly Nickel’s military career would have been valued 
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by the SA and the police, but the fact that Nickel was a high ranking “old fighter” and long-term SA 
officer would have afforded Nickel direct access into the police ranks. 
Born in 1900, Karl Deckert joined the army in October 1918 but, like Himmler, was probably not sent 
to the front before the end of the war. After the war Deckert became part of the Freikorps “Littwitz” 
until June 1919 and then spent a year in the Reichswehr. From the army, Deckert joined the police in 
July 1920 where he received steady promotion becoming an officer in 1928, Captain in 1934 and 
Major in 1938. Between 1936 and 1941, immediately before his appointment as Battalion 
Commander of 304, Deckert was Adjutant to Hans Lammers, the head of the Reich Chancellery. 
During his post-war trial Deckert, as well as a few former professional and personal associates, 
claimed that he was by nature a military man who was an opponent of the Nazi hierarchy. However, 
Deckert appears to have mixed socially and professionally in high NSDAP circles. Deckert joined the 
Party in November 1932, at a time when police officials could join following the lifting of the 
prohibition of police membership in the NSDAP in summer 1932 and experienced a rapid ascension 
through the ranks of the police after 1933.42 He held a high position in the Reich Chancellery 
assisting Lammers and appears to have had a personal relationship with Himmler either through his 
position at the Chancellery or as part of the SS-Personnel Office.43 Furthermore, in 1940 Deckert 
married the daughter of an SA-Oberführer and was clearly on very friendly terms with Eva Braun, as 
can be seen in the surviving images from Braun’s home movies at the Berghof.44 
From 1933, as they did with other branches of the civil service and sphere of German life, the Nazis 
attempted to purge the police of “politically unreliable” individuals. The numbers of those actually 
discharged from the police do not appear to have been great, in part because the bulk of the police 
force seem to have generally leaned politically towards the right in any case. However, the 
dismissals that there were created vacancies that could be filled by Nazi people. Additionally, the 
major loss of police personnel to the Wehrmacht in 1935 also opened up posts for long-term Nazis, 
especially from the SS-VT and General SS who were given preferences for these posts after 
Himmler’s take-over of the police in 1936.45 It would appear that Nickel and Deckert, as far as their 
careers under the Nazis were concerned, benefitted from the purges of the police. 
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Two former members of the Freikorps were company commanders in Battalions 314 and 304. 
Theodor Wendorff, born in 1902, was until December 1941 the 2nd Company commander in 
Battalion 314. Wendorff had joined the German army in 1918 but it is not known if he served at the 
front. In 1919-1920 he joined the Freikorps “Brigade Reinhardt” led by Wilhelm Reinhardt, an 
antisemitic, authoritarian commander. For a period in 1920 he was part of the Berlin Brigade of the 
Reichswehr which was also led by Reinhardt.46 In 1921 Wendorff joined the police and was part of 
the Lapo until 1935. However, despite Wendorff’s military background and long career in the police 
(Wendorf was a police official from 1921 until 1963), it wasn’t until 1937 that he became an officer 
in the police. Wendorff was not a member of the NSDAP and did not become an SS member until 
1939.47 Johann Meissner, born in 1899, was the commander of the 3rd Company of Battalion 304 in 
Poland and Ukraine. Meissner had served in the German army from 1917, was in the Freikorps “Iron 
Division” until 1920 when he joined the police. Meissner became a lieutenant in 1929, but it was not 
until 1940 that he was promoted to captain. Meissner did not join the NSDAP until May 1933 and did 
not become a member of the SS until 1940.48 Both Wendorff and Meissner only became captains in 
conjunction with their entrance into the SS. 
The senior officer positions in Battalions 314 and 304 were filled with men from the “front 
generation” who had joined the German army during the First World War (though it seems that not 
all had actually fought at the front) and went on to join the Freikorps. Their military experience 
appears to have been valued in the German police, but it is probably not a coincidence that the two 
company leaders, Wendorff and Meissner, did not receive the same career elevation after 1933 as 
the battalion commanders, Nickel and Deckert, who appear to have both been very well connected 
within the Nazi hierarchy. 
Most of the rest of the company commander positions in Battalions 314 and 304 were taken by men 
of similar ages to the rank and file, of the “war youth generation”, who were too young to have been 
members of the Freikorps. Like the other senior commanders, some appear to have risen through 
the ranks of the police over a long career and some were drawn from long-term members of the SA 
or SS. In addition to Wendorff, the other two company commanders in Battalion 304 in 1940 and 
1941 were Walter Meisel (born in 1905) and Oskar Christ (1912). Unlike most of the other officers 
                                                          
46 BAB SSO 236B, SS personnel file Wendorff. R19 3279, HA Orpo file Wendorff, medical record. VBS 
2836065003797, RuSHA ‘Fragebogen’ form Wendorff. Colonel Wilhelm Reinhardt, an authoritarian 
commander who later became an SS-Gruppenführer, was known to have called the flag of the Republic a “Jew 
flag” and had summarily discharged soldiers known to have been sympathetic to the Republic, Wolfram Wette, 
The Wehrmacht. History, Myth, Reality (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2006), p.47.  
47 StA 320 Js, File 1, Wendorff’s SS file, pp.37-42. ZStL B162/6693, statement by Wendorff, 1973, pp.1873-6. 
48 BAB SSO 307A, SS personnel file Meissner. BAB VBS 2836035013409, RuSHA ‘Fragebogen’ form Meissner. 
53 
 
Christ was born into a working class family and did not go to grammar school, but began an 
apprenticeship as a mechanic at the age of fourteen. After completing his three and a half year 
apprenticeship, Christ had a short term of unemployment, after which he joined the police in his 
home town of Wiesbaden in 1931. Christ worked his way through the ranks of the police until he 
was forced to resign as Police Commissioner of Wiesbaden in the late-1960s because of his trial 
concerning his murderous activities as part of Battalion 314. From 1935 to 1937 Christ did his 
military service in the army then attended a training course at the Berlin-Köpenick police officer 
school after which in 1939 he became a lieutenant in the police and the equivalent rank of SS-
Untersturmführer.49 
The other two company commanders of Battalion 304 in 1940 and 1941 appear to have joined the 
police from the SA and the SS. Karl Hanstein (1908) joined the SA in 1929 and then the police in 
1934. After attending officer school, Hanstein became a lieutenant and SS-Untersturmführer in 
January 1939 and 1st lieutenant (SS-Obersturmführer) in 1940.50 Werner Mayr (1914) joined the SS at 
only seventeen and was one of the first SS guards at the Dachau concentration camp in April 1933. 
After proving himself for two years at Dachau Mayr was selected for the SS-Junkerschule in 
Braunschweig and then joined the police in 1937 after holding a position in the RuSHA. Following 
completion of the police officer training course at Fürstenfeldbruck in June 1938 Mayr became a 
police lieutenant, and five months later 1st lieutenant and SS-Obersturmführer.51 Clearly Hanstein 
and especially Mayr enjoyed a more rapid rise through the ranks than Christ because of their SA and 
SS affiliations. Rounding out the senior officer ranks in Battalion 304 was Dr Busse (1911), the 
battalion doctor. Busse was a member of the SA from 1933 and the SS from 1938 and joined 
Battalion 304 following his posting as Standortarzt at Dachau concentration camp.52 In 1940 with the 
formation of Battalions 314 and 304, all the senior officer positions were filled by SS men. Some of 
these men were career policemen who had worked their way through the ranks and had started 
their careers during the Weimar Republic; all of these men must have been considered “politically 
reliable” enough to have survived the Nazi purges of the police and may well have only become SS 
men because of the implications on their careers as police officers. About the same number of 
officers had become so through their earlier Nazi affiliations and benefitted from the purges; 
enjoying a more rapid ascension through the ranks than the career policemen. However, by the late-
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1930s and into the war years the SS and police hierarchy were filling the officer ranks with a 
younger, perhaps more ideologically cultivated cohort. 
The junior officers of the first Hitler Youth generation 
Although they hail from a different generation, the junior officers of Battalions 314 and 304 form a 
strikingly homogeneous group that bears more of a resemblance to the RSHA leadership corps than 
the other groups that made up the battalions. By the late-1930s career officers like Wendorff and 
Meissner and long-term Nazis such as Hanstein were not the priority type of officer for the police as 
Himmler and Daluege turned to youth. In 1937 Himmler announced that the future officer corps of 
the police would come exclusively from the new SS-officer schools and instructed his local police 
officials to identify suitable members of the Hitler Youth and young men who had just completed the 
Abitur (preparation exams for entrance to university) for these positions. As far as possible officers 
were to be drawn from the SS-Junkerschulen in Bad Tölz and Brunswick, but because of a high 
demand for SS-leaders across all agencies of the SS this proved not to be practical. It appears that 
candidates for the new SS officer corps would be drawn from recent Abiturenten who would be 
trained as SS-Junkers at the police officer schools in Berlin-Köpenick and Fürstenfeldbruck. The 
candidates, each of whom it would appear had been selected by local officials, was required to apply 
for membership to the SS before starting the training. In March 1940, Daluege ordered that 
concerning the immediate filling of the officer corps, a priority would be given to these graduates of 
the SS-Junker schools; after this group the positions would be filled by qualified professional 
policemen from the ranks, and lastly demobilized Wehrmacht officers.53 
The police battalions as militarised units were modelled on the German army. Like the army, the 
junior officer corps of the police battalions was drawn from the upper social and educational strata. 
In Eastern Front (1985), Bartov found that the great majority of the junior officers of the German 
Army in 1941 (over 65 percent) came from the middle classes; a stratum that constituted only about 
25 percent of the German population.54 Despite Hitler’s intention to commission ordinary soldiers 
during the war regardless of social and educational backgrounds, there appears to have been a 
reluctance of army commanders to commission NCOs. Bartov points out that this is probably 
because the commanders held the view that officers in a modern army required the educational and 
technical qualifications that were really only achievable by those from the middle classes, therefore 
the junior officer ranks were mostly filled with Abiturenten.55 The commissioning of officers from the 
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“sozial erwünschte Kreise” (socially desirable circles) followed a general inclination that dated back 
to before the Imperial German Army and reached a height with the Reichswehr during the Weimar 
Republic in which over 90 percent of junior officers were Abiturenten. With the enlistment of police 
officers, retired officers and NCOs and Austrian officers, the overall numbers of Abiturenten in the 
junior officer ranks are thought to have been reduced to about 50 percent by 1939; this number 
decreased further during the war. However, the number of Abiturenten remained exceptionally high 
among the youngest age-groups.56 From the late-1930s the German police recruited from this group 
of young, middle-class Abiturenten that would fill the junior officer positions in the police battalions. 
These Abiturenten were also part of what has been called the “best defined and most homogenous” 
generation, the “first Hitler Youth generation”.57 Fulbrook has convincingly argued that this 
generation, those born from 1915, being “perhaps uniquely exposed to the full onslaught of Nazi 
propaganda”, by virtue of their age “were highly vulnerable, over-exposed [to Nazi propaganda], and 
hence more readily mobilized and ultimately disproportionately willing to go along with the Nazi 
cause”.58 This generation, unlike its predecessors did not have adult or, as was the case for the 
majority of this generation, adolescent experiences of other political or social norms or developed 
views to draw upon that might counter-balance what it was being told everywhere; particularly in 
schools and as part of organised activities.59 
For those Germans born after 1915, the common major experience for most was their incorporation 
into the Hitler Youth (HJ) from 1933.60 During 1933 the number of members of the HJ increased from 
approximately 120,000 in January to nearly 2.3 million at the end of the year; approximately 47 
percent of boys aged between ten and fourteen were in the DJ and 38 percent of boys aged 
fourteen to eighteen in the HJ proper. By 1936 membership had increase to five million. In 
December 1936, the “Hitler Youth Law” heralded the incorporation of all German youth backed by 
increased pressure to conform and “voluntarily” enrol, but it wasn’t until two following executive 
orders in March 1939 when membership in the HJ became compulsory.61 Under the Nazi regime this 
cohort, more than any previous cohort, was exposed to homogeneous socialisation that to an extent 
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eroded the impact of class, gender, religion and regional differences on the youth experience.62 HJ 
members could mix with youngsters from other social milieus and individuals could rise through the 
ranks regardless of their class backgrounds. Furthermore, a good record in the HJ could even aid 
social mobility outside of the organisation, in giving access to better schools, apprenticeships or 
jobs.63 Dagmar Reese has shown that for most girls and young women their time in the BDM, and 
then the Reich Labour Service (RAD) and the War Auxiliary service, was for most a liberating and 
exciting experience. Individual experiences, Reese argues, would of course have differed, not least 
due to the idiosyncrasies of each local leader, but that common elements were much stronger than 
the differences.64 Based on an extensive range of surveys and oral histories, Alexander von Plato has 
found that the general experiences of former HJ members can be divided into three main groups: a 
large group who went with the flow; a medium sized group of enthusiasts and a smaller group who 
roundly opposed the HJ. These are at best ideal types and, as von Plato concedes, do not account for 
the variety of individual experiences.65 However, regarding the former members of the HJ who went 
on to become officers in the police battalions, some assumptions regarding their experiences in the 
HJ can be made. As the individuals were locally selected by SS and police officials who probably had 
contact with the local HJ leaders, it seems likely that the individuals did not have bad HJ records and, 
given the position they were being recruited for, probably held a leadership position at some point. 
Also it seems likely that the individuals would have got on fairly well with the pre-military training 
and the ideological cultivation or they would not have volunteered for the militarised police as SS 
men; their experiences in the HJ seem likely to have been largely positive. 
Fulbrook has argued that the Nazi system within which the HJ organisation was embedded was both 
dynamic in that it fostered certain kinds of behaviour including the use of violence, and constraining 
as it subdued others; a system of cultivation that ultimately produced and rewarded among the 
youth the social types it needed while simultaneously silencing the rest.66 One mark of the success of 
this cultivation of youth can be seen in the ease with which a minority of the first Hitler Youth 
generation were mobilised to carry out the “spontaneous” street violence of the 1930s, including 
the thuggish violence of Kristallnacht which was carried out mainly by these cohorts. It would appear 
that a sizeable proportion of the young people of this period, argues Fulbrook, could be mobilised in 
a way that the older generations could not.67 By the late-1930s, it was predominately the HJ 
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generation that were in positions charged with controlling and exercising violence towards older 
Germans.68 In 1938 nearly 80 percent of SS-Totenkopfverbände (SS-TV) members were from the first 
Hitler Youth generation (year groups 1915-1922). Many of these men would form the ranks of the 
Waffen-SS, which would recruit a further 48,894 men in 1940, the majority of whom were born from 
1920-1922.69 
With the introduction of Reichsarbeitsdienst (Labour Service – RAD) and conscription into the 
Wehrmacht which both came into effect in spring 1935, membership in the HJ became a step in the 
model course of education “in the spirit of National Socialism” for the young males of the first Hitler 
Youth generation. In April 1935 following the introduction of Wehrmacht conscription, Werner von 
Blomberg announced that “Service in the Wehrmacht is the last and highest step in the general 
educational process of any young German from the home to the school, to the Hitler Youth and 
Labour Service”.70 The exhaustive activities of the HJ, including weekend hikes and longer camps, 
which commanded so much of the youth’s time outside of school, and then the several months of 
labour service meant that from the mid-1930s young Germans were ever more exposed to the Nazi 
worldview. Those that were not fully convinced by the propaganda offerings and political lessons 
were constrained to a considerable extent to behave as if they were.71 By late-summer 1941, twelve 
of the junior officer positions in Battalions 314 and 304 were filled by young men from this first 
Hitler Youth generation. Of the older officers from this group that were with the battalions before 
summer 1941, those born between 1915 and 1917, four were members of Battalion 314 and one 
Battalion 304. 
The 1st Company commander of Battalion 314 was Rudolf Jahnhorst, born in 1915 in Upper Silesia. 
His surname until 1941 was Janik, but changed it as “Jahnhorst felt more German”. Jahnhorst was in 
the HJ from August 1934 to March 1935, the RAD for six months in 1935 and then the Wehrmacht 
for three years during which time he became an officer candidate. Jahnhorst joined the police in 
1938 as an officer candidate and graduated as lieutenant and SS-Untersturmführer in 1939 from the 
training school at Berlin-Köpenick. Jahnhorst had completed his Abitur while in the HJ.72 Hans Hertel, 
platoon leader in 1st Company and Jahnhorst’s deputy in 1941, was born in Hamburg in 1916. While 
at Gymnasium Hertel was in the HJ from 1933 to 1938 where he was a fellowship leader. Hertel 
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passed the Abitur in 1936. Probably because of his position as leader in the HJ, Hertel did not join 
the RAD and only spent eight days in the Wehrmacht before joining the police as an officer 
candidate. Hertel graduated from Berlin-Köpenick in December 1939 as lieutenant and SS-
Untersturmführer. Platoon leader in the 2nd Company and deputy company commander to Wendorff 
was Franz Bauer, born 1917 in the Sudetenland. Bauer finished his schooling during the Abitur in 
1936 and completed two years of national service in the Czech army during which time he began 
officer training. Bauer joined the Schupo following the annexation of the Sudetenland and in January 
1941 graduated from Berlin-Köpenick. In his statement in 1973 Bauer stated that he joined the 
NSDAP after the officer training course because of a “völkisch attachment to Germanness”, rooted in 
his experience of “the oppression of the ethnic German minority in the Sudetenland”. He also said 
that he was “impressed by the authoritarian nature of the National Socialist state”. Bauer came to 
Battalion 314 in Zamość following the training course.73 
The two Adjutants in Battalions 314 and 304 were Karl Steinmann and Helmut Streubel, both born in 
1915. Steinmann was born in Gelsenkirchen into a working-class family and did not attend grammar 
school and take the Abitur. Steinmann started his labour service in 1932, then joined the SA in 1933 
at seventeen before completing a year’s military service. Steinmann worked as a glass blower for a 
year before joining the police as a Wachtmeister. Steinmann must have proven himself in the rank 
and file as he graduated from Berln-Köpenick as a lieutenant and SS-Untersturmführer in December 
1939 and joined Battalion 314 (then Ausbildungsbataillone Wien-Strebersdorf) in January 1940 as 
Adjutant. Steinmann graduated from officer school with a “satisfactory”, but was not considered by 
the examiners to possess the desired appearance or Haltung (“attitude” or “posture”) necessary for 
a trainer and platoon leader, so he became an adjutant instead.74 Streubel, born in Leipzig did attend 
grammar school and completed his Abitur in 1934. He was in the HJ from April 1933 to July 1936 
during which time he did a year in the Wehrmacht, then following a year working in the Justice 
Department, joined the police as an officer candidate and graduated from officer school in 
December 1937.75 
Name Year HJ Abitur RAD Wehrmacht Officer 
school 
Battalion 
Bauer 1917  1936  1936-1938 
(Czech Army) 
1941 314 
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Hertel 1916 1933-1938 1936  1936-1938 1939 314 
Jahnhorst 1915 1934-1935 1934 1935 1935-1938 1939 314 
Steinmann 1915   1932-1933 1934-1935 1939 314 
Streubel 1915 1933-1936 1934  1934-1935 1937 304 
 
From the backgrounds of these five officers we can see that all five experienced significant exposure 
to Nazi influence beyond that of the average German citizen during the 1930s; four officers were 
involved in NSDAP organisations before joining the police and Bauer was impressed by the Nazis as 
an “ethnic German” in the Sudetenland. Hertel, Jahnhorst and Streubel were all in the HJ into their 
early twenties; it is known that Hertel held a high leadership position, but it seems likely, by virtue of 
their advanced ages in the organisation, that Jahnhorst and Streubel did too. Steinmann was not in 
the HJ, though this was probably because he had left school earlier than the grammar school 
students and already begun an apprenticeship before 1933. However, Steinmann was in the SA from 
an early age. Only Jahnhorst was in the RAD. Steinmann and Streubel had both done their national 
service in the Wehrmacht (what von Blomberg considered the “last and highest stage” in National 
Socialist education) before the RAD became more or less compulsory in 1935, and Hertel appears to 
have held a high enough position in the HJ for his service in the RAD not to have been deemed 
important. All five had between one and three years’ experience in the army (Bauer in the 
Czechoslovakian Army), which would have been possibly the primary consideration for the recruiters 
of the militarised Orpo; all left the army as officer candidates except for Steinmann. 
Steinmann was the only one that came from a working-class background and was not entered for 
the Abitur. Whereas the other four were fast-tracked into officer positions, Steinmann was forced to 
rise through the ranks. In the 1930s the academically orientated Gymnasium drew most of their 
pupils from the middle-classes, with only approximately 3 percent of pupils coming from the 
working-class; university education and higher social standing was not a realistic option for the 
majority of German adolescents.76 Despite Nazi rhetoric on the erosion of class distinctions, the 
working-class was poorly represented in the officer corps of the Wehrmacht as they did not conform 
to long-established social and educational criteria.77 This appears to have been much the same case 
for the militarised Orpo which was largely modelled on the German army. That Steinmann, although 
considered suitable enough for the Orpo officer corps, was considered to be lacking in “appearance 
and Haltung” suggests that his social and educational background may have had something do with 
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it. The average age of this group on their appointment as Schupo officers was 23, two years younger 
than the overall pre-war average of new Orpo lieutenants.78 However, it does appear that into the 
war years, the officer corps of the Orpo were getting even younger and more homogenous. 
The class of 1941 
On 18 August 1941 72 recent graduates of the 19th Officer Training at Berlin-Köpenick were 
dispersed amongst the 22 police battalions that were already on former Soviet territory. Among 
them were Lieutenants Gerhard Panis, Hans Pütz, Wilhelm Schleich and Günter Schellwath who 
were sent to Battalion 314 and Lieutenants Karl Becker, Franz-Xaver Lochbrunner and Rudi Seeber 
who were seconded to Battalion 304.79 At the time all seven of these lieutenants and platoon 
leaders were 21 years old or younger; six were born in 1919 or 1920 and one, Pütz, was born in 
1922. It seems likely that the majority of the other 65 officers were from this age group. 
Detlev Peukert has argued that with the 1939 laws making membership in the HJ compulsory and 
into the war years, the attraction of the movement and consequently the HJ organisation among the 
German adolescents of the late-1930s and 1940s (those born approximately between 1922 and 
1932) began to decline. The disciplinary and surveillance measures employed to enforce “service” in 
the HJ, in which HJ patrols played a considerable role, and the increasing concentration on pre-
military drill into the war years began to cultivate a general apathy and rejection among a large 
number of adolescents who turned in their thousands to unregimented independent gangs such as 
the “Edelweiss Pirates” and the “Swing Youth” whose numbers rebelled, often violently, against the 
regimented HJ.80 On the whole, this trend does not appear to have been the case with the “first 
Hitler Youth generation”, those born earlier from 1915 to 1922 in which rebellious groups, such as 
the White Rose organisation in Munich, appear to have been much more exceptional. Many from 
the age groups 1918-1922, the group that formed the younger junior officers of the 19th officer 
training at Berlin-Köpenick, would have been the HJ leaders of the late-1930s that were enforcing 
the increasing pre-military drill and leading the HJ patrols. Unlike the slightly older group of junior 
officers born before 1918 such as Hertel and Jahnhorst who had experienced other political norms 
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as adolescents before the Nazi seizure of power, this younger group of officers had belonged to the 
HJ from pre-adolescence and went through school during the Nazi period. 
The Lebenslauf of Karl Becker submitted to the SS Main Office in 1942, illustrates the kind of 
background of these young junior officers before joining the police battalions. Becker came from a 
middle-class family (his father was Regional Head of Schools) and attended a number of Gymnasien 
in Augsburg, passing his Abitur in early 1939. Becker was in the HJ from May 1933 to September 
1937 and joined the NSDAP in January 1938. Becker left the HJ to join the NSKK (National Socialist 
Motor Corps) in which he served until April 1939 when he began his labour service. From the RAD, 
Becker was drafted into the Wehrmacht in September 1939, but was released after one month to 
study medicine at university. In February 1940 he volunteered for the Schupo and was drafted into 
Police Training Battalion Fürstenfeldbruck in April 1940 in which he served until September 1940 
when he was ordered to the police school in Dresden-Hellerau for squad and platoon leader training 
course. During this period in the police he was classed as a “Police Candidate”. In February 1941 he 
was appointed “Officer Candidate” and from Dresden-Hellerau was sent to attend the 19th Officer 
Training course at Berlin-Köpenick from which he graduated as lieutenant and SS-Untersturmführer 
on 11 July 1941. From 21 July to 22 August Becker was a platoon leader in the 1st Company 
München, his local police district, until dispatched to join Battalion 304 in Ukraine.81 
Becker was an Abiturient, was in the HJ from thirteen to eighteen, became a member of the NSDAP 
at eighteen and was active in other Party organisations and did his military service (in Becker’s case 
this was cut short for university study) before volunteering for the police as a prospective officer. 
Becker’s background matches the ideal of the future SS and police officer corps as do the 
backgrounds of his Berlin-Köpenick classmates.82 
 
Name Year HJ NSDAP RAD Wehrmacht Police 
Panis 1920 1933-1938 unknown unknown 1938-1939 Oct 1939 
Schellwath 1920 1933-1941 1938 1939 1939 Mar 1940 
Schleich 1920 1933-1941 1938 1939  Feb 1940 
Pütz 1922 unknown unknown unknown unknown unknown 
Becker 1919 1933-1937 1938 1939 1939 Feb 1940 
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Lochbrunner 1919 1933-1938 1938 (SA)   Feb 1940 
Seeber 1920 unknown unknown 1939 unknown May 1940 
 
The only background information that could be found on Pütz was that he was part of the 19th 
Officer Training course and joined Battalion 314 along with Panis, Schellwath and Schleich. It appears 
that all members of this group came from a middle-class background and were Abiturenten. The 
above table demonstrates a number of additional similarities in the personal backgrounds of this 
group of junior officers. Unfortunately, it appears that little biographical information has survived 
about Pütz who was killed in 1942. With the exception of Pütz who was only nineteen years old 
when he became platoon leader in Battalion 314, all were born between September 1919 and 
August 1920 resembling a school year group and were only 21 years old in August 1941 when they 
came to their respective battalions in Ukraine. 
All were in the HJ from the ages of twelve or thirteen to at least eighteen, joining in 1933, a time 
when membership was not compulsory. Schleich and Schellwath were still members of the HJ at the 
age of 21 when they finished officer training. Schellwath stated in his SS file that he held a HJ 
leadership position, but the length of membership indicates that Schleich too had probably reached 
the higher leadership ranks in the organisation.83 Peukert has indicated that the HJ leaders were 
disproportionately from grammar school backgrounds.84 Despite the supposed eradication of class 
differences in the HJ organisation, this seems likely to have been the case primarily because most 
other young men in their late-teens would have had less spare time outside of work or 
apprenticeships. That Panis, Becker and Lochbrunner remained in the HJ until their late-teens 
suggests that they too held leadership positions, though perhaps not as senior as Schellwath and 
Schleich. Lochbrunner, a teenage “political instructor” for three years in the HJ, may well have risen 
even further up the ranks in the HJ if had he not elected to join the SA instead.85 Schellwath, Schleich 
and Becker all joined the NSDAP at the earliest opportunity, at eighteen years old. Lochbrunner 
joined the SA and Becker the NSKK, both straight from the HJ. In this regard, these five demonstrate 
a significant level of enthusiasm for Nazism at a young age. It does not appear to be the case that 
these young men were like the majority of their contemporaries in the HJ in more or less going with 
the flow, as von Plato has argued, but seem more likely to have belonged to the group of 
enthusiasts. 
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All appear to conform to at least some of the steps of von Blomberg’s ideal path of National Socialist 
education: attending school after 1933; lengthy periods in the HJ; a period of service each with the 
RAD and of military service. The exception in this group is Lochbrunner who did not do service in 
either the RAD or the Wehrmacht as he was in the SA. Judging by the dates on which these men 
joined the police, it appears that all joined as part of the 26,000 man campaign, probably as part of 
the extension decree of October 1939 regarding the recruitment of Abiturenten from the year 
groups 1918-20 as prospective officers. These men were likely hand-picked by SS recruiters who 
probably had contact with the local HJ or SA leadership. All were given a fast tracked career in the SS 
and police; their starting salary, based on pre-war levels was considerably higher than that of long-
serving rank and file career policemen other than the most senior NCOs.86 All had been part of pre-
military or paramilitary organisations almost continuously since the age of fourteen, and had been 
part of Nazi organisations since twelve or thirteen. 
Like Becker all the men of this group would have spent a period of five or six months as a “Police 
Candidate” for basic training in a local training battalion. Following basic training all attended squad 
and platoon leader training at Dresden-Hellerau until February 1941 when they started officer 
training in Berlin.87 Upon successful completion of the training the newly appointed SS and police 
Junkers were sent to a police administration, presumably to await their assignments: Panis, Pütz, 
Schleich and Schellwath were in Dusseldorf and Becker, Lochbrunner and Seeber were in Munich. 
Himmler’s memo of 18 August 1941 ordered the immediate dispatch of these officers to Battalions 
314 and 304 in Ukraine.88 
To what extent then can the junior officers of Police Battalions 314 and 304 be considered an “elite” 
or “vanguard” group? Roseman has argued that the Nazis managed, at least temporarily, “the trick 
of robbing the youth movement of its independence whilst still profiting from its elan”; the German 
youth in Nazi ideology as well as in their own self-perception was accorded the image of a vanguard 
in creating the Nazi society of the future.89 Members of the HJ were encouraged by its leadership to 
regard themselves as the “young elite” of the movement. During the Nuremberg Party rally in 
September 1934, Baldur von Schirach the leader of the HJ gave a speech introducing Hitler stating as 
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much: “…our movement, whose young vanguard you are and whose standard bearers you will 
be…”90 
The extent to which the junior officers, having spent their adolescence in the HJ, carried this attitude 
with them to their roles in the police battalions is difficult to determine based on post-war character 
descriptions of the junior officers by their former subordinates in Battalions 314 and 304 as they are 
somewhat scarce in the trial records. However, among the few depictions of some of the junior 
officers there does seem to have been a general view of these young SS officers as a distinct group 
within the battalions. A driver of the 3rd Company of 314 got to know Lieutenant Panis in Ukraine as 
his chess partner: “Well that’s the way young officers are. He was reckless, was in the SS and wanted 
to talk others into joining the SS. He reacted angrily to me when I did not [want to join]”.91 Another 
member of the 3rd Company remembered that Panis had a very relaxed way of using the “German 
greeting”, for which he was yelled at by his superior, Meisel. Generally Panis was not remembered 
favourably by former company members: “He was an arrogant man who came fresh from the officer 
school”; “Lieutenant Panis came fresh out of officer school and thought from the start that he could 
drive his head through the wall”; “Panis was just a young officer who wanted to become something”; 
“Panis was a young, jagged officer who came straight from the war school. He failed at the front 
however”.92  Similar assessments were made by former battalion members on Schleich and Pütz 
who were also “fresh out of officer school”. Like Panis, they also received the displeasure of their 
company commander, Wendorff, who yelled at them loudly, although Wendorff, in the opinion of 
one former member of Battalion 314, was the only officer who would have done so.93  Bauer, slightly 
older than Panis, Schleich and Pütz, who had joined Battalion 314 a few months before them, 
received more mixed reviews from former 2nd Company men. One policeman recalled Bauer as a 
“modest person” who would never have acted like Schleich and Pütz. Another remembered Bauer as 
a “friendly man” like Wendorff. However, one former policeman remembered him in a similar light 
to the other young officers: “He was a young officer...was very much pro-German, was arrogant and 
thought he was something better than us”. Wendorff recalled Bauer as being “one of those young 
officers, in so far as I can remember, who came from the Ordensburg [SS training schools] and was 
deeply rooted in the National Socialist ideology”.94  The description of Bauer as being “pro-German” 
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and ideologically driven seems reasonable as Bauer himself admitted – as we have seen – that he 
had a “völkisch attachment to Germanness” and was attracted by the nature of the Nazi state.  
A former member of the 3rd Company of Battalion 304, described Lochbrunner (probably the 
policeman’s platoon leader) as being “moody” and “vain”, but recalled the older career officers in a 
more favourable light.95 Generally, the much younger, recently graduated officers appear to have 
been considered by at least some as a distinct group and their portrayal by their former comrades’ 
contrast with the general portrayals of the older officers and NCOs. Platoon Sergeant Söllner of 304 
was from Halle in Saxony and was known by the nickname “Sonny”. 1st Lieutenant Welsch of 304, 
also from Saxony was, according to one subordinate, someone “who one could talk to about 
everything”. NCO Walter of 314 was, like most of the rank and file in 314, from Vienna and was 
described as being a “genial” type.96 
The somewhat more positive depictions by former battalion members of the older, career police 
officers and NCOs generally appear to stand in contrast to the general depictions of the younger 
officers and there seems to have been a level of resentment from the former rank and file towards 
this group; at least as depicted in the post-war testimonies. Generally, these few largely negative 
descriptions of some of the junior officers portray a group that were considered arrogant with a 
somewhat cavalier attitude to form, ideologically driven and inexperienced. As a group they may 
have attempted to compensate for the fact that they were less experienced than the other officers 
and NCOs with ideological zeal.  
The young, junior officers do stand out from the rest of the policemen as a distinct group. First, this 
group is considerably younger than the rest of the battalions, a fact that would have been more 
conspicuous because of their officer status. Second this younger group appears to have been more 
socially privileged, being drawn from the middle-classes, as opposed to the more working-class 
backgrounds of most of the rank and file, and had been educated to a higher level. Third they were 
drawn from the ranks of the HJ leadership and other NSDAP organisations whereas the majority of 
the rank and file appear to have not had these affiliations. All these factors distinguish this group 
from the other groups within the battalions and contributed to their receiving a fast-tracked career 
path enjoyed by neither the older officers nor the rank and file. The distinction is, to an extent, 
reflected in the post-war depictions. That these individuals had been treated as a “vanguard” from a 
young age and then given elite professional status in the SS and police, strongly indicates that they 
may well have considered themselves a youthful vanguard.  
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The “300-level” police battalions were heterogeneous groups as far as the generational, social and 
geographical backgrounds and prior political affiliations of the members are concerned. The average 
age of these battalions does not tell us much about the mechanisms of the groups at battalion, 
company or squad level. However, further generational and social differentiation of groups within 
the formations indicate different levels of professional experience and ideological commitment both 
vertically and horizontally in the command structure which provide a better view of how the 
battalions were structured and operated. How “elite” the 300-level battalions, compared to their 
reservist counterparts, actually were is not clear as it is difficult to determine quite how extensive 
the recruitment process was in 1939 and 1940 as far as ideological commitment was concerned. 
What is clear is that the officer ranks were significantly more “Nazified”, based on SS, SA and NSDAP 
membership than the rank and file. However, there were also marked differences in this regard 
within the officer ranks which included some long-term police officers who appear to have joined 
the SS and NSDAP for career reasons and others who were encouraged to join the police as officers 
precisely because of their Nazi affiliations. Clearly there was considerable overlap between these 
two groups. A prominent example is Deckert, the Commander of Battalion 304 who was a long-
serving policeman who also appears to have been extremely well connected in the Nazi hierarchy. 
A distinct group within the officer ranks were the junior officers. These young men were recruited as 
an elite group, by virtue of their generational, political and educational backgrounds, and 
represented the ideal future officer corps. However, no matter how ideologically sound these men 
were or were perceived to be, they would still have to perform pivotal roles in a professional 
organisation. The training of these men in preparation for their envisaged roles will be examined in 












Chapter 2. Role and Training 
After gaining control of the uniformed police forces in 1936, Himmler sought to meld the SS and 
police organizations into a single structure based on a military model. The foundation of this 
organization would be a specific culture achieved in part through training with a particular emphasis 
on the cultivation of a Nazi worldview and a particular Haltung. To achieve these goals Himmler 
would not have to start from scratch. A military influence within the police institutions in Germany is 
evident going back to the late nineteenth-century where a large number of ex-soldiers who had 
been socialized for periods in the army were filling the police ranks. This situation continued after 
the First World War with the police recruiting from professional soldiers and conscripts as well as a 
large number of Freikorps members. Before 1933 German police forces were typically right-wing 
leaning groups with a strong martial bearing.1 Himmler and Daluege sought to build on the prior 
military and political identity of the police and marry this identity with SS ethics creating a particular 
ideological Haltung that went beyond the conditioning of the police as antisemites.2 From 1934 the 
RuSHA was instrumental in forming early guidelines for the ideological schooling of the police which, 
according to Daluege, was about transmitting the spirit of the SS to the police corps. In August 1938, 
Himmler withdrew from the RuSHA the responsibility for indoctrination and gave general 
responsibility to the SS Main Office. Himmler himself took a lead role in establishing a standardised 
“SS-like political and ideological education” that aligned the training of the Order Police with that of 
other SS organisations, strongly indicating his personal pedagogical preferences for a mix of 
disseminating knowledge, lectures and social gatherings, “not for the brain, but for the whole person 
and which speaks to the heart”.3 The regular indoctrination and military training which intensified 
with the outbreak of war, was intended to form the basis of Himmler’s planned merger of the police 
with the SS to form the “Corps for the Protection of State”.4 Therefore, by the start of the war in 
1939 and with renewed vigour after the invasion of the Soviet Union, the police battalions were 
receiving the same indoctrination as their Security Police and SD counterparts.5 The training received 
by the newly created police battalions in 1940 and 1941 consisted of more than ideological training. 
Basic police and military training formed the main blocks of the general training, but these aspects 
were infused with ideological perspectives. The initial training for the new recruits of the 26,000-
man campaign that formed the companies of the 300-level battalions played a significant role in the 
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creation of an organisational culture within the militarised and hierarchical structure of the 
battalions that set the parameters of expected and accepted behaviour of the policemen. However, 
it was the individuals within the organisational structures that created the culture of the platoons 
and companies of the police battalions and the biggest influences on the new recruits were their 
superiors with whom they were in direct, consistent contact. The low-level officers that led the 
platoons and companies, the immediate superiors of the rank and file, were in the positions that 
would greatly influence the culture and actions of the smaller units that made up the battalions. This 
chapter will demonstrate that these officers received training based on a German military model 
that sought not only to install a particular Haltung, but were trained to act as role models and the 
disseminators of ideological ideas to their immediate subordinates and who were actively 
encouraged to use the initiative that their positions within the hierarchical structure would afford 
them. This chapter will begin by examining the type of basic training received by the rank and file of 
Battalions 314 and 304 prior to their deployment in Poland. It will then examine the training of the 
junior officers and the nature of their intended role in the police battalions. 
Basic training 
The new recruits from the 26,000-man campaign arrived at the then “training battalions” in 
Chemnitz and Vienna in March 1940 and July 1940 respectively. Basic training lasted for six months 
and then the battalions were deployed in Poland. Most of the career officers and NCOs had arrived 
at the home bases in Chemnitz and Vienna some time before the arrival of the new recruits. 
Additional officers and NCOs (some from the reserves) would join the battalions after the initial 
training. In the case of Battalion 304, the career policemen arrived in Chemnitz in November and 
December 1939 and would play a role in the training of the recruits. Many of these men, some of 
whom were in the midst of their NCO training when the recruits arrived, came from the Saxony 
region, had had military experience and a number of years police experience.6 It is likely that, 
because of the Nazi penetration of the state which gave preference in career advancement to party 
and SS members, Nazi affiliations were higher among the career policemen carrying out the 
training.7 However, the social background of these men was also closer to that of the new recruits 
than the younger junior officers, most of whom would join the battalions after the initial training. 
One of the career officers who took part in the initial training for Battalion 314 in Vienna was 
Theodor Wendorff. Wendorff, the 2nd Company commander, was recalled by many former company 
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members in a positive and comradely light. Somewhat older than the average battalion member, 
Wendorff was remembered as being a fatherly figure who was “fair, clean and accessible” and 
“loved a good drink and good food”.8 The general portrayal of Wendorff by former members of the 
2nd Company as a friendly, sociable character, is confirmed by a report in Wendorff’s SS file from 
August 1941. A reference included in the report provided by Major Schmidt who was the battalion 
commander in Vienna states that: “[Wendorff] was a caring leader to his company and they 
respected him. He is popular in comradely circles because of his likeable personality.” Schmidt also 
reviewed Wendorff’s effectiveness as a trainer: “He has good military knowledge and practical 
experience and was able to employ well this knowledge gained from his previous position in the 
educational duties that he was assigned”. However, many of the former 2nd Company members also 
portrayed Wendorff as “an opponent of the regime”, something that is not confirmed by the report. 
The report does generally refer to Wendorff’s valuable military and police experience, but an 
assessment of his “National Socialist Worldview” states: “Always supports the National Socialist 
State. He understands how to provide his subordinates with the National Socialist philosophy 
convincingly”.9 As a popular and respected officer, but also an SS-man, it is not clear how 
representative Wendorff is of the other officers and NCOs who were involved in the initial training in 
either respect. However, the report does demonstrate the significant personal role that the officers 
played during the initial training of the new recruits. “Worldview” training aside, Wendorff’s 
commander, Major Schmidt, clearly considered Wendorff’s prior military and police experience to be 
an asset during the basic training.  
Guidelines of January 1940 issued for the training of the 300-level battalions emphasised the need 
for the recruits to be educated “for toughness” in order to fulfil their anticipated wartime duties and 
basic training was to include an introduction to police duties, physical fitness, military training and 
the “strengthening of character and worldview”.10 Many former policemen expressed their surprise 
at the minimal level of more “traditional” police training. One former member of 314 recalled that: 
“At that time I thought that after the training I would be assigned to a police position and allowed to 
perform normal police service. These ideas were not uncomfortable ones. However, already during 
the training I was discovering something worse”.11 Another former member of 314 stated that: 
“Instead of the hoped for police training, we only got a military one”.12 It may not be unreasonable 
to accept that the new recruits, many of whom joined the police for career reasons and to avoid 
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serving at the front, were genuinely surprised at the time at the lack of training for traditional police 
duties. Indeed, the testimonies of former battalion members indicate that the training they received 
was more militarily oriented, including infantry training and special weapons training.13 Guidelines 
for the training of the Schutzpolizei issued in March 1940 set out what was to form the basic training 
of the new police battalions: four weeks were to be devoted to physical fitness and self-defence; six 
weeks for weapons training; two weeks for ideological training which included topics such as Volk 
ohne Raum, Raum ohne Volk, the Nuremberg Laws of 1935 and the new Reich and its leadership; 
four weeks for lessons on the organisation of the police and its tasks, including the legal system and 
general policing; and five weeks of practical training in the field.14 These guidelines were issued 
around the same time as the 26,000 man campaign, so were likely to have formed the basis of the 
training of the 300-level battalions. Rudolf Miksch, formerly of Battalion 304, recalled that military 
drill, infantry tactics training including field exercises on topography and orientation, and shooting 
practice were undertaken daily. Sport and physical fitness were also on the daily agenda.15 
Miksch also recalled that part of the “schooling” was based on ideological tenets of Deutschtum and 
the concept of a “master race”.16 Imperial traditions and popular ideals of colonial ventures had not 
disappeared along with Germany’s colonies after the First World War and a widespread cultural 
colonial imagination appears to have survived the war. Colonialism also formed an important aspect 
of Nazi ideology and appears to have formed a considerable part of police training leading up to the 
invasion of the Soviet territories.17 British intelligence officers appear to have been particularly 
interested in the level of colonial training for the police. An intercepted message dated 4 November 
1940 stated: “RFSS – send to group commanders of all police training battalions re beginners’ 
courses in colonial languages”.18 In response to this message, on 8 November Police Regiment 
Warsaw reported an Oberleutnant (1st lieutenant) and Hauptmann (captain) of Battalion 304 for 
participation in the course for colonial languages.19 At that time the battalion was stationed in 
Warsaw as part of Police Regiment Warsaw, the Oberleutnants were Hanstein and Welsch and the 
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two Hauptmänner were Mayr and Meissner. The following report from mid-November 1940 
indicates that the intelligence officers were trying, unsuccessfully, to establish which languages were 
actually being taught. “Courses are short, lasting only one month, but affect a large number of 
police, principally officers and NCOs. Thoroughness of organisation and many instructional centres 
indicate far-reaching intentions”.20 Colonialism appears to have been the topic of the month in 
November 1940. The title of the monthly theme pamphlet to be used during police ideological 
instruction was “Germany’s right to colonies”.21 As early as 1937 Daluege was interested in creating 
a colonial police force and after the victory over France, the possibilities of taking over French 
colonial possessions and re-claiming Germany’s other lost colonies enthused some among the SS 
and police leadership for colonial ventures.22 However, as many historians have shown, Hitler had 
little interest in overseas colonies and as Donald Bloxham has convincingly argued, any focus on 
African colonies after the late-1930s would have been misplaced, as Hitler himself considered 
overseas colonies to be vulnerable during wartime.23 
It appears to be far more likely that Himmler’s “far-reaching intentions” regarding colonisation 
would have geared the training of the police to the colonisation of Eastern Europe. It seems unlikely 
that the two leaders from Battalion 304 who, at the time of the course were engaged in activities in 
Poland, would have been sent to attend a “colonial language course” only to have served in some 
other area of the globe. These men, along with the other officers and NCOs who were principally 
affected by those courses were heavily involved in the training of the men in their units. It is far 
more likely that the experiences garnered during the courses were expected to be disseminated to 
their subordinates in preparation for their conceived tasks in Poland and the Soviet Union. It 
certainly appears that the anticipated roles of the police battalions in establishing German colonial 
rule in Eastern Europe formed a significant part of the basic training. Miksch of Battalion 304: “We 
were taught that only the German is able to create order in Europe and bring culture to the 
people…to keep and feed the [“German”] nation he needs living space”.24 In his post-war testimony, 
Miksch stated that he thought that these lessons “were not only designed to justify [the policemen’s 
role in] a war of conquest, but mainly to make us feel like Herrenmenschen ourselves, that we were 
superior to other peoples and races and that we were meant to bring them culture and order”.25 
                                                          
20 NA HW 16/1, GCCS early reports on German Police 1939-1941. Report form the period 12/11/40-18/11/40. 
21 Westermann, Police Battalions, p.104. 
22 Westermann, Police Battalions, pp.80-2. 
23 Bloxham, Final Solution, p.19. 
24 Miksch, cited in Klemp, Vernichtung, p.57. 
25 Klemp, Vernichtung, p.57. 
72 
 
According to Miksch, the “Jewish race especially was presented to us as being inferior and 
Germany’s main enemy”.26 According to Matthäus’ findings on police training, antisemitic issues 
were not prominent and may not have gone beyond the types of messages that were projected onto 
the general population at the time. Antisemitic views relating to political or ideological issues were 
present, but it is not clear how effective the attempts to create an organisational spirit around racist 
doctrines were following the considerable expansion of the police forces in 1940.27 The effectiveness 
of this aspect of the training is likely to have varied greatly depending on the individual receiving and 
the officer dispensing it. The principle that Jews were to be treated as enemies, even if unarmed, 
was part of the basic police training. In September 1940 Himmler ordered that the entire SS and 
police were to see the film Jud Süss over the winter; at a time when Battalions 304 and 314 were 
stationed in Poland.28 From the studies on the indoctrination of the police by Matthäus and 
Westermann, it appears that the nature of antisemitic indoctrination became more explicit in the 
lead up to and during the months following the invasion of the Soviet Union.29 The training profile of 
the Orpo a few days before the invasion stated: “As long as the Jews are allowed to live among other 
nations and races, there will be no peace on earth...the Jew is the general world enemy number 
one”.30 Few of the former members of Battalions 314 and 304 admitted to having received 
ideological preparation as part of their training during the trial processes, but it was part of the 
preparation of the battalions and would continue to be part of the ongoing training whilst in Poland 
and Ukraine.31 
From the training guidelines issued for the basic training of the police battalions in 1940, it is clear 
that less time during basic training was to be devoted to ideological training than the other topics; 
twice as much time was to be given to “police work” than ideological education. However, training 
of the police battalions was to be continued in the field following basic training and it may have been 
the ideological sessions delivered by the junior officers in the field that most resonated with the 
policemen and may have stuck out in their memories after the war. The main source for monthly 
and supplementary daily sessions to be delivered by unit leaders in the field was the Politischer 
Informationsdienst (PID), a propaganda paper published by the Orpo “Office for Ideological 
Education”, which was renamed Mitteilungsblätter für die Weltanschauliche Erziehung der 
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Ordnungspolizei (MBI) in May 1941.32 The material contained in the PID and MBI covered a range of 
topics, including political, social, economic, military, geographical as well as racial aspects that could 
be used to give meaning or to justify current events.33 For example, from May 1941 the eastern 
territories featured overwhelmingly in geographical articles in the MBI.34 MBI articles were also 
explicitly antisemitic such as an article from a June 1941 issue titled “Jewry and Criminality” and in 
December 1941, “One War Aim: A Europe Free of Jews”.35 
The extent of ideological training during basic training and the general effectiveness of these 
“lessons” on the policemen of the battalions is difficult to establish. It would seem likely that the 
most effective ideological lessons were those delivered by officers in the field, perhaps drawn from 
the PID and MBI, as justifications for the actions of the policemen. This aspect of the role of the 
junior officers and the implications on the actions of the policemen will be discussed further in this 
and the following chapters. 
Officer training 
Like the structure of the Orpo units, the role of the junior officers of the police battalions were 
modelled on traditions of the German army. The junior officers of the German army served as the 
“connecting link between the high command of the Wehrmacht and the political leadership of the 
Reich on the one hand, and the rank and file on the other”.36 Generally only Abiturenten would be 
selected as potential officers during basic recruit training. Following several months service in the 
ranks, the potential officer would attend a six month officer training course.37 As we have seen in the 
previous chapter, most of the junior officers of Battalions 314 and 304 had passed the Abitur and 
spent a period in the ranks of the Orpo, including attending NCO training, before starting a six month 
officer training course. In addition to serving as the link between the order givers and the receivers 
of the rank and file, the junior officers of the army were responsible for the morale, discipline and 
education or training of the troops under their command in both military and ideological matters.38 
In his study of the junior officer corps of the Wehrmacht, Bartov concluded that the junior officers, 
“assisted by abundant propaganda material with which they were supplied, had a far greater 
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influence upon the morale, ésprit de Corps and ideological conviction of the troops than any outside 
functionaries”.39 The junior officer corps were trained to be able to function in the field without 
detailed orders, relying on a considerable level of initiative to carry out the tasks assigned by 
commanding officers.40 The training of the junior officers of the police battalions appears to have 
been aimed at the creation of a junior officer cadre that would perform a similar role to their 
counterparts in the army. 
From 1936 police officer training was carried out at the Polizei Offizier-und Schutzpolizeischule in 
Fürstenfeldbruck and the Polizei Offizierschule Berlin-Köpenick.41 The courses lasted about six 
months and some courses may have been split between the two schools. In Battalion 314: Jahnhorst 
and Christ graduated as lieutenants from Berlin-Köpenick in early 1939; Hertel and Steinmann 
graduated in the same class from Berlin-Köpenick in December 1939 and Bauer graduated in January 
1941.42 In Battalion 304: Streubel graduated from Fürstenfeldbruck in December 1937; Mayr 
graduated from Fürstenfeldbruck in June 1938 and Hanstein graduated as a lieutenant in January 
1939 from one of the two schools.43 The average age of this group of junior officers on graduation 
was 25, which was the average age for new police lieutenants before 1940. As we have seen from 
the previous chapter, Panis, Pütz, Schellwath and Schleich of Battalion 314 and Lochbrunner, Becker 
and Seeber of Battalion 304 all graduated from the 19th Officer Course at Berlin-Köpenick in July 
1941. The average age of this group on graduation was 21. Most of the older group had spent 
considerable time in the rank and file of the police, SS or the army before attending police officer 
training. The younger group had all joined as part of the 26,000-man campaign, just over a year 
before their graduation as officers. The officer cadets of the 19th Officer Training course at Berlin-
Köpenick are likely to have been mostly the Abiturenten from the 1918-20 year groups that were 
allowed to be recruited as officer candidates as part of the recruiting campaign: a younger and less 
experienced group than previous officer cadet groups. 
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In preparation for the 19th Officer Course at Berlin-Köpenick, Himmler sent a message to the 
Dresden-Hellerau police NCO school regarding the collection and transportation of officer 
candidates to Berlin. The message states that the training would commence on 12 February 1941 
and the last training day was scheduled to be 12 July 1941. “Since the police Wachtmeister and the 
candidates (those who have completed the Abitur) already took part in [NCO] training, the training is 
to be started right away.” In the message, Himmler clearly distinguishes between the NCOs and the 
aspiring officer candidates who had done their Abitur. Of the two groups, Himmler clearly favoured 
the latter as officer material: “After the mid-term exams I am to be informed by 26. 5. 41. of any 
reasons, particularly with regards to the police Wachtmeister, for individuals who are only partly 
suited to a career as an officer and are not to continue the training.” An indication of the type of 
training the candidates were to receive can be seen in the articles that Himmler instructed them to 
bring with them, including: two bullet cases; a rifle, pistol and ammunition; field dressing; a gasmask 
and field glasses. The candidates were also to bring their own pens and pads for the classroom 
lessons.44 
Over the course of six months the officer candidates were to be schooled and assessed in six main 
topics: platoon leader training in preparation for the “front”; physical education; police tactics; air 
raid defence; legal education and police precinct and office duty. The legal education was split into 
six categories: criminal law and court proceedings; general police law; special police law; traffic law; 
national politics and ideological education; administrative and civil service law and civil law. 
Altogether the individual final assessments appear to have been weighted towards the legal 
education. The candidates were also taught war history, weaponry, teacher training and general “life 
teachings”.45 It is not clear from the surviving documents precisely how much time was spent on 
each subject during the course. 
A surviving document from the Berlin-Köpenick school to be used as part of the course was intended 
to provide an overview of the role of a Schutzpolizei officer as “teacher” and “educator”: 
1) The guiding line for every police task is always the worldview. The police 
Wachtmeister is firstly to be schooled in the sense of the National Socialist 
worldview. 
2) The police are tied to the laws in its tasks; because we don’t live in a police state but 
a state of law. But the laws are laid out today according to the National Socialist 
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worldview. The law book has stayed the same, but the view has changed. The 
Wachtmeister must have good knowledge of the laws, but in addition, a general 
idea of the laws that are not relevant for us. 
3) Furthermore, every policeman has to be familiar with the political, economic and 
cultural situation. He must have good general knowledge. 
4) He must be bred to have a strong personality and character. He acts according to 
his sense of duty, which means that he has to be just towards all members of the 
Volk. 
5) He must be physically fit. 
6) He must be good with arms.46 
In the course material that was used by Berlin-Köpenick that survived the war there are no explicitly 
antisemitic sections or references, but that does not mean that antisemitism did not feature during 
the courses. It does not seem unreasonable to assume that antisemitism featured just as much, if 
not more so, in the officer training as compared with the basic training of the new police recruits. 
After interviewing Karl Jäger, formerly of Battalion 304, during the 1970s the East German 
prosecutors concluded that he had been convinced by SS antisemitic ideas during his basic training 
but even more so during his time at the officer school, despite the fact that he failed the course.47 As 
is made clear by the overview of the pedagogical goals of the courses, the Nazi worldview was to be 
the foundation of the training; the “guiding line” for all police duties. As the key component of the 
worldview, racist ideas must have been prominent during the ideological lessons and the prism 
through which other aspects of the training were to be viewed. 
As part of their training the candidates were exposed to Nazi ideological ideas in practice. In their 
post-war testimonies, both Bauer and Hertel stated that as part of the course the trainees were 
taken to “visit” the Sachsenhausen-Oranienburg concentration camp. Hertel attended the course in 
the second half of 1939 and Bauer the second half of 1940. Both men claimed that they were 
informed that only “opponents of the regime” and criminals were imprisoned there.48 At the end of 
1939 the camp contained over 12,000 prisoners with a broad range of categories of prisoners, 
including Gypsies, Jews, Jehovah’s Witnesses and homosexuals and in 1940 the majority of the 
prisoner population was non-German. During the winter of 1939-40 the death toll rose considerably 
and in the period January to May 1940 there were 2,184 registered deaths. Many of these deaths 
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resulted from executions. Rudolf Höss, who was part of the camp administration from 1938 to 1940, 
claimed that there were executions every day after the outbreak of the war; executions that 
included many prisoners categorised as Jews.49 Neither Bauer nor Hertel stated how long these visits 
lasted or what precisely they were exposed to. However, it seems highly unlikely that the course 
members taken to the camp were not exposed to the brutal measures employed by the 
administration and the guards and the extreme conditions in which the prisoners were held. Located 
in Oranienburg was the office of the Inspectorate of Concentration Camps headed by Theodor Eicke 
and a training school for camp leaders and guards where procedures of systematic terror were 
developed in theory and practice.50 Again, it would seem unlikely that an opportunity to integrate 
the training of the police officer candidates with the ideological, theoretical and practical training of 
the SS camp system located within the vicinity of the camp would be missed. 
Following his takeover of the uniformed police in 1936, Himmler made it clear that the uniformed 
police, like the political police, should not be restricted by “legal norms”. Instead, the policeman in 
his duties was to follow a National Socialist “common sense”.51 An examiner for a gendarmerie 
officer training course in 1941 set out the expected answers to a question regarding punishment 
under the law. 
1. A person is sentenced when he commits a deed which under the law is punishable. 
2. A person is punished, further, if he commits a deed which, according to the people’s 
basic thought [Grundgedanken] of a law and according to the basic people’s judicial 
sentiment [Volksempfinden] deserves punishment. 
3. If no criminal law can be applied, then the deed is punishable according to that law 
which best corresponds to the basic thought.52 
National Socialist legal philosophy was based on Volk and race rather than state and law, meaning 
that this concept of a legal code, centred as it was on the Nazi brand of “common sense” was 
arbitrary in nature and emotional, as demonstrated by the examiner’s model answer to the question 
above.53 
This concept of a Nazi common sense is evident in an example of a lesson draft on the topic of fraud 
to be used at Berlin-Köpenick. The object of the lesson was not to understand a particular aspect of 
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the law, but for the candidate to understand what is wrong-doing. “The wrongness of fraud is to be 
focused on, in this way the candidate should reach a stage where there is a strong impulse to 
intervene”, this is the “cultivational goal of the lesson.”54 The lesson plan starts with some examples 
of fraud and deception and moves on to discuss the wrongness of “lies”, something the instructor 
was to emphasise that “a German person is unworthy of” and “goes against the German character.” 
The concluding section exhorts the instructor to make clear that severe punishments should be 
administered for “underhandedness” especially if it threatens the welfare of society. Following this 
the instructor should explain that the “common good before self-interest is a principle of the 
National Socialist worldview”.55 The purpose of the lesson was to contribute to the cultivation of a 
Nazi common sense that would elicit an emotional response to “crimes” that threatened the 
Volksgemeinschaft. Instead of being a lesson on a common aspect of the law, which would seem to 
be a usual part of police training, the lesson is infused with ideological strains. That this particular 
criminal aspect is depicted as being contrary to “Germanness” indicates a view of criminality along 
biological lines.56 The examiner of the gendarmerie officer course went on to write in relation to the 
question of “lawful punishment” that “a man with polluted blood is not capable of recognising 
injustice, but a man with racially pure blood is”.57 
As part of the “legal” training at Berlin-Köpenick, the officer candidates were being taught that Jews 
and other fremdvölkische elements were not only excluded from the Nazi concept of law, but were 
also more likely to act in a manner that was contrary to the “common good” of the 
Volksgemeinschaft. In a speech to gendarmerie commanders in January 1941, the protection of the 
Volk was presented as the ultimate function of the police ranks: “As the representative of the State, 
a police officer must be the best friend of the Volk, while he must be the representative of the 
Volksgemeinschaft against all criminal elements it is possible to be at the same time the true friend 
of every anständig German and the resolute adversary of every enemy of the Volk.”58 The arbitrary 
and emotional basis of National Socialist concept of legality based on this particular brand of 
“common sense” provided a fertile foundation for the graduates of the police officer training to 
justify and legitimise the murder of civilians in terms of the inherent criminality of the victims and as 
necessary and “decent” acts in defence of the Volksgemeinschaft. More will be discussed on this 
aspect of the role of the junior officers in the following chapters. 
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The intent to inject a Nazi common sense based on the worldview doctrines with police duties is 
apparent in the training material regarding obedience to orders and the use of initiative. During his 
trial in the 1970s, Bauer admitted that in addition to learning the fundamentals of criminal law, the 
training at Berlin-Köpenick also included a focus on a section of the military penal law regarding 
“illegal orders”.59 An extract from the Wehrmacht periodical Kriegskunst und Bild was used as part of 
the 16th Officer Training course at Berlin-Köpenick in October 1939. A section discussing the 
potential difficulties that unit leaders might face in war, titled: “How would a tactical task work in 
practice?” illustrates the notion of the sanctity of orders, but also mentions the possibility of not 
following orders. “One starts with the order. What does the order that I have received say? The 
order is the entire base for the actions of the leader! He may never move away from the order he 
received unless there are very important reasons for doing so”.60 The extract doesn’t give any 
examples of “very important reasons” for not carrying out an order. However, given that the Nazi 
worldview and common sense was intended to form the basis for interpretation of law along with 
other aspects relating to police duties, much may have been left to the individual’s interpretation of 
what constitutes an “illegal order” or orders that do not conform to a personal interpretation of the 
worldview. This indicates a degree of flexibility in interpretation, albeit within the somewhat 
abstract boundaries of the worldview. The formation of the police into military style regiments and 
battalions implemented a militarised hierarchical structure infused with SS personnel and principles. 
However, during their training the officer candidates were taught and encouraged to exercise 
initiative. In October 1941 Hitler spoke about the “culture of activism” and initiative that had been 
fostered throughout the Nazi ranks over the years. “Where would I be if I did not find trusted men to 
do the work that I cannot do, hard men...who act as radically as I would? The best man for me is he 
who bothers me least, in that he takes 95 out of 100 decisions on himself.”61 Within the Nazi 
organisation it had become common for subordinates to use their “common sense” in interpreting 
orders. A document from 1939 explains this process: “In the interest of the Party it is also in many 
cases the custom of the person issuing the command – precisely in cases of illegal demonstrations –
not to say everything and just to hint at what he wants to achieve with the order.”62 The importance 
of initiative is highlighted in the overview of the purpose of the schooling at Berlin-Köpenick. To use 
[knowledge] correctly, one needs a mental flexibility and beyond that a straight-forward and goal-
oriented disposition. If the student gets unused to working independently then the mind is slow and 
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acts as a hindrance. The police sergeant must learn to think and act independently.”63 However, 
within the same document there appears to be a tension between obeying orders and acting 
independently in a section under the heading “The main tasks and purpose of the police”. On 
“individual service”: [The policeman] is responsible for his own actions and can only rely on himself. 
He must think and judge independently. He acts in a cultivational way [educates others], has to be a 
role model and must have good standing and appearance.” These standards were also to be 
expected of a unit leader: “the leader has the responsibility in this case. The [subordinate] has to 
fulfil orders and tasks and perform under physical strain”.64  This section of the overview appears to 
imply that the future police officers, the leaders of the companies and platoons of the police 
battalions, were to operate within a hierarchical structure that deflected responsibility for actions 
from the subordinates within the group or unit to the commander, which at times when the 
battalions were deployed at company or platoon strength, would be themselves. In these situations 
the young lieutenants might be expected to “think and judge independently” and act using initiative, 
thereby taking responsibility for his and his unit’s actions. However, if the “guiding line for every 
police task is always the worldview”, the officer could use initiative and think “independently” even 
at the lower levels of the structural hierarchy, if he acted within the parameters of the prescribed 
worldview. 
Overwhelmingly, the training material is dominated by military-related training and theory, including 
unit and battalion formations, weapons training and the formation of military character. A training 
document from Berlin-Köpenick dated November 1938, titled: “The organisation of a strengthened 
police battalion”, demonstrates the intentions of melding established Wehrmacht structures and 
methods with police training. Major Freitag, the author of this training material, reasoned that as an 
increasing number of individuals at that time were joining the ranks of the police after receiving 
some kind of military training in the Hitler Youth, SS-work service and the Wehrmacht, the exercises 
and battle training of the Orpo were to be “based on Wehrmacht regulations and not some older 
regulations of the police that were based on other tactical considerations”. Freitag stated that in the 
interests of a thriving cooperation between the police and the military, common forms such as 
language, technical terms, decision-making, the dispensing of orders and the formation of units 
should be made the same, but with some aspects particular to the police. These ideas were based on 
the anticipated role of the police in the upcoming war which, Freitag argued, “means developing 
new police tactics which are removed from the basic ideas of the Wehrmacht tactics”.65 The 
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overview of the lesson goals for the training at Berlin-Köpenick which appears likely to have been 
written after the invasion of Poland, highlights the tasks of the police during war. “Here the police 
have the tasks of pacifying and securing the borders, defence against air raids, espionage, sabotage, 
parachutists and air-landing troops, the clearing of specific areas and active action at the front.”66 
Clearly the police battalions were intended to be formed as combat capable units but the main body 
of their tasks were anticipated to be in securing the areas behind the front line and on the home 
front. For Freitag the decisive factors in organising and equipping the police fighting corps were their 
anticipated wartime functions and “probable enemy”. Freitag identified the main task of the police 
to be the “controlling and annihilation of armed rebels in the city and in the country” as well as 
parachutists and “specific enemy troops”. To combat these enemies would require “specific 
equipment and good training of the protection corps” for “close combat of all kinds” including the 
use of daggers, side-arms, spades, grenades, pistols and bayonets.67 Therefore, the officer cadets 
were not only to be trained in group military forms and police tactics, but were also to be trained as 
police soldiers capable of killing at close quarters; although in this particular case the training ideas 
seem to be directed towards killing armed “rebels”. The Haltung of the policeman, in addition to 
being based on the Nazi worldview was to be “a soldierly one in every task”.68 However, it was the 
internalisation of the ideological worldview that was considered to be the greatest asset to be 
cultivated in the officer cadets. It was the “soul” of the leader, more than physical and mental 
abilities that would “enable the leader in the most difficult of storms and battles to be a role model 
for his men amidst death and horror and to step out in front of them calm and relaxed before 
death”. It was to be made clear to the officer candidates that it was possible to acquire these 
abilities by being “strict with yourself”, by “overcoming egocentricities in thinking about yourself and 
instead thinking about the community and the Fatherland”.69 Outside of the group tactics and 
weapons training, the military part of the training for the officer candidates included the recurring 
themes of attaining a specific Haltung, acting as a role model for their subordinates, putting aside 
self-interest and acting with feeling, or “soul” towards the community or “Volk”. 
Perhaps the most significant aspect of the police officer training which would have the most far-
reaching effects on the actions of the police battalions in Eastern Europe was the training of the 
officer candidates as “educators” and “cultivators” themselves. In the absence of explicit mention of 
ideological tenets in the surviving training material, the clearest expression of transmitting 
ideological standards can be found in the attempts of the SS-run school to mould the candidates into 
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educators or cultivators of the Nazi worldview.70 In a part of a training document dedicated to 
educational methods, titled: “Education and upbringing in the National Socialist State”, the 
instructors and future instructors are shown a life cycle of worldview cultivation. Starting in the 
parental house the young person learns the German language, “the greatest connecting bond of the 
Volk”, and learns ideas of “integrity, manners, obedience and honesty.” At school the boy learns a 
“sense of duty” and after ten years of age, a sense of pre-military education and “love of the 
Fatherland.” In the Hitler Youth the boy is strengthened in his worldview and will be consequently 
accepted into the Party or one of its divisions. Following the Hitler Youth and work service, the 
young man is to enter a category of the military which represents “the coronation of his prior pre-
military education”, where he is “educated to act independently” as a “political soldier” and finally 
to become a “role model for the young nation.”71 
Instructions from the Inspectorate of Security Police and SD addressed to the leaders of the 
“schooling community” dated 21 March 1941 outlined the type of pedagogical aims of the SS-run 
training courses: “The community leader is a leader and educator, not teacher. He is a role model 
and comrade...The community leader has to guide adults in the SS way”. “[The training] should grip 
the men mentally in their worldview and make their thinking and feeling uniformly in the spirit of 
the SS-man.”72 This is the type of approach taught at the Berlin-Köpenick school that officers in their 
role as educators were to adopt. Some instructions given to the instructors at the school on the 
intended purpose of the lessons state: “It is not enough to have a large amount of knowledge, but to 
pass it on to others in a lesson kind of way...Specific knowledge is not enough, one must be able to 
apply this knowledge to specific areas.”73 Throughout the instructional material are references to 
appealing to the whole person, in “body, mind and soul.” The instructors were to appeal to all the 
senses and create emotional experiences which, all together, should create the desired Haltung. 
However, these methods and attempts to create an emotional experience were not to be overdone. 
According to the instructions, the lessons should still be “fresh, fun and lively...as too serious tone 
can put [the student] off or seem comical.”74 The intention appears to have been for the instructor 
to create an all-encompassing yet comradely experience. The officer candidates were to emotionally 
internalise the ideological Haltung and then pass it on to others. In starting with the ideological base, 
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the intention was to “cultivate” an ideological lens through which all following lessons were to be 
viewed. “The cultivation takes its principles from the worldview. The worldview finds its principles in 
National Socialism and, in turn, the Führer’s book Mein Kampf and the Führer’s speeches.”75 
The training of the police battalions did not end with basic training, the education of the men, 
including the achievement of the desired Haltung, was intended to be an ongoing process. One of 
the means of achieving or maintaining the desired Haltung was to hold informal get-togethers and 
other social events. These events were intended to supplement the more formal training and were 
probably used during the training courses as well as after the units had been deployed in Poland and 
the former Soviet territories.76 “Fellowship evenings” appear to have been a frequent event and 
could involve the whole battalion or be organised at company or platoon level. One former member 
of the 2nd Company of 304 recalled one of a number of company fellowship evenings.77 These 
evenings were encouraged by Himmler and he even issued guidelines for the holding of these events 
in February 1941. Himmler directed that there must be a responsible leader present who was to be 
in control of the proceedings. The leaders were not to “sit together and build a club amongst 
themselves, but to sit among the men, that is why it is called a fellowship evening”. Himmler clearly 
did not want these events to turn into drinking evenings and issued strict regulations on the amount 
of alcohol each man could consume. Instead, the evenings were intended to maintain an ésprit de 
corps and include some suitable music, poems and a speech by the leader. The evenings were also to 
be used as a means of education.78 These events, primarily a mechanism for the shaping of the 
Haltung of the police, probably did not usually conform to Himmler’s guidelines.79 The tone and 
itinerary probably depended on the officer or officers leading them. 
Whether as part of the fellowship evenings or during some other time, officers were supposed to 
hold 30-45 minute sessions every week on themes that could be used as a medium to convey Nazi 
“educational” themes.80 Themes that were used by the police before the invasion of the Soviet 
Union included: “Jews and criminality”, “the blood community” and “the greater German Reich”.81  
Instructions dated 18 July 1941 intended to be used by leaders of “political classes”, including 
company and platoon leaders, outlined the political worldview lesson over the weeks following 28 
July 1941. Topics to be covered included a general overview of the nationalities and different 
                                                          
75 BAB R20/67, Document used for the 19th Officer Cadet Course at Berlin-Köpenick 1941, ‘General 
Introduction’ to ‘educational’ matters.  
76 Matthäus, ‘Anti-Semitism as an Offer’, pp.19-20. 
77 StA 120 Js, statement by Kluge, 1977, p.1138. 
78 Matthäus, Kwiet, Förster and Breitman (eds.), Ausbildungsziel Judenmord? Document 13, pp.196-8. 
79 Westermann, Police Battalions, p.81. 
80 Browning, Origins, p.232. 
81 Browning, Origins, p.232. 
84 
 
peoples of “Russia”; “Jewishness”, on which the focus was to be on the role of the Jews and the 
Bolshevik leadership during revolution and state leadership.82 These then were the type of lessons 
that were to be delivered by the unit commanders of the police battalion that probably included the 
recently graduated young officers. One former member of the 2nd Company of 314 recalled Bauer 
giving a lesson a few days before the invasion of the Soviet Union on “the political view and spirit”.83  
It is not clear whether Bauer was giving the lesson to his platoon or the whole company or if he was 
using instructions distributed by the SS and police leadership. In any case, Bauer, who would only 
have been 23 years old at the time, was performing one of the tasks he had been specifically 
groomed for at the officer school. The effectiveness of these lessons may have, in part, depended on 
the individual giving them, but the extent to which these messages were internalised by the men 
receiving them cannot be accurately determined. An article from the “Black Corps” in 1938 indicates 
the indifference of some SS men to these indoctrination lessons: “Of course, this or that person 
thinks, ‘We ought to go along, especially because our superior officer is also going to be there 
(promotion!). In any case’, as these people console themselves in a typically philistine manner, ‘the 
cosy get-together afterwards is always really nice’”.84 
As officers these men were to “cultivate” their subordinates, in part through delivering regular 
political instruction sessions, but were also to behave as “role models”. Police officers that were 
involved in educating the rank and file were to set an example by conducting themselves publically 
and privately in the “proper” National Socialist way. Educators were to maintain a “strict military 
posture in his conduct, dress, speech, and form of expression.85 Here we can see the intended 
purpose of the “life teachings” aspect of the officer training. The officers as educators were to 
consider themselves as “political warriors in front of political soldiers” and were to provide the men 
under their command greater awareness of “positive living”; “he must live what he teaches”.86 Three 
of the junior officers from Battalion 314 must have been considered effective enough as educators 
as they went on to become training officers in police training schools in 1943. Panis and Bauer 
became training officers for the Police Officer School that was Berlin-Köpenick, but was then 
relocated to Oranienburg and then Mariaschein in the Sudetenland. Schleich was employed as a 
training officer at the Police Weapons School in Lyon.87 
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Part of the role of the junior officers then, was to carry themselves as model SS officers and National 
Socialists. From the concluding assessments of some of the graduates of police officer training, it 
appears that considerable weight was placed on the character of the candidate by their evaluators. 
Mayer graduated from Fürstenfeldbruck in June 1938 with an overall score of 157, a much higher 
score than the average for that particular course which was 127. Mayer had had considerable 
practical experience within SS organisations, having already served as a Dachau guard, attended the 
SS-Junker school in Braunschweig and held a position in the RuSHA before attending police officer 
school. Mayer was also judged by a superior in the RuSHA as having a “clean character”, to be a 
“good comrade” and a “fanatical National Socialist”.88 Mayer did well in officer training and he 
received a good final evaluation from the training school: “Lieutenant Mayer is spiritually above the 
average of his comrades and has an interest in his profession. Accordingly, he showed independent 
thinking in his performances”. However, the evaluator concluded: “In his manners he has yet to be 
rounded”.89 Steinmann, from the 14th Officer Training course in Berlin-Köpenick in December 1939 
also seems to have been considered to be somewhat lacking in his personal bearing: “In appearance 
and posture he is lacking and that is why as of now he is not to be used as a training officer”. 
Steinmann’s overall score was 116, slightly lower than the average score of 118 and he received 
“satisfactory” grades for most of the subjects, including platoon leader and ideological training. His 
best mark was in administration and civil law, which may have led to Steinmann becoming an 
adjutant rather than a platoon commander.90 Seeber graduated from the 19th Officer Training course 
at Berlin-Köpenick in July 1941 with an overall score of 75, five points lower than the average for the 
course.91 However, despite his low score Seeber received only praise in his concluding evaluation: 
“Neat character with clear, open nature. He is well built, appearance and manners are impeccable. 
He has leadership qualities and promises to be a useful officer”.92 Clearly manner, physical 
appearance and posture were considered to be important characteristics for a junior officer and 
platoon leader. SS candidates were to be accepted only if they passed a “racial examination”, which 
involved an assessment of “physical build” and a “racial evaluation”.93 The type of “manner” and 
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“posture” desired of the junior officers is not clear, but seems likely to have been based on 
Himmler’s romanticised ideal of a “chivalrous” and “decent” SS Junker order.94  
That the average score for the 19th Officer Training course in 1941 was much lower than that of the 
1938 and 1939 courses suggests a general decrease in technical ability of the police officer 
candidates. That the majority of the 121 officer candidates that graduated from Berlin-Köpenick in 
July 1941 were probably from the 1918-20 year groups, and therefore younger overall than earlier 
officer candidate groups, suggests that a relative lack of prior “professional” experience may have 
been the reason for the lower scores on technical matters. However, as we have seen, technical 
capabilities were not the only criteria the instructors and examiners were interested in. Overall, as 
Abiturenten and former HJ leaders this group of officer candidates may have been a better fit to the 
SS-police ideal of the future officer corps than men like Mayer and Steinmann; neither of whom 
were Abiturenten or had been members of the HJ. The only policemen from Battlions 314 and 304 
known to have attended an officer course and failed is Jäger of Battalion 304. It is likely that Jäger 
attended the Berlin-Köpenick officer school from September to December 1940 after the NCO 
course in Dresden-Hellerau. Jäger had been a member of the SA as a troop leader, and the Party 
since 1931 and had taken part in the arrests of political opponents in his hometown in 1933, so he 
would have been considered an “old fighter”. However, Jäger was 28 years old during the training, 
considerably older than the other candidates from the two battalions. In addition, Jäger had 
attended Realschule and consequently, not been entered for the Abitur. Jäger himself cited the 
reason for his failing the course was that he didn’t have the Abitur.95 It appears likely, despite his 
proven ideological commitment, that because of his age and limited formed education, Jäger would 
have been one of the NCOs Himmler considered to be “only partly suited to an officer career”. To 
adequately perform the “cultivational” role envisioned for them, a high level of formal education 
and a certain type of physical appearance and personal manner were qualities, along with a level of 
technical knowledge and capability and ideological strength, considered most desirable for a junior 
officer in the police battalions. 
Two evaluations written in 1943 on the performances as platoon officers in the field of two of the 
graduates of the 19th Officer Training course, Seeber of Battalion 304 and Panis of Battalion 314, 
illustrate some of the qualities that were sought after for a junior officer in the police battalions. 
Seeber was killed by a mine in 1942 and a letter was sent from the HSSPF headquarters in Kiev to the 
Orpo Main Office in June 1943 evaluating Seeber’s performance as an officer in the battalion. 
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“Lieutenant Seeber was a very suitable officer. He possessed very good leadership qualities and had 
an excellent educational and military influence on his platoon. In combat he was always an 
outstanding role model for his subordinates”.96 Captain Meisel of Battalion 314 gave a report of his 
platoon officer in the 3rd Company Lieutenant Panis in March 1943. Meisel wrote that Panis had 
shown that he possessed great energy and was composed and “cold blooded in critical situations”. 
In these ways he “always set a great example for his subordinates in his platoon”. “Because of his 
[proven] abilities he received special orders during combat missions which he carried out in an 
exemplary manner…His behaviour towards superiors was always spotless and his manner in uniform 
was an example to his comrades…He is a good leader to his men who even uses his sparse free time 
to help willing subordinates with their progress by holding lessons”. Meisel rounded off his glowing 
report with: “Ltn Panis has made National Socialist ideology (Gedankengut) his own and he 
understands [how] to teach his men ideologically (weltanschaulich)”.97 
Panis’s “cold blooded” behaviour in leading and carrying out “special orders” will be discussed in 
more detail in the following chapters. A significant part of the role of the junior officers then was to 
act as ideological “educators” and “role models” to their subordinates. It appears that part of the 
officer training courses were geared towards cultivating these leadership qualities, particularly in the 
“teacher training” and “life teaching” aspects of the training. However, some qualities that were 
desired by the SS and police leadership from their officers for the performance of these roles could 
not be attained through officer training, such as the completion of the Abitur, a certain type of 
character, posture, manner and appearance considered to be fitting of a leader of “ideological 
soldiers”. In this regard the younger officers of the July 1941 class of police lieutenants may not have 
been lacking despite their lower overall training performance. A generational unit of educational 
elites and ideologically cultivated former HJ leaders, such as this, may well have suited the ideals of 
Himmler and Daluege of the future SS and police officer corps just as well, if not better, than their 
older and more experienced colleagues. 
Arrivals 
Most of the company and platoon leaders of Battalions 314 and 304 were already with the 
battalions during basic training in Chemnitz and Vienna. Bauer joined 314 in Poland. During the trial 
investigations there was some uncertainty when the younger officers of the 19th Officer Training 
course arrived at Battalions 314 and 304 in Ukraine. Following the end of the training course on 12 
July 1941, Panis, Pütz, Schellwath and Schleich reported to the police administration in Düsseldorf 
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and Becker, Seeber and Lochbrunner reported to the Munich administration where they were 
involved in police duties.98 Becker claimed that he then returned to Berlin which “was the collection 
point for 40 new lieutenants who were to be moved to Russia”.99 According to Becker, about 40 
officers were loaded on a bus and driven towards the east and wherever they reached a place 
assigned to one of the officers, they jumped out. “Somewhere in Ukraine I arrived with Lieutenant 
Lochbrunner and one other to Police Battalion 304”.100 That one other was Lieutenant Seeber. 
A memo from Himmler’s office dated 18 August 1941 listed the names of 72 graduates of the 19th 
Officer Training who were to be assigned to the 22 police battalions already operating in the Soviet 
Union.101 The memo states that “The [listed] officers are to be on the march so as to arrive at the 
supply points no later than 22 August 1941, from which they are to be sent on their way to the listed 
police battalions and reserve police battalions”. The supply point for the police battalions in the 
southern sector was Cracow.102 Lieutenants Panis, Schellworth, Schleich and Pütz of Battalion 314 
were probably all on the same bus as Lochbrunner, Becker and Seeber of 304 that drove eastwards 
from Berlin. Schellwath stated in his post-war testimony that he joined the battalion in Kovel; the 
battalion staff and 3rd Company were stationed in Kovel until the first days of September 1941. In 
the report written by Meisel on Panis, he states that Panis was with the battalion from 3 September. 
The post-war witness statements of former rank and file policemen suggest that the new lieutenants 
arrived at the battalion together, which appears to have been just as Battalion 314 were leaving the 
Kovel area during the first days of September.103 It seems likely that Becker, Lochbrunner and Seeber 
would have arrived to Battalion 304 around the same time as their colleagues. Battalion 304 was 
stationed in Starokonstantinov until 4 September, so the three lieutenents probably joined the 
battalion there.104 Some of these officers who finished the officer training in the summer of 1941 
tried to make the time of their arrival with these units out to be as late as possible in order to avoid 
being implicated in the earlier massacres carried out by both battalions in Ukraine.105 However, 
these junior officers arrived at a time when Battalions 314 and 304 were beginning to carry out 
massacres of Jewish women and then also children and it appears that some, or perhaps all of these 
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men were involved in large massacres almost immediately following their arrival in Ukraine. Their 
participation in these massacres will be discussed in the following chapters. 
Conclusion 
The police battalions were constructed on the back of a pre-existing martial identity of the German 
police and the basic training of these battalions was grounded on a military model. Basic police and 
military training were the main blocks of the six months of initial training, but the training was 
infused with ideological standards. A main aim was to cultivate the worldview of the policemen and 
a desired Haltung amongst the ranks. It is not entirely clear how this aspect of the training differed 
from the usual general Nazi propaganda tenants and how great an influence it had on the mind-set 
of the rank and file. It seems likely that the purpose of some aspects of the training was to prepare 
the policemen for their tasks in Poland and then further east, such as training centred on their 
intended role in the grand eastern colonial project and encouragements to feel and behave as 
Herrenmenschen. These aspects may well have induced a certain mind-set that some of the 
policemen took with them into the eastern territories. 
The officer training courses at Fürstenfeldbruck and Berlin-Köpenick were intended to create Orpo 
Junkers fit to perform a role based on the German army model. The junior officers of the German 
army were fundamentally the connecting links between higher orders and the rank and file. These 
men were to act with unswerving obedience to higher orders, but were also supposed to be able to 
act with initiative. Traditionally, they were educated men responsible for the morale, discipline and 
education of the men under their command. The junior officers of the police battalions were to lead 
from the front and were supposed to know the correct course of action instinctively. However, these 
“instincts” were to be informed by a solid grounding in Nazi “common sense”. The ideals of Nazi 
legal theory could only really be carried out by those who acted according to Nazi common sense, 
which, in general, meant acting according to the general good of the Volksgemeinschaft. As role-
models these officers were intended to personify the soldierly, SS ideal in looks, manner, thinking 
and action. Most of the young men who would become junior officers in Battalions 314 and 304 had 
been cultivated as a National Socialist “vanguard” in the HJ and now they were being trained to carry 
themselves as a vanguard of the SS. The personal traits of these SS Junkers appear to have been 
considered just as important in the performance of their role as police and military technical 
knowledge. Perhaps the most important aspect of the role of the junior officers with regards to the 
carrying out of mass murder by the platoons and companies of the police battalions, lay in their 
capacity as “educators” or “cultivators”. Ideological rationales for the tasks and actions of the 
policemen in Eastern Europe seem likely to have been most effective when given face-to-face in the 
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field. Integral to the role of the junior officers then, was a thorough understanding of Nazi common 
sense. If the individual officers had not fully internalised the tenets of National Socialism, they were 
to behave as though they had, and to surrounding events for their subordinates accordingly. 
The 72 graduates of Berlin-Köpenick that were dispersed among the police battalions in the Soviet 
Union in late-August or early-September 1941 may have been a radical injection at a crucial 
juncture. These young men were deployed at the time when the police battalions in the east were 
beginning to carry out large-scale massacres of Jewish civilians that included the elderly and infirm, 
women and children among the victims. The justifications among the perpetrators for these actions 
may have had to rely even more heavily upon Nazi ideological tenets than perhaps was the case with 
the earlier massacres of Jewish men of “military age”. Despite their lower overall score, the SS and 
police leadership must have considered each of the 72 graduates ready to perform these tasks. The 
reports written by the superiors of Panis and Seeber indicate that at least some of this class 





















Chapter 3. Poland 1939-1941 
Browning has argued that Germans were more transformed by their experiences and actions in 
Poland between 1939 and 1941 than they had been during the domestic dictatorship from 1933 to 
1939.1 This chapter will outline some of the key events in Poland before the invasion of the Soviet 
Union, will analyse the experiences and actions of Battalions 304 and 314 while carrying out Nazi 
racial policies during this period, and determine how significant the events in Poland were for the 
following mass killing in Ukraine. The battalions arrived in late-1940 following their initial training. By 
the time of their arrivals, the German occupation agencies in Poland had been involved in brutal and 
radical “population policies” and had created an atmosphere of violent permissiveness. Upon their 
arrival, the battalions were enforcing Nazi policies that involved a significant level of brutality and 
violence, but, as will be shown, by the time the battalions left for Ukraine not every policeman had 
been directly involved in killing actions in Poland. However, the circumstances and general 
permissiveness facilitated the emergence of radical elements or enthusiasts among the ranks of the 
battalions who did engage in killing even though it was not required of them. This chapter will give a 
brief overview of some events that preceded the arrival of the battalions in Poland, will recreate as 
far as possible the actions and experiences of the men and officers of the battalions in Poland, and 
assess their significance for the battalions’ subsequent actions in Ukraine.  
Extending the boundaries of permissible behaviour 
Colonial ideas concerning the “wild east” had been part of the German social fabric since the 
Wilhelmine era and the Nazis did not have to construct from scratch a conception of Poland as an 
area fit for German colonisation. The German soldiers, policemen and civilian administrators that 
entered Poland in 1939 and 1940 had long been exposed to historical stereotypes of Poland as a 
“backward”, “hostile” place inhabited by racial inferiors.2 The Nazis’ building on existing cultural 
notions of “the east” as a strange, hostile place, populated by inferior peoples (excepting the ethnic 
German inhabitants) undoubtedly contributed to the effect on many of the German soldiers and 
policemen entering Poland of removing moral and ethical norms that would normally have 
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influenced their behaviour in the Reich. Connected to the portrayals of “backwardness”, Poles and 
Jews were couched as racial “others”, as natural and dangerous enemies of the Volksgemeinschaft.3 
The Polish campaign set the pattern for the systematic targeting of civilians that would become the 
Nazis’ method of warfare in the subsequent campaigns in eastern and southeastern Europe.4 
Between September and December 1939 the Einsatzgruppen, Self-defence corps (ethnic Germans 
under SS coordination), the Uniformed Police, Waffen-SS and the German army shot approximately 
45,000 Polish citizens in the German occupied parts of Poland. About 7,000 of this total were Polish 
Jews; a figure somewhat higher than the Jewish portion of the population.5 Field commanders often 
took their own measures against civilians, ranging from the execution of individuals to entire villages 
without referring to higher levels in the command structure in administering disproportionate 
reprisals for civilian attacks. No specific instructions had been issued regarding the summary 
destruction of homes and communities, so these commanders were spontaneously acting using their 
initiative, without having to depend on the formalities of courts-martial.6 The massacres of civilians 
in large numbers by the German army would continue even after the establishment of the civilian 
administration.7 In contrast to Bartov’s arguments on the process of barbarisation of the Wehrmacht 
in the Soviet Union,8 Rossino argues that the war of 1939 spanned too short a time period for 
brutalization to have had a significant impact.9 The German Army was already operating in a 
destructive way, using racially motivated methods that stood in conjunction with the veneration of 
violence and ideological goals of National Socialism and established the context in which the 
Einsatzgruppen would develop their brutal practices.10 
As part of the operation code-named “Tannenberg”, Einsatzgruppen consisting of SS and police 
personnel under the leadership of selected men of the Security Police and SD, followed the 
Wehrmacht into Poland. In addition to these units a “special purpose” (z.b.V.) group lead by Udo von 
Woyrsch was added at the time of the invasion. The “Directives for the Deployment Abroad of the 
Security Police and the SD” of July 1939, directives agreed to by the OKH and Heydrich, described 
the responsibilities of the Einsatzgruppen as “combating all elements hostile to the Reich and to 
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Germany”, authorized the arrest of all persons on a wanted list, including German emigrants, and 
Poles who primarily on the basis of their position and reputation, might be considered a security 
threat. However, the directive also clearly forbade “the abuse or killing of arrested persons”, and 
explicitly stated that force was only to be used to “break the resistance”.11 From the start the 
Einsatzgruppen engaged in the mass executions of people within the context of the “intelligentsia 
campaign”, a campaign designed to debilitate the Polish state by eliminating its leadership, but the 
Einsatzgruppen extended their mandate for mass killing to involve Polish Jews. The instructions 
given to von Woyrsch, which appear to have been similar to those given to other Einsatzgruppen 
leaders on 11 September, were directed towards the spreading of terror amongst the Jewish 
population in order to force as many as possible to flee from areas intended for German 
colonisation; in the case of von Woyrsch’s group, East-Upper Silesia.12 
In addition to the members of the Uniformed Police who formed part of the Einsatzgruppen, 21 
police battalions had been deployed in Poland by the end of September 1939. Like the 
Einsatzgruppen, these battalions were assigned to each of the Wehrmacht’s armies, were 
subordinated to the respective army commander and were supposed to “sweep behind the 
advancing armies”.13 During the campaign the police battalions were to perform tasks that ranged 
from duties such as guarding prisoners, weapons transports and important industrial sites, to 
engaging in combat with the Polish army and carrying out executions of civilians. Because of the 
rapid advancements of the German armies, the police battalions became involved in fighting 
sections of the Polish army that had been bypassed by the Wehrmacht.14 The accounts of military 
successes of these units would no doubt have found their way into the training curriculum of the 
300-level battalions in 1940. As well as engaging in fighting, the actions and perceptions towards 
Polish resistance mirrored those of broad sections of the Wehrmacht. During the course of the war, 
police reports described armed resistance as acts by “bandits”, “gangs” or “guerrillas”, thus 
reflecting the criminalisation of any resistance to the imposition of German “law and order”.15 Also 
mirroring the Wehrmacht directives legitimising reprisals and summary executions, on 3 September, 
Himmler ordered his police units to execute Polish “rioters” found with weapons on the spot. On 5 
September “gang fighters” were reported to be at large in Tschenstockau (Częstochowa). The police 
battalion sent in to put down the resistance did so with brutality, reporting afterwards that the 
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“franc-tireurs” had been hanged on lamp-posts in the street.16 Aside from killings related to 
“security” or “resistance” revolving largely around racial prerogatives, during the war and under the 
following civilian administration the police were heavily involved in the execution of racial policy in 
Poland. Along with the Einsatzgruppen, the Self-Defence Corps, Waffen-SS and Wehrmacht units, 
the police were involved in the executions of Polish “elites”, Jews, the patients of psychiatric 
institutions, “a-social” individuals, prostitutes and Gypsies.17 It appears that the police were 
consistently using capital punishment for a variety of reasons.18 
During the Polish campaign tensions arose between elements in the Wehrmacht hierarchy and the 
SS leadership. Some Wehrmacht commanders were not prepared to accept the killings being 
perpetrated by German units, particularly those committed by SS and police units. It appears that 
the objections raised by some Wehrmacht commanders were based primarily on two concerns. First, 
the objections to the excessive violence inflicted on the Polish Jews that offended segments of the 
officer corps were based less on humanitarian concerns than on the detrimental effect on army 
discipline. Second, the killings done by the SS units were carried out without court-martial which, 
although Wehrmacht commanders were doing the same thing, was seen as a challenge to 
Wehrmacht executive authority.19 However, perhaps because most Wehrmacht officers did not 
fundamentally disagree with the targeting of Polish civilians in principle, the Wehrmacht leadership 
was open to negotiation with the SS leadership. Over a period of a few days in mid-September 1939 
in the midst of war, although they were in a position to intervene in the mass murder being carried 
out by SS units, Wehrmacht officers made large concessions that gave the SS leadership significant 
extensions of authority in Poland.20 On 4 October, Hitler declared a general amnesty for SS and army 
personnel who were to undergo trials as a result of Wehrmacht commanders’ interventions for 
committing crimes against Polish civilians, citing an understandable “embitterment caused by Polish 
atrocities”.21 Perhaps even more significantly, at the end of the war in October 1939, Hitler gave 
permission to Himmler for the creation of a separate jurisdiction for SS and police courts comparable 
to the military courts.22 Therefore, from October 1939, all SS and police units and personnel 
deployed in Poland were subject to a new judicial system which included authority to issue the 
death penalty. In his biography of Himmler, Longerich has pointed out that it was not coincidental 
that this separate jurisdiction was granted after the war, on the heels of attempts by the Wehrmacht 
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to prosecute SS personnel and the extension of SS authority over repressive security measures. On 
an organisational level, this judicial system afforded Himmler the means to ensure that his particular 
principles on “decency and discipline” within the SS were abided by.23 
As Rossino has highlighted, the relationship between the army and SS was complicated and full of 
contradictions, but common racist perceptions of Poles and Jews were enough to facilitate a 
significant level of cooperation.24 The level of cooperation and the weakness of Wehrmacht 
commanders provided the opportunities to extend the authority of the SS by creating its own 
independent judicial courts.25 The concessions made by the Wehrmacht regarding the SS and police 
use of court-martials and the recognition of an SS chain of command outside of Wehrmacht 
channels would give the SS leadership far more room for manoeuvre in establishing the 
organisation’s dominance over racial security issues. These developments combined with the 
experience of involvement in reprisals, the prosecution of racial policies, and the general 
mistreatment of the Jews in 1939 extended the boundaries of permissible behaviour within the 
ranks of the Uniformed Police.26 
Following the defeat of Poland, the military administration was officially replaced by a civilian 
administration on 26 October 1939.27 Beginning in autumn 1939 Nazi organisations attempted to 
implement population policies based on racial principles. The western parts of Polish territory were 
to be annexed to the Reich and “Germanised” largely through resettlement and expulsion. The 
central section, the Generalgouvernement, separating the annexed territories and the Soviet 
controlled territories was to become an area populated by former Polish citizens who were to exist 
on a deliberately depressed standard of living and would provide a reservoir of cheap labour.28 
That the Lublin district of the GG became an early destination for the victims of the Nazi population 
engineering plans, headed by the SS, set in train ongoing jurisdictional conflicts between the civil 
administration and the SS.29 A key development in population policy in Poland was the transfer by 
Hitler to Himmler of all authority for the organisation and implementation of the “ethnic new order” 
on 7 October 1939. Himmler was given the title of Reich Commissioner for the Consolidation of 
German Nationalism (RKFDV), which initially was restricted to the areas to be annexed to the 
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Reich.30 The overlapping of jurisdictions between the main German agencies in the occupied areas 
meant that the police battalions in the GG were in a position where they were operating under the 
executive authority of the civil administration under Frank, but were nominally operating within the 
SS and police chains of command. Three police battalions were stationed in each of the four districts 
of the GG and formed a district regiment under the command of a regimental commander 
(Kommandeur der Ordnungspolizei – KdO) and were rotated from Germany on tours of duty. These 
battalions operated through two chains of command. The normal police chain ran from the battalion 
commander to the KdO, through the overall Orpo commander (Befehlshaber der Ordnungspolizei – 
BdO) in Cracow to Daluege’s main office in Berlin. For operations that involved cooperation with 
other SS agencies, the battalion commander would report to the SSPF (Globocnik in Lublin), to the 
HSSPF in Cracow (Krüger) and finally to Himmler.31 Regardless of the clashes over authority, the 
police battalions in the GG and the annexed territories would become key organisations in the 
pursuit of Nazi racial policies, whether they were operating within SS jurisdictions or under the civil 
administration. For the first few months of the occupation, the police forces were largely 
concentrated on the pacification of the Polish countryside, which included the types of “cleansing 
operations” ordered by Himmler. However, by summer 1940 these units had become increasingly 
involved in “resettlement” actions.32 
Battalions 304 and 314 were deployed to the GG in September and December 1940 respectively. The 
arrival of Battalion 304 in Warsaw coincided with Frank’s decision to approve a sealed ghetto in the 
city on 12 September. Throughout the period of resettlement in Poland, the police battalions had 
been heavily involved in the resettlement of ethnic Germans and the resulting displacements of 
hundreds of thousands of Polish citizens from their homes.33 Battalion 314 was deployed to continue 
the enforcement of racial policy in the Lublin district, which had been the primary target deportation 
area in the GG, in December 1940. Like the arrival of Battalion 304, the arrival of Battalion 314 in 
Lublin also coincided with a newly conceived “short-term” plan. At the end of 1940, Heydrich had 
been developing a third short-term plan that was to involve the expulsion of 771,000 Poles 
(including a small percentage of Jews) from the incorporated territories to the GG in order to 
“accommodate” ethnic Germans from south-eastern Europe, and the deportation of 60,000 
Viennese Jews.34 It seems likely that Battalion 314, along with its other security duties, was supposed 
to be involved in the resettlement of these deportees. 
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Battalion 304 in Warsaw 
Police Battalion 304 arrived in Warsaw from Chemnitz in September 1940 around the same time 
that Frank officially approved a sealed ghetto in Warsaw. Part of the duties of the battalion in the 
Warsaw district was to provide “property protection” which included the guarding of industrial and 
military units, a train line and the accommodation barracks. “Gendarmerie posts” or bases were also 
set up in the rural areas, each of which was commanded by a platoon leader. In addition to the 
guard duties, the training that had begun in Chemnitz was continued in Warsaw.35 During the West 
German trials of members of Battalion 304, a few former policemen mentioned the role of the 
battalion in the deportation of Jews from the district into the ghetto area, the sealing or closure of 
the ghetto in October 1940 and the role of the battalion as a guard unit of the ghetto from October 
1940 to April 1940.36 
According to the diary of the leader of the Jewish council, Adam Czerniaków, on the same day that 
Frank approved a sealed ghetto, 12 October 1940, he was informed that: “Until October 31, the 
resettlement [into the ghetto area] will be voluntary, after that compulsory. All furniture must 
remain where it is”.37 Presumably, the furniture as well as the Jewish homes were to be used by the 
Polish families moved out of the area that was to be ghettoised. Between early October and mid-
November a massive, and as far as allocated space is concerned, unequal population exchange took 
place in which 700 ethnic Germans and 113, 000 Poles were moved out of the area and 138,000 
Polish Jews were moved in.38  Battalion 304 played a major role in the subsequent forcible 
expulsions of the Jewish population who had not already moved into the ghetto area from their 
homes. On one particular day, the entire 2nd Company of Battalion 304 entered the city to force 
Jewish families into the ghetto. Upon arrival the group leaders, with about fifteen subordinates 
each, were instructed to search each building that had presumably been identified as Jewish 
residences and take the inhabitants into the ghetto. One of these group leaders was Walter 
Hofmann of the 2nd Platoon. Hofmann entered the first apartment with one of his men, instructed 
the residents to pack the necessary possessions and leave the room. It is not clear how long the 
residents were given before they were forcibly removed, but Hofmann had left four members of his 
group to drive the people onto the street while he entered the next building. On that day fourteen 
people were evicted from their homes and escorted by Hofmann’s group all armed with rifles. Two 
or three days later Hofmann’s group again were involved in the deportation of people into the 
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ghetto. This time Hofmann’s group escorted seven people from the Praga district of Warsaw.39 It is 
very likely that Hofmann and his group were authorised to use their weapons should they have 
encountered any resistance, but the level of violence or abuse actually used during these particular 
evictions and deportations is not known. 
The ghetto was sealed off on 16 November by a three metre high wall on which was mounted 
barbed wire. Initially the German police guarded the passages of the ghetto, but were later replaced 
by Polish policemen under the supervision of German police. The 87 man German guard under the 
command of a lieutenant was stationed in three posts outside the surrounding wall.40 A total of 
fourteen entrance and exit points had to be constantly guarded by members of the battalion who 
were deployed inside and outside the ghetto. The primary job of the guard units was to arrest 
anyone who had left the ghetto without authorisation, those who were found outside without the 
required armbands, and those who tried to smuggle clothes, food, medicine or fuel into the ghetto; 
in short, material that would aid keeping the ghetto inhabitants alive. As group leader Hofmann 
would act as the officer on duty or as the deputy to a platoon leader with about fifteen men under 
his command.41 Another group leader in the same company, Karl Jäger, personally performed at 
least 25 guard duties between January and April 1941, during which time he ordered the arrest of at 
least 70 people.42 Other members of the 2nd Company were found to have taken part in up to 25 
guard duties arresting an unknown number of people.43 The several people known to have been 
arrested by members of Battalion 304 for not wearing the required armband were delivered to the 
battalion staff; but it is not known what became of them there.44 Armed resistance from the ghetto 
was apparently not a factor that concerned the Germans in 1940 and 1941, with resistance being 
confined to social aid, cultural activities, illegal political meetings and the making of pamphlets. 45  
Therefore, the policemen deployed at the ghetto were not operating in a situation which presented 
any real threat to their lives. As part of “self-help” resistance, there was large scale smuggling, which 
according to the diary of a former ghetto inhabitant, was carried out “through all the holes and 
cracks in the walls, through connecting tunnels in the cellars of buildings on the border, and through 
all the hidden places unfamiliar to the conqueror’s foreign eyes”.46 Part of the responsibility of the 
policemen on guard duty was to contain the smuggling, an activity that probably accounts for the 
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majority of arrests.47 People with identifying permits were allowed to pass through the gates and it 
was part of the job of the guard unit to check the receipts for imported food to stop smuggling by 
this route.48 According to the findings of Wolfgang Curilla, the actions of the German police guards at 
the entrances and exits could be arbitrary. Sometimes the policemen would brutally take all the food 
carried by the smugglers but there were also policemen who didn’t appear to care what was being 
brought into the ghetto.49 Many of the German and Polish guards accepted substantial bribes from 
smugglers who were then allowed to take extra food through the entrances by night.50 According to 
Yisrael Gutman smuggling was for the most part tolerated and the measures taken against it were 
meant only to restrict its magnitude. “Sometimes a German sentry, moved by compassion or looking 
to relieve his boredom with an entertaining sight, would let a gang of children pass through the 
gate”.51 There appear to have been a mix of attitudes among the policemen as guards of the ghetto. 
The multiple arrests of smugglers or even suspected smugglers made by policemen such as Karl 
Jäger suggest that there were some battalion members who were willing to act more severely in the 
enforcement of Nazi racial policy than others. The severity of the actions of the guards may have 
depended on the individual policeman or the commander of the guard unit. 
As well as arrests, which in themselves were likely to have had brutal consequences for the victims, 
the policemen committed acts of violence, including killings of the ghetto inhabitants. German 
policemen often took young smugglers to the guard-rooms, took away everything they had on them 
and beat them severely.52 There were also regular shootings of mainly Jews but also of Poles 
committed by the German guards. Gutman also notes that “it was not rare for a German guard to 
shoot and kill children who tried to steal across to the other side”.53 Emmanuel Ringelblum noted 
that on several occasions smugglers were shot in the ghetto prison, and on one occasion there was a 
“veritable slaughter” of 100 people near Warsaw. Among the victims were Jewish children of 
between five and six years old, “whom the German killers shot in great numbers near the passages 
and at the wells.”54 It is not known how many people were killed by members of Battalion 304, but 
as one of the core guard units of the ghetto, it is likely to have been many. As well as pocketing 
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bribes, it is known that some German policemen enriched themselves by engaging in violent 
robberies of ghetto inhabitants.  
The conditions created by the Germans in the closed ghettos and the areas in towns assigned to 
Jews only were extreme. Because so many people were crammed into relatively small areas with 
wholly inadequate supplies, disease became rife and the death rate was high.55 On 23 May 1941, an 
underground Polish newspaper published a description of the Warsaw ghetto conditions as they 
appeared from outside the walls: 
Further crowding has resulted in conditions of ill-health, hunger and monstrous poverty 
that defy description. Groups of pale and emaciated people wander aimlessly through 
the overcrowded streets. Beggars sit and lie along the walls and the sight of people 
collapsing from starvation is common. The refuge for abandoned children takes in a 
dozen infants every day; everyday a few more people die on the streets. Contagious 
diseases are spreading particularly tuberculosis. Meanwhile the Germans continue to 
plunder the wealthy Jews. Their treatment of the Jews is always exceptionally inhuman. 
They torment them and subject them constantly to their wild and bestial 
amusements.56 
Battalion 304 participated in the forcible deportations of Jews into the ghetto, and then as guards, 
patrolling both outside and inside the ghetto walls, were well positioned to observe the results of 
the incarceration in which they took part. Some of the men personally profited from the situation by 
accepting bribes and by stealing. The above report was published in May just after the battalion had 
been deployed elsewhere, but from November 1940 to April 1941 as one of the guard units, the 
policemen of Battalion 304 were able to witness a continuous deterioration of conditions within the 
ghetto. The terrible conditions of the ghetto can to a considerable degree be attributed to a few 
individuals in the civil administration. In December 1940, the Transferstelle was created to act as an 
economic intermediary between the ghettoised Jews and the outside world which effectively had 
the power either to stimulate economic activity or strangle it. The latter course would lead to the 
starvation of the inhabitants. According to Browning the head of the Resettlement Division in the 
district, Waldemar Schön, who had created the Transferstelle, was more inclined towards the latter 
position. Schön’s appointment of Alexander Palfinger as head of the Transferstelle who had been 
transferred from the Lodz ghetto administration because he didn’t agree with the “productionist” 
direction taken there, appears to confirm this. Schön and Palfinger apparently accommodated the 
suggestion of Karl Neumann, the district head of the Food and Agriculture Division, in December 
1940 to halt the supply of food to the ghetto for that month in order that the inhabitants would 
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surrender their hidden money and use up the smuggled food.57  This decision contributed greatly to 
the skyrocketing death rates which increased throughout the first half of 1941, a time period when 
Battalion 304 served as a guard unit, peaking at 5,560 deaths in August.58  
In March Dr Walter Emmerich at the Economic Division and his advisor Dr Rudolf Gater presented 
Frank with a memorandum on the economic viability of the ghetto and encouraged organisational 
changes to this end. This sparked off a debate between those termed by Browning as “attritionists” 
who effectively saw the dying out of the ghetto inhabitants as the desired goal, and the 
“productionists” who sought the (temporary) maximisation of the economic potential of the ghetto 
releasing the economic burden from the Reich.59 Following a meeting in April a majority decision was 
reached which decided that efforts were to be made to put the ghetto on a productive footing and 
the economic administration was reorganised to these ends.60 As a guard battalion and direct 
witnesses to the starvation of the ghetto inhabitants, the extent to which the men of Battalion 304 
were aware of the differences in policy regarding the feeding of the inhabitants is unclear but they 
would certainly have been made aware of the decision to withhold provisions that led to the 
starvation of so many people.  
In addition to guard duty at the ghetto, Battalion 304 were also involved in the guarding of work 
details which is likely to have included the guarding of the labour camps.61 In spring 1941 fifteen 
camps were opened in the Warsaw district for the purpose of water control projects using labour 
from the ghettos. The conditions in the camps were terrible and the treatment of the labourers 
brutal and when this became known to the ghetto inhabitants it became it became impossible to 
find volunteers and the authorities resorted to the impressment of labour; as a result of a large 
volume of complaints a delegation that included a Captain Meissner of the Schupo and a member of 
the Jewish Self-Aid Society visited some of the camps to report on the conditions.62 The report was 
made in May 1941 around the time that Battalion 304 is supposed to have ended its period of duty 
as a guard battalion at the ghetto. Commander of the 3rd Company of Battalion 304 was Captain 
Meissner. None of the company leaders of the other two battalions (308 and 301) that together with 
304 made up the Police Regiment Warsaw were called Meissner so it appears likely that the man 
who made the report was Meissner of Battalion 304.63 In his report Meissner admitted that the 
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prescribed food rations had not been received in the camps and that brutality and corruption was 
common among the guards. However, he blamed the death rates on the unusually cold and wet 
weather and the “inferior human material” that had been recruited by the ghetto council: “One has 
the impression from the nature of the human material recruited for labour by the Jewish council, 
that the Jewish residential district perceives the work camps as an institution for disposing of its 
inferior elements”.64 Meissner appears to have taken a similar attitude to members of the district 
and ghetto administration in December 1940 that the inhabitants were holding out material and 
goods, in this case “human material” that could otherwise be appropriated by the German 
occupiers. Instead of recognising, as Browning points out, that after months of systematic starvation 
there were unlikely to be many strong and healthy workers left in the ghetto, Meissner appears to 
have adopted a brutal attitude, informed by Nazi racial conceptions, towards the suffering of the 
ghetto inhabitants. 
Another indication of the attitudes towards the ghetto inhabitants among the ranks of the police can 
be seen in the reaction of one of the battalion commanders at Warsaw to the suggestion made by 
the district doctor that the police units should be ordered ruthlessly to shoot anyone who tried to 
leave the ghetto without permission in order to combat the spread of typhus. The commander - it is 
not clear whether this was Major Nickel of 304 - vigorously opposed this proposal on the grounds 
that this would lead to the relaxation of discipline amongst his men and that he couldn’t answer for 
the consequences.65 This commander was probably aware of the brutality already demonstrated by 
some policemen as guards, and how this killing licence could potentially affect the men under his 
command. It is not clear whether objections such as this had any influence on the decision, but the 
death penalty for the unauthorised leaving of the ghetto was not decreed until October 1941, a 
couple of months after Battalion 304 had left the Warsaw district.66 
Battalion 314 in Lublin 
Police Battalion 314 left Chemnitz after about six months of basic training on 14 December and 
arrived in Zamość in the Lublin district on 16 December 1940 where they stayed until the end of May 
1941.67 The battalion was one of three along with Battalions 306 and 307 that formed Police 
Regiment 25 in the Lublin district. The regiment commander (KdO) was based in the district capital, 
Lublin.68 While in Zamość the training was continued, but the battalion was also involved in 
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“practical” duties. These included the guarding of military units, bridges and factory installations, 
guarding and patrolling the isolated Jewish area in the city and rounding-up forced labour for the 
labour camps in the area. Sub-units of the battalion were deployed for combatting local resistance.69 
The Lublin district, following the initial plan of a Jewish reservation, had become the destination for 
many of those deported from the incorporated territories. The battalion arrived at a point in the 
evolution of the resettlement and deportation policies during the development and attempted 
implementation of the third short-term plan. 
By December 1940, the Madagascar Plan was no longer being mentioned as a viable option; instead 
the destination of the planned Jewish expulsion was now starting to be referred to as “a territory yet 
to be determined”. It was around this time, the winter of 1940-41, that two important policies were 
being finalised: the third short-term plan and the decision to invade the Soviet Union during the 
spring of 1941. In preparation for the latter, the Wehrmacht sent 2,500 train loads of troops and 
material into the GG between November 1940 and March 1941; a mass deployment that would 
effectively halt the implementation of the third short-term plan.70 In January 1941, Heydrich 
informed HSSPF Krüger of the plan that had been decided during a meeting with Eichmann’s 
resettlement experts in December, to deport 831,000 people into the GG. This figure was to include 
771,000 Poles including some Jews who had not been ghettoised, from the incorporated territories 
and 60,000 Jews from Vienna. On top of these figures, the army requested 200,000 people to be 
relocated to the GG in order to free up space for training areas. 238,500, including 10,000 Jews from 
Vienna were to be resettled by May 1941.71 Presumably, as Krüger had been informed, the police 
battalions stationed in the GG would have been briefed on the intended influx of deportees and are 
likely to have been primed to receive these people in their respective districts. As Zamość had 
already served as the destination for deported Jews from the incorporated territories, it seems likely 
that Battalion 314 was to play a role in the resettlement plans.72 However, practical obstacles once 
again proved insurmountable and the transports were stopped in March 1941. The primary obstacle 
turned out to be the incompatibility of the deportations and the troop movements and preparations 
for Barbarossa.73 Nevertheless, between January and March 1941, nearly 26,000 people had been 
deported to the GG as part of the third short-term plan, including over 9,000 Jews.74 The transports 
that did arrive in Zamość are likely to have been met by members of Battalion 314 which, as 
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described by a witness, would have involved a level of violence. The deportees from the 
incorporated territories had been forced to leave their homes then were “herded like cattle, pushed 
and beaten”.75 As was the case in the Cracow and Radom districts, the ghettoisation of the Jews in 
the Lublin district followed a different pattern to that of Warsaw. Ghettos or allocated districts in 
towns for Jews were seen more as “transit” ghettos and were not usually sealed off like Lodz and 
Warsaw. Struggling with the demands of overpopulated cities, local authorities shifted Jews from 
the district capitals into the smaller towns where they were crowded into residential quarters.76 
With the creation of the Lublin ghetto on 24 March 1941, Jews in the city were given the option to 
leave the city with a few possessions rather than stay in the to-be-ghettoised area and go to one of 
the specified smaller towns in the district as there was only a certain capacity envisioned for the 
ghetto.77 One of the towns that received an influx of Jews was Zamość. Zamość had a pre-war 
population of 12-14,000 Jews, of whom all but 3,000 fled to the Soviet territories with the outbreak 
of the war. However, these people were replaced by 8,000 Jews deported from the incorporated 
territories and by Jews from the neighbouring villages.78 The extent to which Battalion 314 
participated in the rounding-up of Jews from the neighbouring areas, which was done by the 
German police, is not clear. A main task of the battalion was to guard the Jewish population in the 
residential area designated as the Jewish quarter in Zamość.79 Very little information emerged from 
the post-war investigations regarding the actions of members of Battalion 314 while guarding the 
Jewish area other than the role played in the enforcement of restrictions placed on the Jews by the 
German occupation authorities. One policeman of the 3rd Company recalled that Jews were not 
permitted on the streets of Zamość after 7pm and that “fines were imposed for infringements” of 
this decree.80 
In addition to their role in the expulsions and deportations, and the guarding of ghettos, the police 
battalions played a key role in seizing or conscripting Polish citizens for forced labour in the Reich 
and GG.81 Aside from the 30,800 Jews who were sent to the Reich for forced labour, during 1940 and 
1941 9,371 Jews from the Radom district, 7,453 from Warsaw, 5,436 from Cracow and 7,106 from 
POW camps were sent to labour camps or ghettos in the Lublin district.82 Members of Battalion 314 
are known to have served as guards at a labour camp in Lublin, but it seems likely that they would 
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also have performed the same duties in the Zamość area where the battalion was based.83 It is also 
known that the battalion played a role in the round-up of Jewish labour. According to Westermann, 
the police were used to conduct raids to in the GG and annexed territories to identify and collect 
“work-shy” Jews and non-Jewish Poles for forced labour.84 Battalion 314 conducted one of these 
sweeps of the Zamość area in May 1941.85 The Jews who were caught up in these raids and placed in 
camps were given harsh accommodation and completely inadequate food, so the death rates in the 
camps were high.86 Three graduates of the Berlin-Köpenick officer school appear to have been acting 
in the fore of “anti-partisan” activities of Battalion 314. Jahnhorst appears to have joined the 1st 
Company straight from the officer school as platoon leader on 1 October 1940 while the battalion 
was still in Vienna. Bauer arrived in Zamość in early-January 1941 just after his course. Both men 
became leaders of “hunting platoons” (Jagdzüge).87 In July 1940, Daluege ordered the formation of 
“police hunting platoons” for the conduct of “special tasks” to be performed in the GG. Initially eight 
Sonderkommandos of 42 men each from the Berlin and Münster districts were formed and were 
divided between the four districts. Instructions were given that the men comprising the platoons 
had to be “good marksmen” and each platoon was supplied with special equipment that included 
long-handled spades and hoes.88 Jahnhorst and Bauer appear to have led similar units formed out of 
the ranks of Battalion 314. Bauer stated that: “In Zamosc we were occasionally assigned to combat 
gangs through the civilian administration. They were also known as “hunting platoons”, to which 
some of the members of my company belonged: especially those who spoke Polish”.89 Jahnhorst, 
who appears to have lived in East Upper Silesia as a youth may well have had a command of Polish 
and may have been considered an ideal leader of one of these special units. That these units were to 
be equipped with a number of drivers and a number of spades and hoes, presumably for the digging 
of pits, suggests that these units may have split into smaller mobile execution squads. 
During the post-war trials Bauer admitted that within the first weeks of his arrival at the battalion in 
Zamość, “as the newest lieutenant” he was assigned the task as leader of an execution squad. 
According to Bauer, this action involved the execution of “two bandits that had been sentenced to 
death” as they were found to be “guilty of robbing and murdering their own country people”.90 That 
these types of units, as conceived by Daluege, were to be led by one officer and that they were likely 
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to have split into smaller units, suggests that as a lieutenant, it seems more likely that Bauer passed 
the guilty verdict himself and led the firing squad. Being involved in a “hunting platoon” does not 
appear to have hurt Jahnhorst’s career aspirations, as according to former battalion members, he 
was promoted to company commander while the battalion was still in Zamość.91 As a platoon leader 
in the 1st Company, Hertel was also involved in leading anti-partisan expeditions. On 9 May 1941 
Hertel led a group of 45 policemen of 3rd Company in an action to arrest members of the Polish 
resistance movement in the Lublin district together with a unit from Battalion 306. Nine people were 
arrested during this action and were handed over to the local SD; Hertel’s report does not mention 
any executions or police casualties.92 As officers and the leaders of these sub-units, Jahnhorst, Hertel 
and Bauer were afforded a significant level of autonomy in the field in actions that probably involved 
executions such as those carried out by Bauer. 
Experience and training 
The aspects of the training that Battalions 304 and 314 received immediately before their 
deployment meshed with the experiences of the men in Poland.  Considering the widespread 
cultural imperialism and conceptions of the “east” propagated through popular culture and then as 
part of the basic training, it seems likely that conceptions of cultural and racial superiority also 
existed in the consciousness of the newly recruited policemen before their entry into Poland. The 
staging of “colonial training” for the police in Poland, police pamphlets such as the one titled 
“Germany’s right to colonies” and the general colonial themed aspects of the training may well have 
found fertile ground in the men’s imaginations. In addition these conceptions can only have been 
bolstered by the opportunities afforded the policemen to think and act as imperial masters over a 
racially inferior native population. In a letter written in November 1940, a Wehrmacht private 
expressed his amusement at the deference shown to him by the local population: “it really is 
comical: the Jews all salute us, although we don’t respond and aren’t allowed to. They swing their 
caps down to the ground. In fact, the greeting is not compulsory, but as a remnant from SS times; 
that’s how they trained the Jews”.93 The doffing of caps, stepping off pavements to allow a 
uniformed German to pass, the emptying of shops on a German’s arrival, may well have provided a 
heady experience for a relatively young man who shortly before may have been an ordinary painter, 
mechanic or unemployed. The brutal deportation of Poles and Jews and the incarceration of Jews in 
extreme conditions in conjunction with the planned resettlement of ethnic Germans experienced by 
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the policemen in Warsaw and Zamość would have provided an immediate illustration of the 
beginning of a reordering of central Europe based on notions of a racial hierarchy; notions that are 
bound to have featured in the training. The militarisation of the police appears to have reaped 
benefits during the Polish campaign when police units became engaged with parts of the Polish 
army. The extent to which the combatting of “resistance” by units such as those led by Jahnhorst, 
Hertel and Bauer were of a “military” nature is unclear. Regardless, as Rossino has argued, the 
militarisation of the SS and police units came into play in killing actions as the murders could be 
couched in terms of military necessity.94 Repeated use of the terms “franc-tireurs”, “bandits” and 
“gangs” are illustrative of these types of legitimisation. However, these justifications could not have 
been used at the Warsaw ghetto in connection with combatting “illegal” exits, stopping smuggling 
and the prevention of the spread of disease. 
The extent of antisemitic messages as part of the basic police training is unclear, but it seems likely 
that the content probably didn’t differ greatly from the types of messages presented to the German 
people as a whole. The German policies in Poland and antisemitic messages created a “self-fulfilling 
prophecy” in which the appearance and behaviour of the Polish Jews lived up to the Nazi stereotype 
of a disease-ridden society given to “illegal” activities such as smuggling.95 The fact that the 
conditions in the Warsaw ghetto, as witnessed and exacerbated by members of Battalion 304, were 
a result of German occupation policies, may well have been lost on at least some of the policemen 
serving there as guards; if the attitude taken by Captain Meissner is any indication. The close 
proximity of the guards to the suffering and death did deter at least some of the policemen in adding 
to the suffering by beating and murdering some of the inhabitants. 
It is not clear how many murders of Jews were committed by members of Battalions 314 and 304 
while in Poland. One aspect of the training of Battalion 304 in Poland afforded an opportunity for 
the more enthusiastic members to engage in the killing of unarmed people. In January 1941 a 
commando of about fifteen men from Battalion 304 was selected and sent from Warsaw to Cracow 
for a three day course. Here the delegates were to be trained in the theory and practice of how to 
kill. Initially the group were given theoretical instructions in killing people by shooting them in the 
back of the neck by an SS doctor. Then the group engaged in the “practical” aspect of the training 
which took place in the courtyard of the police buildings. Five victims at a time were brought out in 
front of the men who would do the shooting. They were made to kneel down facing a high wall then 
the participants shot them in the back of the neck with pistols. A total of 75 people were killed in this 
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way by the fifteen policemen. The victims were Jews, probably from the area. One of the policemen, 
who took part in this, murdering five people, was Arno Schumann who would become a group 
leader in 1943. Schumann had joined the Party and the SS in 1937 and admitted that he was chosen 
to attend this “special” training because he had excelled during NCO training. The names for the rest 
of the participants are not known, but, according to the post-war findings of the District Court in 
Halle, they were also chosen because of their “zeal”.96  Schumann was not an officer, but it seems 
likely that the fifteen men were to act as “instructors” for the rest of the battalion. The fact that 
about fifteen men were sent to this training indicates that the battalion’s involvement in mass killing 
was anticipated. Of the younger officers in 304 that had recently attended officer school, only 
Streubel was with the battalion by January 1941 and it is not known whether he was part of this 
group. Why exactly this “training” was done at this time is unclear. The murders committed by 
members of Battalion 304 in Warsaw do not appear to have been officially authorised acts. There 
were discussions amongst the German administration in Warsaw regarding the authorisation of the 
shooting of unauthorised people leaving the ghetto, but the order did not come into effect until 
October 1941, well after the battalion had left Poland. Therefore, it seems unlikely that the 
execution practice would have been designed specifically for that reason. In the post-war trials of 
former members of Battalion 304 there are no mentions of any “hunting platoons” formed by sub-
units, but this should not exclude the possibility that some were created. By January 1941, Himmler 
(and presumably Daluege) was aware of the plans to invade the Soviet Union and may well have 
already been anticipating a more “radical” approach to the “security” tasks of the SS and police units 
on Soviet territory. In any case, this training action provided an early opportunity for more radical 
elements within the battalion to come to the fore in killing activities. 
Of the group of young, recently graduated officers identified in the previous chapter, only Hertel, 
Jahnhorst and Bauer of Battalion 314, and only Streubel of Battalion 304 were with their units in 
Poland. Already in Poland, as platoon leaders these men were afforded the opportunity to put into 
practice the theoretical elements of the training received at Berlin-Köpenick. Bauer and Hertel are 
known to have spent time at the Sachsenhausen concentration camp as part of their training and 
would have witnessed and likely been instructed on the methods employed at the camp, which 
included executions. The number of deaths and level of brutality occurring at the camp would have 
contributed to the preparation for their experience at the brutal forced labour camps in Zamość. 
Trained as “educators” and “cultivators”, they may well have passed on some of the lessons learned 
from the camp administrators in Sachsenhausen to the men in their platoons and companies. Some 
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of the key themes of their training are likely to have been employed in practice by Bauer and 
Jahnhorst as leaders of the “hunting platoons”. As leaders of these mobile units, they would have 
been afforded the scope to use their initiative and to demonstrate the activism that were 
emphasised in training. The sentencing of “bandits” to death on the spot by the “hunting platoons” 
is likely to have involved a use of the flexible Nazi conception of “law” as conveyed during the 
training course. As educators responsible for the training and cultivation of the men under their 
command, the worldview framework would have been employed in the lessons or “gatherings” to 
rationalise or legitimate the events and policies in which the men of the battalion were engaged. 
SS and police courts as a means of cultivation 
Another educational device employed by the battalion officers was the threat of the SS and police 
courts. From October 1939, with the assumption of the judicial system of SS and police courts, 
breaches of conduct would be dealt with internally within the SS organisation. Himmler reserved for 
himself the power to suspend or confirm sentences related to cases involving SS leaders and police 
officers. Cases dealing with the lower ranks would usually be dealt with by Himmler’s subordinates, 
but he wished to be personally informed of all cases that involved actions contrary to “ideological 
obedience”, which included sexual offences.97 For SS and police units in occupied Poland, private 
contact with the Polish civilian population was forbidden. Particular emphasis was placed on the 
prohibition of sexual contact with Polish women; an offence that would result in the offender being 
put in front of an SS and police court and discharged if found guilty.98 In a post-war statement, one 
former member of the 3rd Company of Battalion 314 related an incident that occurred in Zamość to a 
fellow company member and roommate named Guist. “Guist was said to have written a letter to a 
Jewish girl which was probably found by the Gestapo. Any communication with Jews was 
forbidden...One morning Guist was suddenly called to the office and from there was taken away. The 
men assumed that he was taken to a penal company or something like that. He didn’t return to the 
company. I never saw or heard of Guist again”.99 Clearly the SS hierarchy, and probably Himmler in 
particular, were concerned that the ordinary policemen would enter into relationships with local 
women and were more than ready to take action to stop this happening. However, the same level of 
concern does not seem to have been applied to cases of killings, unless these actions involved 
another element that was contrary to the SS code of conduct. In a speech to Gauleiters and other 
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members of the Party hierarchy in February 1940, Himmler responded to concerns raised regarding 
atrocities committed by SS and police units in Poland: 
I don’t deny it at all – in fact, I’m well aware of it – that here and there in the east 
excesses have occurred, shooting where people were drunk, cases where people may 
well have deserved to be shot but shouldn’t have been shot by someone who was 
drunk, where looting has occurred throughout the east in a manner that I must say I 
didn’t believe possible...if  I’ve been informed by a few Gauleiters that police sergeant 
so-and-so has sent some parcels home, I’m very grateful for that. We shall note it and 
deal with the man.100  
Clearly Himmler did not want, or did not want to be seen to allow his men to be running amok in the 
east. That killings were frequent was not the issue; but the manner or circumstances in which the 
killing were done, if they involved drunkenness, looting or any other breach of “decent” behaviour, 
were issues to be addressed. According to Matthäus, sentences given by SS and police courts to men 
who killed through a lust for murder while deployed in the east were rare and, and where there 
were guilty verdicts found, they were often softened by Himmler or converted to a period of 
probation.101 With regards to the lower-ranking policemen, whether or not the offenders were to be 
taken to the courts is likely to have depended on the discretion of their immediate commanding 
officers. While on guard duty at the Warsaw ghetto it appears that three members of Battalion 304 
shot and killed Jews. The KdO Warsaw, Lieutenant Colonel Petsch, requested Deckert, the battalion 
commander in Ukraine, to send the three men back for questioning.102 In his post-war testimony, 
former Battalion member Wolf, one of the three men implicated in this case, gave a different 
version of events: “Two battalion members were supposed to have beaten to death Poles or Jews. 
They also robbed them...Nickel [battalion commander in Chemnitz and Warsaw] ordered a search 
and sent the two men to the SS and police court in Berlin”. According to Wolf, Deckert stood up for 
the two men, organised for them to be brought back to the battalion in Kiev and had them 
“promoted out of turn”.103 It appears to be the robbing of the victims that was the decisive act in 
determining the attempts to bring the perpetrators to trial, not necessarily the killings themselves. 
Whether or not the policemen were taken from Warsaw to Berlin, or later requested to be returned 
to Warsaw or Berlin from Ukraine, Deckert’s attitude towards the killing of Jews is more than 
evident in a letter to Petsch from Ukraine after the battalion had been involved in the shooting of 
thousands of Jews: “As unit commander, I couldn’t possibly give an order today to shoot 10, 50, 100, 
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600, 1,000 yes even 5,000 Jews at once, and the next day send the same Wachtmeister for 
questioning because on one occasion in Warsaw he shot a Jew”.104 
The responsibility for the enforcement of Himmler’s ideals of the SS-code through the threat of SS 
and police courts lay to a considerable extent in the hands of the company and platoon leaders. 
Some officers in those positions may have taken a more relaxed attitude towards offences than 
others. One former member of the 2nd Company of Battalion 314 recalled that while in Vienna he 
was heard making a derogatory comment about Hitler and was to be sent to be tried, but Wendorff, 
the company commander got him off.105 It seems likely that this was a self-serving story told in post-
war proceedings in order to distance the individual from any ideological or “base” motive for the 
later killings in Ukraine. However, it is significant that the former policeman cited Wendorff as an 
officer who would take a softer line on enforcing the “code”, even though Wendorff was himself a 
member of the SS. Bauer, on the other hand, appears to have used the SS and police courts more 
vigorously. Trained as an educator and cultivator of the Nazi worldview and SS ethics at Berlin-
Köpenick, Bauer may well have used the SS and police courts to enforce the code of behaviour for 
his subordinates. In his biography of Himmler, Longerich argues that the extent of Himmler’s 
involvement in the prosecution of offences committed by SS and policemen reflected his pedagogic 
mentality. The tough actions taken through the SS judicial system against sexual offences, offences 
linked to alcohol and property crime were all elements that he sought to eradicate through 
education and training.106 According to the post-war testimonies of former members of the 2nd 
Company, Walter Dietz shot himself on 5 May 1941 in Zamość because Bauer had harassed the 
policeman by threatening him with the SS and police court, even though Dietz had protested his 
innocence.107 The nature of the “offence” committed by Dietz is not clear, but it does appear that 
Bauer may have taken his role of “cultivator” seriously and sought to encourage aggressively these 
values in his troop through the mechanism of the SS judicial system. 
Conclusion 
By the time Battalions 304 and 314 arrived in Poland in September and December 1940 respectively, 
conditions had been established in which experiments with brutal mass population movements, 
brutal and murderous improvised solutions were occurring amid a general atmosphere of 
permissiveness of violence towards the civilian population. Many of the Germans entering Poland 
from September 1939 onwards brought with them common and long-established conceptions of the 
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cultural and racial inferiority of the people occupying the areas to be colonised. The alignment of 
those who were considered to be members of the Volksgemeinschaft, by way of their racial 
credentials, and those who were not, was violently and radically implemented by the German 
occupiers. In the policies of attempted homogenisation, expulsion, deportation, discrimination and 
murder of sections of Polish society would become an everyday experience for those involved.108 In 
1939 and 1940 in Poland, certain structural alignments were established within and between the key 
occupation agencies. Brutal mistreatment and organised killings of the civilian population outside of 
the Volksgemeinschaft by the SS agencies, army and members of the civil administration were 
commonplace.109 The use of disproportionate retaliatory and punitive measures sanctioned by the 
army commanding officers contributed greatly in creating an atmosphere of violent permissiveness; 
actions that continued well beyond the subsidence of actual civilian resistance.110 The frictions that 
appeared between the SS and army leadership and to an extent the civil administration seem to 
have been based on concerns for some in the army on the effect of such violence on discipline and 
jurisdictional authority. On the whole, however, as Rossino has noted, the seeds of successful 
collaboration between the army and the SS were sown in Poland and would continue over to the 
invasion of the Soviet Union; the police battalions were able to operate in collaboration with each of 
the three agencies.111 Army concessions to the SS established a chain of command outside of the 
army and civil administration and gave concessions that facilitated the use of court-martials by the 
SS and police units. These developments, combined with the establishment of a separate jurisdiction 
for the SS and police courts, gave the SS apparatus a significant measure of autonomy in establishing 
the parameters of permissible behaviour within the SS and police ranks. 
Several recent studies have sought to narrow distinctions between the murderous population 
policies in Poland from 1939 to 1941 and the extermination policies that followed with the invasion 
of Soviet territories.112 Longerich in particular has emphasised the murderous intent of plans for the 
deportation of Jews as conceived by SS organs as well as the significance that, even though the 
ghetto “productionists” temporarily won out, the possibilities of annihilating the inhabitants were 
considered. Browning agrees with Longerich in that Poland marked a watershed in the genocidal 
imaginations of Nazi policy makers, although the decisive “leap” from murderous expulsion to 
systematic murder was taken months after the invasion of the Soviet Union.113 
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Outside of the Nazi hierarchy and policy makers, a radicalisation of the “direct perpetrators” on the 
ground can be traced through the events in Poland. Battalions 304 and 314 were directly engaged in 
the prosecution of Nazi policies in Poland and played a significant role in expulsion and deportations, 
guarding of ghettos and isolated Jewish quarters, the enforcement of discriminatory decrees, seizure 
of forced labour and the guarding of the labour camps. These men witnessed the high mortality 
rates in the ghettos and the labour camps after having taken part in placing people in these 
situations. For the rank and file of the battalions, the impact of their training, which was continued 
beyond basic training, should be related to the context of their early experiences in Poland. The 
colonial and antisemitic aspects of the ideological schooling would have been more effective when 
combined with the everyday experience of the individual being able to behave as a member of the 
master race and Volksgemeinschaft towards the native inhabitants. From the perspective of the 
guards, the conditions forced on the ghetto inhabitants and people in the labour camps may have 
conformed to the stereotypes abundant in Nazi propaganda as well as training. A significant aspect 
of the training that does not appear to have come to fruition in Poland was the extensive military 
training received by members of the battalions. The atmosphere of permissiveness and 
radicalisation exceeded anything the policemen would have experienced in Germany either as 
civilians or policemen. Death and brutality became an everyday experience, but the men’s actions 
were not without limits. Boundaries were set for behaviour that was to conform to the SS code and 
enforced by the threat of the SS and police courts. Individuals or small groups appear to have been 
involved in killing, but there do not appear to have been any occasions in Poland in which units of 
the battalions were engaged in mass killing. There still may have been concerns among the police 
ranks of the effect unbound killing would have on the discipline of the men; concerns were 
illustrated by the commander at the Warsaw ghetto regarding the discussions of a killing order. By 
the time the battalions were deployed in Ukraine, not all of the men or even the majority had killed 
or been directly involved in killing. However, some did even though they were not required to. The 
occupation climate in Poland afforded opportunities for radicals or enthusiasts to come to the 
fore.114 This is reflected in the different attitudes and actions displayed by the German guards at the 
Warsaw ghetto; apparently, only some policemen engaged in the shooting, beating, torture or 
robbing of the ghetto inhabitants. Another opportunity for the more enthusiastic members of 
Battalion 304 can be seen in the killing practice training held in Cracow, where men were specially 
chosen because they had demonstrated a level of “zeal” for it. 
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Few of the group of young, recently graduated officers that would be with the battalions in Ukraine 
were with their units in Poland. Jahnhorst and Bauer of Battalion 314, appear to have been 
immediately involved in leadership roles in the “hunting platoons” and Hertel also led a mobile sub-
unit. These positions would have afforded them the opportunity to display or put into practice some 
of the qualities that the training at the Berlin-Köpenick school was designed to instil, such as the use 
of initiative, leading from the front and a conception of “law” (in sentencing “bandits” to death on 
the spot) as expressed through the Nazi worldview. Another role envisioned for the officers at the 
training school was as educators or cultivators of the worldview. In Poland the lessons or gatherings 
that were to be led by the officers on ideological topics would have resonated far greater whilst the 
recipients were actively engaged in the prosecution of policies that were rationalised through 
ideological tenets. As cultivators, these officers also used the threat of the SS and police courts as a 
mechanism for installing the SS code in their subordinates; a method that Bauer appears to have 
employed aggressively. The extent to which these young officers were directly involved in killing and 
brutality already in Poland is unclear, only Bauer is known to have been involved in an execution. 
However, the organisation, supplies and tasks of the “hunting platoons” suggests that at least Bauer 
and Jahnhorst were involved in other killings. It is impossible to assess the readiness of the battalion 
members as murder units while still in Poland, as the units were not ordered or required to be 
involved in such actions. However the emergence of some radical elements within these units 
suggest that at least some men could have been relied on to lead from the front. The significance of 
the Poland experience will be further examined after assessing the mass murders that the battalions 













Chapter 4. Police Battalion 314 and the Early Massacres in Volhynia 
Police Battalion 314 was deployed as the 3rd Battalion of Police Regiment South under the command 
of HSSPF Russia South Friedrich Jeckeln in Ukraine less than a month after the German invasion of 
the Soviet Union. Operating in the Kovel area of Volhynia from 14 July to 1 September 1941, the sub-
units of the battalion were directly involved in some of the earliest actions of mass killing 
perpetrated by Orpo and other mobile killing units in Ukraine in the areas already overrun by the 
advancing German army. During this period, the battalion was separated into a number of sub-units 
spread out over the Kovel area. These sub-units, usually at company or half-company strength, 
perpetrated a number of massacres of Ukrainian Jews in various small towns and villages. Some of 
these actions were organised and led by junior officers who were often the only officer present. 
Alexander Kruglov has estimated that just before the invasion on 22 June 1941, there were 
approximately 2.7 million Jews living in the territory of what is now Ukraine. Of this number, 900,000 
escaped the German advance with the retreating Red Army during summer 1941 and about 100,000 
survived the following German occupation. Over 1.6 million of the pre-invasion Jewish population 
were killed by the Nazis and their accomplices, the vast majority of these victims were killed close to 
their homes.1 Nearly 500,000 of this total were killed during the second half of 1941 by the units 
under Jeckeln’s command (accounting for approximately 300,000 victims), including Battalions 314 
and 304, and by Einsatzgruppen C and D, largely in areas still under military administration.2 
However, although massacres committed by German units were already taking place in late June 
and early July 1941, the larger massacres of entire Jewish communities did not occur in Ukraine until 
late August starting with the massacre at Kamenets-Podolsky; a number of larger-scale massacres 
followed after mid-September 1941. Initially the HSSPFs and Einsatzgruppen commanders appear to 
have received instructions only to execute certain groups of Soviet functionaries, especially targeting 
any Jews found amongst them.3 Therefore, to begin with, only a small section of the Ukrainian 
Jewish population was being targeted for execution. However, within a short space of time, the 
victim groups targeted were expanded by many units to include all Jewish males of military age in 
regionally isolated locations, usually with the exception of some skilled and specialist workers. Some 
units were also beginning to kill women and children in July, but the majority of the victims of the 
first two months following the invasion were Jewish males.4 The “watershed” moment came with 
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the Kamenets-Podolsky massacre of 23,600 Jews, including Polish, Czech and Hungarian Jews 
between 27 and 30 August which signalled a turning point from the targeting of mostly male Jews to 
the murder of all Jews regardless of age or gender by the SS-police forces in Ukraine. This shift is 
especially evident in Ukraine from mid-September 1941,5 although it appears that British Intelligence 
were able to discern a notable shift in the actions of the SS-police forces on former Soviet territory 
from late August following the massacre at Kamenets-Podolsky: 
The execution of “Jews” is so recurrent a feature of these reports that the figures have 
been omitted from the situation reports and brought under one heading…Whether all 
those executed as “Jews” are indeed such is of course doubtful; but the figures are no 
less conclusive as evidence of a policy of savage intimidation if not of ultimate 
extermination.6 
Any incredulity on the part of British Intelligence that the SS-police forces in the Ukraine were 
murdering so many Jews as “Jews” appear to have been dispelled by mid-September 1941: 
The fact that the police are killing all Jews that fall into their hands should by now be 
sufficiently well appreciated. It is not therefore proposed to continue reporting these 
butcheries specially, unless so requested.7 
The shifts in the targeting of groups of Jews that evolved before mid-September 1941 cannot simply 
be regarded as responses to explicit orders issued by Himmler, Heydrich, Daluege or Jeckeln, but 
rather, as Longerich has argued, the evidence suggests that these shifts occurred as part of a longer 
process in which unit leaders became progressively accustomed to the atrocities that they 
themselves and other unit leaders were committing.8 Indeed, much appears to have depended on 
the individual unit commanders and their interpretation of orders on the ground; the fact that 
before mid-September, not all units in the same areas started murdering women and children at the 
same time suggests that at this stage many unit commanders on the spot were left with a 
considerable degree of manoeuvrability as far as their use of initiative and of interpretation of 
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orders or directions is concerned. This chapter will examine the roles of the junior officers as the 
commanders on the spot and their influence on the massacres from Battalion 314’s arrival in 
Ukraine in mid-July up to the involvement of the battalion in the larger-scale massacres from mid-
September 1941. 
From 14 July to 12 September 1941 sub-units of Battalion 314 are known to have directly 
participated in at least thirteen separate massacres in the Kovel area and at least one action in the 
Vinnitsa area in September.9 During this period sub-units of the battalion were operating separately 
and it appears that most, if not all, of the above massacres were carried out by smaller units led by 
the junior officers. In the Kovel area: Jahnhorst, as 1st Company commander was in charge of the 
part of the company stationed in Luboml; Hertel, as second in command of the 1st Company, was in 
command of the other part of the company in Maciejow (Matseiv) and Bauer appears to have led 
the massacres by the 2nd Company in the Holoby area. In the Vinnitsa area in September, a massacre 
was carried out by the 3rd Company under the command of Panis. This chapter will examine the 
preparations and deployment of the battalion and the timing and nature of the first massacres in 
Ukraine and will attempt to analyse how these events relate to the broader events following the 
invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941 with particular regard to the timing of the actions and the 
selections of victims. This chapter will also examine in some detail the actions of the sub-units of the 
battalion and the role of the junior officers in some of these massacres during the two month period 
from mid-July to mid-September 1941. It will be shown that these junior officers, often as the most 
senior Orpo officer present in the areas where the massacres were carried out by the policemen 
under their command, were operating in conditions that afforded them a significant level of 
autonomy in decision-making and organisation. From the available evidence, we can see elements of 
their officer training being put into practice in preparing and organising the perpetration of these 
massacres in Ukraine. 
Deployment into Volhynia and instructions 
Police Battalion 314 left Zamość and arrived in Tschenstochau (Czestochowa) on 21 June 1941. There 
is no information on what the battalion activities were in Tschenstochau in the weeks before their 
departure into Ukraine, but they are likely to have involved further training and preparations for 
their upcoming role. From Tschenstochau the battalion was deployed into Ukraine in mid-July, 
travelling separately from the other two battalions that formed Police Regiment South (Battalions 45 
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and 303).10 The Regiment staff section was initially stationed in Brody11 but by early August had 
moved further east and was stationed with Battalions 45 and 303 in Ljubar.12 It appears that the 
battalion was travelling in company strength, but all took approximately the same route from 
Tschenstochau to the Kovel area where the units arrived on 14 July, travelling through Lemberg 
(Lvov), Brody and Rovno.13 Once in Kovel, the battalion was stationed in separate towns across the 
area: the battalion staff and 3rd Company were stationed in the city of Kovel; the 2nd Company was 
stationed in Holoby, a small town that lies 26 km south of Kovel; the 1st and 2nd Platoons of 1st 
Company were stationed in Maciejow which lies about 25 km west of Kovel and the 1st Company 
staff with the 2nd and 3rd Platoons were stationed in Luboml, situated about 35 km west of Kovel.14 
Therefore, on arrival the battalion was separated into four main groups spread out around the area 
assigned to the battalion and would remain separated in this way until it left for Vinnitsa on 1 
September 1941. The battalion commander stationed in Kovel was Oberst Willy Dressler who had 
replaced Major Kahr in Zamość.15 On arrival in Kovel, only four of the junior officers and graduates of 
the Berlin-Köpenick officer school were with the battalion. Jahnhorst, as company commander, was 
in command of the half of the 1st Company stationed in Luboml; Hertel was in command of the other 
half of 1st Company in Maciejow; Bauer as deputy company commander was with the 2nd Company 
in Holoby under Company Commander Wendorff and Steinmann as battalion adjutant was stationed 
in Kovel with the battalion staff and 3rd Company.16 Curiously, Christ had been temporarily seconded 
to the Regiment staff on the march, where he would later serve as adjutant to Rosenbauer from 
August until his return to Battalion 314 later in 1941.17 In the Kovel area because of the separation of 
the battalion into sub-units, Jahnhorst, Hertel and Bauer would all find themselves in command 
positions during massacres on at least one occasion each from July to August 1941. 
Luboml and Maciejow lie along the Lublin-Kovel railway line. Kovel is the largest town in the area 
and is estimated to have been home to about 15,000 Jews in mid-1941, Maciejow had an estimated 
2,600 Jewish residents and Luboml is known to have had about 3,162 Jewish residents in 1937. 
Holoby, was the smallest town of the four and is likely to have had a smaller Jewish population in 
1941. Between 23 and 28 June 1941 this area of Volhynia was occupied by the German military and 
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a regional military administration (Gebietsleiter) subordinated to Army Group South was 
established.18 All Jews in the Kovel district deemed capable were put to work within the first weeks 
of German occupation and a number of measures were imposed on the Jewish populations, 
including the wearing of an armband, curfew and travel restrictions. Jewish councils were created in 
each town and the Jewish population were made to surrender all valuables.19 Through the Jewish 
councils, collective levies in the form of money, valuables and food articles were demanded to 
finance the construction or repair of roads, railways, bridges and buildings deemed to be necessary 
for the German war effort and occupation. These levies appear to have varied from place to place 
and were imposed at the discretion of the local German commander. It is known that at the 
beginning of the occupation 100,000 rubles were demanded from the Jewish population of Kovel 
and in July and August 1941, the period in which Hertel and part of the 1st Company occupied the 
town, 300,000 was demanded in Maciejow.20 The killing of Jewish civilians of the Kovel district, with 
the assistance of the local Ukrainian militia, appears to have begun at the start of the occupation. In 
Kovel soon after the occupation 60-80 Jews from the intelligentsia were arrested and later shot.21 On 
2 July 1941, five Jewish males were shot in Luboml by order of the Ortskommandant in front of the 
gathered Jewish men of the town in retaliation for the alleged cutting of a German telephone wire. It 
appears that the five men were randomly selected from the crowd that had been told to gather in 
the town square.22 One survivor who was present at the execution recalled one or more Germans 
saying “this will be a sign for you that we mean business”.23 Whether or not the wire had actually 
been cut, this event was clearly arranged as a means to intimidate the Jewish population. It is 
significant that the Germans chose to punish the Jewish population only in retaliation for supposed 
sabotage even though it appears that the perpetrators, if indeed there actually were any, had not 
been found. This method and rationale appears to have been consistent with other actions carried 
out by German units during the early stages of the invasion of the Soviet Union and this sort of 
punitive and disproportionate reprisal action would get worse over time. 
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As HSSPF Russia South, Jeckeln was to act as Himmler’s representative in the field and had under his 
command Einsatzgruppe C, Police Regiment South and, in reserve, Police Battalions 304, 315 and 
320.24 Jeckeln’s job was to coordinate the efforts of the units under his command with each other 
and the other agencies, including the mobile units of the Todt Organisation and the VoMi and in 
particular the Wehrmacht security divisions.25 The tasks of the security divisions were to pursue the 
enemy and pacify the army rear areas and protect military installations; tasks that involved 
considerable overlap with those of the SS-police units.26 The Einsatzgruppen were to advance rapidly 
in the wake of the army advance and were comprised of autonomous sub-units, Sonderkommandos 
and Einsatzkommandos, whose tasks were to secure centres of power in the towns and cities and 
terrain in the rear areas. Einsatzgruppe C was comprised of Sonderkommandos 4a and 4b and 
Einsatzkommandos 5 and 6.27 During the early stages following the invasion of the Soviet Union, 
under the Wehrmacht administration there appears to have been a high level of cooperation 
between these agencies despite the crossovers in security tasks.28 Himmler had made an agreement 
with the Wehrmacht command that on Soviet territory, the HSSPFs would receive logistical support 
from the Wehrmacht, but would receive instructions for “special tasks” directly from Himmler.29 
Einsatzgruppe C would receive orders from Heydrich and Müller in Berlin, but could also be 
coordinated by Jeckeln and regional military leaders. The Orpo units received few orders from Berlin, 
but instead received orders from Himmler’s field command or Jeckeln.30 The company and platoon 
commanders of Battalion 314 would receive their orders through the Regiment Commander Franz, 
then from September 1941, Rosenbauer, or Battalion Commander Dressler. 
Pohl has pointed out that the police battalions assigned to Jeckeln were not deployed for 
investigative purposes or instructed to set up police stations; their tasks at the outset were not clear 
and depended largely on Jeckeln’s instructions.31 One former member of the 2nd Company stationed 
in Holoby defined the tasks of the company at that time as “cleaning up of the army rear area of 
scattered Russian troops, recording and collecting of Russian prisoners and the carrying out of the 
pacification of the area assigned to the unit”.32 A significant part of the security role of the police 
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battalions was to pacify and protect the main transit routes as well as the major towns and cities. 
The way in which Battalion 314 was initially deployed illustrates this. From west to east, Luboml, 
Maciejow (both occupied by the 1st Company) and Kovel (3rd Company and battalion staff) are all 
located along a stretch of the main transit road and railway line connecting Lublin with Kovel. Holoby 
(occupied by the 2nd Company) had a main railway station and was situated on the main road 
running north-south connecting Kovel and Luzk. A daily report of British Intelligence dated 24 August 
1941 while Battalion 314 was still in Kovel stated, “…Police Regiment South: traffic control and road 
protection as usual”.33 However, the pacification and security tasks of the battalion in the Kovel area 
included mass executions of Jewish civilians. It is not entirely clear where and when the units of the 
battalion received instructions to murder Jewish civilians in towns in the Kovel area as part of their 
security duties, or from whom. 
On 2 July 1941, Heydrich issued orders to the leaders of the Einsatzgruppen which stated that, as 
well as targeting state functionaries and commissars, “Jews in party and state positions” and other 
“extremist elements (saboteurs, propagandists, snipers, assassins, agitators, etc.)” were to be 
executed.34 This vague and imprecise order set the scope of those to be executed very wide and left 
much to the interpretations of the men who were to carry out these executions.35 Copies of 
Heydrich’s order were given to the HSSPFs, but it is not known how widely Jeckeln, for example, 
spread the order among the units under his command. As far as the security tasks of the SS-police 
forces in the elimination of potential political opponents are concerned, as Martin Dean has argued, 
the interpretation made by many unit and higher leaders is that Jews were automatically to be 
included in this category.36 This is particularly evident in a report sent by Jeckeln to Himmler and 
Daluege dated 1 August 1941 detailing the recent activities of the 1st SS Brigade, including the 
shooting of: “73 Russian Soldiers (Guerrillas); 165 Functionaries and other persons who have 
rendered considerable service to the Bolshevist system, among them 4 women; 1658 Jews who have 
rendered considerable services to the Bolshevist system and who reported Ukrainians to Bolshevist 
rulers”.37 The association of Jews with Bolshevism served a common rationale of unit leaders for the 
execution of Jewish civilians, at first predominantly male, as partisans or partisan helpers, 
functionaries of the Soviet state, or as a target for reprisals, even though in Ukraine in mid-1941 
there were few organised partisan groups.38 Also included in Heydrich’s order were the instructions 
                                                          
33 NA HW 1/35. 
34 Noakes and Pridham, Nazism, Document 814, pp.1091-92. 
35 Longerich, Himmler, p.523. Ingrao, Believe and Destroy, pp.143-4. 
36 Dean, ‘Gendarmerie’, p.173. 
37 Wiener Library [hereafter WL], War Crimes Trials: document transcripts and other papers. Einsatzgruppen 
and HSSPF reports, 1726 – No 1165, 1 August 1941. 
38 Lower, Nazi Empire, pp.57 and 183. 
122 
 
to promote “self-cleansing” by anti-communist and anti-Jewish circles in the occupied areas.39 In the 
whole of the Ukrainian SSR, according to Soviet documents, 8,789 prisoners were executed in the 
prisons during the Soviet retreat, killings that were associated with an exaggerated role of local Jews 
in the Soviet regime by Nazis as well as many Ukrainian locals and nationalist groups.40 In addition to 
inciting or facilitating pogroms, at least some unit leaders used the atrocities as a rationale for killing 
large numbers of Jewish civilians. A report concerning the activities of Einsatzgruppe C in July stated: 
“…the main activity of Einsatzgruppe C was directed towards the liquidation of all Jews and 
Bolshevists responsible for the murderous terror in these parts”.41 Reports of the NKVD killings were 
used to reinforce the racial stereotype of a horrific “Jewish-Soviet paradise” that had been brought 
to an end by the entry of the German troops. The Schwarze Korps referring to the NKVD murders 
insisted that each German soldier would return from the east as “a convinced antisemite, since over 
there he can see Israel as it really is”.42 
Like the rest of the units and agencies preparing for their involvement in the invasion of the Soviet 
Union, the policemen of Battalion 314 would have been subject to the preceding and accompanying 
Nazi efforts of legitimising a “war of annihilation” against Judeo-Bolshevism.43 Ideological material 
given to the Orpo for training and lessons included essays linking the invasion with a German history 
of eastward migration and settlement and papers proclaiming Jews as the “world enemy number 
one”.44 Instructions issued by Himmler’s staff for ideological lessons to be delivered by company and 
platoon leaders in July 1941 included instructions for lessons on the role of Jews and the Bolshevik 
state.45 These types of messages were to be delivered by the unit leaders before and immediately 
after the invasion. One former member of the 2nd Company of Battalion 314 recalled Bauer giving an 
ideological lesson just prior to the invasion and, as it was part of their role as unit officers, it is likely 
that he and the other unit commanders passed on these training messages either as formal lessons 
or as part of informal discussions. During a farewell address to Police Battalion 322 (deployed as part 
of Police Regiment Centre) in Warsaw on 10 June, every policeman was extolled “to appear before 
the Slavic peoples as a master and show them that he was a German”. At an officers’ meeting of 
Police Battalion 309 shortly before its deployment in the central areas, the battalion commander 
disclosed verbally the Commissar Order and Barbarossa Decree, as would most likely have been the 
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case with all other army and police units to be deployed in former Soviet territory.46 These are the 
types of messages that were to be communicated to the rank and file by the company officers; the 
appeals to behave as a master race may well indeed have been a topic of one of Bauer’s ideological 
lectures. Shortly before the deployment of Battalion 314, Major Kahr led an officers’ meeting in 
Zamość. It seems likely that this was the moment, shortly before the invasion, that Kahr passed on 
the Commissar Order and Barbarossa Decree. Bauer and Hertel are known to have attended this 
meeting, probably along with the other battalion officers, including Christ, Jahnhorst and Steinmann. 
During the meeting Kahr is reported to have said: “Now in this situation, one will have so much 
power over life and death like never before”.47 This comment may have come on the back of a 
discussion over the interpretation of the Commissar Order and Barbarossa Decree, discussions that, 
in turn, the junior officers may have had with their subordinates if the orders were passed further 
down the chain of command. A former member of the communications platoon recalled that 
Steinman led a gathering of the battalion before departure for “Russia” in which he communicated a 
decree by Himmler that “all Jews capable of reproduction [zeugungsfähigen] from the age of 
thirteen, as well as the sick, were to be shot”.48 Whether or not this former policeman remembered 
the time and details of this assembly precisely, it is likely that the junior officers would communicate 
the results of the officer’s meeting to their sub-units in similar assemblies. As battalion adjutant, the 
communications platoon could have been part of Steinmann’s responsibility along with members of 
the staff administration, therefore, it would have been his job to communicate orders to them 
personally. 
As was the case with Poland, the ideological preparations received by the battalion members and 
exhortations towards and licence for the use of extreme violence are likely to have resonated with 
many of the policemen when combined with their initial experiences on the ground. The route of the 
sub-units of Battalion 314 to the Kovel area went through Lemberg, Brody and Rovno. During early 
July 1941, just preceding the passing through of Battalion 314, units of Einsatzgruppe C had executed 
hundreds of civilians in Rovno, including “250 Bolshevist, predominantly Jewish officials, agents, 
etc.” and 15 Jews as a reprisal for the murder of a Ukrainian nationalist leader; “The Ukrainian 
population on their part set the synagogue and houses belonging to the Jews on fire”.49 The 
interpretations of the NKVD atrocities and the pogroms committed by local civilians, along with the 
extreme violence and destruction instigated and committed by the German units themselves, must 
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have been a formative experience for many of the battalion members even before they reached 
their destinations in the Kovel area. These spectacles of violence, despite the fact that most of the 
violence was instigated and committed by German units, may have appeared to validate and 
reinforce the ideological preparations they had been receiving regarding depictions of the USSR as a 
dangerous, barbarous place and its inhabitants as savages.50 
However, the precise nature of the orders, instructions and preparations received by members of 
Battalion 314 prior to and during the invasion regarding the executions of Jewish civilians are 
unclear. In 1947 as a Soviet captive, a former member of the 1st Company in Battalion 314, Theodor 
Küster, recalled that as the battalion crossed the border into Soviet territory (giving the date of the 
battalion’s entry into Ukraine as 21 July 1941), they received the order that the policemen were to 
“annihilate all Jewish civilians that they came across”.51 However, it does not appear to be the case 
that the members of the police battalions that entered Soviet territory during the first few weeks 
were given any such order; regarding the police battalions, both Westermann and Browning agree 
that the police units received no general orders to annihilate Jews prior to the invasion. Former 
policemen who recalled such orders during post-war trials were likely either to be trying to shift 
responsibility for their actions to the obedience of higher orders, or were recalling the details of the 
Commissar Order or Barbarossa Decree interpreted in the light of later orders and actions.52 The fact 
that the first massacres of Jewish civilians by the SS-police units were directed mainly against 
members of the Jewish intelligentsia, Jewish communist officials and civil servants, targeted as the 
perceived potential organisers of resistance, strongly suggests that these units received no order to 
murder all Jewish civilians in Ukraine.53 Rather, during the first weeks following the German invasion, 
the massacres show variations in the groups of victims targeted. As Longerich has shown, “some 
units set the upper age-limit of the male victims higher than others; in some places the entire male 
population in a particular age-group was murdered, in other places it was ‘only’ some, and here 
again to varying extents”.54 Therefore, if the initial massacres show some pattern in that the murder 
units targeted mainly Jewish men, the variations demonstrate that the unit leaders had considerable 
room for manoeuvre and use of individual judgement.55 This follows Matthäus’ view that the top 
Nazi leadership, at least at this early stage, regarded “more subtle calls for action, if received by 
eager activists” to be more effective than explicit orders that “could be counterproductive if they 
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created confusion, stifled initiative, or did not correspond to the situation on the ground”.56 Seen in 
this context, Küster’s testimony to Soviet interrogators may be more revealing. Küster mistakenly 
dated the entry of the battalion into Ukraine and the giving of the order to “annihilate all Jewish 
citizens” as 21 July 1941. It is known that the units of Battalion 314 arrived in the Kovel area on 14 
July 1941. However, it appears that shortly after the units’ arrival there was an officers’ meeting held 
in Kovel, which seems likely to have taken place shortly after the arrival of the battalion in the area. 
Küster was a member of the 1st Company and was stationed in Maciejow under the command of 
Lieutenant Hertel, and it is known that a massacre of Jewish men by the units under Hertel’s 
command took place shortly after this officers’ meeting in Maciejow. Therefore, although he 
incorrectly dated the entry of his unit into Ukraine, Küster may have been recalling the transmission 
of Hertel’s interpretation of an order received at the officers’ meeting to the men under his 
command shortly before they perpetrated the massacre. 
The 1st Company in Luboml and Maciejow 
According to Hertel’s post-war testimony, shortly after arriving in the Kovel area an officers’ meeting 
took place at the battalion headquarters that had been established in the city of Kovel. Hertel stated 
that Jahnhorst, the 1st Company commander in Luboml, drove his second in command, Hertel, to this 
meeting which must have taken place sometime shortly after 14 July. According to Hertel, during the 
meeting the officers present were informed that over the next few days an SS-commando (in some 
post-war testimonies these were referred to as “SD-men”) with a special commission would be 
visiting the battalion sub-units in the various locations, but, according to Hertel, exact orders were 
not discussed. Dressler, the battalion commander, is said to have stressed that this commando was 
to be given all assistance by the policemen in their tasks.57 A sub-unit of the Einsatzgruppe zur 
besonderen Verwendung (z.b.V.) is known to have been stationed in the town of Kovel in July and 
August 1941; a fact that the post-war prosecutors may not have been aware of.58 Jahnhorst and 
Hertel claimed that shortly after this meeting, some “SD” men came to Luboml and Maciejow and 
organised the massacres that are known to have taken place in these towns and carried out by the 
policemen under Jahnhorst and Hertel’s commands indicating that they were not aware of the 
intended tasks before the arrival of the SD in each town. However, as will be shown below, the 
leaders of the SD-unit are very likely to have been present at the meeting in Kovel attended by 
                                                          
56 Matthäus, ‘Controlled Escalation’, p.227. 
57 ZStL B162/6697, Final Summary Report, 1978, p.2856. StA 320 Js, File 2, Final Summary Report, 1978, p.87. 
JuNS, Vol XLV, pp.298-301. 
58 Kruglov and Schalkowsky, ‘Kowel’, p.1388. A fifth Einsatzgruppe had been established in Cracow in early July 
1941 and sent to eastern Poland which from August was named Einsatzgruppe z.b.V. See Longerich, Holocaust, 
p.185. Kovel was formerly part of Poland and was only just on the other side of the GG border.  
126 
 
Hertel and Jahnhorst. Therefore, the upcoming tasks were discussed in the meeting with Hertel and 
Jahnhorst present, along with a representative of the 2nd Company.  
This meeting is supposed to have taken place at a time during which we can trace a level of direct 
intervention by higher level commanders on the actions of some of the police units on the ground. 
On 9 July, Daluege when speaking to members of Police Regiment Centre (PRC) called for 
“Bolshevism finally to be eradicated”, and on 11 July the commander of PRC passed on an order 
from the HSSPF that “all male Jews between the ages of 17 and 45 convicted as plunderers are to be 
shot according to martial law”.59 British Intelligence intercepted this order and reported that the 
battalions of PRC (Battalions 316, 322 and 307) appeared to have “’special duties’ ahead of them; 
this phrase last appeared in our decodes after the cleaning up of Poland, when participants were 
told that they were strictly to hold their tongues as to what their ‘besondere Aufgaben’ had been”. 
The intelligence officer also reported that in connection with this order, a request had been made to 
locate sound-film apparatus, “since these are needed to help the troops in face of their ‘special 
duties’”.60 Part of the order issued by the PRC commander on 11 July stated that: 
The battalion and company commanders are especially to provide for the spiritual care 
of the men who participate in this action. The impression of the day are to be blotted 
out through the holding of social events in the evenings. Furthermore the men are to be 
instructed continuously about the political necessity of the measures.61 
The request for film equipment appears to have been to do with these considerations of looking 
after the “spiritual care” of the perpetrators. Shortly following these orders PRC reported on 17 July 
that it had shot “1153 Jewish plunderers” in the Slonim area.62 Just shortly afterwards direct orders 
regarding the shooting of Jews appear to have been issued to Police Regiment South (PRS). On 24 
July the commander of Police Battalion 45, Major Besser, met with the commander of PRS, Colonel 
Franz, in Sheptovka and was told that by order of Himmler the Jews of Russia were to be destroyed 
and his battalion was to play a role in this task. Soon after this meeting, Battalion 45 committed 
massacres against the Jewish population in the Sheptovka area, including women and children.63 On 
28 July, Jeckeln had moved his headquarters to Sheptovka and may have had some personal 
influence on the actions of Battalion 45.64 At some point between the departure of Battalion 314 
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from Poland and its arrival in the Kovel area, it does not seem unlikely that the battalion leadership 
had some form of contact with Jeckeln and perhaps, like Battalion 45, may have received verbal 
instructions from him either personally, via Franz or over the radio. From 11 July, Jeckeln had his 
headquarters in Lemberg, a city that lay on the route taken by Battalion 314 towards Kovel and it 
may have been the site of a meeting. Himmler appears to have met with Jeckeln in Lemberg on 21 
July and issued some verbal instructions; Pohl states that it was around this time that Jeckeln 
ordered his forces to kill anybody suspected of having “abetted the Bolshevik system”.65 This order 
from Jeckeln is not only still vague enough to allow interpretation on the part of the unit leaders, but 
also broader than orders targeting only male Jews between certain ages, such as those issued to the 
commander of PRC on 11 July. 
It appears that units of Battalion 314 may have been carrying out massacres of Jews before 21 July; 
according to survivor Jacob Biber, the first massacre in Maciejow is supposed to have taken place on 
18 July and the 2nd Company may have carried out a massacre in Mielnica as early as 16 July 1941.66 
Therefore, it seems likely that the battalion leadership received instructions, either from Jeckeln or 
another source, regarding the shooting of Jewish males before Jeckeln’s meeting with Himmler on 
21 July. Regardless, it seems unlikely, given the flurry of instructions emanating from the SS-police 
leadership in the area and during that particular time period, that Jahnhorst and Hertel would be 
summoned to drive from their posts in Luboml and Maciejow respectively to Kovel for a meeting 
which appears to have immediately preceded massacres in both those locations under their 
leadership without some discussion of orders or instructions regarding the killing of Jews. 
Luboml 
On 22 July 1941 the part of the 1st Company under the command of 1st Lieutenant Jahnhorst shot 
217 Jewish men in Luboml. According to Jahnhorst’s trial statement in 1973, an SD man of higher 
rank arrived in Luboml and requested that Jahnhorst put his men at the disposal of the SD for an 
execution of the town’s Jews. Jahnhorst claimed that he resisted the order, but was threatened by 
the SD man with a court martial for insubordination during war. Jahnhorst then drove to battalion 
headquarters in Kovel to meet with Dressler who apparently told him that he must obey the order of 
the SD man and carry out the execution. Jahnhorst claimed that he requested a transfer to a fighting 
unit then left Kovel for Luboml where he would find that the massacre had been carried out in his 
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absence.67 One former company member stated that he witnessed an exchange of words between 
Jahnhorst and two SD men because Jahnhorst did not agree with the order, but no further evidence 
emerged that confirmed the rest of Jahnhorst’s story.68 Instead, witnesses, including the former 
platoon leader Grünwald, confirmed that not only was Jahnhorst present at the execution, but that 
he organised the action and gave the order to his men.69 According to the findings of the post-war 
investigations, on the day before the execution Jahnhorst gathered his men and gave them the order 
to remove the Jews of the town from their homes and that they were to be brought to a warehouse 
where they would remain under guard. Following this they were to be shot. The policemen were 
told by Jahnhorst to tell the Jews that they were being collected to be put to work. One former 
company member recalled the company sergeant, Arneitz, announcing to the gathered policemen 
that if they had to shoot partisans, “this means they would have to shoot Jews”. This statement was 
not confirmed by the other witnesses some of whom only recalled Jahnhorst making an 
announcement regarding the execution. It is possible, however, that Jahnhorst made a similar 
announcement or comment himself, before or after the execution. The Jews of the town were 
rounded up by the 2nd and 3rd Platoons under Grünwald and Radinger, the platoon leaders, and were 
guarded overnight.70 A number of survivor witnesses recalled the policemen arriving with big trucks 
and rounding up between 200 and 400 men from their homes with the help of Ukrainian militia.71 
On the following day a selection was made. The men were put into two columns, those in one 
column were loaded into the trucks and taken to the Jewish cemetery where they were shot.72 The 
others that were released presumably were deemed by the Germans to be able to perform 
necessary jobs. According to one survivor, the relatives of the men taken were told to produce gold 
coins, vodka, boots and other goods in exchange for their men’s lives. Some relatives were to find 
out later that the Germans had set up a table with the vodka and other goods in the cemetery and 
were celebrating after the shooting.73 Before being shot the men were forced to write letters to their 
families stating that they were being sent to Germany for work and the notes were brought to the 
families. The families of the victims were told what had happened by the Ukrainians that were 
present at the cemetery.74 
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During the trial the prosecutors were unable to establish whether Jahnhorst gave the order to fire 
and Jahnhorst himself denied all complicity. Several witnesses stated that he was present at the 
shooting site.75 Jahnhorst claimed that he did not agree with the murders and that he was trying to 
get away from the battalion as quickly as possible “because the things I saw there were 
depressing”.76 The opinions given during the trials of Jahnhorst by his former subordinates were 
generally positive and two witnesses claimed that they thought Jahnhorst was against the shooting 
of Jews.77 Jahnhorst claimed that he had demanded a transfer to a “fighting unit”, which he got and 
was transferred to an SS-police division in Holland on 6 October 1941. However, Jahnhorst’s career 
did not suffer following his transfer as he was shortly afterwards promoted to battalion commander 
in the Waffen-SS.78 It does appear that while in Luboml Jahnhorst was suffering with a particular 
illness for which he received constant treatment from the battalion doctor and was later sent to 
recover in a military hospital.79 We know of cases in which unit leaders suffered functional problems 
of a psychosomatic nature as a result of their involvement in the massacres. Such problems were 
easy for SS doctors to recognise and they tended to prescribe the sufferers a course of leave.80 In 
Ordinary Men, Browning discusses the case of a Captain Hoffmann, like Jahnhorst an SS-man and 
company commander in Battalion 101. Hoffmann started suffering from diarrhoea and stomach 
cramps following his company’s first “action” in 1942, symptoms that would apparently reoccur with 
each following action. Even though he tried to hide his illness and continued to give orders for 
massacres from his sickbed, Hoffmann was eventually transferred to a police battalion fighting on 
the Eastern Front and did not suffer any consequences as far as his career was concerned. Browning 
concludes that Hoffmann displayed symptoms of a psychologically induced illness, caused by or 
aggravated by his company’s activities.81 Walter Blume, the initial commander of SK 4a, was, in the 
view of his men, obviously deeply uneasy about the actions carried out by his unit. Even though 
Blume was in agreement with the “necessity” of the actions and actually took part, he ultimately 
couldn’t cope and had himself transferred.82 According to one former policeman, at Luboml 
Jahnhorst turned away during the execution and left.83 The same witness stated that he got the 
impression that Jahnhorst was against the shooting; an argument that Jahnhorst tried to make 
during the post-war trial. However, as was the case with Hoffmann and Blume, it may well have 
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been the case that rather than disagreeing with the murder of Jewish civilians, Jahnhorst was unable 
to cope physically or emotionally; as he stated himself, the things he saw made him depressed. Like 
Hoffmann, Jahnhorst had himself transferred to a “fighting unit” with no negative repercussions for 
his career; rather he received a promotion shortly after his transfer. 
Similarly, there were no career repercussions following his supposed resistance to the orders of the 
SD leader. Jahnhorst claimed that the SD man threatened him with his life if he disobeyed the 
orders, a common defence given by many defendants during post-war trials, which following 
extensive research into the actions and motives of the “direct” perpetrators we know is not very 
likely at all to have been the case.84 During the post-war trials, Jahnhorst was found to have lied 
about being commander of the 1st Company, about his presence at the first massacre in Luboml, 
about not attending the officers’ meeting in Kovel (if Hertel is to be believed on this count), about 
being threatened by an SD leader and about the reasons behind his transfer. Instead, whether or not 
he found the actual murders difficult to cope with, Jahnhorst appears to have played a lead role in 
the massacre at Luboml. He prepared the men for the task, gave the order to his gathered 
policemen, organised the killing process and was present, at least for a while, at the killing site. 
Maciejow 
In Maciejow the other half of the 1st Company under the leadership of Hertel also carried out a 
massacre of Jewish men during what appears to have been around the same time as the massacre in 
Luboml. Survivor Jacob Biber has stated that the round-up of victims killed in the first large massacre 
in Maciejow occurred on 18 July 1941, four days before the massacre in Luboml. Hertel’s post-war 
version of events in Maciejow bears a striking similarity to Jahnhorst’s version of Luboml. Hertel 
claimed that an “SD commando” of three or four men arrived in Maciejow shortly following the 
officers’ meeting in Kovel. The SD leader demanded that Hertel put his men at the disposal of the SD 
for an execution of Jewish civilians and showed Hertel a written order from Jeckeln for the task.85 
Like Jahnhorst, Hertel claimed that he resisted the order and tried to make contact with the 
battalion headquarters in Kovel by radio and by telephone at the town railway station, neither of 
which worked. He also claimed that he was threatened with an SS-police court and a possible death 
sentence. During the post-war investigations of former members of Battalion 314 in the 1960s and 
1970s, Hertel changed his story considerably and appears to have been attempting to replicate 
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Jahnhorst’s account.86 From the witness statements, there does appear to have been an “SD” 
presence at the execution in Maciejow, but it seems unlikely that the SD leader would be 
brandishing a written order from Jeckeln as claimed by Hertel and, as with Jahnhorst, less likely that 
Hertel would be threatened in such a way.87 Regardless, Hertel continued to organise his policemen 
to collect the Jews from their homes, guard the area to prevent outside interference or escape 
attempts and to form a shooting squad.88 
Hertel ordered that all Jewish men were to be arrested and brought to the courtyard of the company 
headquarters which appears to have been an old monastery. This was done with the help of the 
Ukrainian mayor and militia and, as with Luboml, the arrested Jews were to be told that they were 
being brought for work. According to Biber and the memoir of Leon Ginsburg, an order was given 
that all Jewish men between the ages of 16 and 60 were to gather in the centre of town at 8am with 
their passports. The Germans sent a few of the older men home then forced the rest to march to the 
police headquarters in the old monastery, here a selection took place while the men were beaten 
with sticks and attacked by the policemen’s dogs. As in Luboml, two groups were formed; one group 
of men who possessed certain craft skills were told to run home, the others were to be shot behind 
a monastery building.89 Hertel carried out a selection by questioning the captives and checking their 
documents while he sat behind a desk. Those who were selected to be shot were taken to a 
separate room where they were guarded overnight. He had also organised the digging of a pit to be 
used for the execution by a group of Jews who would also be shot at the end of the execution.90 On 
the day of the execution, the Jews who had been selected to be shot were taken in groups of six to 
the pit, directly behind the farm house that served as the company barracks where they were shot 
standing in front of the pit in the back of the neck by a squad of six shooters. The shooting squad 
was changed throughout the execution, but it is not clear how many policemen acted as shooters. 
The post-war trial investigators concluded that there were probably about 200 victims.91 According 
to Biber, 400 men had been collected in the town, 75 returned and 325 were killed.92 It remains 
unclear exactly where Hertel was during the execution and what he was doing, but it is clear that he 
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played the key role in the organisation of the policemen under his command in order to organise 
and carry out the massacre. As was to be the practice in Luboml, the victims were made to write to 
their families saying that they were to be working in a labour camp.93 
The massacres in Maciejow and Luboml were so similar in procedure that it seems clear that the 
details must have been discussed at the officer’s meeting which appears then, if Biber’s dating is 
accurate, to have occurred between 14 and 17 July 1941. Hertel and Jahnhorst would not have been 
surprised, as they claimed, by the arrival and orders of the “SD unit”. Longerich highlights Battalion 
314 as an example of a police battalion shooting women and children as early as July 1941; that is 
before the other SS-police units under Jeckeln’s command in Ukraine.94 This contention is no doubt 
taken from the findings of the post-war trial proceedings that part of the 1st Company under the 
command of Hertel carried out a massacre of men, women and children in Maciejow.95 However, it 
is clear from the accounts of several survivors from Maciejow and Luboml that in July 1941, Battalion 
314 were in fact killing only Jewish men at this time. The trial proceedings appear to have mixed up 
the details of the first massacres in mid-July with those of massacres that were carried out in 
Maciejow and Luboml in August 1941 and later in Ukraine in which the battalion were also targeting 
Jewish women and children. 
The 2nd Company in the Holoby area. 
The 2nd Company arrived in Holoby, a small town 26 km south-east of Kovel, around 14 July 1941. 
The two officers were the Company Commander Wendorff and his second in command and leader 
of the 1st Platoon Bauer. The 2nd and 3rd Platoons were led by older NCOs, Tachezi and Walter. The 
primary tasks of the 2nd Company were to guard the main train line that ran through Holoby and to 
“secure” and “pacify” the area. During July and August 1941 there appears to have been a number 
of killing actions, some of which were brought to light through Bauer’s own testimony. The trial 
proceedings were able to identify three events that involved the killing of Jewish civilians led by 
Bauer, but it remains unclear exactly when, where and in which order these events occurred.96 
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At some point after the arrival of the company in Holoby, the three platoon leaders are supposed to 
have received orders from Wendorff regarding a “clearing action” of the area, which included the 
task of segregating the Jews of the area from the rest of the population. The vague nature of this 
order could not be clarified by the trial proceedings. However, in order to “segregate” the Jews 
Wendorff, explaining the plan over a map, is alleged to have ordered his leaders to make contact 
with the local militia and mayors of the villages so that the Jews could be identified. The evening 
before they were to set off, the policemen were gathered to receive their orders and a sergeant 
called for volunteers for “an unspecified action” to be explained the next day.97 Bauer later claimed 
that he did not know if he had received a command or a “strong suggestion” by a higher officer, but 
that he was to select and arrest male Jews who were of an age to reproduce or carry weapons; a 
directive that appears similar to the orders issued to PRC on 11 July. Bauer also claimed that he 
received an order from Wendorff, probably at the briefing, that the arrested Jews were to be shot. 
Wendorff for his part denied this and suggested that Bauer could have been acting on his own 
initiative.98 Bauer, as confirmed by his own testimony, was afforded a significant level of initiative in 
carrying out his orders as he was left with a choice; the decision was his whether to transport the 
arrested Jews back to the company headquarters in Holoby, where they would probably be 
transported back to the battalion headquarters in Kovel, or to shoot them on the spot.99 For the first 
massacre examined here by Bauer’s unit, which appears to have immediately followed Wendorff’s 
instructions, Bauer opted to carry out the killings on the spot rather than transport the victims back. 
Bauer later claimed that he made this decision because he felt that the terrain in the area in which 
the village lay had become impassable as they were still partly mined from the time of the fighting 
and that there was a threat of partisan activity in the area, “That is why we could not move freely…I 
had to be careful”.100 The post-war prosecutors were not convinced by this explanation and 
concluded that a return transport would have been possible, but Bauer decided not to take this 
option. Bauer’s decision may have been motivated by reasons other than expediency. A former 2nd 
Company member recalled the company sergeant moaning about the fact that the 2nd Company had 
“got” too few Jews compared to the other two companies.101 It cannot be excluded that the 
sergeant may have been reflecting Bauer’s opinion of the situation. The way in which units of 
Battalion 314 had been separated in the Kovel area left the junior officers in command positions, 
including, at least for operations outside of Holoby itself, Bauer. Within the atmosphere of 
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permissible violence and the orders targeting Jews for execution, Bauer may have been measuring 
his performance, and therefore career prospects, against the performance of his contemporaries in 
this regard. 
The day after the gathering of the company for volunteers, Bauer set off with two trucks, one empty, 
and a group of 30 volunteers to a village located some distance from Holoby.102 It is possible that this 
village was Mielnica, a village that is about 30 km east of Kovel in the Holoby area. In 1941 there 
were approximately 1,000 Jewish inhabitants in Mielnica and it is known that a massacre of 
approximately 280 Jewish men took place there sometime in mid-July 1941. This massacre appears 
likely to have been carried out by the 2nd Company of Battalion 314, and may well have been the 
first massacre in the Holoby area carried out under Bauer’s command around the same time as the 
massacres in Maciejow and Luboml.103  
According to witness statements from former policemen that were part of this unit, as they were 
approaching the village Bauer suddenly saw a Jewish civilian, identified with an armband, on the 
railway track walking towards the village. Bauer is reported to have said, “There is one already”, 
ordered the trucks to stop and got out and beat the man with his whip. The man was then hauled up 
onto a truck and driven to the village.104 One of the former policemen who recalled this act by Bauer 
supplemented his account with references to Bauer as a “Jew-hater”.105 In this instance Bauer may 
have been acting according to a virulent antisemitism as indicated by the witness testimony, an 
eagerness for violence, a demonstration of his power as an officer, or indeed a combination of these 
factors. However, the effect of this act, whether intentional or not, would have been 
demonstrative.106 Bauer’s comment of “There is one already”, suggests that the men under his 
command would already have had at least a strong indication of what their upcoming tasks would 
be. Physically attacking and assaulting a man purely because he could be recognised as a Jew clearly 
demonstrates precisely who, even if it was not already clear to the policemen, their upcoming 
targets would be. In addition, Bauer was demonstrating that he would be leading the violence from 
the front and was more than willing to carry out any act that he was to order, or had ordered, 
himself. During post-war testimony Bauer responded to a question of why he did not try to avoid 
carrying out carrying out the order he claimed he had received from Wendorff. Bauer answered that 
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he had contemplated feigning illness rather than leading the shooting “on the spot”, but because he 
was the only officer present he had to motivate his men to carry out the order.107 That Bauer 
actually contemplated feigning illness after leaving Holoby seems very doubtful, but his explanation 
regarding his perception of his role as leader and motivator appears more credible. 
According to Bauer, on arrival in the village, he sought out the mayor and instructed him to provide 
guides in order to locate the homes of the Jews. He then divided his men into smaller teams that 
would carry out the search and collection of the victims, those who would transport the victims to 
the execution site and the shooting squad; like Jahnhorst and Hertel, Bauer instructed his men to tell 
the victims that they were being brought for work. While the collection of the male Jews was being 
carried out, Bauer left for the pit that was being dug by some of the local population, located about 
100-300m outside of the village, with the shooting squad by truck.108 Before the shooting began, 
Bauer instructed his men how the killing would be done and informed them that he would be 
present at the shooting site. In his post-war statement on the shootings in general, Bauer said that if 
on occasion there were enough shooters available, he would have two shooting squads operating at 
the same time, but sometimes in different places. If this was the case, Bauer said that he would still 
have to lead the killing process by being present at both sites. On this occasion in the unknown 
village near Holoby, Bauer organised a process in which twelve Jews at a time were forced to lie face 
down in the pit and the shooters were to stand with one foot on the buttocks of the victim. Bauer 
and platoon leader Tachezi would also act as shooters. After the first row of victims had been shot 
the next two groups of twelve people would be forced to lie down on top of them, the remaining 
victims were shot while standing facing the pit. The victims that had not fallen into the pit after 
being shot would have to be dragged into the pit by the Ukrainians who had dug it. According to the 
findings of the post-war prosecutors, at least 100 (if this was Mielnica it was more like 280 victims) 
Jewish men were killed in this way, including the man that Bauer had beaten on the railway line; 
after each shot the shooters were given schnapps. Bauer recalled that any victims during shootings 
under his command that had tried to escape and were wounded, would be brought back to the pit 
and killed in the ordered way.109 
When asked in 1973 whether it was always the same men that always acted as shooters Bauer 
replied that he didn’t always pick the same people: “I had known my people long enough to know 
who I could trust [with certain tasks] and could assign them accordingly. Of course, according to my 
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observations, there were one or another of the men who didn’t seem to be in the frame of mind to 
participate [in the shootings]”. However, it appears that those who requested not to take part in the 
shooting squad still took part in the overall killing process: “In these cases they were given guarding 
or security duties”. Bauer indicated that there were some individuals who were regular volunteers, 
but that none of his men were forced to participate as a shooter; although each squad leader was 
expected to take part in this way.110 
Bauer may not have been the author of the task and may have indeed been acting within the 
parameters of specific orders or perhaps guidelines, but clearly took ownership of the action as far 
as organisation and perpetration were concerned. His post-war expressions of feeling a 
responsibility to carry out his duty as an order receiver and order giver as the only officer at the 
scene may have been true to an extent, but may also have been intended to obscure the presence of 
more “base” motives such as a virulent antisemitism or lust for violence which, judging by witness 
statements regarding his actions and character, appear likely. Certainly, expressions of these 
motives during the trial procedure would have carried a far stronger penalty than the one Bauer 
eventually received.111 However, regardless of his motives, his leadership role as the commanding 
officer on the spot is clear. The trial proceedings also brought to light a number of other actions in 
which Bauer played the lead role, all of which occurred sometime in July or August 1941. These 
isolated actions carried out under Bauer’s command demonstrate the significant level of autonomy 
junior officers could enjoy in the field. 
Generally it appears that partisan activity in the Kovel area was at this time in the summer of 1941 
not very high, but there was some activity in the Holoby area designated to the 2nd Company. One 
former policeman recalled that one of the bridges in the area had been blown up and one of the 
policemen was shot.112 Another former policeman recalled a time, which may be related to the 
blowing up of the bridge and the shooting of the policeman, when part of the 2nd Company, probably 
led by Bauer, had been on the road for two or three days combatting a partisan group in 
cooperation with “another unit”. According to the witness, the unit had succeeded in capturing four 
or five partisans who, after a “brief interrogation”, were shot. Furthermore, on the same expedition 
a “Russian” commissar was captured in a small village, taken to a house and beaten to death under 
the leadership of Bauer.113 In what appears to have been a connected incident, another “Russian” 
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was shot under Bauer’s leadership along with two Jewish male civilians. The “Russian” and two 
Jewish men were arrested in a small village in the Holoby area and taken to a wooded area outside 
of the village. Bauer apparently spoke to the Russian who took a piece of paper out of his pocket and 
handed it to Bauer prompting Bauer to beat him with his riding crop. The Jews were made to dig a 
pit and the Russian was shot while, according to the post-war witness statements, trying to run 
away. The two Jews had to collect the body and place it in the pit and were then shot in the pit by 
Tachezi with a machine pistol and his foot on the buttocks of the victim as was the method applied 
during the first massacre. Tachezi then announced to those present that the Jewish men were shot 
because they were giving the Russian accommodation, so were “complicit” in his crimes. Bauer led 
the entire action.114 It is not entirely clear why the “Russian” was killed, whether it was because he 
was viewed to have been a partisan, Red Army straggler or a Soviet official. But because this event 
appears to be related to the bombing of the bridge and the shooting of the policeman it seems likely 
that he was executed in connection with these acts. It is possible that the two Jewish men were in 
fact giving accommodation to the Russian as in Tachezi’s announcement, but it is also possible that 
the Jews were arrested purely in order to dig the pit and murdered anyway as witnesses. For 
executions the killers would not normally dig the pits themselves or bury the bodies of the victims 
but would have the local population perform these tasks instead. As Ingrao has pointed out, the 
German gunmen and guards found the idea of handling corpses repellent as it increased the contact 
between killers and victims.115 According to Lower, when the Germans arrested partisans, or those 
suspected of being partisans in Ukraine, if the suspect was Jewish he or she would usually be shot on 
the spot, but if they were part of the nationalist or Soviet underground they would be interrogated 
before being killed.116 The fact that Bauer decided in this case to carry out the execution on the spot 
rather than transporting the man back to headquarters was probably not unusual for a leader of a 
unit in those types of situations. 
The linking of partisan or enemy activity behind the front lines with Jews may have served as a 
rationale for a further massacre that occurred under Bauer’s leadership which appears to have been 
carried out as a form of reprisal. Sometime in July or August the 1st Platoon of the 2nd Company 
under the leadership of Bauer arrived at a village that could not be identified during the trials. The 
organisation and preparation of this action by Bauer followed the same pattern as the massacre 
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described above and the victims appear to have been Jewish men. On this occasion however, the 
method of shooting differed significantly. The victims were made to stand on the edge of the pit 
facing away from the shooters in groups of four. Bauer organised two shooters for each victim that 
stood 15-25m behind and were instructed to aim for the upper body of the victims on the firing 
command given by him. Bauer assigned one of his men to “finish off” those who were not killed by 
the first volley. According to a witness, who also participated as a shooter, Bauer and Tachezi also 
shot those who were not yet killed. The trials were unable to determine how many Jewish men were 
murdered on this occasion, but concluded that it was at least twelve.117 The witness that 
participated as a shooter claimed that he did not volunteer for the job and did not know in advance 
that the execution was to be of Jews. However, he also wanted to make it clear that “in that area 
there had been parachutists”.118 This statement was clearly designed to avoid being accused of 
knowingly volunteering for an execution of Jews, but may also reveal the rationale that was 
employed at this time for the massacre of Jewish civilians by units of Battalion 314 in the Kovel area. 
The claims made by the accused and witnesses during the trials that there was some enemy or 
partisan activity does not appear to have been fictitious. 
British Intelligence intercepted a message from Jeckeln to Himmler and Daluege, among others, 
dated 24 August 1941: 
In following up the remnants of the 9th Partisan Battalion, the Regiment had come 
under enemy machine-gun fire about midnight. Exchange of light signals between 
bandits and aircraft observed…[PRS] after a heavy engagement with partisan troops (7 
man strong) who had destroyed the telephone lines had cleared up the situation…Small 
parties had shot 12 bandits and franc-tireurs and 70 Jews.119 
Jeckeln does not single out Battalion 314 in this message, but it does appear to match up with some 
of the witness statements about the spate of actions by the unit led by Bauer, which, according to 
one statement, was involved in “anti-partisan activity” along with another unit, that quite feasibly 
may also have been part of PRS. Another intercepted message, this time from PRS to Daluege, 
reported the funeral of a Captain Richter (Reserve) carried out by Battalion 314 on 30 August 
1941.120 It is not clear whether this is the same man that some former battalion members claimed 
had been shot in connection with the actions described above. It does not appear that there was a 
Captain Richter in any of the battalion’s companies at that time, but he may have been one of the 
staff or another policeman stationed in the Kovel area. 
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Lower has shown that the Germans in Ukraine used disproportionate reprisal measures in response 
to the few attacks by partisans or enemy troops on the German forces during this early stage in the 
occupation, which essentially served as a cover for carrying out the mass murder of Jews at a time 
when relatively little resistance actually existed.121 The way the second execution perpetrated by 
Bauer’s unit was carried out, in addition to the connections made in the witness statements of this 
massacre with partisan activity, suggests that this may have been a reprisal action. On this occasion 
the victims were shot from a longer distance and the shooters were instructed to aim for the upper 
body, which is quite a difference in method compared with the first massacre carried out by Bauer’s 
unit where the victims were shot at very close range. The second massacre appears to have been 
staged like a court-martial and may well have been justified on the spot as a military necessity in the 
same way that Tachezi’s announcement was designed to justify the shooting of the two Jewish men 
that had dug the pit. If this action was indeed carried out during the anti-partisan excursion under 
Bauer’s leadership, it seems possible that this was an action carried out on Bauer’s initiative. 
Following his police interrogations in 1973 and 1974, the West German prosecutors found Bauer to 
be extremely well orientated about details and circumstances that might have remained unknown 
and concluded that he seemed willing to confess to his actions and appeared to want to relieve his 
conscience. The situation appeared to change dramatically during his main trial where he altered his 
account significantly and attempted to deflect responsibility for his actions. In the main trial Bauer, 
possibly imitating Jahnhorst and Hertel, claimed that there were two SD men present at the first 
massacre; something he had not claimed in his earlier statements and which was not confirmed by 
other witnesses.122 Despite Bauer’s earlier relative openness, the trial proceedings were not able to 
determine more precisely when and where each of the actions under Bauer’s command occurred. It 
does appear that the first massacre described above preceded the other actions, but it is not clear 
by how long. 
What does emerge relatively clearly is Bauer’s prominent role in these actions in which he appears 
to have exercised a considerable measure of initiative. Bauer claimed that after returning to 
headquarters in Holoby, he submitted a report to Wendorff which, according to Bauer would have 
read along the lines of: “Operation carried out, so many stragglers apprehended and delivered, so 
many Jews shot or brought to company”.123 Despite Bauer’s own testimony that he was given the 
choice by Wendorff either to carry out the shootings on the spot or to transport the Jews back to 
company or battalion headquarters, Bauer appears to have often chosen the former option and 
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carried out the interrogations, executions and massacres under his own command. According to 
Bauer himself, the “shootings of Jews would have been contrary to [Wendorff’s] very nature” and 
following the first massacre he accepted Bauer’s report “without comment”.124 This opinion of 
Wendorff appears to have been shared by his former company men, one of whom stated clearly that 
he had “never seen Wendorff at a shooting”, although he had seen Bauer.125   
The final massacres in Kovel by Battalion 314 
A flurry of executions were carried out by sub-units of Battalion 314 in the Kovel area during the last 
few days prior to their relocation to Vinnitsa on 1 September 1941. Jeckeln reported a number of 
shootings that had been carried out by Battalion 314: the shooting of 25 Jews on 18 August; on 21 
August the shooting of 28 Ukrainians and on 23, 24 and 26 August the battalion shot 367, 294 and 69 
Jews in the Kovel area. According to a diary kept by a member of the 1st Company, between 21 and 
28 August the company shot 53, 69, 64 and 30 Jews.126 The figures given in Jeckeln’s report may 
represent the total numbers of executions reported by the battalion as a whole so may include the 
figures shown in the 1st Company diary. It is not clear how many massacres the battalion actually 
carried out during this period, but it is clear that there was a high level of activity in the last two 
weeks before the battalion left the area. In contrast to the earlier massacres carried out by Battalion 
314 in July, the victims of these later massacres in August 1941 appear to have been mostly Jewish 
women. 
Survivor Bertha Reis described how she had been given a work permit and was employed by “the 
Schupo” in Kovel over the summer of 1941; so she is likely to have been employed by a member of 
the 3rd Company or battalion staff.127 During the last couple of days of August, it appears that at least 
some of the policemen had been informed of a plan for a massacre to be carried out by the company 
in Kovel. The policeman that Reis worked for told her that “if she had a man, she should tell him that 
on Saturday he should come for work”. In the early afternoon of [Saturday] the policeman she 
worked for said that he needed his laundry because they [3rd Company and battalion staff] were 
leaving the next day. Reis found out later that that same afternoon Jews had been forcibly removed 
from their homes and were rumoured to have been shot. The “old mother” from next door had been 
taken, but not her two sons.128 On 31 August the 3rd Company shot 88 Jews in Kovel.129 
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There was a second massacre in Luboml carried out by Jahnhorst’s units of the 1st Company on 21 
August.130 On this occasion an estimated 400 Jews, mostly women, were rounded-up and murdered 
either on the same day as the round-up or the next. The Jewish Council tried to bribe the Germans 
but only a few were released.131 The second massacre in Maciejow was carried out around the same 
time as the second massacre in Luboml where about 300 women were killed at the same place as 
the first massacre.132 For the second execution there appears to have been a change made to the 
method of execution in that instead of using rifles, machine-guns were used. According to one 
former policeman, a fellow policeman told him that the change had been made because the former 
process had become “too drawn-out”.133 It remains unclear whether there was an SD presence at 
the second massacre, but as the unit commander, Hertel must have initiated or at least agreed to 
this change in method. Hertel had formed a Jewish council, but ordered them to be shot for not 
providing the demanded amount of foodstuffs, which, according to one former company member, 
was carried out as the unit was preparing to leave Maciejow.134 It appears that many of Maciejow’s 
Jews had hidden or fled to the surrounding countryside before the round-up for the second 
massacre. The Germans offered rewards for every Jew discovered and the Ukrainian militia, which 
according to Biber helped the Germans in every action anyway, tried to hunt down those that had 
fled; it appears that the killings continued until Hertel and his units left town.135 The new 
commandant of the civilian administration that replaced the military administration following the 1st 
Company’s departure from Maciejow, stopped the killings and other harassments of the town’s 
remaining Jewish population by the militia.136 
The temporary cessation of the killings under the new administration seems likely to have been 
more to do with the fact that by September 1941, Hertel and his men had murdered more or less all 
Jewish adults aside from those considered to be “essential” workers rather than any personal 
convictions on the part of the new commandant. The creation of these conditions appear to have 
been the reason for the flurry of executions carried out by Battalion 314 in late-August 1941 in the 
Kovel area before the establishment of civil administrations. It would appear then that sometime in 
August, before 21 August, the units of Battalion 314 received orders to kill all “non-essential” Jewish 
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workers. From the testimonies of survivors from Kovel, Luboml and Maciejow, it appears that the 
victims of the massacres in late-August were primarily women who had not been given work 
permits. The extent to which small children were also victims of these massacres is unclear. In Noike, 
Ginsburg mentions that following the second large massacre in Maciejow there were many small 
children – orphans – left in the town.137 Sobel mentions that there was a “third” round-up in Luboml 
after which “several” men, women and children were killed, but it is not clear when this action took 
place. The change in the victims targeted by Battalion 314 may have led to the change in execution 
methods adopted by Hertel’s men in Maciejow. The use of machine guns in the second massacre 
may have been an attempt to lessen the burden of murdering the elderly, sick, women and possibly 
children that may not have been felt by the policemen to the same extent whilst murdering men of 
“military” age. This method, as described by the former policeman, made the process faster and 
would have required the participation of fewer “shooters”. Whether this was done on Hertel’s 
initiative is not clear, but as the commander of the units involved it seems likely that he had at least 
some input on the issue. 
During the post-war trials, some former 1st Company members who were present during massacres 
either at Luboml or Maciejow claimed to have helped Jewish families escape during the round-ups, 
moments when they were not being “watched” by higher ranks.138 Several more claimed to have 
requested to be excused shooting duty. A driver claimed that he was told he had to shoot once 
during the first massacre in Maciejow, but he along with some of the other drivers complained and 
they were no longer detailed as shooters.139 More common were accounts that policemen became 
sick or told their NCOs that they couldn’t shoot and were given other duties;140 the drivers with the 
1st Company drove the victims to the execution site during the second massacre in Maciejow. 
Following the first massacre in Maciejow, some policemen complained that they couldn’t eat 
anymore as they had the stench of blood in their nostrils.141 Bertha Reis’ testimony shows that there 
was at least one member of Battalion 314 who was prepared to help Jews escape being murdered, 
but it is significant that this policeman did so out of view. Testimonies given by the former policemen 
who were involved in the massacres that claim they refused to shoot or helped save Jewish lives 
cannot be relied upon as during trial proceedings the witnesses would not want to incriminate 
themselves. It is perhaps easier to accept accounts of perpetrators becoming sick as a result of the 
tasks. However, none of the witnesses who stated that they requested to be excused shooting duty 
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stated that they did so because they fundamentally disagreed with the act, they did so because they 
could not cope. All were given other duties and none claimed to have suffered any repercussions as 
a result, points that can also be applied to Jahnhorst if there is any truth to his claim that he resisted 
the order of the SD. These findings confirm Browning’s claims in Ordinary Men. Jahnhorst and 
Hertel, however, as the unit leaders on the spot were not in positions in which they could be 
excused duty or hide or request other tasks had they so wished. Whether they disagreed with the 
actions or found them physically and emotionally difficult to deal with both performed as the 
organisers of their unit in carrying out the massacres. 
Lieutenant Panis and the 3rd Company in Vinnitsa 
One further example of a junior officer of Battalion 314 leading a massacre of Jewish civilians, before 
the battalion’s involvement in the larger-scale massacres of autumn 1941, occurred on 12 
September in the Vinnitsa area. This action appears to have been led by Panis who was the new 
commander of the 1st Platoon. The commander of the 3rd Company was Captain Meisel, but Panis 
appears to have been the officer leading the shooting. In Panis’ SS file is a letter from Meisel giving a 
character reference on Panis’ behalf. In the letter Meisel states that Panis had been an officer in his 
company from 3 September 1941, just over a week before leading this killing action in Vinnitsa.142 It 
is not known for certain if Panis took part in any other killing action prior to 12 September, but this 
may have been his first experience of such an action. 
Panis was accused of leading this particular action where an unknown number of Jewish men and 
women were murdered. According to a witness who took part in the shooting squad on this 
occasion, Panis organised the executions so that the victims were made to stand with their backs to 
the pit, facing the shooting squad who were armed with rifles. Panis is supposed to have given the 
firing commands and then went to the pit to kill the wounded with a machine-pistol.143 Providing the 
witness statements were correct, Panis would have led this action less than a month after finishing 
officer training. The method employed by Panis in organising the shooting is notable in that it was 
carried out in a similar fashion to the second massacre led by Bauer in the Holoby area. This action 
also appears to have been organised to resemble a more traditional military-style execution or 
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court-martial. Bauer claimed that he had heard through comrade circles that Captain Meisel “was 
disposed towards blindfolding the victims of necessary [my emphasis] Jewish shootings”. Bauer 
explained that he found these stories believable as they corresponded exactly to the impression he 
had of Meisel.144 It is not clear what Bauer’s impressions of Meisel were, but Bauer claimed that he 
was influenced by Meisel’s example to use hand signals instead of shouting the firing command in 
order to ease the suffering of the victims; a claim that was shown to be false by numerous witnesses 
who clearly remembered him shouting the commands.145 Meisel was an older, career policeman and 
may well have used this more “traditional” military-style method of execution in Poland or Ukraine, 
or indeed both. However, it is revealing that in the 1970s Bauer used the term “necessary” in 
connection with the murder of Jewish civilians and the use of this method of killing. Bauer may have 
been invoking a justification used at that time for these early executions as performed as a military 
or security necessity and the organisation of these acts as a deliberate charade intended to conform 
to this justification. 
As a very young (21 years old) and recently posted officer with probably little or no experience of 
murdering civilians, Panis may well have taken advice from his more experienced superior, Meisel, 
on how to carry out the execution or perhaps followed Meisel’s example, although there is no 
evidence to suggest that Panis used blindfolds. However, it does appear that the experience of 
officer training contributed considerably to the preparation of Panis in order to organise and 
personally lead an execution of Jewish civilians. 
Roles and influences of the junior officers 
One of the ways in which the junior officers of Battalion 314 influenced the mass murders during this 
period can be seen in the organisation of the killing actions themselves. Of the massacres for which 
there is information in the Luboml, Maciejow and Holoby areas it appears that to an extent their 
organisation followed a common procedure. The local mayor and militia were used to identify the 
homes of the Jews, the commander would organise his men into search and collection groups, 
groups for guarding the area including the collection point where the victims would be gathered, a 
group for transporting the victims to the killing site and a firing squad. He would organise the digging 
of a pit for the execution which would be done by locals or the victims themselves and would carry 
out a selection of the victims. It also appears that the policemen who were to carry out the tasks 
were informed ahead of time of the task either by the unit commander or an NCO and the 
policemen carrying out the search and collection were ordered to inform the victims that they were 
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being taken for work purposes. That these procedures appear to be fairly uniform among the cases 
involving the units under the command of Jahnhorst, Hertel and Bauer suggests that there was some 
discussion at the battalion or company command of how to carry out these actions. However, there 
were also a number of differences in the way the actions were carried out that suggest a measure of 
personal influence on the part of the unit commander on the spot. 
Although they appear to have been acting according to superior orders or guidelines, the junior 
officers would have had an influence on the selection of the victims. In the cases of Jahnhorst and 
Hertel where there is likely to have been an SD commander, the degree of influence on deciding who 
was to be shot may have been minimal. The SD commander may have had the leading role in 
deciding the age range, sex and number of the victims as well as determining the “essential workers” 
who were, for the time being, not to be killed; although Hertel’s role in checking the documents 
during the selection in Maciejow certainly contributed to this process. Bauer, although acting under 
directives from Wendorff, as the only officer present would certainly have had a greater role in this 
regard in organising the massacres in the Holoby area. If the second massacre involving Bauer’s unit 
was actually perpetrated as part of an anti-partisan operation, Bauer may even have conceived of 
the action himself in the field. The actual location of the killing site appears to have depended on a 
number of logistical factors such as the proximity of wooded areas or circumstances like the 
presence of partisans, factors that may have to have been considered on the spot by the officer in 
charge.146 The first massacre in Luboml under Jahnhorst was carried out some distance from the 
town, whereas the first massacre carried out by Bauer’s unit was done within only a couple of 
hundred metres and in Maciejow the shooting was done directly behind the unit’s accommodation 
probably within view and certainly within hearing distance of the rest of the town’s population. In 
some if not most police battalions and units of the Einsatzgruppen efforts were made by 
commanding officers to evenly distribute the violent tasks among the men, in particular the actual 
shooting.147 According to witness statements under Hertel’s command in Maciejow all members of 
the unit were expected to shoot once, but in all units men could request not to shoot and were 
allocated other tasks by the unit or group commander without serious repercussions. The general 
picture that emerges from the post-war trials confirms the findings of most studies on the German 
perpetrators in that the policemen could request not to take part as a shooter and be given other 
tasks. However, the extent to which pressure was put on individuals to shoot at least once at some 
point remains unclear and is likely to have varied from unit to unit depending on the commander or 
group leaders. Bauer’s testimony on this seems to be the most reliable in that he admits that all 
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NCOs under his command were expected to take part as shooters, but from the rest he knew who he 
could and who he could not rely on. Bauer’s statement does not appear to be particularly self-
serving in that he is still admitting to playing the primary role in ensuring his unit could carry off the 
task, a responsibility that was shared by Jahnhorst, Hertel and Panis but which was handled 
differently in each case. No evidence emerged to suggest that any of the policemen refused to take 
part in the murder actions in any capacity. 
The actual method of shooting employed was also at the discretion of the commanding officer 
present at the scene. For the first massacres of each sub-unit under Jahnhorst, Hertel and Bauer, the 
shooting was done at close range. But the methods employed for the second massacres carried out 
under Hertel’s and Bauer’s commands differ significantly. For the second massacre in the Maciejow 
area under Hertel machine-guns were used instead of rifles. The intention here was to speed up the 
process and further distance the killers from the victims in an attempt to minimise the “spiritual 
exertions” of the killers themselves.148 In both the second massacre carried out by Bauer’s unit and 
the massacre in the Vinnitsa area under the leadership of Panis a firing squad method was used. This 
may have been done in order to correspond with the rationale that the executions were carried out 
as a military “necessity”, in the form of a reprisal or security measure, an ideologically driven murder 
action crudely disguised as a practical military one.149 The best, or most suitable methods of 
organising and preparing killing actions were discussed within the officer ranks, but no precise 
instructions were given on how the victims were to be shot and it was left to the individual 
commander to work out the most suitable method for himself and the men under his command.150 
Finally, aside from the practical organisational aspects of the murder actions, the officer in charge at 
the scene was expected to lead from the front. The trial proceedings on Hertel were not able to 
determine his actions during the actual shootings (although it is clear that Hertel played a lead role 
in the intimidation and extortion of the Jewish population of Maciejow). It is clear that Jahnhorst, 
Bauer and Panis were all present at the actual killing site, but a vanguard role is most apparent in the 
cases of Panis and especially Bauer. Witnesses stated that Panis and Bauer gave the orders to fire 
and participated as shooters themselves, including the killing of the wounded victims in the pits. 
Bauer in particular can be seen leading from the front with extremely violent behaviour. He not only 
participated in the executions but he also personally led the beating of a man to death and 
witnesses stated that he whipped both the Jewish man and “Russian” before ordering their 
executions. 
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Aside from conclusions that may be drawn from the methods employed by the unit leaders in 
carrying out the murders, very little evidence regarding the legitimisation of the acts and “spiritual 
care” for the perpetrators, tasks that would have been an important part of the officer’s role, can be 
found in the trial records. Among the German units that perpetrated the mass murders, it is known 
that as early as June 1941 the leaders of these units were attempting to legitimise the actions of the 
killing groups and that speeches were given by officers of all ranks, including Himmler himself, at the 
murder sites.151 Aside from two comments reported to have been made by a couple of NCOs under 
the command of Jahnhorst and Bauer connecting partisan activity with the murder of Jewish 
civilians, there is no evidence of the junior officers giving speeches or making legitimising comments 
before, during or after the murder actions. The second part of the order issued by the Colonel of PRC 
on 11 July 1941 stating that the battalion and company commanders were to provide for the 
“spiritual care” of the men by holding social evenings and Himmler’s insistence on his officers and 
men participating in ordered “comradeship evenings” suggests that similar orders as those given to 
PRC would have also been given to the battalions of PRS. It would have been part of the jobs of the 
junior officers, as well as the company commanders like Wendorff, to perform these duties while the 
battalion was separated into smaller units in the Kovel area. However, aside from Bauer organising 
schnapps for the shooters at the first massacre in the Holoby area and the organisation of alcohol in 
Luboml, there is no evidence for this particular aspect of the officers’ role. This role would have been 
particularly important during this period in managing the policemen under their command through 
the transitions to massacres of adult males in July to the massacres of the elderly, sick, women and 
then children in the autumn. 
From the evidence available for the actions of the junior officers of Battalion 314 during this period 
from mid-July to mid-September 1941, we can trace some elements of the officer training received 
by these individuals at Berlin-Köpenick being put into practice in Ukraine. Their role as educators is 
difficult to trace. The training and ideological education of the rank and file to be carried out by the 
officers was intended to be an ongoing process and there is no reason to assume that this was not 
done. The training material placed great emphasis on making ideological “knowledge” practically 
applicable in creating an ideological lens through which events and circumstances were to be 
viewed. This part of the role of the junior officers would have been carried out during the weekly 
educational lessons that were supposed to be delivered, during comradeship evenings and also at 
the sites of the murder actions themselves. The initiative and activism that was supposed to be 
embodied by the officers is visible to an extent in the preparation, organisation and carrying out of 
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the killing actions, in particular in the changing of shooting methods by the units led by Hertel and 
Bauer. It is difficult to trace the actions of Hertel and Jahnhorst as they diffused all responsibility for 
their actions behind superior orders, so Bauer provides the clearest example of the powers held by a 
leader of a small mobile unit. Bauer, although operating within what appears to have been general 
orders given to him by Wendorff, showed a great deal of initiative and activism. He chose to carry 
out the first execution in the Holoby area himself, even though he had the choice not to do so, and 
he may have even been the author of the second massacre. Clearly Bauer also had no problems in 
carrying out interrogations and executions of civilians and suspected partisans himself in the field, 
demonstrating the culture of activism that the training school was attempting to inculcate in the 
candidates. Finally, the conception of the officer as a “role model” can be seen in the presence of 
the junior officers, except in the case of Hertel, throughout the killing process and notably at the 
killing site itself. Bauer and Panis were also leading by example in doing the killing themselves. The 
most striking example of this can be seen in Bauer’s whipping of the Jewish man before the first 
massacre. By performing this act, Bauer provided an example to his men of the type of violent 
behaviour that they would have to perform, short of the actual killing which he was also to 
















Chapter 5. Police Battalion 304 and the Large Scale Massacres of Autumn 1941 
During August 1941 there was a dramatic increase in the numbers of Jews killed in Ukraine by the SS 
and police forces under Jeckeln’s command. In contrast to the earlier, relatively smaller scale 
massacres of June, July and early August discussed in the previous chapter, which targeted 
overwhelmingly Jewish men of “military” or “reproductive” age, between 27 August and 30 
September over 100,000 Jews were killed and the elderly, women and children made up the 
majority of the victims. However, the precise source of this dramatic shift in killing remains unclear.1 
The massacre of 23,600 Jews, including a large number of women and children, near Kamenets-
Podolsk at the end of August 1941 was by far the largest massacre of the war to that point. Jeckeln 
was present during the massacre carried out by his staff and Police Battalion 320 with the assistance 
of the local Ukrainian militia and Hungarian soldiers.2 Longerich has described the massacre at 
Kamenets-Podolsk as the “initial spark” that ignited the shift to systematic genocide in the areas 
under Jeckeln’s command.3 From mid-September 1941 there followed a high increase in the 
numbers of victims murdered including a number of massacres perpetrated by SS and police forces 
under Jeckeln in the major cities that exceeded 10,000, overwhelmingly Jewish, victims in each case. 
These large-scale massacres tended to follow approximately the same process. Upon arrival in a city 
the Sipo and SD would shoot hundreds of Jewish men and the military administration would register 
the remaining Jewish occupants. Following negotiations between the HSSPF or Einsatzgruppe 
commander and the army field administration or high command, the majority of the registered Jews 
would be shot, often with Wehrmacht support.4 In contrast to some of the earlier massacres 
perpetrated on a smaller scale by the same SS and police units in July and August such as those by 
Battalion 314 as discussed in the previous chapter, there was clearly less scope for initiative below 
the senior leadership levels as far as the authorship for and carrying out of these larger-scale 
massacres which involved the planned coordination of a number of different units was concerned. 
However, for most of the units involved on the ground, the massacres after mid-September 
represented a shift not only in the sheer numbers of victims, but in the fact that for the first time 
they were being called on to perpetrate the murder in large numbers of civilians that were not men 
or women of military or reproductive age; victim groups now included the elderly, infirm and small 
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3 Longerich, Holocaust, p.251. 
4 Pohl, ‘Ukraine’, p.34. 
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children. This level of coordination of targeted victim groups did not happen immediately following 
Kamenets-Podolsk or at the same time across the SS and police units. 
On 12 August Himmler met with Jeckeln, apparently dissatisfied with the inadequate reports of the 
1st SS Brigade, and urged him to act more aggressively.5 During the first weeks of August, the 
Einsatzgruppe C leadership were told that, in principle, Jewish women and children were to be shot 
as well as some men.6 Nevertheless, in the weeks following the meeting, the numbers of Jews killed 
by Jeckeln’s forces jumped dramatically and the scope of the mass murders expanded, at different 
times and places for different units, to include the elderly, women and children amongst the 
targeted Jewish victims.7 As part of Einsatzgruppe C, SK4a had begun shooting women in large 
numbers in the Zhytomir area, and soon afterwards also children, whereas the murder of women 
and children by EK 5 can be documented for the first time in mid-September. The 1st SS Brigade was 
already murdering women at the end of July and was murdering children by mid-August.8 The police 
battalions under Jeckeln appear to have started murdering women in larger numbers in late-August, 
but entire communities, including children from mid-September. Reserve Police Battalion 45 went 
from committing massacres of hundreds of Jewish civilians in late-August to participating in the 
murder of approximately 12,000 Jewish victims in Berditshev on 15 and 16 September, about 18,000 
Jews in Vinnitsa on 19 and 20 September and 33,771 at Babi Jar, with Battalion 303 on 29 and 30 
September. Battalion 320, with the 1st SS Brigade, committed its first massacre (in Ukraine) on 20 
August in Starokonstantinov murdering 439 men and women and only a week later 23,600 at 
Kamenets-Podolsk.9 
As shown in the previous chapter, Battalion 314 committed a number of massacres of Jewish 
civilians with the numbers of victims totalling under one hundred or in the low-hundreds during July 
and August and began murdering women as well as men in late-August, but may not have begun 
murdering children as well until the involvement in its first larger-scale massacre in Dnepropetrovsk 
                                                          
5 Browning, Origins, pp.311-12. Lower, Nazi Empire, p.71. 
6 Alex J. Kay has recently argued that the commander of EK 9 in Russia Centre received orders from Heydrich to 
include Jewish women and children in the massacres in late-July 1941. The SS units in the central sector appear 
to have begun shooting women and children somewhat earlier than Jeckeln’s units in the southern sector. Alex 
J. Kay, ‘Transition to Genocide, July 1941: Einsatzkommando 9 and the Annihilation of Soviet Jewry’, H&G 
Studies, 27, 3 (2013), pp.411-42. 
7 Browning, Origins, p.312. Andrej Angrick, ‘Annihilation and Labor: Jews and Thoroughfare IV in Central 
Ukraine’ in Brandon and Lower (eds.), Shoah, p.191. 
8 Longerich, Holocaust, pp.223-26. On the 1st SS Brigade, see Martin Cüppers, Wegbereiter der Shoah. Die 
Waffen-SS, der Kommandostab Reichsführer-SS und die Judenvernichtung 1939-1945 (Darmstadt: 
Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2005), pp.165-74. Henning Pieper, Fegelein’s Horsemen and Genocidal 
Warfare. The SS Cavalry Brigade in the Soviet Union (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015). 
9 Curilla, Baltikum, pp.791-9. As discussed in the previous chapter, it seems unlikely that Battalion 45 were 
killing Jewish children in already in July 1941. Prior to its involvement in the Babi Jar massacre, Battalion 303 is 
known to have murdered at least 2,583 victims during 28 massacres. 
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on 13 and 14 October 1941.10 The involvement of Battalions 314 and 304 fit the general pattern in 
Ukraine in the murder of Jewish civilians by SS and police forces. Battalion 314 did not start 
murdering women as well as men until late-August and was involved in the murder of children after 
mid-September. Battalion 304, like Battalion 320, entered Ukraine in mid-August and, unlike 
Battalion 314, started killing men, women and children from early-September 1941. Significantly, 
Battalions 304 and 320 were Jeckeln’s reserve battalions and he decided to deploy these during the 
period of escalation in mid-August. 
The larger-scale massacres that were perpetrated by the SS-police forces from mid-August 1941 
appear to have involved greater coordination amongst different agencies in the field and more 
extensive planning at higher levels of command than the earlier smaller-scale massacres of June, July 
and August. On the face of it, it would appear that the lower-ranking officers of the police battalions 
did not enjoy as much room for initiative and were no longer the authors of the massacres or 
operating in overall command positions as was often the case previously. However, this chapter will 
show firstly that during the period of the larger-scale massacres in the second half of 1941 the police 
battalions were still involved in a number of smaller-scale Aktionen carried out by sub-units under 
the command of lower-level officers. Secondly, it will show that although not in overall command 
positions, the lower-ranking officers still played a pivotal role in the carrying out of the larger-scale 
massacres. These officers were still in command of their units and had to organise their men, prior 
to and during the massacres, who were given specific roles to fulfil. Significantly, the part of the role 
of these officers was to legitimate the actions of their men either before or after the fact. Firstly, this 
chapter will explore a number of massacres perpetrated by Battalion 304 during autumn 1941. The 
massacre at Gaisin (Haisyn) will be investigated in somewhat more depth than the other massacres 
involving Battalion 304 as more attention was spent on this particular case than the others by the 
post-war trials. This will show how the battalion rotated the tasks of each sub-unit over the period in 
an attempt to spread responsibility for the massacres broadly across the battalion. It will also show 
how specific individuals appear to have consistently played lead roles. Secondly, this chapter will 
examine the large massacre perpetrated by Battalion 314 in Dnepropetrovsk and show the multi-
faceted individual roles played by junior officers in carrying out the massacre. 
The preparations of Police Battalion 304 and the march through DG IV 
While stationed in Warsaw at the end of July or beginning of August, the 4th Company was dissolved 
and its members divided among the remaining three companies and communications platoon. The 
4th platoon of each company (every 2nd platoon was divided into two half platoons) were armed with 
                                                          
10 Not in Vinnitsa on 19 and 20 September 1941 as stated in Curilla, Baltikum, p.796, among others. 
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light machine guns. At the beginning of August the men and NCOs had been given bicycles and were 
given instructions on how to use and maintain them; the officers were to travel in motor vehicles, 
the communications platoon had motorcycles and the administration and kitchen personnel were to 
travel by truck. According to the diary of a former member, the battalion left Warsaw sometime 
between 13 and 21 August 1941 and travelled through Lublin and Tarnopol to its first stop in 
Starokonstaninov.11 The battalion was deployed by Jeckeln at just the stage in mid-August during 
which there was an escalation in killing by Jeckeln’s forces in Ukraine. 
It was at this point in time that there were also some important personnel changes within the 
battalion. The three junior officers, Lochbrunner, Becker and Seeber, had graduated as police 
lieutenants and SS officers after completing the 19th Officer Training course at Berlin-Köpenick on 11 
July 1941 and joined the battalion in Starokonstantinov in late-August 1941.12 These three SS men, 
all only 21 years old at the time, replaced NCOs as platoon officers. It was probably at this time that 
Streubel, another Berlin-Köpenick graduate was promoted from platoon leader to battalion 
adjutant. This now meant that of the nine platoon leader positions (twelve if the half-platoons are 
included), three were occupied by junior officers and the rest by the older NCOs. A further addition 
was in the shape of SS Doctor Busse who joined the battalion from the SS Medical Office on 12 
August. Busse, 30 years old in 1941, joined the NSDAP in 1937 and the SS in 1938 and may have 
been added to the battalion at this time, days before the deployment of the battalion, for a 
particular kind of expertise in addition to the usual requirements of a staff doctor.13 Ingrao has noted 
that the medical doctors of the Einsatzgruppen units often played a role in the field and sometimes 
at the killing sites, in teaching killing techniques.14 During a post-war trial, a witness and former 2nd 
Company member confirmed that this was indeed part of the role performed by Busse: “[Before one 
killing operation] we were instructed by a staff doctor who was at that time part of the battalion. He 
was from the SS and a very crazy person”.15 From December 1938 to February 1940, Busse was the 
                                                          
11 ZStl BArch (Bundesarchiv Ludwigsburg) [hereafter ZStL] B162/26795, Final Report, 1988, pp.1591-95. 
12 BAB R19 1205, HA Orpo file Seeber. SSO 269A, SS personnel file Lochbrunner, SSO 050, SS personnel file 
Becker. In Seeber’s police file is a letter from Himmler’s RFSS office dated 18 August 1941 to a number of SS 
and police officials regarding the deployment of the graduates of the 19th Officer Training course at Berlin-
Köpenick. An order states that “The officers are to be on the march so as to arrive at the supply points [for 
Lochbrunner, Seeber and Becker as well as the four junior officers of Battalion 314, the supply point was 
Cracow] no later than 22 August 1941, from which they are to be set in march to said closed police battalions 
and reserve police battalions”. 
13 BAB SSO 125, SS personnel file Busse. 
14 Ingrao, Believe and Destroy, p.182. 
15 StAw München I 120 Js 157-158/74 [hereafter StA 120 Js], statement by Andörfer, 1975, p.886. 
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Standortarzt in Dachau where it is likely he gained knowledge and experience of the killing 
techniques that were passed on to members of Battalion 304 in Ukraine.16 
Finally, at approximately the same time as the above personnel changes, there was a change in the 
battalion commander position. Major Willy Nickel who had been the battalion commander in 
Chemnitz and Warsaw was replaced on 22 August 1941. A message from Himmler and Daluege to 
Jeckeln sent on 21 August intercepted by British Intelligence stated that “Nickel is to be replaced, 
but remains to be used for something else”.17 A former member of the 2nd Company who, in his 
post-war witness statements proved to have a very good memory for names and places, recalled 
that Nickel was replaced at the battalion’s first stop in Ukraine, Starokonstantinov. “During one of 
the 2nd Company’s ‘fellowship evenings’, Nickel came to us personally to say goodbye”.18 It seems 
unlikely that Nickel was replaced for reasons of ideological commitment. Nickel was a veteran of the 
First World War, both a member of the Freikorps and the hard-line antisemitic Deutsch-Völkischen 
Schutz- und Trutzbund, an NSDAP member from 1929 and high-ranking SA officer from 1930-1936 
prior to joining the police.19 Nickel, therefore, was not a career policeman like most of the NCOs of 
the 300-level police battalions, but an “old fighter” and SA man rewarded with a high-ranking entry 
into the police in 1936. The main reason for the personnel change more likely lay in that Nickel 
became ill in Warsaw; he apparently had to have seven teeth removed and developed rheumatic 
complaints.20 Nickel’s removal from Battalion 304 didn’t hurt his career as he was promoted in 
November 1942, a promotion that coincided with his entry into the SS, to lieutenant-colonel and SS-
Standartenführer.21 
As the replacement for Nickel, Himmler suggested Major Karl Deckert who had been the battalion 
commander of Battalion 310 since 22 July 1941. Like Nickel, Deckert also had been in the Freikorps 
following the First World War and was also an “old fighter” who joined the NSDAP in 1932. Unlike 
Nickel, Deckert was an SS officer from 1938 and a career police officer from 1920. Deckert may have 
been considered by Daluege as well as Himmler as an ideal candidate. Prior to taking command of 
Battalion 310, Deckert had been Dr Lammers’ adjutant at the Reich Chancellery in Berlin and, likely 
due to his position, appears to have mixed in high NSDAP circles. In what remains of Deckert’s SS 
                                                          
16 BAB SSO 125, SS personnel file Busse. 
17 NA HW 16/45, GCCS report, August 1941. 
18 StA 120 Js, statement by Kluge, 1977, p.1138. Stefen Klemp stated that Nickel and his successor Deckert 
were battalion commanders in Warsaw. However, from the trial testimonies and British Intelligence reports, it 
appears that Nickel was replaced by Deckert in Starakonstantinov, therefore after the Battalion had left 
Warsaw. Klemp, Vernichtung, p.76. 
19 BAB SSO 349A, SS personnel file Nickel. Klemp, Vernichtung, pp.77-8. On the Deutsch-Völkischen Schutz- und 
Trutzbund, see Longerich, Holocaust, pp.13-14. 
20 Klemp, Vernichtung, p.78. 
21 BAB SSO 349A, SS personnel file Nickel. 
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personal file, there is a telegram of congratulations from Daluege for the wedding of Deckert to the 
daughter of a Reichsamtsleiter in 1940.22 A field posting may well have presented an ideal 
opportunity for a career-minded social climber and SS- police officer. This appears to have been the 
impression of many of his former subordinates in Battalion 304. Many of those former policemen 
who remembered Deckert as post-war witnesses associated Deckert with the Party or SS through 
the wearing of the SS Rune, the golden party medal and, in particular, his SS uniform in addition to 
the fact that he came straight from a prominent post in the Chancellery.23 It appears that Deckert 
had been sent to lead the battalion specifically for the upcoming massacres of Jewish civilians that 
the battalion would carry out; an opinion that seems to have been held by some battalion members. 
A former member of the 3rd Company who displayed a remarkable memory for details as a trial 
witness in 1975 stated that: “My personal opinion is that Deckert was posted to the battalion for this 
reason [the massacres]. This opinion was shared by many officers and other groups”.24 A former 2nd 
Company member had heard that Deckert “came to the front in order to move up the ranks of the 
SS”.25 A former K-Staffel member was of the opinion “that Battalion Commander Deckert was 
transferred at that time to the battalion only because of the Jewish actions [just mentioned]”.26 Care 
must be taken with these types of statements from trial witnesses who themselves were likely to 
have been directly involved in the killings, as they may be attempts to deflect culpability for their 
own actions by placing the blame on higher orders from an authority figure such as Deckert. 
However, given Deckert’s background prior to his appointment as battalion commander and the 
timing of his arrival, it does seem plausible that he was indeed given this position primarily in 
relation to the upcoming mass murders. 
During Deckert’s trial that took place in the 1970s, many former policemen of Battalion 304 said that 
they could not remember Deckert. Undoubtedly, at least some of these men were trying to detach 
themselves from the mass killings or may have been wanting to protect Deckert. Many of those that 
stated they could not remember Deckert could often remember Nickel, their company or platoon 
officers and some other former comrades.27 However, that Deckert was not remembered by many 
may also be an indication of how the battalion actually operated during this period in Ukraine. That 
more of the former battalion members remembered Nickel is perhaps not surprising given that 
Nickel was the Party Stadtverordneter in Chemnitz, the battalion home-base, built up the SA-
                                                          
22 BAB SSO 138, SS personnel file Deckert. 
23 StA 120 Js. For example, statements by: Asmus, 1975, p.905; Schreiber, 1977, p.1071; Kaufmann, 1977, 
p.1144; Rossbach, 1980, p.1285. 
24 StA 120 Js, statement by Asmus, 1975, p.911. 
25 StA 120 Js, statement by Rossbach, 1980, p.1285. 
26 StA 120 Js, statement by Zimmerman, 1980, p.1301. 
27 StA 120 Js. For example, statements by: Andörfer, 1975, p.885; Beinert, 1975, p.899; Karls, 1976, p.974. 
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Feldjägerkorps in Saxony, and from 1936 was a higher-ranking policeman, presumably in the 
Chemnitz area, so may have been visible or had contact with some of the policemen of 304 before 
the formation of the battalion.28 Additionally, in both Chemnitz and Warsaw the battalion was 
stationed in one place as a unit for an extended period of time so Nickel is likely to have been more 
visible. In Ukraine in autumn 1941 however, the battalion appears to have travelled in separate sub-
units, probably in company strength, and only came together as a whole during extended stops. In 
Ukraine Deckert appears to have had much less contact with the battalion ranks than Nickel had 
had. Many former battalion members testified that they had very little to do with Deckert and only 
saw him on rare occasions, many more were able to remember their platoon and company 
leaders.29 It does seem plausible that the men of the rank and file had little if any contact with 
Deckert and that the authority figures with whom they had consistent contact were the platoon and 
company commanders. However, the few times when the battalion did come together and operated 
as a whole unit in summer and autumn 1941 were the occasions when the battalion carried out the 
mass killings in towns and cities along the route. Therefore, although it may be the case that they 
had little contact with him, at least for some, Deckert may have personified the orders that involved 
the battalion in repeated mass murder. 
A number of post-war testimonies by former battalion members recalled speeches given by 
commanders after the battalion had left Warsaw. Rudolf Miksch, formerly of 2nd Company, recalled 
in 1975 that during a roll-call in Zamość, therefore just before the entry of the battalion into Ukraine, 
a speech was given to prepare the men for the mass executions. 
[We were told] that at least one million too many Jews were living in the Ukraine and 
that we were to participate in their removal. Even though we knew at that point that 
these Jews were to be annihilated - we didn’t know how until Starokonstantinov - we 
didn’t think about it further. That meant that to many of the members of our battalion, 
the theoretical and practical ideological influences had taken effect in the respect that 
the annihilation of the Jews was seen as a necessity, or at least as something that one 
needn’t worry about.30 
Other former battalion members who recalled speeches referring to their upcoming duties 
remembered these occurring actually in Ukraine and coinciding with Nickel’s departure and 
Deckert’s arrival. Kaufmann, another former member of the 2nd Company, recalled that one day the 
                                                          
28 BAB SSO 349A, SS personnel file Nickel. Klemp, Vernichtung, p.77. 
29 StA 120 Js. For example, statements by: Andörfer, 1975, p.885; Beinert, 1975, pp.899-900; Karls, 1976, 
p.974; Schreiber, 1977, p.1071; Kutschker, 1977, p.1124. Some witnesses that stated that they hardly ever saw 
Deckert also recalled him in connection with his SS uniform or Party insignia, affiliations that Deckert was 
trying to play down during his trial. This lends more credence to these statements as they were clearly not 
trying to protect Deckert.   
30 Klemp, Vernichtung, p.83. 
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battalion was gathered in a square and was introduced to the new commander, Deckert, by an SS 
and police officer.31 According to Kaufmann, this officer gave a speech in which he said, “among 
other things”, that “the battalion was to be used for resettling actions according to the order of the 
Führer. He himself would carry out every Führer order even though he has five or six children at 
home”. Nickel’s SS file shows that he had five children, so it seems likely that the officer giving the 
speech referred to by Kaufmann was in fact Nickel.32 Shortly after this speech (Kaufmann thought it 
was perhaps the day after), Deckert is supposed to have given more or less the same speech to the 
battalion: “I can remember that during his speech in Zhytomir, he said that the upcoming 
resettlement operations would be led by him personally. I saw Deckert only every now and then 
during the march and then it was only in the distance driving by”.33 Two other former policemen 
recalled Deckert giving a speech upon arrival to the battalion. Haschke stated that at the farewell 
ceremony for Nickel, “Deckert told us that he brought some new orders and that the duties would 
not be pleasant”.34 Asmus recalled that Deckert said that “what lay ahead of us had nothing to do 
with soldierly activities, but that “the soldier has to obey whatever is asked of him. What he meant 
by this we didn’t know at the time”.35 
These statements differ in a number of respects. Miksch’s statement in particular differs from the 
others not only in the timing of the speech but also its explicit nature. It is possible that a speech 
such as the one Miksch describes was given before the battalion entered Ukraine and started 
committing mass murder, perhaps by Nickel, and that the men of Battalion 304 were indeed 
ideologically primed to receive these types of orders. Care should be taken with regards to the other 
three accounts that make references to higher orders, “Führer orders” and expectations of 
obedience to orders, statements that appear to be fairly typical among former policemen and other 
members of perpetrator groups during post-war trials in order to deflect responsibility away from 
themselves and on to binding higher orders. Kaufmann stated that the speeches occurred in 
Zhytomir, but it is known that Deckert arrived while the battalion was in Starokonstantinov, the site 
of the first mass execution carried out by Battalion 304 and before the battalion had reached 
Zhytomir. Therefore, it appears that the speech or speeches were given in Starokonstantinov. It may 
also be possible that the HSSPF referred to by Kaufmann was in fact Jeckeln. Deckert recalled an 
evening when he was summoned to Jeckeln who told him that now he could do something; meaning 
the mass executions of Jews. It cannot be determined exactly when and where the conversation 
                                                          
31 StA 120 Js, statement by Kaufmann, 1977, p.1144. 
32 BAB SSO 349A, SS personnel file Nickel. 
33 StA 120 Js, statement by Kaufmann, 1977, p.1144. 
34 StA 120 Js, statement by Haschke, 1980, p.1342. 
35 StA 120 Js, statement by Asmus, 1975, p.911. 
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took place. It is possible that Deckert met with Jeckeln in Starokonstantinov or just before.36 Also the 
timing of the speech, probably on or around Deckert’s arrival on 22 August, corresponds with the 
timing of Jeckeln’s efforts to extend the killings in his area following Himmler’s intervention on 12 
August. In any case, as Battalion 304 was one of Jeckeln’s “special purpose” units held in reserve up 
to this point, it is likely that Jeckeln would have had some personal influence on communicating the 
nature, though perhaps not precisely, of the unit’s upcoming tasks. It is also more likely that 
Battalion 304 was given these types of instructions at this time than other battalions such as 
Battalion 314 that had been deployed into Ukraine earlier in July 1941. 
A number of post-war statements by former battalion members suggest that upon departure from 
Warsaw, the policemen were not told of their specific tasks or destination, but that they were aware 
that they were headed south-east, perhaps to the Caucasus, and that they would be travelling along 
the Durchgangsstrasse IV (DG IV).37 Running through the southern half of Ukraine, the DG IV would 
stretch 2,175 km and serve as the Wehrmacht’s main supply line in the southern sector. The DG IV 
as such had not existed before the war but was a series of roads and highways that were to be 
joined together by SS and Wehrmacht planners with the use of forced labour. Responsibility for 
maintaining and improving DG IV was taken by the Todt Organisation (OT) and the SS took 
responsibility for providing the forced labour.38 At the time of the entry of Battalion 304 in Ukraine in 
August, OT officials had already targeted Jews for forced labour on the road in the Zhytomir area and 
in the same region during early to mid-September OT and military planners had started to plan for 
seven labour camps to be spread between Vinnitsa and Gaisin for road construction. These plans 
were being made at the same time that Battalion 304 was travelling down that stretch of road.39 
Angrick has shown that until December 1941 there had only been a modest level of maintenance 
done on DG IV, in the most part due to the priority given by the units under Jeckeln’s command to 
the annihilation of whole communities with little regard for economic interests. Only in December 
did Himmler take more of an interest in the movement of supplies on DG IV and in February 1942 
agreed to bring DG IV in line with settlement policies.40 From mid-August to mid-October 1941, the 
period when Battalion 304 was travelling on the DG IV, the tasks of the battalion seem to have been 
concerned more with the annihilation of Jewish communities than construction issues. However, it 
                                                          
36 StA 120 Js, Deckert’s testimony, 1981, p.1431-2. Deckert claimed that he replied to Jeckeln, “My God, these 
are still people. You can’t do that”. To which Jeckeln or his adjutant replied, “Deckert, you probably haven’t 
recognised the sign of the times”. 
37 StA 120 Js, statements by: Beinert, 1975, p.901; Karls, 1976, p.974; Rossbach, 1979, p.1285; Zimmermann, 
1979, p.1300. Zimmermann stated that the battalion was informed that they were to be used for the 
protection of the oilfields in the Caucuses. 
38 Angrick, ‘DG IV’, pp.192-3. Lower, Nazi Empire, p.62. 
39 Lower, Nazi Empire, pp.143-4. 
40 Angrick, ‘DG IV’, pp.194-7. 
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does appear that the actions taken by Battalion 304 along this stretch of road may have been 
couched in terms of security measures and perhaps related to the importance of the thoroughfare 
for the prosecution of the war. A former member of the 2nd Company acting as a witness during a 
post-war trial stated that the collections of people – the witness claimed that he didn’t know that 
the people collected were Jews or that they were taken away and shot – was known as “securing the 
supply lines” (zur Sicherung der Nachschublinien).41 A former member of the K-Staffel stated that 
“the task of the battalion was also the security of railway stations and railway lines which were 
extremely vulnerable to the partisans”.42 Clearly the tasks of guarding and securing of transport links 
are more suited to stationary, localised units such as the soon-to-be-established gendarmerie 
stations rather than a mobile unit like Battalion 304 and, given the content of the training received 
by the battalion members, this would have been clear to all at the time. Unless of course the mass 
executions carried out by the battalion were indeed depicted as a necessary retaliatory or pre-
emptive means of securing these essential supply lines, such as the DGIV; a rationale that depicted 
the entire Jewish population as partisans or partisan helpers. In his letter to the commander of the 
Orpo in the Warsaw district, Oberstleutnant Petsch on 29 November 1941, Deckert used the type of 
millennial language likely to have been common currency among SS officers: 
We are in a war that has been forced upon us by Judea for our people’s existence. Here 
considerations of human mildness must recede. In this war it is about wiping the slate 
clean and to protect our Greater German Reich for the future centuries from the Jewish 
world pest and the Asian danger from the east.43 
It is not clear whether explicit rationales regarding antisemitic security measures in the form of 
“resettlement” actions were given in the speeches by Nickel, Deckert or Jeckeln before the first 
massacre in Starokonstsntinov or if these were the rationales employed after the actions. The 
speeches associated with Deckert’s arrival as recalled by some former battalion members may have 
been vaguer concerning the battalion’s upcoming involvement in mass murder. Nevertheless, it does 
appear that Deckert’s arrival, and perhaps also the arrival of the three junior officers, were seen 
perhaps retrospectively by some as a point which started a decisive shift towards the direct 
involvement of the battalion in mass murder. 
Starokonstantinov and Vinnitsa – early September 1941 
According to the diary of a former policeman, the battalion arrived in Starokonstantinov on 21 
August and left on 4 September 1941. At the time of the German occupation of the town on 8 July 
                                                          
41 StA 120 Js, statement by Rossbach, 1979, p.1286. 
42 StA 120 Js, statement by Heinrichs, 1979, p.1312. 
43 Cited in Klemp, Vernichtung, p.82. 
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there were approximately 6,000 Jews remaining. Before the town was transferred from a military to 
civilian administration in September, there were a number of executions carried out by German 
units against of the Jewish population: twenty Jews were shot soon after the occupation of the 
town; on 3 August companies of the 8th SS Infantry Regiment shot 302 men and 187 women on the 
pretext of not enough Jews showing up for labour detail and sabotage; some Jewish individuals 
deemed incapable of work were shot in early August and on 18 August approximately 150 young 
Jewish men and women were shot. The largest of these executions was carried out by Battalion 304 
which shot at least 500 Jewish men, women and children on 2 September.44 
During the days leading up to the first mass execution, it appears that some units of the battalion 
were involved in the capture and execution of “Russian” parachutists. On 25 August, British 
Intelligence reported: “Police Battalion 304 is in action against parachute troops and captures 8 of 
them. The booty includes 4 parachutes and 15 kg of dynamite packs”.45 A former member of the 3rd 
Company recalled an occasion near Starokonstantinov when he was involved in the shooting of five 
parachutists. 
Meister Altmann [platoon leader in the 3rd Company] put together a group as leader of 
the execution squad including myself. A pit had been dug at the execution site and the 
Russians had to kneel individually facing the pit. They were shot one after the other…I 
remember that two or three shooters were shooting at one Russian. Meister Altmann 
wanted it that way so that each group would have its turn. They were shot in the neck. 
During the action an HSSPF was present.46 
Another former member of the 3rd Company remembered shooting parachutists on Jeckeln’s 
orders.47 Two former members of the 1st Platoon, 2nd Company recalled participating in the shooting 
of five to eight “Red Army men” while in Starokonstantinov. Melzer, who was responsible for killing 
one of the men, remembered the shooting took place only about 100m from the accommodation.48 
It is not clear from these testimonies whether the executions were one and the same or different 
actions, but they do share a similarity in the number of men executed and the approximate timing of 
the executions. Therefore, in light of Jeckeln’s report, the battalion was involved in finding some 
Soviet soldiers just before the massacre in Starokonstantinov, but it is not clear if Jeckeln himself 
was present at the executions. That the executions, according to Melzer, took place close to the 
accommodation presumably in Starokonstantinov, suggests that there may be a connection 
between the capture and shooting of the Soviet soldiers and the following massacre of some of the 
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town’s Jewish population. A pretext that the soldiers were in some way helped by Jews of the town 
may have been used to justify the massacre of a large number of the Jewish residents. Platoon 
Commander Altmann was able to organise the executions so that a number of policemen under his 
command shared the experience of killing. It may be then no coincidence that the 3rd Company were 
chosen to act as the shooters for the first massacre. 
Shortly before the massacre on 2 September 1941 the battalion was told in a briefing that Jews from 
the town were going to be shot and which units were to perform which tasks.49 1st Company was 
assigned the task of driving the Jews to a collection point, 2nd Company closed off the town and 
guarded the transport of the victims to the execution site which was done with trucks and the killing 
and the securing of the killing site was done by 3rd Company. Parts of the 2nd Company along with 
other units violently removed the Jews from their homes as identified by the local militia. One 
former policeman “heard that all the company commanders were present [at the killing site] along 
with the Major”.50 Just before they were shot, the victims were searched for jewellery and other 
possessions before they were made to pass through a corridor formed of 3rd Company men. 
According to one witness the shooting was done by two or three men in rubber coats with machine 
pistols. The same witness recalled that at least two of the platoon leaders of the 3rd Company were 
active at the execution site.51 A former member of the 1st Company recalled that “as my comrades 
came back from the pit they were so depressed that one could not talk to them”.52 During the 
massacre on 2 September, at least 500 Jewish men, women and children were murdered. About a 
month after this massacre a ghetto was established that contained about 5,000 Jews of the town 
and most of these people were murdered by the Sipo and SD, with assistance from German 
gendarmerie and Ukrainian police, on 20 May 1942.53 
 The battalion left Starokonstantinov two days after the massacre on 4 September and headed to 
Vinnitsa. In Vinnitsa on 5 September the battalion carried out the massacre of approximately 2,200 
Jewish men, women and children.54 At the beginning of the German occupation there were 
approximately 18,000 Jews living in the city, at least 10,000 of whom were killed by Reserve Police 
Battalion 45 on 19 September 1941.55 As in Starokonstantinov the battalion was gathered together 
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before the impending Aktion and briefed.56 In this case it appears that volunteers were requested 
from across the battalion to carry out the shooting. As group leader in the 3rd Company, Jäger was 
requested to provide a shooter from his group. However, Jäger felt that the members of his group 
were not up to killing women and children so he volunteered himself. During his shift of one and a 
half hours he shot at least 100 individuals. Perhaps because some of the volunteers had not yet shot 
anybody, Schumann of 2nd Company was asked to demonstrate how to carry out the killing as he had 
attended the “special training” on killing in Cracow. Schumann demonstrated by killing at least 15 
people before returning to command his own group at the collection point, once he was satisfied 
that the volunteers could carry out the task.57 
Gaisin – September 1941 
On 6 September 1941, the day after the massacre in Vinnitsa, units of Battalion 304 arrived in Gaisin, 
a town located about 82 km south-east of Vinnitsa, where it would stay until 19 September. 
Following the German invasion of the Soviet Union, about 2,000 Jews of a pre-war population of 
4,109 had not fled the town.58 On 16 September at least 1,409 Jewish men, women and children of 
Gaisin were killed along with 29 Jews from Ladyzhin, a nearby town where a unit of Battalion 304 
had carried out a massacre on 13 September.59 The town was occupied by the Wehrmacht on 25 July 
1941 and before the transfer to the civilian administration sometime in autumn 1941 the town was 
administered by the OK 1/275 (Ortskommandantur) under a Major Heinrich. By the time Battalion 
304 arrived, the OK had organised the implementation of anti-Jewish measures which included the 
wearing of armbands, forced labour and prohibition from leaving the town. At some point in 
summer or autumn 1941 an “open ghetto” was created by Major Heinrich, but it is not clear if this 
was done before or after the first massacre on 16 September.60 In Gaisin the units of the battalion 
were stationed in numerous buildings spread throughout the town and, like the other German 
occupiers in the town, probably took advantage of their position by exploiting the local population. 
Marz, a former member of a Wehrmacht communications squad stationed in Gaisin, recalled that 
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the six-man squad were “assigned” two female Jews as cleaners.61 According to one former member 
of the communications squad, policemen from Battalion 304 went out of their way to do “little 
harassments to the Jews”.62 According to another former member of the communications squad, 
Deckert acted particularly ruthlessly against the Jews of the town.63 Geiger, another former 
communications man, recalled Deckert as “a very arrogant officer…very distant towards his 
subordinates”. During a post-war trial Geiger insisted that he remembered Deckert in part due to an 
incident in which he threatened Geiger’s friend Marz with a “war court” for “joking with his cleaning 
girl”. According to Geiger, “nothing happened to Marz but the cleaning girl was immediately fired 
and ordered out of the house…she was probably killed during the “cleansing operation” (Geiger used 
the term Säuberungsaktion as a witness in the late-1970s).64 
In addition to “little harassments” against the town’s Jewish population, while stationed in Gaisin 
the battalion was involved in a number of executions and massacres before the large massacre in 
Gaisin on 16 September. On 12 September three Jews were executed in connection with stealing 
property.65 A few days after the arrival of the battalion in Gaisin, 15 Soviet POWs were shot, 
probably by the 2nd Company. On 13 September 486 Jews were killed near the town of Ladyzhin. On 
the day some units travelled by truck from Gaisin to Ladyzhin. Schumann’s group of 2nd Company 
were also involved in this massacre, but it is not clear which other units of Battalion 304. The East 
German courts found that Schumann himself was responsible for shooting at least 15 of the 
victims.66 
On the morning of 12 September a “propaganda march” took place in which the Jews of the town 
were collected by the battalion and “made to march through the streets in a sort of procession”.67 
Lower has highlighted the fact that the German practice of forcing the Jews to march through the 
town was common and primarily done to involve the local populations in the anti-Jewish 
measures.68 There also appears to have been a selection made in which those considered to be 
skilled workers were separated. Motelj Jusim, a blacksmith by trade was not killed on 16 September, 
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but his wife and three children were.69 As in Starokonstantinov and Vinnitsa, on the morning of the 
Aktion the battalion was gathered to receive their orders. Langer of the communications squad 
remembered the men standing lined up in front of Deckert.70 This may have been a point when the 
battalion was given a rationale for the tasks they were about to carry out. A former 2nd Company 
member recalled one such justification for Gaisin: “At the time they said that the Jews were shot 
because they were suspected of being involved in the blowing up of a German hospital”.71 A former 
1st Company member recalled a strikingly similar reason given for the massacre in Gaisin: “We were 
told that the Jews were shot because they had killed badly wounded German soldiers. One could 
actually see 40-50 grave crosses. These soldiers were said to have been the seriously wounded left 
behind and were reportedly killed by the Jews. So they told us at the time”.72 A former member of 
the 3rd Company recalled an incident that appears to have been related to these stories. “One day 
during the first days in Gaisin came the command to search the houses of the Jewish population of 
Gaisin for weapons, ammunition and explosives. The Jewish homes were already marked by Jewish 
stars…As I understood it, the searches proved fruitless. Suddenly a few days later it appeared that 
weapons and ammunition had been found after all”.73 According to the witness the Aktion 
proceeded shortly after this revelation. That three former policemen, representing all three 
companies of the battalion recalled such similar stories suggests that either a story regarding the 
Jews responsibility for the deaths of German soldiers was in fact an excuse used by the battalion 
leadership at the time, or there had been some discussion amongst former policemen before the 
trial. It is perhaps not inconceivable that this was the rationale provided by the battalion leadership 
at the time and, perhaps, at the briefing for this particular massacre in Gaisin. Waitman Beorn has 
shown that in the summer and autumn of 1941 a formula that was mobilised on the ground level in 
the Soviet Union attempted to explain the mass murder of Jews under the guise of an anti-partisan 
war: “all Jews were Bolsheviks, all Bolsheviks were partisans (or at the very least supporters of 
partisans, and thus, all Jews were also partisans or partisan supporters”.74 The blaming of local Jews 
collectively for actions that may or may not have been taken by retreating Red Army soldiers or 
partisans would not have been a deviation from the norm as far as rationales given by numerous 
German killing units in former Soviet territory since June 1941 and to a lesser extent also in Poland 
from 1939-41 are concerned. 
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The Aktion on 16 September began at 6 am with the 2nd Company forcibly removing the Jews from 
their homes which had been marked by the Ukrainian police the day before and brought to the 
market square. The escorting of the victims to the shooting site and the guarding of the square was 
done by 3rd Company and part of 2nd Company. The shooting, securing of the shooting site and the 
collection of valuables was this time carried out by 1st Company.75 A former member of the 
Wehrmacht communications squad wanted to make it clear that the OK had nothing to do with the 
collection and shooting of the Jews.76 No evidence emerged from the post-war trials that indicated 
the direct participation of the soldiers in the massacre, but that does not mean that some did not 
participate in some form or other; perhaps as spectators. During the round-up members of the 2nd 
Company mishandled, poked with bayonets and beat the victims with rifle butts.77 At least some 2nd 
Company men appear to have been very thorough in their searching for hidden victims, looking 
through rubbish, holes and other potential hiding places.78 Aside from marking the homes of the 
Jews for the German policemen, the local Ukrainian population also helped during the round-up. A 
former member of the Wehrmacht communications squad recalled that: “the Ukrainians harboured 
a certain hatred for the Jews. They even betrayed hiding Jews to the SS and police”.79 Few Jewish 
residents would have escaped the round-up. Michail Hendelsmann recalled in 1969 how as a young 
man, about 22 years old, he escaped the round-up in the morning by jumping out of a window and 
fled to another town returning only two or three days later.80 
In escorting the victims to the execution site, which was situated about 2 km outside of the town, 
members of the 3rd Company used violence including kicking, punching and constant pushing.81 As 
the victims reached the shooting site they were forced to hand over their clothing, shoes, money 
and other valuables that were to be deposited in the specific boxes.82 The former battalion bursar 
(Kassenleiter), Liethen and his subordinate, Klarner, recalled receiving a large amount of money and 
gold teeth following the Aktion; the money was put in a Red Cross box which was being used as a 
cash register. Liethen claimed that he couldn’t remember where the gold teeth came from.83 On 17 
September, the day after the massacre, Major Heinrich reported receipt of “several items of 
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jewellery” that had been handed in by the Ukrainian militia.84 It is not known what was done with 
the stolen valuables and money. The victims were forced to lie down in prepared ditches in groups 
of about ten people and shot with machine-pistols.85 Only one witness, Schumann, testified that 
Deckert was at the shooting site. Langer of the Wehrmacht communications platoon, who appears 
to have watched the actions unfolding in the town, assumes that Deckert was at the execution site 
as he didn’t see him in the town following the rounding-up of the victims. Three witnesses 
remembered seeing Hanstein, the 1st Company commander at the killing site, one recalled that 
Mayr, 2nd Company commander, was present, one remembers Meister Weigand the 2nd platoon 
leader in 2nd Company and two Lieutenant Welsch the 1st Platoon, 3rd Company leader.86 It appears 
that there was usually a strong officer and platoon leader presence at the sites of these massacres. 
Survivor Marija Goldschmidt was able to provide testimony on the killing site at Gaisin in 1969: 
It wasn’t possible to flee anywhere because on top of the wall [an earthen wall on one 
side of the ditches] was a ring of armed Germans. I and the other unlucky people were 
told to undress. I was standing there with only my nightgown, when a tall German 
approached with officer shoulder bits. He was humane. He took me by the hand and led 
me to the path and said that I should take my child and flee to another village where I 
could escape death. As the German led me away…I saw how the Germans threw 
children into the pits alive and another German who was shooting adults with his shirt 
sleeves rolled up to the elbow. As well as him, other Germans were shooting. All this I 
saw as I was being led away from the shooting place by the German officer…It is not 
clear to me why he showed humanity towards me and my child. Perhaps he heard my 
child screaming and saved us from death because of that.87 
Marija Goldschmidt did escape to another village with her child and then joined a partisan group in 
the forests. Her parents and three sisters were killed in the massacre on 16 September. It cannot be 
established who the officer was that chose to save Goldschmidt and her child, or why he did so. 
There are no similar accounts that emerged from the West and East German trial proceedings of 
officers saving people. It may have been that an officer had more freedom in his movements than a 
policeman from the rank and file and therefore had greater opportunity to perform such an action. It 
may also have been the case that the situation at the killing site was somewhat chaotic or perhaps 
busy with many German policemen and auxiliaries coming and going, so an individual would have 
been able to carry this action out unnoticed or unchallenged. Nevertheless, this account shows that 
if there were opportunities for policemen to perform such deeds at that stage of the killing process, 
there were plenty of opportunities to do so at other stages; in particular the round-up. It is of course 
conceivable that the officer in question may well have been capable of saving some people and 
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contribute to the killing of others on the same day and therefore may not have fundamentally 
disagreed with the overall task. 
Other survivor testimonies show that levels of diligence and perhaps, in some cases, exuberance 
towards performing the task of destroying the Jewish community of Gaisin varied among the 
policemen. Elisabeth Shor claimed at the shooting site that she was not Jewish. A German policeman 
asked an interpreter who said that he could not confirm the girl’s “nationality”, so the German let 
her go.88 Michael Blumenblatt, at the time a boy of 14, remembered other Jewish women claiming 
they were Ukrainians at the shooting site and, after a few questions from the Germans, were let go. 
Blumenblatt did the same thing and was let go by a German also. It is feasible that there were some 
policemen in Battalion 304 who had difficulties with the killing of women and children but may have 
been less troubled with contributing to the murder of men. The whole process and performance of 
the mass murder of the Jewish community in Gaisin as related by members of the Wehrmacht 
communications squad and especially Marija Goldschmidt’s harrowing account of the killing site 
appear to have differed significantly from the more traditional, military-style firing squads that some 
units of Battalion 314 used in the murder of Jewish men only a month previously in Volhynia. 
For other members of the battalion, the murder of women and children in this way does not appear 
to have been too great a threshold to cross. Langer, formerly of the communications squad, related 
a conversation with a battalion member on cordon duty: 
The sentry told me that a unit of volunteers was sought for the shooting operation. 
They would get special rations. Men had volunteered but he had not volunteered as he 
didn’t want to shoot anyone. He didn’t tell me who had asked for volunteers. I asked 
him if maybe participation in the firing squad took place under duress, but he replied 
that this was not the case, only volunteers were eligible.89 
Gross, another member of the communications squad recalled a policeman talking to his group 
about the shooting: 
That man was completely finished with his nerves and wanted to talk about the event 
to cleanse his soul. He said ‘No one is being made to shoot, I can only be used for 
cordoning duty’. He went on to say that some of his comrades were acting in a blood 
frenzy.90 
At Gaisin the responsibility for forming the firing squad and other tasks at the shooting site were 
with the 1st Company under 1st Lieutenant Hanstein and Lieutenant Becker. The majority of the 
volunteers may have come from the 1st Company, whose turn it was, but the division of labour 
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among the sub-units was fluid at Gaisin and battalion members from the other companies ended up 
performing a number of tasks on the day, including at the execution site. Hoffman of the 2nd 
Company was initially used during the round-up of the victims. He was then ordered by Company 
Commander Mayr, to help in the transport of the victims to the execution, and then to assist the 
shooters at the execution site, which he did. We have seen how Schumann was involved in more 
than one task during the day, including the initial demonstration and supervision of the killing. 
Melzer, also of the 2nd Company, was involved in the transport of the victims to the execution site, 
and later himself shot about 20 victims.91 Pöhlig of the communications platoon throughout the day 
was involved in the removal of the victims from their homes, the escort of the victims to the 
execution site, the cordoning chain at the killing site and finally he was asked by an officer at the site 
to shoot; which he did.92 Different officers are likely to have been put on command at different 
locations during the killing process and are likely to have commandeered men at times from other 
units as they came and went. However, if only volunteers were eligible to perform as shooters, as it 
appears they were, men like Pöhlig, Hoffmann, Schumann and Melzer would have been requested 
rather than ordered, if indeed they hadn’t already volunteered of their own accord. 
Sub-units of the battalion left Gaisin over the following couple of days and were reported to be on 
the march to Kirovohrad on 19 September.93 Following the massacre, the remaining Jews of Gaisin 
were forced into an “open ghetto” until 17 November 1941 when, with the exception of 120-150 
skilled workers, they were shot also by a gendarmerie unit and Ukrainian militia. Most of the skilled 
workers were shot in May 1943 by a Sipo unit and Ukrainian militia.94 
Kirovohrad and Uman – September and October 1941 
In September and October 1941 Police Battalion 304 continued to comb the route of DG IV on the 
stretch of roads between Gaisin and Oleksandriia, carrying out a number of massacres until the 
winter conditions forced the battalion to turn back north-west towards Kiev. Somewhere between 
Gaisin and Kirovohrad and sometime between 17 and 20 September, it appears that the 2nd 
Company were involved in at least one massacre of men, women and children. In the East German 
trial against Hoffmann, it was found that during this period in a small village at least 450 victims 
were murdered in a massacre that only took about an hour to perpetrate. Following the massacre 
the men of the shooting unit were transported back to the village from the shooting site and given 
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alcohol.95 In the trial against Miksch, also of the 2nd Company, it was found that he participated in 
the murder of 40-50 old men, women and children in a small village during the same three day 
period just after leaving Gaisin.96 The disparity in the number of victims between the two accounts 
suggest they were in fact two separate incidents. It is unclear whether or not it was only the 2nd 
Company under Captain Mayr that carried out these massacres. However, it is significant that the 
unit involved appear to have become so practiced in carrying out mass murder that they were able 
to murder such a large number of people in a short space of time. At least some of the sub-units 
arrived in the city of Kirovohrad, the capital of the Kirovohrad Oblast, on 20 September and the 
battalion would be stationed there until 12 October 1941. 
On 30 September in Kirovohrad the battalion carried out the murder of 4,200 Jews. Most of these 
victims were old men, women and children, but among the victims were also 600 POWs.97 Starting in 
the early hours of the morning the 1st and 2nd Companies drove the Jewish residents from their 
homes which had been previously marked by the Ukrainian militia. The victims were transported 
from the collection point to the killing site outside of the city also by the 1st and 2nd Companies. At 
the shooting site, the 2nd Platoon of 3rd Company (probably under the leadership of Lieutenant Rudi 
Seeber) removed clothes and valuables from the victims. The other two platoons of 3rd Company 
with volunteers from 1st Company carried out the shooting.98 It is not clear who was leading the 
Aktion overall as Deckert was not placed at the scene by any post-war witnesses. However, as the 
battalion as a whole was barracked in Kirovohrad, it seems very likely that Deckert was involved 
either in the city or at the shooting site. Post-war witnesses cited Hanstein and Lieutenant Becker 
(both 1st Company) as the commanders of the round-up and other witnesses cited Company 
Commanders Hanstein (1st Company) and Mayr (2nd Company) as being involved in the shooting 
along with a number of NCOs from across the battalion.99 While stationed in Kirovohrad the 
battalion was involved in a number of smaller scale Aktionen. At some point during the stay, units of 
the 2nd Company were involved in the killing of about 15 exhausted and starving POWs. According to 
the findings of the East German prosecutors, the prisoners were thrown bread and were shot while 
they were grasping for it.100 On 4 October units of Battalion 304 carried out the murder of 305 Jews 
in Oleksandriia, a town east of Kirovohrad.101 On 6 October, units of the battalion carried out the 
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arrest and execution of a number of supposed communists as identified by the local militia in 
Kirovohrad, including a Soviet commissar.102 
On 7 October units from all three Companies of Battalion 304 travelled from Kirovohrad to Uman by 
truck in order to carry out the massacre of the Jews there the following day.103 On 8 October, about 
5,500 Jewish men, women and children of the city and about 500 POWs were shot by these units.104 
Presumably a sizeable portion of the battalion remained in Kirovohrad and did not participate in this 
particular massacre. Uman is situated west of Kirovohrad on the road to Gaisin, and was home to 
over 13,000 Jews, according to a 1939 census. The organisation of the massacre followed 
approximately the same pattern as the previous large-scale massacres in Starokonstantinov, 
Vinnitsa, Gaisin and Kirovohrad. On this occasion the 2nd Company were operating at the execution 
area along with volunteers from the other two Companies.105 Following this massacre, only about 
1,500 Jews remained in the “open ghetto”.106 The final Aktion that is known to have been carried out 
by Battalion 304 before the battalion took its winter quarters in Kiev took place in an unknown 
village near Znamianka where 47 Jewish men were shot on 14 October. On the same day as this 
massacre a unit of the 2nd Company handed over three Soviet “functionaries” to an SD unit, so it 
appears that the two incidents were probably connected.107 
Battalion 304 left Kirovohrad for its assigned winter quarters in Kiev probably around the same time 
as the massacre in Znamianka, arriving in Kiev on 19 October 1941.108 The policemen of the battalion 
travelled (most by bicycle) all the way from Warsaw to Oleksandriia in the east and back north to 
Kiev in a journey lasting 68 days from 13 August to 19 October 1941.109 During this journey 
collectively the battalion murdered at least 15,658 people from the first large massacre in 
Starokonstantinov on 2 September to the massacre in Znamianka on 14 October; a period of 43 
days. The vast majority of these victims were Jewish civilians and the majority of these appear to 
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have been the old and sick, women and children. This figure only accounts for the massacres that 
have been documented so the total of victims within this period is almost certain to have been far 
greater. Deckert was certainly satisfied with the performance of the battalion under his command. In 
his letter to Petsch on 29 November 1941 while in Kiev, Deckert wrote: 
Since I have had the honour of leading this battalion the men have behaved in an 
exemplary way in carrying out their assignments…The opinion of HSSPF General Jeckeln 
that [Battalion 304] is to be considered as the best battalion in the operational area of 
Ukraine bears persuasive witness to this.110 
When HSSPFs Jeckeln and Prützmann exchanged positions in late-October 1941 it appears from an 
intercepted message by British Intelligence that Jeckeln wanted to take Battalion 304 under Major 
Deckert north with him.111 
In the information that emerged from the post-war investigations on the massacres committed by 
Battalion 304, a general pattern could be observed. The lower-level commanders, including the NCO 
platoon leaders, were informed the evening before or in the morning of an impending Aktion. The 
companies and platoons were divided according to their tasks and volunteers were found to carry 
out the shootings which would be led by the company commanders at the execution site. The Jewish 
victims were removed from their homes that had been marked by the local militia and taken to a 
collection point. From there the victims were driven in marching columns or in trucks to the 
execution site which would be outside of the town. At the execution site, the victims would be 
robbed of their valuables and clothes and were forced to go through a corridor formed of policemen 
to the pits, ditches or ravines. There in groups of 5-10 the victims were shot after being forced to lie 
in the pits. The shooting squad was replaced after one or one and a half hours and had a three to 
four hour break until the next turn. It was estimated that each shooter would murder 30-60 people 
in an hour. The shooters wore rubber coats and were given alcohol and cigarettes. Sometimes 
members of the SD were present at the execution site, as was the battalion Doctor Busse, 
presumably in supervisory roles. The massacres were always completed by late-afternoon and the 
pits were covered with chlorinated lime then covered with earth.112  
Despite apparently following a systemised routine, as the example of Gaisin, probably the third large 
massacre carried out by Battalion 304, shows, the massacres were not necessarily that smoothly run 
and involved the use of extreme violence by policemen (in addition to the actual shooting) at every 
stage of the procedure. However, although each stage of the procedure involved an extreme level of 
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violence and were in themselves necessary components of the killing process, it appears that the 
battalion leadership attempted to lessen the burden of the actual shooting by rotating the main 
tasks of the companies with each massacre. In Starokonstantinov the 3rd Company was stationed at 
the killing site and carried out the shooting with other volunteers from across the battalion. In 
Vinnitsa the shooting appears to have been carried out by volunteers from across the battalion; in 
Ladyzhin it was the turn of the 2nd Company to be stationed at the shooting site; in Gaisin the 1st 
Company, the unknown village between Gaisin and Kirovohrad the 2nd Company; Kirovohrad, 1st 
Company again and Uman, 2nd Company. For the lower ranks, it appears that only volunteers were 
eligible to do the shooting and “there were always enough volunteers”. 113 However, this does not 
mean that there was no coercion involved. One former policeman recalled that Hanstein demanded 
that the NCOs of his company (1st Company) had to participate in the shooting, but the same man 
testified that he refused this demand and suffered no disadvantages as a result.114 According to a 
former member of the K-Staffel, the shooters received bonuses in the form of cinema visits, food 
and alcohol.115 These measures suggest that generally the act of shooting was not considered to be a 
desirable task by a considerable proportion of the battalion’s ranks. The weight of the demands on 
the rank and file policemen to participate as shooters is likely to have varied according to the 
commanding officer involved. A number of former policemen testified that there were a number of 
“radical types” who always seemed to have been at the forefront of things.116 It does appear that 
there was a group of policemen who were willing participants; men like Schumann, Miksch and 
Hanstein who lessened the demands on the less enthusiastic policemen to participate as shooters. 
The concluding report of the East German trials against former members of Battalion 304 stated that 
only a few questioned showed any personal sadness or regret for their experiences. Only one former 
policeman admitted that he found the experience of the shootings too much and had to return to 
the barracks before the end of the Aktion.117 A few witnesses stated that a number of men tried to 
avoid participation in shooting and it does appear that some of the policemen were unable to cope 
with the battalion’s murderous tasks.118 A former member of the Wehrmacht communications 
platoon in Gaisin recalled a conversation with a member of Battalion 304 during which the man 
explained that he “wanted to get away from it”.119 A former sergeant in the Sicherungsabteilung of 
the Durchgangsstrasse IV recalled coming across a young policemen among a group of policemen on 
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bicycles coming from Kirovohrad during the winter of 1941-42. “This young man had completely lost 
his nerves and wanted to shoot himself. When I asked him why he said that his unit was constantly 
on the move to shoot Jews and that he couldn’t do it anymore”.120 Asmus, a former 3rd Company 
member, stated that he’d heard about the shootings carried out by the 1st Company in Gaisin: “It 
was said that during this Aktion, some of the participants lost their nerves so that they just shot 
around. The shooting Aktion must have been badly organised because, as I heard, some of the 
shooting squad refused to shoot the Jews”.121 No other testimony confirmed Asmus’ statement. 
However, it is significant that Asmus blames the loss of nerves and refusals to take part by some 
policemen on bad organisation. This seems to suggest that officers and perhaps also NCOs were 
responsible for ensuring that individual policemen were allocated tasks that they were capable of 
carrying out which would alleviate additional strains on the perpetrators by ensuring the smooth 
running of the Aktion at their particular stations. Some policemen found the task of murdering 
unarmed civilians disagreeable to the extent that they did try to avoid participation, particularly at 
the killing site and there were some that became psychologically incapable of participating. 
However, with the exception of Asmus’ statement on Gaisin, there is no evidence to suggest that at 
any point the battalion as a whole struggled to carry out the massacres. This does not mean that 
there was no concern on the part of the battalion leadership over the morale of the men and their 
collective ability to be able to carry out orders. Deckert expressed this concern in his letter to Petsch 
regarding the sending back of three policemen to be questioned over shooting a Jewish man in 
Warsaw, arguing that “Here [Ukraine] the same Wachtmeister would be punished by me if he didn’t 
[my emphasis] carry out a shooting order…This method can only confuse my men and make them 
insecure and could cause a loosening of discipline”.122 It is not known what the punishment would 
have been as no evidence from any of the post-war trials emerged that indicated that a policeman 
from the rank and file from either Battalion 304 or 314 had ever been punished for refusing to 
shoot. There are however a few accounts of individuals who refused to take part in the actual 
shooting and suffered no consequences as a result. This does not mean that pressure was not put on 
individuals to participate by shooting, whether through peer pressure, career concerns or indeed the 
threat of punishment, however mild, which is likely to have depended on the officer concerned. 
Equally as importantly, it appears that the battalion leadership was mindful of the men’s reactions to 
the tasks carried out by the unit and their capacity as a group to continue to carry out the tasks. As 
we have seen, a number of battalion members at some point appear to have “lost their nerves” 
during the massacres. Therefore, on the one hand there was an attempt to spread the responsibility 
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for killing as widely as possible throughout the battalion by rotating the tasks of the three 
companies. On the other hand the fluidity of the Aktionen as far as individuals performing multiple 
tasks during the same massacre is concerned, as well as the emphasis on the use of volunteers, is 
where the “eager” participants were given ample opportunity to come to the fore giving more 
opportunity for those who were less enthusiastic to fade into the background. How many of these 
eager killers were the “many” ideologically motivated battalion members mentioned by Miksch 
(Miksch appears to have considered himself as one of them and his actions suggest that this was 
probably indeed the case), that considered the massacres of entire Jewish communities as a 
“necessity”, is not clear. What is clear from the trial records is that many of the witnesses and 
accused felt much more comfortable admitting their role in performing cordon duty or in the 
removal of the victims from their homes or even transporting the victims to the sites of killing than 
admitting to participating in the shooting squad, despite the fact that these tasks were directly 
contributing to the mass murders. For the most part this would have been to avoid prosecution by 
admitting to performing the actual shooting. However, this may also reflect a mind-set at the time 
where many policemen felt more comfortable, and less responsible, performing roles other than 
actually shooting. 
Related to these concerns are the tasks of the officer ranks to justify the actions of the battalion 
during this period. The speeches by Deckert and possibly also Nickel and Jeckeln to a gathered 
battalion appear to have at least strongly indicated to the men their upcoming tasks, but it is not 
clear how explicit these speeches were. A former member of the battalion staff remembered the 
term “resettlement” from that time, although he claimed he didn’t know that it meant killing.123 
Similarly, a former 2nd Company member recalled that in Gaisin, “we were only told that the Jewish 
inhabitants were going to be resettled. Here for the first time it became clear what the word 
resettlement actually meant”.124 Terms like “resettlement” and also “cleansing” were probably used 
by the higher ranks at the time, but if the policemen really did not know what they actually meant at 
first, it cannot have taken long to realise. The Aktionen performed by the battalion may well have 
been linked to a “security” rationale. The fact that the battalion was carrying out these massacres 
along the route of what would become the main German transport and supplies route suggests that 
the massacres may have been couched in these terms. With a few of the cases the main massacre 
was preceded by a real or imagined link to an armed enemy. The massacre in Starokonstantinov was 
preceded by the capture and shooting of parachutists in the area. In Gaisin Jews of the town were 
blamed for killing wounded German soldiers. A number of supposed communists and a commissar 
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were captured in the Kirovohrad area and a number of “Soviet functionaries” were captured near 
Znamienka just before the massacre there. However, contrary to the earlier massacres carried out 
by Battalion 314 in July and August against primarily younger Jewish men, in Ukraine Battalion 304 
from the start was carrying out massacres of entire Jewish communities, therefore “security” 
rationales that targeted Jewish civilians as partisans, potential partisans or partisan helpers may not 
have been considered as sufficient. It appears to be more likely that for the mass murders of whole 
populations that included many individuals who quite obviously were not physically capable of 
providing any real threat, security rationales were married, in line with the Nazi worldview, with 
millennial rationales such as those mentioned quite clearly by Deckert in his letter that targeted the 
Jews as a whole. 
Immediately before the involvement of Battalion 304 in a series of mass murders along the stretch 
of roads that would become the DG IV, there was an influx of SS personnel into the officer ranks. 
Deckert was chosen specifically for the task by Himmler or perhaps Jeckeln. From the witness 
statements it appears that Deckert was associated by the men with these new tasks, but remained 
largely aloof and appeared to have little personal contact with the rank and file of the battalion. Part 
of Dr Busse’s job was to instruct the men on how to kill efficiently, although Schumann, one of about 
15 other members of Battalion 304 to have attended the practical killing course in Cracow in January 
1941, also took a lead role in demonstrating killing techniques. Additionally, three newly created SS 
lieutenants, Lochbrunner, Seeber and Becker, appear to have all arrived to the battalion together 
and filled the platoon leader positions. These men would have had much more personal contact with 
the men under their command and are likely to have played a significant role in projecting 
ideological justifications for the series of massacres. Along with the company commanders and some 
NCOs in command positions, it appears that these young men would have played pivotal roles in 
distributing orders and organising volunteers to their own sub-units. There also appears to have 
been a strong officer presence at the killing sites. But generally, very little direct evidence emerged 
from the post-war trials on the actions of these junior officers in preparing and carrying out the 
massacres. 
Police Battalion 314 and the massacre in Dnepropetrovsk 
Battalion 314 left Vinnitsa on 14 September 1941, was briefly stationed in Kirovohrad (until relieved 
by Battalion 304 on 19 September) and arrived in Dnepropetrovsk on 21 September.125 Pohl, Lower 
and Curilla have each stated that Battalion 314 was involved in the massacre of about 15,000 Jews 
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carried out in the city of Vinnitsa on 19 and 20 September 1941 along with EK 6 and Reserve Police 
Battalion 45.126 However, a message intercepted by British Intelligence sent on 19 September stated 
that Police Battalion 314 was on that day stationed at Kirovohrad and was preparing to proceed to 
Dnepropetrovsk.127 Kirovohrad lies approximately 300 km south-east of Vinnitsa, a fair distance to be 
covered. Martin Dean has found that in the city of Vinnitsa 146 Jews were murdered at the end of 
July 1941 shortly after the occupation of the town by the Wehrmacht, about 600 Jews were 
murdered during the first half of September and about 15,000 Jews on 19 and 20 September.128 As 
detailed in the previous chapter, it is known that part of the 3rd Company of Battalion 314 under the 
leadership of Lieutenant Panis carried out a massacre in Vinnitsa on 12 September, which may well 
have been the massacre of the 600 Jews in early September that Dean mentions. That the battalion 
is known to have left Vinnitsa on 14 September and been in Kirovohrad on 19 September and then in 
Dnepropetrovsk (about 500 km east of Vinnitsa) on 21 September indicates that the battalion, at 
least as a whole, could not have participated in the large massacre in Vinnitsa on 19 and 20 
September. It is possible that one or more sub-units of Battalion 314 participated in the Vinnitsa 
massacre and then caught up with the main body of the battalion in Dnepropetrovsk at a later date. 
But it does appear to be the case that the first large-scale massacre of Jewish civilians involving the 
entire battalion occurred on 13 and 14 October in Dnepropetrovsk where about 15,000 Jews were 
murdered by the battalion and what appears to be a very small detachment of EK 6. This would be 
the last large-scale massacre organised under Jeckeln’s supervision before his exchange of positions 
with Prützmann.129 
In a strikingly similar manner to Battalion 304, the officer ranks of Battalion 314 received an influx of 
SS officers before the battalion’s involvement in the large-scale massacre in Dnepropetrovsk. Four 
newly-promoted lieutenants arrived at the battalion either in the Kovel area or in Vinnitsa shortly 
after completing the same officer training course at Berlin-Köpenick. Lieutenant Schellwath became 
platoon leader in the 1st Company, Lieutenants Schleich and Pütz became platoon leaders in the 2nd 
Company and Panis, as we have seen, came to the 3rd Company as platoon commander.130 In 
October 1941, Schellwath, Schleich and Panis were all 21 years old and Pütz was only 19. These four 
young officers were all classmates at Berlin-Köpenick with Lochbrunner, Seeber and Becker of 
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Battalion 304 earlier that year. As with Battalion 304, there was also a change in the battalion 
commander for 314. British Intelligence intercepted a message from Himmler to PRS dated 13 
September 1941 that said “in the interest of the service”, Major Severt is appointed as Commander 
of Police Battalion 314.131 One former Battalion member recalled that Severt introduced himself to 
the NCOs in Dnepropetrovsk and another that Jahnhorst left after Severt’s arrival.132 Jahnhorst left 
the battalion on 6 October in Dnepropetrovsk, so Severt would have arrived in late-September or 
early-October. Jahnhorst, the 1st Company commander, who had been ill while stationed in Luboml 
and who later claimed to have left the battalion as he did not agree with the massacres, was 
replaced by Christ, the former commander of 1st Company before he became part of the PRS staff.133 
A former member of the 1st Company in Poland recalled hearing that Jahnhorst’s departure was 
because he did not “get on well” with the officer ranks in the battalion.134 One further change in the 
command structure for the Aktion in Dnepropetrovsk concerned the 2nd Company leadership. 
Wendorff, the 2nd Company commander, claimed after the war that he reported sick to Major Severt 
before the start of the Aktion with advanced periodontitis. During the post-war trials, Bauer 
confirmed Wendorff’s illness around that time (as does Wendorff’s police personnel file) and no 
witnesses, including Bauer, could remember seeing or speaking to Wendorff during the 
executions.135 It appears then, that because of Wendorff’s absence Bauer as his deputy was in 
command of the 2nd Company for the duration of the massacre. Therefore, at the start of the 
massacre in Dnepropetrovsk, of the 14 command positions that included: the battalion commander, 
his adjutant, the three company leaders and nine platoon leader positions (excluding the half-
platoons in each company), ten were filled with SS officers; eight of whom were graduates of Berlin-
Köpenick. 
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According to the diary of a former 1st Company member, the rounding-up of the Jewish victims was 
started by the battalion on 10 October and the battalion received their “marching orders” on 12 
October.136 From the results of the post-war trials, it appears that after collecting the victims from 
Dnepropetrovsk and interning them in a department store, the battalion was ready to march out of 
the city but at the last minute received orders to return to the accommodations.137 The original 
orders issued by Jeckeln were that Battalion 314 were to leave after the collection, so were not 
initially supposed to be involved in the massacre that followed. However, an order by Jeckeln or 
another higher SS or SD officer ordered the battalion back with instructions to carry out the 
“liquidations” immediately. It is not clear whether the Jews were originally gathered in the 
department store for another unit to come and carry out a massacre or for any other reason. It 
appears that the Wehrmacht (FK 240) in Dnepropetrovsk had made preparations for the 
establishment of a ghetto, but the rapid, and apparently unexpected, massacre made these 
preparations unnecessary.138 Major Severt is supposed to have followed these orders reluctantly.139 
The West German courts were persuaded that an “SD” unit, probably EK 6, was present at the 
massacre and may have communicated the orders to Severt. Enough former policemen could not 
remember seeing any SD men during the massacre to suggest that it was a small detachment and 
probably played an organisational role.140 On 12 October, the same day as the cancelled march, an 
officers’ meeting was called during which the organisation of the forthcoming massacre was 
discussed.141 It appears that Major Severt was at the meeting, but that his adjutant Lieutenant 
Steinmann took the lead. Hertel claimed that he received his orders for the massacre from 
Steinmann.142 Bauer stated that although Severt was (in Bauer’s opinion) stricter than Dressler had 
been, he was not as decisive and left the “uncomfortable matters” to Lieutenant Steinmann.143 
Following the meeting specific orders were passed on to the platoon leaders who were not at the 
meeting by the company officers and relayed to the rank and file by the platoon leaders.144 The 
division of tasks for the carrying out of the massacre in Dnepropetrovsk do not appear to have been 
as clearly delineated as with the massacres carried out by Battalion 304. The 1st Company was given 
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the orders to guard the department store, cordon off the area and transport the victims on foot and 
by truck to a collection point near the ravine where the victims were shot. The 2nd Company was 
given the task to guard the execution site and drive the victims from the department store to the 
collection point. While they were being guarded at the collection point by the 2nd Company, the 
victims were forced to hand over their valuables. All three companies appear to have been given the 
task of taking the victims from the collection point to the execution site.145 Unlike the massacres 
carried out by Battalion 304 there is considerable overlap between the tasks of the three companies. 
This may have been organised deliberately by the battalion leadership in such a way to spread out 
the responsibilities for the overall Aktion amongst the battalion’s sub-units. 
The shooting appears to have been done by an SD unit of 4-20 men and volunteers from across the 
three companies of Battalion 314.146 A former battalion member recalled an SD man announcing 
“the policemen may also participate”.147 It appears then that the “SD unit” may have initiated the 
shooting, but were gradually relieved by volunteers from Battalion 314. As with Battalion 304, there 
appears to have been a strong officer presence at the execution site. A former member of the 1st 
Company remembered seeing Severt and Christ (probably 1st Company commander at this time) at 
the execution site, although he didn’t see them taking part in the shooting.148 Bauer claimed that 
Hertel (also 1st Company) was at the execution site during the time when the 1st Company was 
shooting. Bauer was also at the execution site, presumably when members of the 2nd Company were 
involved in the shooting.149 Probst of the 1st Company remembered Platoon Commander and 
Reserve Sergeant Edelmüller (presumably also of 1st Company) leading the shooting squad which 
was made up from his platoon.150 All this suggests that the shooting was done by platoons, made up 
of volunteers and lead by the platoon and company leaders. Due to the extraordinarily large number 
of victims on this occasion, it would seem likely that the companies rotated shooting duty. 
The weather conditions at Dnepropetrovsk during the massacre only added to the horror imposed 
on the victims by the German units carrying out the massacre. During the first day the rain had 
turned some areas extremely muddy leaving many victims standing “knee deep in mud” at the 
collection point before being dragged to the ravine by the policemen.151 Furthermore, the 
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perpetrators were unable to murder all the victims on the first day of the shooting (13 October), so 
the shooting was halted at nightfall. The battalion leadership hadn’t considered it necessary to 
transport the remaining victims back to the city, but instead left them overnight in an open field 
completely unprotected and exposed to the weather and guarded by the 2nd Company under Bauer. 
In the evening the rain had turned into snow and many of the victims froze to death in the field 
overnight. Those that tried to escape were shot at by members of the 2nd Company. The next day the 
policemen found many bodies frozen in the mud. Among those that had survived the night many 
had their feet frozen into the mud and had to be forcibly removed by policemen in order to be taken 
to the ravine to be murdered there.152 
Little information emerged from the post-war trials on the role played by Battalion Commander 
Severt at Dnepropetrovsk. No witnesses portrayed Severt as an enthusiastic participant in the mass 
murder of Jews and post-war evidence emerged that suggests Severt was actually reluctant to return 
to Dnepropetrovsk on 12 October for his battalion to carry out the murder of the Jews imprisoned in 
the department store.153 It may also have been the case, as Bauer claimed, that Severt was 
personally “uncomfortable” with such matters and left much of the organisation to his adjutant, 
Steinmann. However, Severt must have known why the Jews of the city were being rounded up and 
imprisoned, so even if he was “uncomfortable” leading the massacre of thousands of Jewish 
civilians, he didn’t necessarily disagree fundamentally with the course of action and, as battalion 
commander, could delegate practical roles to his subordinate officers. Furthermore, if Severt really 
had a pronounced aversion to such actions, it is hard to see why he was chosen to replace Dressler 
at that particular time as battalion commander. A former member of the 1st Company stated that he 
saw Severt or Christ at the execution site ordering a policeman to check if a man claiming not to be 
Jewish was circumcised.154 Acting as 1st Company commander or in another senior role, five 
witnesses (all former battalion members) claimed that they saw Christ firing randomly into gathered 
Jews at Dnepropetrovsk with his pistol, killing several. Christ appears to have been screaming about 
the Jews being responsible for the death of his brother.155 This sort of extreme behaviour does not 
appear to have been out of character for the 1st Company commander. At an unknown time and 
location, Christ is said to have shot several “Russian” farmers on their way to the fields without any 
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provocation; an act Christ justified by labelling the farmers partisans.156 Further examples of Christ’s 
murderous actions will be discussed in the following chapter. 
Both Bauer and Hertel appear to have been very active during the massacre. Bauer, acting as 2nd 
Company commander in the place of Wendorff, gave instructions at the department store, collection 
point, at cordon posts and at the execution site. Bauer assumed a role that saw him back and forth 
between all posts assigned to the 2nd Company including at the execution site when his subordinates 
were active there.157 More than thirty years after the event, for the benefit of the trial proceedings 
Bauer sketched a detailed overview of the whole Aktion which showed he was very well acquainted 
with what went on.158 Hertel, acting either as platoon or company commander also seems to have 
covered a lot of ground during the massacre. Hertel commanded his men at the department store, 
organised the cordoning duties of the 1st Company and was present at the execution site when men 
of the 1st Company were carrying out the shooting.159 Crucially, one former member of the 1st 
Company, who appears to be referring to the events in Dnepropetrovsk, recalled Hertel giving 
“lessons” to the 1st Company explaining the “Jewish actions” to alleviate any scepticism among the 
men.160 When these “lessons” were carried out and their precise content are not known. However, 
this is a clear example of the role played by the junior officers in justifying the actions performed by 
the battalion for the men under their command by “educating” them in the necessity of the tasks. 
Immediately following Dnepropetrovsk, Battalion 314, along with the rest of PRS, appear to have 
been involved in “cleansing actions” around the Perijasslavel and Khozki areas on the river Dnepr 
that were tracked by British Intelligence. PRS led by Jeckeln appear to have been involved in anti-
partisan activities in October and November that involved frequent executions.161 A message from 
Jeckeln to Himmler among others on 30 October stated that Battalion 314 was deployed in the 
Khozki area and that the local residents were being blamed for supplying partisans with weapons.162 
On 16 November the HSSPF Staff Company reported under the heading “Aktion nach Kriegsbrauch”: 
“Police Battalion 314, cleansing operations in Komarovka area completed”.163 These reports indicate 
that Battalion 314 was involved in an unknown number of massacres which appear to have been 
couched as part of a “security” sweep of the area, no details of which were captured by British 
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Intelligence.164 Following the completion of the operation, the battalions of PRS travelled further 
east with Battalion 314 headed for Kharkov where it would be stationed over the winter. According 
to British Intelligence during late November and early December 1941 “the covering phrase Aktion 
nach Kriegsbrauch occurs in every situation report”.165 
Both Battalions 304 and 314 received an injection of SS officers prior to the involvement of the 
battalions in large-scale massacres from September 1941. Unlike the smaller scale massacres of July 
and August carried out by sub-units of Battalion 314, the junior officers were neither the authors of 
the massacres nor were in overall command positions. However, the roles of these officers in 
enabling the battalions as whole units to carry out the larger massacres were far from negligible. We 
can see that with both battalions efforts were made to spread the responsibility for the massacres as 
broadly as possible amongst the companies. Battalion 304 rotated the main tasks of each company 
with every massacre and Battalion 314 appears to have rotated the tasks of the companies within 
the same massacre at Dnepropetrovsk. In addition to communicating higher orders to the lower 
ranks and dividing specific tasks down through the platoon and group leaders, one of the tasks of the 
company and platoon commanders would have been to ensure that there were enough policemen 
under their command willing to perform the assigned task; this appears to have been particularly 
important with shooting assignments. A premium seems to have been placed on the organisation 
and smooth running of the murder operations in order to reduce unnecessary strain on the 
perpetrators; assigning men to tasks that they were perhaps unwilling or unable to perform 
efficiently would not be conducive to these ends. Both battalions appear to have encouraged 
volunteers for the shooting and, as is especially evident with Battalion 304, a number of “eager” 
participants appear to have come to the fore. Again, over time the officers, as well as NCOs acting as 
platoon and group commanders, would come to know these individuals and be able to draw on 
them when needed. The case of 314 at Dnepropetrovsk shows a number of individual junior officers 
playing major roles during the massacre. Lieutenant Steinmann appears to have taken over some of 
the main organisational tasks; Christ showed himself to be an extremely violent individual by 
shooting randomly at groups of Jews and Hertel and Bauer, both possibly acting as company 
commanders at this particular massacre, covered a lot of ground in supervising the contributions of 
their men to the massacre in a number of different tasks. Finally, and perhaps most crucially, Hertel 
appears to have led “educational” lessons offering justifications for the mass murder of thousands of 
civilians carried out by him and his men. That the junior officers were trained in part to perform 
“educational” roles within their battalions at Berlin-Köpenick suggests it is fair to assume that the 
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other graduates that filled many of the company and platoon commander positions in Battalions 304 
and 314 performed similar roles in rationalising and justifying mass murder to their men before or 







Chapter 6. 1942 and 1943 
This chapter will focus mainly on the actions and experiences of the policemen outside of the 
immediate participation in large-scale killing and how these experiences influenced their continued 
participation in carrying out policies geared towards mass murder. Over the winter of 1941-42 both 
Battalions 314 and 304 would be stationary for a period of time that allows a closer look at the 
interactions between the policemen and the local populations and the moral code that guided their 
thoughts and actions during this period and the times when the battalions were carrying out the 
massacres of Jewish civilians. Some evidence emerged during the post-war trials regarding this 
period that allow an examination of the behaviour of one individual in particular and a discussion of 
how Nazi and SS codes of behaviour influenced the actions of the policemen. During 1942 and 1943 
both battalions were involved in a variety of activities for the benefit of the Nazi imperial project 
generally and the more immediate needs of the German war effort which were performed largely in 
sub-units under the command of junior officers. This chapter will examine the influence of the 
officers on the behaviour of their men in carrying out these tasks. 
Winter Hardships 
Both Battalions 314 and 304 would be for the most part stationary over the winter of 1941/42. 
Battalion 304 would spend the winter in Kiev where it arrived on 19 October and Battalion 314 was 
stationed in Kharkov from 5 December.1 By December 1941 conditions such as the extreme cold, a 
shortage of suitable winter clothing, lack of food, fuel and ammunition as well as the breakdown of 
equipment due to the extreme conditions, were having an influence on the ability of the German 
army to wage war and a negative effect on the discipline of the troops. According to Stephen G. 
Fritz, around Christmas 1941 the number of German troops freezing to death on the Eastern Front 
exceeded the number of replacements.2 The difficult weather conditions appear also to have had an 
effect on the units behind the front, including Battalions 314 and 304. From late autumn British 
Intelligence reports on the intercepted German messages show some of the difficulties experienced 
by the German units in the east. The main problems appear to have been related to transport issues 
caused by the mud and then snow and ice. The transport system, particularly the roads, appears to 
have been completely overstrained with heavy delays, standstills and frequent calls for tractors to 
aid broken down vehicles. There were also problems with the railways. In the south, those taking 
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leave could hope for a good service from Lemberg to Germany, but it appears that there were 
problems getting to and from Lemberg from central Ukraine.3 In November 1941, Captain Meisel 
and others that were returning from leave appear to have had problems returning to Battalion 314 
then stationed in Pereyaslav.4 
Aside from presenting difficult travelling conditions (Battalion 304 were travelling mostly by bicycle), 
the transport problems meant that the policemen did not receive frequent post; Police Regiment 
South (PRS) reported that some units had been eight weeks without letters.5 Like the front soldiers 
the police battalions in the east were also forced to cope with a severe lack of winter clothing which 
appears to have been a constant subject in the communications intercepted by British Intelligence. 
“The authorities refer applicants to an order of General Daluege regarding the issue of winter 
clothing (possibly quite an inadequate order), or to some other authorities. Or they admit that the 
things are not to be had…The clothing and underwear of Police Battalion 309 are deficient, and the 
general health only ‘moderate’”. A later message shows that by mid-December, clothing had been 
made available for Battalions 304 and 315 in Lemberg, but the problem of transporting the clothing 
to the units remained; “units are called upon to make their own arrangements for collection”.6 The 
decrease in the number of massacres committed by the SS and police units in winter 1941-42 
appears to have been in part because the weather conditions hindered the mobility of these units. 
This is particularly evident in the case of Battalion 304, a unit that was only partly motorised to begin 
with, which had to stop its consistent run of large massacres along the DG IV in October 1941. 
The Soviet counteroffensive which began on the night of 5-6 December came at a time when the 
German units were hopelessly overextended across a very broad front, when the soldiers were 
mentally and physically exhausted and with low supplies, inadequate winter equipment and hardly 
functioning, vulnerable supply lines. During the early months of 1942 the sustained Soviet offensive 
which resulted in significant German losses, meant that few units were left for mobile operations in 
the rear areas. The SS-police units, including Battalions 304 and 314, were needed to fill in gaps at 
the front.7 From March until May 1942 units from Battalion 314 (now the 3rd Battalion, Police 
Regiment 10 – later SS-Police Regiment 10) was deployed at the front. It appears that Battalion 314 
was not deployed at the front as a whole unit, but that sub-units were used to bolster other front 
units. For example, 1st Lieutenant Christ, then 1st Company commander, was serving in March 1942 
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under the 11th SS-Standarte “Planetta”; it is not clear whether the rest of the 1st Company was as 
well.8 From April to June 1942 Battalion 304 was deployed at the front near Taganrog. During this 
period the battalion was renamed as 1st Battalion of Police Regiment 11, soon afterward renamed 
the SS-Police Regiment 11 and units of the battalion wore the uniforms of the SS-Leibstandarte 
“Adolf Hitler” (LSAH).9 
According to Westermann, the police battalions that were used at the front won praise for their 
combat prowess, justifying the extensive military training they had been receiving since 1940, but 
that some units had suffered so many casualties that these battalions required wholesale 
replacement in spring 1942.10 The Soviet offensive had ground to a halt by February 1942, so it 
appears that Battalions 314 and 304 missed much of the hardest fighting.11 Neither battalion 
therefore required wholesale replacement, but, judging by the officer ranks, there were a number of 
casualties. In Battalion 304, Lieutenant Seeber was killed and Lieutenant Streubel wounded on 26 
May 1942.12 For Battalion 314, Lieutenant Pütz was killed in March and Wendorff’s replacement as 
2nd Company commander, Captain Götz died of his wounds in May 1942.13 A couple of post-war 
testimonies from former policemen suggest that, at least in the eyes of some of their subordinates, 
not all of the junior officers in Battalion 314 were as effective leading from the front as they had 
been during the massacres committed by the battalion in 1941. According to one testimony 
Lieutenant Panis, the 3rd Company platoon leader who appears to have led a massacre of Jewish 
civilians in Vinnitsa, “failed at the front” because he was scared.14 Oskar Christ received a badge for 
being shot in the upper thigh while in action east of Kharkov in March 1942, but a former 1st 
Company member testified that he had been told by other policemen that Christ had inflicted the 
wound on himself.15 
Battalions 314 and 304 then, appear to have experienced some of the physical and mental hardships 
during the winter of 1941-42 as well as brutal front-line combat that Bartov and Westermann have 
argued “greatly enhanced the brutalisation of the troops” (in Westermann’s case, Police Battalion 
310) that made them more willing to implement Nazi racial policies on the ground.16 This may 
indeed have been the case for some in Battalions 304 and 314. However, as has been shown, all the 
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sub-units from both battalions proved themselves more than capable of carrying out mass murder 
for an extended period before the harsh winter weather conditions in Ukraine and certainly well 
before experiencing combat action and casualties. 
The massacre in Kharkov by Battalion 314 
Approximately 12,000 Jews were killed in Kharkov by Battalion 314 and units of SK 4a over the 
winter of 1941-42.17 While stationed in Kharkov the three companies of Battalion 314 rotated the 
duties of guarding important objects and buildings, training for the front and guard duty for the 
recently established ghetto for the Jewish population.18 On 5 December 1941, the same day as the 
arrival of Battalion 314 in Kharkov, the municipal administration passed a resolution that the city’s 
population were to be registered starting the following day; Jews were to be registered on separate 
lists from the rest of the population.19 It seems likely given the timing of the resolution and the 
arrival of Battalion 314 into the city, as well as the nature of the task itself, that the battalion played 
a role in the registrations. On 14 December a decree was issued that all the registered Jews had to 
move to the barracks located on the grounds of a tractor factory and that anyone found in the city 
after 16 December would be shot. On 17 December the barracks were surrounded by guard units 
from Battalion 314;20 no provision for food was made and sanitation was extremely poor. According 
to a survivor, in one part over 70 people were crammed into an area fit for only 6-8 people in normal 
circumstances and 20-30 people were dying each day from hunger.21 A report from Battalion 314 
states that the companies of the battalion formed the guard units of the ghetto from 17 December 
1941 to 7 January 1942.22 
During this period many policemen acting as guards engaged in the robbery of the Jewish population 
and in random murder prior to the start of the mass executions from 7 January 1942. Some guards 
accepted bribes for people to go to the market or to fetch water.23 According to a survivor, S. S. 
Krivoruchko, the Germans (meaning also Battalion 314) engaged in not only random, unorganised 
thievery by breaking into apartments and taking whatever they wanted, but also organised pillaging. 
“Usually, the Germans would burst into the room on the pretext of searching for weapons and 
would steal anything that came to mind. In the event of any resistance, they dragged people out into 
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the yard and shot them.”24 Nina Mogilevskaya, another survivor from Kharkov also recalled: “The 
doors [to the barracks] opened when the Germans, on the pretext of searching for weapons, came 
to steal. They took everything: valuables, clothes, food”.25 Although it seems reasonable to assume 
that many of the policemen were lining their own pockets, it does appear that the policemen may 
also have pooled the stolen food and property. A former battalion member recalled carrying out 
“searches for weapons” (without success) in connection with a guarded area in which fuel, food, 
clothing and other things were stored by the policemen which presumably contained stolen goods.26 
Krivoruchko recalled instances of organised thievery carried out by the German guard units. For the 
purpose of extracting goods and materials from the Jews, a Jewish elder was designated by the 
Germans to collect “taxes” imposed on the population; exactions that increased with each 
demand.27  
The day before Christmas and New Year’s, they demanded that we gather supplies to 
organise parties for the people who were guarding us and money to buy vodka. Ragged, 
half-starved people tore the last lumps of sugar or fat out of their children’s hands and 
gave them to the bandits to arrange parties. That was still not enough. The Nazi 
scoundrels demanded that we give them watches and valuables. These demands were 
met, backed up as they were by the threat of shooting.28 
Krivoruchko also recalled witnessing 15-20 murders every day for trumped up offences.29 A report 
from Battalion 314 mentioned that the 1st Company while on guard duty shot “Jews trying to leave 
the ghetto who did not stop when called”.30 As with the massacres carried out by Battalions 314 and 
304 in 1941, the murder of Jewish civilians in Kharkov appears to have gone hand in hand with the 
robbing of the victims. On 24 January 1942 the 1st Company commander, Oskar Christ, signed for the 
receipt of 83 Dollars and 850 Swedish Crowns.31 A large execution appears to have been carried out 
by Battalion 314 in Kharkov on 23 January, so this money was probably a result of the forced 
collections of 1st Company during the massacre. Christ appears to have been at the forefront of the 
killings during the massacre in Dnepropetrovsk and, as will be shown, in Kharkov. It does not seem 
unlikely that Christ’s men felt constricted in any way regarding the murder of Jewish civilians while 
on guard duty. During his time as an officer in Battalion 314, Christ certainly seems to have been at 
the centre of the murderous activities and the sometimes related thefts. A former 1st Company 
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member recalled that following the wounding of a policeman in December 1941, Christ requested 
permission from Major Severth for the shooting of 100 hostages, but Severth only gave permission 
for the shooting of five people.32 It is not clear whether these hostages were to have been taken 
solely from the Jewish population of Kharkov or how serious the policeman’s injuries were. It is clear 
however that the incident was made to serve as another excuse to carry out executions. Christ’s 
readiness to use mass violence is clear. Significantly, provided the recollections of the former 1st 
Company policeman were reasonably accurate - and it should be noted that this description does 
not appear to be out of sorts as far as descriptions of Christ’s readiness for extreme violent 
behaviour are concerned - this incident demonstrates that the commanding officer could, and at 
times had to, curb enthusiasm for killing from their subordinates. Had Christ been the commanding 
officer on the spot, 100 hostages would have been executed. The guards under Christ’s command 
were not likely to have felt significantly retrained from using violence against Jews. 
On 5 January 1942 Korsemann took over the position of HSSPF Russia South from Prützman. Soon 
afterwards units from SK 4a and Battalion 314 began the killing of the Jews held in the barracks of 
the tractor factory.33 Unlike the massacres carried out in 1941, the mass murders in Kharkov appear 
to have been spread out over a period of weeks. It is known that Battalion 314 carried out massacres 
on 18 and 23 January while stationed in Kharkov.34 One of the reasons for the extended period 
appears to be because of repeated Soviet air raids.35 During the executions on 23 January Christ was 
reportedly picked up by “SD men” on the morning of the execution and stayed at the edge of the 
ravine with the SD during the execution.36 A former member of the communications platoon of 
Battalion 314 remembered Lieutenant Pilz “standing out especially” through his participation in the 
shooting on 23 January.37 During the liquidation of the ghetto in Kharkov, one or more gas vans were 
used to kill several hundred of the victims.38 A number of former members of Battalion 314 
remembered “hearing” about the use of gas vans in Kharkov, or being told initially that the Jews 
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were being taken for work service in Germany, and only afterwards that they had been gassed in the 
vans.39 
During the post-war trials a former member of the 1st Company remembered his commander Christ 
rationalising the massacres of Jews. “The Jews were responsible for the death of his brother because 
we had them to thank for the war. They said in the jargon of those days that the Jews were useless 
eaters and they had the opinion that violent measures against them were necessary”.40 According to 
Pohl, the Wehrmacht concerns about the food supply in Kharkov played a significant role in the 
decision to liquidate the ghetto at that particular time. “Here [Kharkov] the connection between the 
Wehrmacht’s seizure of food stores, its ideological perception of the food situation, and the decision 
to murder [Kharkov’s] Jews is particularly clear”.41 The representations of the Jews as “useless 
eaters” by the officers of Battalion 314 as the reason for the liquidation of the Kharkov ghetto differs 
somewhat from the earlier “partisan” based rationalisations and indicates that by January 1942, the 
all-consuming nature of the murder of Ukraine’s Jews was becoming more evident to the policemen. 
The shift in rationalisations for mass murder also corresponds with Nazi ideological prerogatives 
regarding the distribution of food supplies. 
Plans for the seizure of considerable food stuffs from former Soviet territories as developed by 
Herbert Backe of the Reich Ministry for Agriculture over the six months prior to the invasion of the 
Soviet Union, were expected to result in the death of tens of millions of lives.42 A crucial part of 
these plans was that the “Russian” cities were to be destroyed and their inhabitants starved to 
death.43 An official economic “handbook” in the shape of the Grüne Mappe was issued to 
Wehrmacht commanders, presumably also commanders of the SS and police, down to divisional 
level. The Grüne Mappe stated that the German troops were to live off the land in order to 
unburden transport routes and to relieve the food situation in German occupied Western Europe. 
The supply of important food stuffs, particularly from the “surplus” areas of Ukraine, to the former 
Soviet central and northern areas, or “deficit” areas, was to be stopped.44 These instructions were 
received in written form at the divisional level in the Wehrmacht and then likely communicated 
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down the chain of command.45 The rationale for the murder of the Jews of Kharkov as “useless 
eaters” that the former member of the 1st Company of Battalion 314 recalled receiving in Kharkov 
may have derived from the type of instructions contained in the Grüne Mappe as interpreted and 
communicated on the spot by a platoon or company commander; in this case, Christ. 
Kharkov and Kiev 
There was famine in Kharkov and Kiev at the time when Battalions 314 and 304 were stationed in 
the cities. Many thousands of the city’s inhabitants died of starvation under German military 
occupation; 1,202 during the first half of May 1942 alone.46 A former Communist Party official 
covertly travelled to Kiev in November 1941 and later reported that “Besides Germans and 
policemen one rarely met a passer-by in the street…Kiev has become a city of beggars”.47 Compared 
to conditions in France, Belgium or Warsaw, occupation duty in the former Soviet cities over the 
winter period of 1941-42 could be full of privations, such as the extreme winter climate, a lack of 
heating and drinking water and, as has been discussed above a shortage of winter clothing.48 During 
the post-war trials, a former member of the 1st Company of Battalion 314 when asked about Kharkov 
claimed he could only remember “hunger, cold and guard duty”.49 The conditions for the German 
policemen in Kiev and Kharkov may not have been as comfortable as they may have wished, but it 
appears that at least some of the policemen sought to improve their situation by the ruthless 
expropriation of the local populations. The companies of both battalions were quartered separately 
and the officers appear to have had their own separate accommodation and facilities.50 Despite the 
extreme privations of the local populations going on around them, there appears to have been 
enough food and drink to fuel numerous parties and Kameradschaftsabende, including a party with 
“lots of alcohol and music” in the officers’ barracks of the 1st Company, Battalion 314 the night 
before the Company was involved in the massacre of some of the Jews held in the tractor factory in 
Kharkov.51 On Boxing Day 1941, an unemployed teacher in Kiev wrote in her diary: “The Germans are 
celebrating. They all walk full and content, all have lights in Christmas trees. But we all move about 
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like shadows, there is total famine”.52 Social events, particularly those revolving around the 
consumption of alcohol, in the occupied eastern cities appear to have played a role in consolidating 
an esprit de corps among the German occupiers and anyone found avoiding such events could face 
consequences ranging from informal exclusion by their comrades to formal reprimands by 
commanding officers. Exclusive and isolated communities of occupiers appear to have consolidated 
in the eastern cities exacerbating the strict division of the occupiers and occupied populations into 
“us and them” based on pre-existing racial conceptions.53 
Koslov has examined how the experience of being in the “East” amplified the violent behaviour of 
the male and female German guards at the Majdanek camp and argues that the experience of an 
eastern posting provided an immediate social advancement for the occupiers. Germans from 
relatively modest social backgrounds, such as the majority of policemen in Battalions 314 and 304, 
were, thanks to their “racial” and cultural distinctions, suddenly advanced to the highest level of the 
social hierarchy. Acting as colonial masters, “ordinary” Germans occupied positions of absolute 
power over the local inhabitants regardless of prior social, political or economic standing; a position 
that afforded a greater freedom or “licence” for behaviour that would have been deemed illegal 
and/or immoral at home.54 In his investigation of the actions of the Wehrmacht in occupied Belarus, 
Beorn has demonstrated that while stationed in any particular location in the “Wild East”, the 
Wehrmacht “soon became involved in all manner of interactions that far exceeded its military 
mandate”.55 We have already seen how members of Battalion 314 exploited the imprisoned Jewish 
population of Kharkov, probably to a large extent for personal gain. It appears that members of both 
Battalions 314 and 304 also made use of their elevated status to exploit the local non-Jewish 
population. On the German occupiers of Minsk, Stephen Lehnstaedt has argued that it was common 
for the Germans to beat, rape and murder, but so long as “discipline and obedience existed, the 
authorities did not mind. Violence was so natural that even the use of service weapons within the 
city limits caused no alarm”.56 There is no reason to suggest that matters were considerably different 
in Kharkov and Kiev than in Minsk. The threat or use of violence was used for personal gain. Berkhoff 
has shown that in Kiev it was common for German, Hungarian and other occupying soldiers to 
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frequent the markets paying prices that they themselves deemed suitable or simply confiscating 
whatever they felt like taking as well as selling food they had collected in other areas.57 
Sometime during the period when Battalion 314 was in Kharkov, Christ appears to have shot a 
carpet dealer in order to come into possession of a carpet. Two former 1st Company members 
claimed that they heard that Christ had shot the man because he felt he was being charged too 
much for the carpet.58 Lehnstaedt has found that for the German occupiers of Minsk, murder was no 
longer taboo and could be carried out repeatedly.59 It does appear that at least some members of 
the police battalions considered Kharkov and Kiev, and perhaps the “east” generally, to be within a 
“zone of exception” in which different rules and moral frame of reference applied. Therefore the use 
of violence, even if it was used purely for personal gain was not considered by many to be out of the 
ordinary. However, even in a “zone of exception” the SS members at least were still supposed to 
adhere to certain “moral” principles. During the war Himmler let SS men know that “immoral 
behaviour” was not going to be tolerated.60 One of the offences that was considered to be immoral 
behaviour was that of “race defilement” and sexual relations with “alien races” was strictly 
prohibited. Himmler appears to have placed great importance on a code of ethical behaviour within 
the SS and police. According to André Mineau, SS ethics revolved around particular moral 
conceptions of “duty, the common good, and virtue”.61 Duty was to be expressed in obedience to 
orders. The common or general good refers to the good of the Volksgemeinschaft which included 
ideas of the preservation of “racial substance” by eliminating “declining birth rates, counter-
selection and racial mixing”.62 Regarding “racial mixing”, SS men were supposed to behave in a 
disciplined way, in accordance with the aims of the Volksgemeinschaft generally and those of the “SS 
community of kinship” (Sippengemeinschaft) in particular.63 
The primary purpose of the SS and police courts that Himmler put into place following the war 
against Poland was to maintain and enforce SS norms of living and behaviour with respect to SS 
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principles on “virtue”, “decency” and “discipline” and adherence to the SS worldview.64 In keeping 
with Himmler’s views of leadership principles for the SS, the judges of the SS courts were not to be 
tied to established laws, but were given leeway “to apply the best of their knowledge and belief to 
find the law that best serves the community of the SS”.65 The courts, therefore, corresponded to the 
ethical framework to which the men being tried were supposed to adhere. The SS and police judicial 
system was intended to take tough action against offences that Himmler had previously sought to 
eliminate through educational and disciplinary methods, offences such as having sex with the wives 
of front-line soldiers and those involving the abuse of alcohol, homosexuality and property crime. 
The courts were also set up to punish those who had sexual contact with “women from ethnically 
alien populations” in the occupied eastern territories, in accordance with Himmler’s order of 19 April 
1939.66 According to a number of studies, many from the SS and police and Wehrmacht units 
stationed in the East ignored this ban and relationships between Germans and local women were 
common.67 In a recent study Regina Mühlhäuser has shown that members of the Wehrmacht and SS 
took advantage of the food shortages by pursuing sex in exchange for food or consumer goods.68 In 
occupied cities, such as Kharkov and Kiev where there were extreme food shortages, for Ukrainian 
women, or indeed men, the acquisition of a German “boyfriend” could be the means to avoid 
death.69 Mühlhäuser has found that although “racial defilement” was strictly prohibited, offenders in 
the occupied eastern territories were hardly ever charged.70 As has been shown, members of 
Battalions 314 were involved in relationships with women from “alien” populations in Poland, which 
may also have included Jewish women. It is likely that a number of members from Battalions 314 
and 304 had relationships in Ukraine, especially in Kiev and Kharkov where the battalions were 
stationed for longer periods of time, as indeed was the case earlier in Poland. Some offenders were 
punished, or at least threatened with punishment by the commanding officer, but the vast majority 
of cases were not. The effectiveness of the SS and police courts on the ground is likely to have 
depended on the individual officer on the spot. 
A former 1st Company member of Battalion 314 claimed that it was generally known by the 
policemen that the officers in Kharkov “had orgies with women and alcohol to entertain 
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themselves”.71 This depiction does not differ greatly from what is known about the activities of 
German occupiers in eastern cities. However, it is not clear whether the former policemen was 
referring to the inclusion of local Ukrainian women in these “orgies”. One of the officers who is 
known to have had a relationship with a Ukrainian woman in Kharkov was 1st Company Commander 
Christ. Christ had an intimate relationship with a 20 year old dancer from the Kharkov city theatre, a 
relationship that appears to have been no secret in the 1st Company.72 Christ had the woman 
employed at the officers’ accommodation as a cleaner and had her living there too until a complaint 
from Schellwath who was living in the same accommodation with Pütz. He would also take her with 
him to drinking evenings with other officers of Battalion 314.73 It appears that the woman attended 
the party held on 17 January 1942, the evening before the battalion carried out a massacre of part of 
the Jewish population in Kharkov, and was dancing with Battalion Commander Severth; much to 
Christ’s annoyance who smashed a glass against the wall and called Severth an “old pig”.74 
In 1943 Himmler was advised by his SS judges that a considerable number of SS and police members 
in the eastern territories were breaking Himmler’s ban on sexual relations with local women and one 
of the judges had discovered that a unit had taken the view that “relationships and sex [with 
indigenous women] were permitted as long as there were no consequences”.75 Clearly Christ’s 
relationship was tolerated amongst the officer ranks of the battalion. At some point during the 
relationship, the woman appears to have told Christ that she was pregnant; something that was also 
talked about in the company ranks.76 Probably for this reason Christ had his “boys” kill the woman in 
March 1942, shortly after Christ had been wounded at the front.77 Lower has found that it was 
common for German perpetrators to rationalise the murder of women who had been sexually 
abused as a “precautionary measure” against Soviet espionage.78 This appears to have been 
precisely what Christ did, rationalising the killing of the woman because of “espionage” and theft.79 
Crucially, Christ does not appear to have suffered any serious repercussions at either the battalion 
level or with the SS courts for either the relationship or the murder of the woman; a fact that would 
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not have been lost on the rest of the 1st Company.80 Just a few months later in August 1942, a former 
member of the 1st Company who had left Battalion 314 in February of that year was sentenced to 
five months imprisonment by an SS court for having a relationship with a Polish woman, presumably 
when the battalion had been stationed in Zamość.81 
It appears that Himmler felt obliged to adopt a somewhat more flexible approach to his ban on sex 
with local women in the East. In June 1942 he relaxed the ban in the GG: “I recognize the difficulties 
facing the men of the SS in the Generalgouvernement from a sexual point of view. I do not 
therefore, object to sex in brothels or with prostitutes subject to medical and police supervision, as 
neither procreation nor close personal relations are likely to occur as a result.”82 In 1943 SS judges in 
the east collectively decided that the ban on sex with indigenous women had to be “urgently” 
amended as they found that so many men were ignoring it.83 Sexual encounters with local women, 
consensual or not, contradicted SS ideas on race and endangered military discipline, the key issue 
appears to have had less to do with SS and policemen having sex with “alien” women, and more the 
resulting “consequences” of unsupervised sexual relations. If Christ’s relationship had been reported 
to higher levels, he may well have been disciplined in some form. However, it appears that the 
battalion leadership and his fellow SS officers did not consider the whole affair, including the murder 
of the woman to be worth reporting to the SS court. 
In stark contrast to the events involving Christ stands a situation involving Lieutenant Panis of the 3rd 
Company who was judged to have not adhered to SS standards of chivalrous behaviour. In August 
1941, shortly before joining Battalion 314 in Ukraine, Panis started a relationship with a young 
German woman in Cologne even though he was engaged to be married to someone else, but then 
broke off both relationships while in Ukraine. The offended young woman in Cologne claimed in a 
letter to the local SS-Standarte that Panis had got her to sleep with him by promising that he would 
marry her. In May 1942 while on leave, Panis managed to renew the relationship with the same 
woman after again promising to marry her and even registered a request to be married with the 
RuSHA, only to break the engagement off again days later after returning to Ukraine. Panis would 
eventually marry a different woman in August 1943.84 The offended woman and her mother wrote 
letters to the SS authorities in Cologne requesting that Panis be punished, which he was. An SS-
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Untersturmführer in Cologne concluded that Panis had lied to the woman in order to have sex with 
her, gave his word of honour, and furthermore broke it all off in an “unmanly way”. The complaint 
and the conclusion of the SS officer were forwarded to the SS Main Office in 1943 to be dealt with by 
the disciplinary courts. In Panis’s defence, Captain Meisel, formerly Panis’s company commander 
and in 1943 battalion commander, wrote to the SS Main Office testifying to Panis’s excellent 
performance as an officer in the field and as a good comrade and example to his men. Meisel also 
added: “Because of his abilities he was assigned to special tasks by the battalion during combat 
missions, which he performed in an exemplary manner”.85 
In June 1943 the SS Main Office judiciary in Munich agreed with the conclusions of the SS-
Untersturmführer stating that Panis had ill-used his officer’s word of honour (Offiziersehrenwort) 
and that his behaviour had “damaged the reputation of the SS”. Panis was sentenced in August 1943 
by an HSSPF to three weeks house arrest which he was to serve at the Oranienburg training school 
for “Actions unworthy of an SS leader and police officer”. Only Meisel’s character reference and 
“military evaluation” prevented a stricter punishment.86 Clearly Himmler considered the virtue of 
“decency” to be of prime importance in fostering a vanguard cohort of National Socialists in the SS 
and remained consistent in extolling his conceptions of key principles and virtues.87 In his well-
known speech in Posen, Himmler highlighted what he regarded as the basic SS principle: SS men had 
to be “honest, decent, faithful, and comradely toward people of our own blood and toward nobody 
else. Our duty is to our Volk”.88 Panis, as demonstrated in Vinnitsa and indicated in Meisel’s 
reference to his important contribution to the “special tasks” of the battalion in his character 
reference was a vanguard murderer. Nevertheless, he was deemed to have crossed a moral line and 
violated SS standards of “decency” in his treatment of the young woman from Cologne. In fact were 
it not for his notable participation in and even leadership of mass murders, he would have received 
an even tougher punishment. Generally it appears that the SS leadership were willing to be flexible 
towards crimes such as Christ’s, which does not appear to have been unusual in the eastern 
territories, yet remained relatively inflexible regarding perceived offences against fellow members of 
the Volksgemeinschaft such as that committed by Panis. 
Officers from both battalions also engaged in relationships with German women stationed in Kiev 
and Kharkov, relationships that would have been deemed more suitable by the SS leadership. 
Lehnstaedt has argued that in Minsk female secretaries were particularly popular among the male 
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German occupiers.89 In August 1942 Streubel, the adjutant for Battalion 314, wrote to the RuSHA 
requesting permission to marry a young woman he had met in Kiev earlier that year who was 
working there as a stenographer for EG C.90 In July 1943 Hertel of Battalion 314 requested marriage 
to a woman he had met in “south-east Russia”.91 The concept of the SS-Sippengemeinschaft was 
intended to form a frame of reference for the SS men and their families; a National Socialist 
vanguard community within the broader Volksgemeinschaft to which they were also supposed to 
devote their “honesty”, “loyalty” and “decency”. Amy Carney has shown that Das Schwarze Korps 
continually promoted the connection between marriage and family through articles that emphasised 
the efficiency of an early marriage, with the basic message that “the younger the couple was at the 
time of marriage, the greater the possibility for raising a family consisting of four or more children”. 
By linking race and heredity with marriage and family, these articles were promoting the biological 
worldview that endorsed “purposeful sexuality”; having sex for procreation rather than pleasure.92 
Six of the junior officers from Battalions 314 and 304 appear to have complied with this ideal and 
married at a young age. Panis (eventually married in 1943), Hertel and Bauer of Battalion 314 and 
Streubel, Becker and Lochbrunner of 304 requested to be married in 1942 and 1943.93 The average 
age of this group in January 1943 was 24 and the average age of their intended spouses was younger 
than that. 
A prerequisite for getting married and producing children lay in the proper choice of spouse 
according to racial criteria. An SS text published in 1936 included a list of “Ten Commandments” for 
choosing a partner. “Commandment” number five stated: “As a German, choose only a spouse of 
the same or of Nordic blood. Racial mixes lead only to degeneration and ruin, but Nordic blood binds 
the whole Volk together”.94  A glance at the process of the individual marriage requests contained in 
the RuSHA personnel files shows the lengths the officials had to go to in order to ensure that 
individual SS officers had chosen their intended spouse along SS racial criteria. Lochbrunner, who 
wanted to speedily marry a Finnish-born Swedish citizen who was resident in Germany at the time 
felt compelled to add to his application “In terms of Aryan descent there are no concerns regarding 
my bride”.95 The primary intention then was to contribute biologically to strengthening the SS-
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Sippengemeinschaft and, by extension, the Volksgemeinschaft by producing racially valuable 
offspring, a concept that was taken very seriously by Himmler. Deckert claimed after the war that he 
had fallen out with Himmler because of his reluctance to reproduce after being married while there 
was a war on.96 The decisions of these men to marry so young are of course likely to have come from 
a variety of motivations. For example, both Streubel and Lochbrunner submitted their requests to 
the RuSHA while their future spouses were pregnant, which, again, contrasts dramatically with 
Christ’s treatment of his Ukrainian girlfriend. However, their decisions did conform to the SS ideal of 
a young vanguard acting in accordance with the aims of the SS-Sippengemeinschaft.97 
The intention on the part of the SS leadership then was that the SS officers, at home as well as in the 
field, were to adhere to certain virtues and morals. That these men were to remain “decent” 
whether in regards to their personal lives or while carrying out mass murder appears to have been 
considered to be very important to Himmler as is evident from his Posen speech in 1943. Welzer has 
argued that National Socialist morality, being based on the absolute inequality of people, excluded 
those not belonging to the “master race” from moral obligations and thus preserved a sense of 
“moral integrity” for the killers.98 However, the extent to which the perpetrators on the ground were 
actually convinced that their actions could be morally justified remains unclear.99 SS ethics and 
morals were intended to govern all aspects of the lives of the SS officers, from the mass killing of 
unarmed civilians to marriage and procreation. It appears that a significant proportion of the SS 
officers of Battalions 314 and 304 who were supposed to represent an ideological “vanguard” 
adhered to these ethics in their personal lives with regards to their marriage record. Some appear to 
have, at least in part, attempted to adhere to these principles and others decided, in some aspects, 
not to. These officers were individuals capable of making independent decisions and the behaviour 
of the individual officer at this level, to an extent, could set the standards and boundaries of 
acceptable behaviour of his subordinates. As Commander of the 1st Company if Christ was known to 
have been having a relationship with a Ukrainian woman, it seems likely that his men may have felt 
more free to do the same without fear of punishment even though the action was forbidden by the 
SS leadership. If Christ was seen to murder for personal gain, which was also prohibited, again his 
men may have felt more inclined to do so too. As well as setting boundaries for behaviour, clearly 
the need morally to justify the actions of the perpetrators was also deemed important. Matthäus 
has argued that as long as “certain legitimising methods” were applied, it mattered little to the 
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perpetrators on the ground what was actually done.100 The SS leadership may have provided the 
general ideological and moral framework for those who were to carry out Nazi policies, but the 
justifications for the perpetrators’ actions were communicated and interpreted on the ground, 
within the frameworks of National Socialist morals and SS ethics. This is why the mass murder of 
Jews in Ukraine was continually justified in terms of “partisan threat” or as “useless eaters”, and the 
framing of the murder of a girlfriend as defence against “espionage” or theft. The killers could still 
view themselves as having acted within the bounds of “decency”. Here also the individual officer at 
this level becomes important. 
Seizing the harvest and Bandenbekämpfung 
On 4 June 1942 British Intelligence intercepted a message sent from Himmler to Korsemann 
regarding the redeployment of the police battalions in the southern sector away from the front line. 
“The question of the police battalions has now been cleared up. Those battalions which are not 
attached to the [LSAH] are to remain under your command. The greatest emphasis is to be laid upon 
seizing the harvest”. The following day Korsemann “wired in triumph” to Krementschug. “The RFSS 
has decided that the Police Regiment Special Purposes remains at the disposal of the [LSAH]. I ask for 
Police Regiment South to return under my command as soon as possible, as I can employ two 
battalions of this regiment for seizing the harvest in the region of the Reichskommissariat”.101 One of 
the two battalions from PRS was Battalion 314. In mid-June Battalion 304 was released from the 
LSAH at the front near Tagonrog and also deployed to requisition crops and livestock for the 
Wehrmacht, for their own supply and to send back to Germany.102 
For this task Battalion 314 was initially deployed in the Kharkov area and Battalion 304 was again 
deployed in the Kiev area; both battalions were deployed in group or platoon strength to cover the 
large areas.103 This operation was consistent with the plans of the Grüne Mappe to stop foodstuffs 
from the “surplus areas” of Ukraine being transported to other parts of former Soviet territory and 
into German channels. Wehrmacht propaganda attempted to justify to the soldiers what was to be 
done. 
Each gram of bread or other food that I give to the population in the occupied 
territories out of good heartedness, I am withdrawing from the German people and 
thus my family…Thus, the German soldier must stay hard in the face of hungry women 
and children. If he does not, he endangers the nourishment of our people. The enemy is 
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now experiencing the fate that he had planned for us. But he alone must also answer to 
the world and history.104 
Consistent with SS ethics of following what was deemed to be good for the Volksgemeinschaft and 
“no one else”, it seems likely that the officers of Battalions 314 and 304 sought, perhaps with the aid 
of official SS propaganda material, to justify this task in a similar way for their subordinates. 
The tasks of the battalions involved supervising the collection of foodstuffs from the fields, searching 
houses for hidden goods and requisitioning livestock. Whatever was deemed to be necessary for the 
policemen’s needs was sent to the battalion kitchens. The civilian population were allocated only 20-
kg of grain per adult and 10-kg for children.105 The battalions were acting in much smaller sub-units 
and this gave individual policemen opportunity to form their own decisions on how they would treat 
the civilian population. It appears that the majority of the policemen chose to act according to their 
orders. A former member of the 1st Company, Battalion 314 recalled that in allocating the meagre 
rations to the civilians, “These directions were for the most part controlled exactly by our unit. There 
were also comrades who were not so exact. I remember also that other members acted very 
brutally”.106 Along with foodstuffs, the police battalions were involved in rounding up and deporting 
back to Germany and elsewhere young men and women for forced labour. Compulsory labour 
service had been introduced in autumn 1941. The work was very low paid and the threat of 
imprisonment was enforced for those who attempted to avoid conscription. Deportations to 
Germany had begun in January 1942, but the battalion still encountered widespread evasion and 
resistance especially in the wooded areas in north Ukraine where there was more partisan 
activity.107 
During the years 1942 and 1943 the German occupation responded to the deteriorating strategic 
situation with terror and increased exploitation in the rear areas. During this period the German rear 
units also started to experience an increase in partisan activity which often led to brutal responses 
from the German occupying forces, including the razing of entire villages and mass killing.108 The 
German police battalions, including Battalions 314 and 304, became increasingly involved in anti-
partisan activity that also crossed over with the tasks of exploitation that both battalions had been 
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performing from summer 1942 in particular with the “seizing of the harvest”. An anticipated 
crossover in these tasks can be seen in Goering’s directive from October 1942. 
1. When combating partisans and clearing partisan-infested areas, all livestock to hand 
is to be removed to a safe area, and the food reserves likewise cleared away to 
deprive the partisans of them. 
2. The entire male and female workforce that may be liable for labour service is to be 
forcibly recruited and taken to the plenipotentiary for labour, to be used either in 
the rear areas or in the homeland. Children are to be specially accommodated in 
camps to the rear.109 
The requisitioning of foodstuffs and labour was to serve as a military function in fighting the partisan 
threat as well as that of exploitation. Because of the way in which the German forces attempted to 
combat the increasing partisan threat, entire villages could be burned and their populations 
murdered or taken away on the slightest excuse or flimsiest suspicion that someone in the village 
had had contact with partisans.110 Rear units were now faced with an actual physical threat which, 
combined with their general fear and contempt for the “bandits” as well as the populations they had 
emerged from, their inability to effectively “pacify” such vast territories and a pervasive ideological 
view of “Jew Bolsheviks” and “eastern races”, meant that they regularly resorted to the use of 
extreme terror and violence.111 Orpo and EG units were used to provide extra manpower for anti-
partisan operations in cooperation with other units and as full “combat” units themselves.112 It was 
only in the summer of 1942, after the front had become more stable, that British Intelligence again 
started regularly to intercept reports of anti-partisan operations, mostly concerning the central 
sector. In the south there appears to have been a considerable amount of anti-partisan activity 
reported, but overall it was judged to be “continual activity of a minor kind”. For the southern 
sector, the centre of partisan activity was in the area of the Pripet Marshes.113 
From autumn 1942 a number of German units were active in the Pripet Marshes, including the 
“Pieper” Kampfgruppe, the Reiterabteilung “Fegelein”, Police Regiment 10 (formerly PRS) including 
Battalion 314, and Battalion 304 which was now part of Police Regiment 11.114 According to British 
Intelligence, until late-summer 1942 Battalion 314, along with Battalions 45, 303 and 311, had been 
active south of Kharkov fighting partisans and rounding up “communist agitators”, “whom they shot 
in great numbers ‘according to martial law’”.115 Following a period of four weeks’ training Battalion 
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314 arrived in the Pripet Marshes in September 1942. Initially the battalion was dispersed among a 
number of small combat units; a former member of the 3rd Company recalled being part of a larger 
company called “SS-Group Gresser”, which was also strengthened by a Ukrainian battalion.116 
Battalion 304 also arrived in September 1942 and was dispersed amongst the fighting groups, 
including a Sonderkompanie commanded by Joachim Pieper. Pieper personally led his own sub-unit 
which included a number of members of Battalion 304 and probably also 314; Panis appears to have 
been one of Pieper’s lieutenants until July 1943 when he was recalled to face the SS-court about his 
personal behaviour.117 By this time Major Deckert had been replaced and was commanding a 
battalion in Police Regiment 17.118 
From November 1942 Battalion 304 appears to have been reformed and was operating in the Pripet 
Marshes. Depending on the type of operation or the strength of an identified partisan group, the 
battalion would sometimes be operating as a whole battalion, but also at company, platoon and 
group strength commanded by junior officers or NCOs.119 The general procedure followed by 
Battalion 304 was constructed from witness accounts of the numerous actions during this period by 
the East German investigators. Initially the battalion staff would be informed of the location of 
partisans by informers of the SD and, according to the expected size of the partisan group, either the 
whole battalion or a sub-unit moved out. Villages that were suspected of helping partisans or being 
the base for partisan groups were generally burned down. The men were usually shot and the rest of 
the population were either shot, burned in their houses, driven out or deported to Germany for 
forced labour. Crops and cattle continued to be taken.120 Presumably, the commander on the spot 
would have a major role in deciding which courses of action would be taken and against whom. It 
appears that there may have been differences of opinion amongst the commanders concerning their 
choices of victims. A former policeman and driver for Dr Busse of Battalion 304 recalled an incident 
in 1943. After collecting some first aid material to be taken to a unit in the field that had been 
involved in a partisan action, the car had to be stopped and Busse got out to go to the unit on foot. 
The driver recalled that when Busse returned he said something like: “such a bunch of swines, they 
shot a blond child there. They’ll hear about this”. On the continuing journey Busse was so upset he 
had to vomit.121 This incident appears to have been a “revenge action”, perhaps for an injured 
policeman. The witness claimed he didn’t know what had happened but it seems likely that there 
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was an execution of civilians as he had heard shots. That Busse was angry about the shooting of a 
“blond child” in particular suggests strongly that executions of civilians were justified, and 
motivated, not only in terms of “military” expediency, but also in ideological terms. 
In December 1942 and early 1943 it appears that the 1st Company of Battalion 314 were involved in 
exceptionally brutal “revenge actions” in the Pripet area. In 1964 a former reserve policeman who 
had joined the 1st Company in March 1942 recalled hearing of an incident in late-December 1942 in 
the village of Tonjesh where a “revenge action” (the witness used the term Racheexpedition) took 
place under the command of Lieutenant Schleich. Schleich eventually took over command of the 1st 
Company from Christ, but it is not clear whether this had happened by December 1942. The 
company had been attacked by a few partisans so Schleich ordered about 70 people, which may 
have been the entire village population, “old people, women and children”, to be locked in a church 
which was then set on fire.122 The same witness also recalled another “Sonderaktion” that took place 
in January or February 1943, again under the command of Schleich, in another small village in which 
60 women and children were burned in a school building. The witness could remember that the 3rd 
Platoon were sitting on a hill while the 1st and 2nd Platoons set fire to the building and shot through 
the windows.123 Nine other former policemen recalled hearing about at least one occasion around 
the beginning of 1943 in which the population of a village in that area were murdered in such a 
way.124 It is not clear from the trial records whether the victims of these massacres were Jews or not. 
The dates of these incidents as given by the witnesses came just after a Hitler decree that was issued 
through the Army High Command on 16 December 1942 which ordered: “the most brutal 
means…against women and children also”. The decree declared that any misplaced scruples in this 
matter were treasonous to the German people.125 Schleich would have been aware of this decree. 
However, even though these types of actions were endorsed at the highest level and perhaps even 
encouraged at the battalion leadership level, the actual decision to carry this out was taken by the 
commander on the spot, in this case Schleich. 
In the midst of the anti-partisan war the assault against the Soviet Jews continued with the 
liquidation of the ghettoised populations that still survived in the Reich Commissariats.126 On 14 
October 1942 the Pieper Kampfgruppe, at a time when this force was made up of members of 
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Battalions 314 and 304, took part in the liquidation of the Kobrin ghetto and nearby labour camps.127 
Both Battalions 314 and 304 suffered casualties during the period in the Pripet Marshes.128 However, 
none of the officer ranks in either battalion was killed in action during this period. Lochbrunner of 
304 received a gunshot wound to the head in November 1942 while in action against “Russian 
gangs” (Banden), but appears to have recovered fairly quickly in Munich.129 Battalions 314 and 304 
do appear to have been involved in some actual combat in fighting partisans during 1942 and 1943, 
but the casualty record, at least for the officer ranks, indicates that rather than actual military 
combat, for the most part the battalions were engaged in other means of combating the partisan 
threat. These included the rounding up of labour from the civilian population, robbing of foodstuffs 
and mass executions. 
As has been shown, the policemen of Battalions 314 and 304 proved themselves capable of carrying 
out mass murder before they had experienced any “hardships”. Even though it appears some 
hardships were experienced over the winter of 1941-42 and in spring 1942 when the battalions were 
drawn into front-line fighting, but the policemen, in particular the officer ranks, appear to have still 
been able to enjoy themselves in Kharkov and Kiev, mostly at the expense of the local populations. 
The battalions were involved in many aspects of the Nazi imperial project, including mass killing and 
the creation of conditions in which millions of people would be starved to death and the immediate 
needs of the German war effort such as front-line combat, the requisitioning of food and labour and 
partisan fighting. There were examples of extreme violence demonstrated by smaller groups and 
individuals during and after the winter and spring of 1941 and 1942, but if the policemen were able 
to commit these acts as a result of brutalisation, it seems more likely to have been a result of 
consistent exposure to and involvement in mass murder rather than winter hardships. The witness 
who vividly recounted the cases of the burning of people by the 1st Company was a reserve 
policeman who had only joined Battalion 304 in March 1942, after the battalion’s involvement in 
large-scale massacres. He therefore may not have been as brutalised as many of his fellow 
policemen at that point. Of course it is likely that there were some who would also have 
remembered these actions but lied about them during the post-war trials, but that this witness felt 
compelled to relate these events to the investigators in detail suggests that they had a definite 
impact on his conscience. Whether enough members of the 1st Company would have been capable 
of carrying out such acts if ordered, against non-Jews, in July or August 1941 is difficult to determine. 
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It appears that the “East” was viewed by many as a “zone of exception”130 in which different rules 
applied and the individual policeman in his perception of a meteoric rise in status could make 
decisions that could mean the death of civilians on a whim. The policemen, and the SS officers in 
particular, were still supposed to be abiding by National Socialist morals and SS values but it appears 
that there were at times differences of opinion regarding codes of behaviour. Christ apparently felt it 
acceptable to have a relationship with a non-Aryan woman, whereas others, perhaps some fellow 
officers in Battalion 314, may have felt otherwise. One officer or NCO in Battalion 304 considered it 
necessary to include a blond child in an execution whereas Dr Busse considered the act disgraceful 
and perhaps worthy of punishment. Christ was clearly an extremely violent individual who was 
probably motivated by factors other than Nazi ideology and SS ethics who even had to be reined in 
by his superior, Severth. However, in the midst of astonishing violence encouraged and facilitated by 
NS morals and SS ethics, it is difficult to distinguish between those who were acting “excessively” 
and those who still considered themselves to be “decent”. An inability to make such a distinction 
may have prevented Christ’s SS colleagues from reporting his acts to SS judicial authorities. 
That the SS leadership felt obliged to relax restrictions on sexual relations in the East because so 
many chose to ignore the rules is an example of central policy being led by actual conditions on the 
periphery. Individual commanders had a considerable impact on the behaviour of their subordinates 
on the ground in a variety of ways. Aside from the mass executions, in every situation in which 
Battalions 314 and 304 were involved, the policemen were acting in relatively autonomous sub-units 
under the command of a junior officer or NCO. In situations where units were carrying out the tasks 
of guarding a ghetto, collecting and supervising the harvest, “revenge actions”, and even in day to 
day living in Kharkov and Kiev where the men were garrisoned in companies in different parts of the 
cities, the commanding officer could determine the parameters of the behaviour of their men; 
whether in leading by example or by issuing orders or instructions determined by the situation on 
the ground. Not least, it was down to the officers to justify and rationalise the actions of the 
policemen at every step. Justifications along the lines that the victims of mass murder were “useless 
eaters” or “partisan helpers”, or that the “revenge actions” were necessary as well as fortifying the 
notion that the perpetrators continued to act within the realms of “decency”, could all fit within the 
parameters of SS morality. 
 
 
                                                          




Angrick has demonstrated that Einsatzgruppe D was a heterogeneous unit. In the same way Police 
Battalions 314 and 304 were also heterogeneous units being comprised of groups of policemen from 
different social, generational and professional backgrounds and sub-units with different functions. 
As far as National Socialist affiliations were concerned, there was a marked difference between the 
officer corps and the rank and file. Mallmann is correct in his evaluation that the rank and file of the 
police battalions were not “elite troops”, but neither were they the “dregs” of the manpower pool. 
Most were volunteers who joined the police for a change in career, were only superficially vetted by 
the SS and relatively few were SS men or NSDAP members. Most were old enough to have 
experienced political norms as adults other than the Nazis and some would have had other political 
allegiances before 1933. Like de Mildt’s “Euthanasia” and Aktion Reinhard perpetrators, the 
collective background profile of the rank and file of Battalions 314 and 304 resembles more closely 
that of a group of “ordinary citizens” rather than “ideological warriors”.1 In contrast, all the officers, 
and probably most of the NCOs were SS men and almost all of the more senior officers were former 
Freikorps or SA members. The junior officers were all SS and NSDAP members and had nearly all 
spent much or all of their teenage years in the ranks of the HJ. This was a much more “Nazified” 
group than Mallmann has allowed for in his analysis of the police battalions and certainly less 
“ordinary” than Browning’s reserve policemen of Battalion 101. 
Police Battalions 314 and 304 were involved in nearly every aspect of Nazi population policies and 
mass murder in Eastern Europe and the actions of the battalions mirrored the rapid radicalisation of 
Nazi policy from 1940 to 1942. Both battalions were involved in colonial population projects in 
Poland in 1940 and 1941 including the guarding of ghettos and the rounding up of forced labour. 
From summer 1941 both battalions carried out a large number of massacres in Ukraine of mainly 
Jewish civilians but also Soviet POWs and Ukrainian civilians and profited from the famines in Kiev 
and Kharkov. Battalion 314 was also one of the first units to be involved in the use of gas vans. The 
two battalions were not trailblazers in that, both in Poland and Ukraine, they entered areas in which 
racial policies and mass murder had already been committed by other German units. The actions of 
Battalions 314 and 304 followed a general pattern regarding the changing targets of mass murder, 
including Jewish women in late-August and children in autumn 1941 in the massacres at times when 
some other units were doing so too. However, these two battalions can certainly be considered as 
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being two of the “vanguard” units of mass murder in Ukraine and there are indications that both 
battalions carried out more massacres than have been highlighted in this study. 
In contrast to Westermann’s argument on Police Battalion 310 and Bartov on the Wehrmacht, the 
policemen of Battalions 314 and 304 were not brutalised by extreme hardships at war and the 
experience of front-line combat. Battalions 314 and 304 did experience “hardships” during the harsh 
winter conditions of 1941-42 along with other German units, but this was only after both battalions 
had already carried out a number of massacres in the summer and autumn. An acclimatisation to 
violence occurred over a period of time through participation in the increasingly radicalised Nazi 
policy in Eastern Europe. Much like Welzer has found with Reserve Battalion 45, by following the 
actions of Battalions 314 and 304 from 1940 to 1942 we can see thresholds being crossed step by 
step.2 From the prosecution of Nazi racial policies in Poland in 1940 and 1941 which included 
violence and instances of killing, to the mass murder of hundreds of Jewish men in July 1941 and the 
murder of women in August 1941 in Ukraine, to the large-scale massacres of entire communities, 
including children, from Autumn 1941 a radicalising process can be traced in which the policemen 
are learning and changing as a result of their involvement in an increasingly radicalising process of 
mass murder.3 
Building on the basic training, the experiences of the policemen in carrying out Nazi racial policies in 
Poland was significant in preparing the battalions as units of mass murder. Browning’s contention 
that Germans were more transformed by their experiences in Poland from 1939 to 1941 appears to 
have been the case with Battalions 314 and 304. The experience of Poland was an important step for 
the majority of the policemen in their habitualisation to violence. This is most evident with the men 
of Battalion 304 who as guards for the Warsaw ghetto were both witnesses to and contributors to 
the extreme conditions within the ghetto. It is not known how many civilians were killed by 
members of Battalions 314 and 304 in Poland, but it is clear that murder was part of the scope of 
actions for many of the policemen before they entered Ukraine. This is particularly evident with the 
killing course attended by some “enthusiasts” from Battalion 304 in Cracow in January 1941. 
It appears that Mallmann’s assertion that the men of the police battalions had no time to become 
brutalised or for a gradual acclimatisation to the violence cannot be applied to Battalions 314 and 
304. The majority of the policemen of Battalions 314 and 304 had been in Poland carrying out Nazi 
racial policies with the units for eight or ten months before taking part in the first massacres in 
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summer 1941, and also experienced a continuation of gradual acclimatisation to mass murder once 
in Ukraine. However, acclimatisation on its own is not sufficient enough of an explanation for the 
abilities of these units to persistently commit mass murder. Certain devices and configurations were 
also in play in ensuring that enough of the policemen remained willing to consistently contribute to 
the tasks of the battalions. Several officers proved themselves to be prepared to perform leadership 
roles in mass murder without an acclimatisation period. Bauer and Panis are known to have led 
massacres within the first few days of their arrivals with Battalion 314. The seven graduates of the 
19th Officer Training course arrived at their units just before the battalions were involved in the 
transition to genocide in Ukraine in late-summer and early-autumn 1941. These seven young officers 
with an average age of 21, along with the other 65 graduates of the training course that were 
distributed amongst the police battalions in former Soviet territory, were clearly considered to be 
ready to perform such pivotal roles immediately. The first large massacre carried out by Battalion 
304 was in Starokonstaninov on 2 September 1941 and the evidence suggests that Lochbrunner, 
Seeber and Becker would have arrived with the battalion in the few days before that date. The two 
glowing reports of Panis and Seeber written by their commanding officers regarding their roles as 
leaders, educators and role models suggest that these junior officers were ready to perform the role 
required of them and continued to do so into 1942 and some into 1943. With the exception of 
Lochbrunner, none of the junior officers of the first HJ generation left the battalions before 1943, 
and all of them, including Jahnhorst were promoted on schedule. 
The officers and NCOs played a significant role in creating a unit culture, starting with basic training. 
The police battalions were constructed along a military model and were trained as a para-military 
security force. The training appears to have been primarily geared towards carrying out Nazi colonial 
projects in Eastern Europe. The Ideological aspects in particular, which included explicit antisemitic 
aspects, encouraging the policemen to act and feel as Herrenmenschen, would certainly have 
created a unit culture which was taken with them into Poland and Ukraine. Whether or not the 
individual policemen had actually internalised the ideological messages given to them as part of the 
basic training, the policemen are likely to have been prepared for the type of behaviour expected of 
them in Poland and certainly would have known who their primary targets were likely to be. But 
perhaps more important than the relative effects of basic training, is the fact that the policemen 
were often isolated in small groups for long periods, thus forced to spend a great deal of time, most 
of which was not spent engaged in killing operations, in the company of their fellow policemen. 
Dorothee Frank has argued that comradery and conformity, stronger in smaller units such as the 
platoons of the police battalions, increases pressure to participate in the group’s activities that, in 
this case, includes mass murder, while simultaneously reducing the burden of individual 
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responsibility.4 Similarly, Kühne argues that comradeship was important in developing a specific 
group morality that enabled groups of perpetrators such as those discussed here to perform actions 
outside of civilian morality and international law.5 Philip Zimbardo has argued that group pressures 
are enough to induce individuals to accept and perform roles without leadership.6 However, the 
leaders of the companies and platoons of Battalions 314 and 304 had a significant impact on group 
behaviour in the sub-units. Very often the only officer and authority in the vicinity for extended 
periods, the junior officers were responsible for social gatherings such as the “fellowship evenings”, 
regular “lessons” and (organised) informal discussions. As on the spot representatives of the SS they 
were also responsible for setting parameters for behaviour and enforcing discipline through 
mechanisms such as the SS-police courts. As Staub has highlighted, a markedly strong respect for 
authority was part of German military culture and should not be underestimated as a factor in 
fostering comradery, conformity and group culture in these sub-units.7 
At times these officers were acting under the leadership of the battalion or company commanders 
or under a superior officer of the Einsatzgruppen. However, there were many occasions when the 
junior officers were the only officers present and were endowed with considerable autonomy in 
their decision making and use of initiative. In Warsaw the smaller guard units of the ghetto would be 
commanded by NCOs or junior officers. In the Lublin district, Bauer and Jahnhorst led “hunting 
platoons” and, on at least one occasion, Hertel led a unit in action against Polish resistance; actions 
that often included the executions of civilians. In the Kovel area, Jahnhorst and Hertel were the 
senior police commanders in relatively large towns in which there were multiple massacres carried 
out by the sub-units under their command. Bauer was the commanding officer of a number of 
actions that included executions, including the massacre in Mielnica in which the decision to kill the 
Jewish civilians on the spot was his. In the Pripet Marshes the evidence suggests that Schleich led at 
least one “revenge action” in which the population of a town were murdered in a particularly 
horrifying way. Like the ninety officer graduates of the SD training school highlighted by Angrick that 
formed the “backbone” of Einsatzgruppe D, the junior officers of Battalions 314 and 304 were 
consistently in direct contact with the men in the field while the higher ranked officers could, and 
often did, remain remote. In their scope for autonomous action these lower-ranked officers, as goes 
Matthäus’ argument on “controlled escalation”, enjoyed considerable agency on the perimeter and 
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in this sense were a significant driving force in the centre-periphery dynamic in radicalising mass 
murder on the ground in the former Soviet territories. 
There appears to have been a range of behaviour from the officer ranks of the battalions. All the 
officers were SS men and nearly all had a long history of NSDAP affiliations, but not all behaved as 
“eager killers” or “Exzeßtäter”. Both the battalion commanders who were in charge during autumn 
1941 of Battalions 314 and 304, Majors Severt and Deckert, remained somewhat remote from the 
everyday experiences of the rank and file, including the massacres. According to Bauer, Severt was 
keen to leave more “uncomfortable matters” to his adjutant, Steinmann, and appears to have been 
reluctant to involve his battalion in the carrying out of the large massacre in Dnepropetrovsk. 
Deckert was remembered by most former members of Battalion 304, officers and men, as being 
largely absent. Deckert mixed professionally and socially in high ranking Nazi circles, so was probably 
given an “opportunity” to prove himself with Battalion 304. Battalion 304 started carrying out large 
scale massacres with the arrival of Deckert and appears to have finished with his departure. Jeckeln 
appears to have been very satisfied with the prolific performance of the battalion under Deckert’s 
leadership, considering the battalion to be his best. Deckert’s letter regarding the punishment of 
three policemen for murdering Jews in Poland certainly used the type of language that was common 
at the time among higher ranking SS men in reference to the mass murders that they were 
committing. Severt does not appear to have had the same qualms over rounding up and imprisoning 
the thousands of Jews that were to be shot in Dnepropetrovsk. Neither man would have been in the 
position of battalion commander at that time had they not been deemed by Himmler and Daluege to 
have been capable of commanding units that were to carry out numerous massacres. Therefore, 
although their leadership may have been more remote from the actual actions of the battalions than 
the men of the companies under their command, they would still have had a personal influence over 
the actions of the battalions. 
On the ground, Christ of Battalion 314 is a more obvious example of an Exzeßtäter and his 
murderous actions would have widened the parameters of permissible behaviour of the policemen 
under his command. Some of his actions however, such as firing wildly into a crowd of waiting 
victims and the murder of the carpet dealer and dancer in Kharkov, would not have been considered 
to be the type of “decent” behaviour desired by Himmler of his SS officers. Wendorff, on the other 
hand, appears to have been somewhat less enthusiastic participant in mass murder. Wendorff, a 
former Freikorps member and SS man was valued by his superiors and his subordinates for his 
military knowledge, comradely nature and abilities as an educator, including ideological instruction. 
Like Severt perhaps, Wendorff does not seem likely to have necessarily disagreed with the 
massacres in principle, but preferred to delegate the actual leadership of these actions to his second 
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in command, Bauer. Wendorff and Jahnhorst both experienced illness during the period when 
Battalion 314 were carrying out massacres in 1941, and both left the battalion that year. It is not 
clear whether their illnesses and their departures were because of the actions of the battalion, as 
Jahnhorst claimed (a post-war witness did claim that Jahnhorst “did not get on well” with the other 
officers) during the post-war investigations. Neither man suffered any career setbacks as a result of 
their leaving. 
If there was a mix of behaviour and responses to involvement in mass murder among the rank and 
file and the higher officer ranks, there is no evidence to suggest any significant deviations from 
Himmler’s desired behaviour on the part of the junior officers of the first HJ generation. This group 
of perpetrators was perhaps the clearest adherents to Himmler’s conception of an SS vanguard. 
These men performed a pivotal role in the progression and practice of mass murder on the ground. 
They had been cultivated as the future Nazi vanguard in the HJ, as young adults they were trained to 
personify the SS elite in their appearance, manner, thinking and action, and were to act as role 
models for their subordinates in the companies and platoons of the police battalions. These junior 
officers formed part of what Browning has termed a “crucial nucleus” of eager perpetrators which 
had a disproportionate influence on events on the ground; not as psychopaths or bloodthirsty 
enthusiasts, but as representatives and enforcers of SS ethics ensuring that the mass murders were 
performed orderly, efficiently and “decently”.  
The testimony of the survivor of Gaisin especially and other witness testimonies show that the 
massacres carried out by the police battalions were not the clinically-organised type that the 
leadership strove for; rather, they were extremely violent at every stage. Evidence from the post-
war trials shows a range of behaviour by the policemen during the massacres. Some policemen 
refused to participate as shooters and some suffered psychological problems. In both battalions it is 
clear that those policemen who requested not to shoot were given other duties and suffered no 
consequences of note for doing so. Only two reliable accounts, both from survivor witnesses, attest 
to policemen helping to save Jews from the shootings. These accounts demonstrate that there were 
possibilities for policemen to help or save potential victims should they have wished to do so before 
the shootings, during the round-ups or even during the massacres. Policemen could also refuse to 
participate or request to leave the battalion. It appears that care was taken by the leadership of the 
battalions to spread the responsibility for the shootings as widely as possible. Only volunteers were 
required to shoot and, in the case of Battalion 304, the companies alternated responsibility for 
providing the shooters for each massacre. It appears that the few policemen who may not have 
been inclined to participate as shooters or felt unable to perform such a duty were offset by a few 
enthusiasts who could consistently be relied on to perform the tasks required of the units. The 
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turnover of personnel for both battalions before experiencing actual combat in 1942 does not 
appear to have been very high, so the conclusion can be drawn that a large number of the 
policemen were comfortable enough to stay with their units and contribute to the massacres by 
performing duties other than the actual shootings. Part of the role of the junior officers was to 
maintain the morale and discipline of the men under their command both of which were important 
to maintain for the carrying out of mass murder in the desired manner. Welzer has shown that the 
killing operations could be choreographed in order to take advantage of a division of labour so 
initially reluctant individual policemen could ease their way from limited to full participation.8 The 
junior officers of Battalions 314 and 304 played a lead role in the organisation and perpetration of 
the massacres. They were often involved in the selection of the victims and the selection of the 
killers from their units. The selection of the shooters was not done randomly as Welzer has found for 
Reserve Battalion 45, but, as Bauer admitted in his post-war testimony, more selectively. The 
officers knew which men they could count on to perform particular tasks. The junior officers were 
often present at the killing sites, giving the shooting orders or carrying out the shooting themselves. 
Angrick has found that platoon leaders in Einsatzgruppe D demonstrated the shooting of victims first 
so that the rank and file would know what was expected of them. Welzer also highlights an incident 
when a company commander in Battalion 45 demonstrated killing for his subordinates.9 This type of 
demonstrative violence was most evident in Bauer’s beating of the Jewish man before the massacre 
carried out by part of the 2nd Company of Battalion 314 in Mielnica. On the occasions when these 
men were the officers in command of a massacre they could organise the method of shooting to 
lessen the “spiritual” impact on their subordinates, by organising the murders to resemble a 
traditional “military type” execution, or by the use of machine-guns to speed up the process. Rather 
than simply the group situational factors influencing the actions of the policemen, we can see that 
the situations themselves were to an extent created by individual officers by managing, 
choreographing and interpreting the events. 
Leonard S. Newman has argued that “situations” themselves do not even objectively exist but need 
to be cognitively constructed.10 Ideological instruction in the form of “educational lessons” held in 
the field was a means to impart meaning for the actions of the police units and there are many 
examples of the officers of Battalions 314 and 304 performing their role as “educators” through 
speeches, lessons, social get-togethers and demonstrations. Mallmann has argued that little time 
was given to ideological instruction and had no discernible effect on the actions of the policemen. 
                                                          
8 Welzer, ‘Killing and Morality’, pp.174-5. 
9 Angrick, ‘Einsatzgruppe D’, pp.86-7, Welzer, ‘Killing and Morality’, p.174. 
10 Leonard S. Newman, ‘What Is a “Social-Psychological” Account of Perpetrator Behaviour. The Person Versus 
the Situation in Goldhagen’s Hitler’s Willing Executioners ’, in Understanding Genocide, p.51. 
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However, as Matthäus has argued, the effectiveness of the ideological training lay less in pedantic 
indoctrination during basic training than in the creation of an ideological atmosphere which served 
as an important part of the unit culture and esprit de corps. Contrary to Mallmann’s suggestions, 
considerable time and effort was given to continuing ideological “cultivation” delivered by junior 
officers through a variety of means in the field where it was most effective. 
The clearest connection that can be identified between ideological ideas and the act of mass murder 
on the part of the “grass roots” perpetrators can be seen in the attempts to legitimise the actions of 
the perpetrators and rationalise the events surrounding them through ideological “lessons” or 
sessions. These sessions were regularly delivered by the junior officers before or after mass murder 
operations. Martin Shaw has argued that the key to mass killing is its legitimacy, or more precisely, 
overcoming the problem of legitimacy in the minds of the perpetrators.11 Similarly, Richard Overy 
argues that a state in which normative moral responsibility is suspended and replaced by a “moral 
obligation to take part”, makes more sense cognitively in explaining the actions of a policeman than 
the impact of any antisemitic lessons he attended during training.12 One of the rationales 
consistently used as a justification for the massacres of Jewish civilians in Ukraine by officers of the 
battalions was that of the Jews as a “security threat”, an increasingly fantastical portrayal of the 
actions in terms of military necessity. This would have the effect of making individual policemen feel 
obliged to take part, not only in defence of a threatened German people, but also of their platoon 
comrades operating in a hostile and potentially deadly environment. As we have seen, efforts were 
consciously made by the commanding officers to not only portray the actions in military terms, but 
to orchestrate the shootings themselves as military operations. As Matthäus has argued, it appear to 
have mattered less to the policemen what they did, so long as “certain legitimizing methods” were 
applied. 
The junior officers were the ones in direct contact with the men of their companies or platoons and 
as the authority figure played the key role in justifying the acts for their men. Recent social-
psychological studies indicate that leadership on the ground is important in interpreting the 
situations the rank and file perpetrators found themselves in and the significance of the actions after 
the fact. Staub has argued that in difficult times subordinates in military organisations tend to 
“accept the authorities’ definitions of reality”.13 In a recent article on the legacy of the Milgram 
experiments, social-psychologists Reicher, Haslam and Miller have found that it is the justifications 
                                                          
11 Martin Shaw, War and Genocide (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003), p.17. 
12 Richard Overy, ‘”Ordinary Men,” Extraordinary Circumstances: Historians, Social Psychology, and the 
Holocaust’, Journal of Social Issues, 70, 3 (2014), pp.524-5. 
13 Staub, ‘Bystanders, Perpetrators and Heroic Helpers’, p.16. 
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provided by the “authority” rather than simply obedience to orders on the part of the subordinate 
or participant that is important. The participant is therefore persuaded that carrying out the action 
“is the right thing to do”.14 Maintaining an atmosphere and group culture suffused in ideological 
principles and providing justifications that can only be made sense of within this cultural framework 
were key contributions towards the perpetration of mass murder by the units of Battalions 314 and 
304. It is in this role that the junior officers were most important to the killing process. 
Like the junior officers in Einsatzgruppe D and in the Wehrmacht, the junior officers of Police 
Battalions 314 and 304 were not just a connecting link between the hierarchy of the Orpo and the 
rank and file, but were the ideological and organisational backbone of their units. This group of 
officers resemble the leadership cadre of the RSHA in that they were from the upper educational 
strata of German society, were hand-picked for roles that involved active, dynamic leadership 
entrenched in a Nazi worldview and SS ethics. As lieutenants in the police battalions, these men did 
not enjoy the same level of “unrestrained initiative” or “dynamic radicalism” as the higher ranking 
RSHA leaders, but were considerably younger and at the beginning of their careers in the SS. These 
men are representative of a radicalised minority of German youth rather than of German society as 
a whole, but were nonetheless products of the Nazi vision to remould German society. Like the RSHA 
leaders, they were the product of a Nazi veneration of youth and were the first wave of a radicalised 
elite and the clearest representatives of the Nazi ideals of a Volksgemeinschaft that emanated from 
the HJ. In the HJ and during officer training they were cultivated to be, and came to perceive 
themselves as, the vanguard and future elite of the SS. 
      
 
     
 





                                                          
14 Stephen D. Reicher, S. Alexander Haslam, Arthur G. Miller, ‘What Makes a Person a Perpetrator? The 
Intellectual, Moral, and Methodological Arguments for Revisiting Milgram’s Research on the Influence of 




BAB Bundesarchiv Berlin 
BAK Bundesarchiv Koblenz 
BDC Berlin Document Centre 
BDM Bund Deutscher Mädel 
BdO Befehlshaber der Ordnungspolizei 
DJ Deutsches Jungvolk 
DGIV Durchgangsstrasse IV 
GCCS Government Code and Cypher School 
GG Generalgouvernement 
HJ Hitler Youth 
HGS Holocaust and Genocide Studies 
HSSPF Höherer SS- und Polizeiführer 
JGR Journal of Genocide Research 
JuNS Justiz und NS Verbrechen 
KdO Kommandeur der Ordnungspolizei 
Lapo Kasernierte Landespolizei 
LSAH SS-Leibstandarte “Adolf Hitler” 
MBI Mitteilungsblätter für die Weltanschauliche Erziehung der Ordnungspolizei 
NA National Archives, London 
NSKK Nationalsozialistisches Kraftfahrkorps 
OK Ortskommandantur 
OT Organisation Todt 
PID Politischer Informationsdienst 
PRC Police Regiment Centre 








SSO SS Organisations 
USCF USC Shoah Foundation Visual Archive 
WO War Office 


































Berlin Document Center personnel files: R19 and R20 (Ordnungspolizei), SSO (SS officers), VBS and 
R9361 (RuSHA). 
R20 Units and Schools of the Ordnungspolizei. 
Bundesarchiv Koblenz 
N1682/5 Personal papers of Rudolf Querner. 
The National Archives, Kew, London 
HW16 Government Code and Cypher School (GCCS), German Police Section. 
WO War Office. 
Staatsarchiv München  
Investigatory and trial files: Staatsanwaltschaft bei dem Landgericht München I 320 Js 84/74 and 120 
Js 157-158/74. 
USC Shoah Foundation Visual Archive Online 
Survivor interviews. 
Wiener Library, London 
War Crimes Trials: Document Transcripts and other Papers, 1938-1948. 
Zentrale Stelle Ludwigsburg 
Investigatory and trial files: AR-Z 1251/65 B162/6649 – 6697 and B162/26795. 
 
Published sources 
Ames, Eric, Marcia Klotz, and Lora Wildenthal (eds.), Germany’s Colonial Pasts (Lincoln and London: 
University of Nebraska Press, 2005). 
Angrick, Andrej, Martina Voigt, Silke Ammerschubert and Peter Klein, ‘”Da hätte man schon ein 
Tagebuch führen müssen”. Das Polizeibataillon 322 und die Judenmorde im Bereich der 
Heeresgruppe Mitte während des Sommers und Herbstes 1941’, in Helge Grabitz, Klaus Bästlein and 
Johannes Tuchel (eds.), Die Normalität des Verbrechens. Bilanz und Perspektiven der Forschung zu 
den nationalsozialistischen Gewaltverbrechen. Festschrift für Wolfgang Scheffler zum 65. Geburtstag 
(Berlin: Ed. Hentrich, 1994), pp.325-385. 
218 
 
Angrick, Andrej, ‘Annihilation and Labor: Jews and Thoroughfare IV in Central Ukraine’, in Ray 
Brandon and Wendy Lower (eds.), The Shoah in Ukraine. History, Testimony, Memorialization 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008), pp.190-223. 
Arad, Yitzhak, The Holocaust in the Soviet Union (Lincoln, NE and Jerusalem: University of Nebraska 
Press, 2013). 
Bankier, David and Dan Michman (eds.), Holocaust Historiography in Context. Emergence, 
Challenges, Polemics and Achievements (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 2008). 
Baranowski, Shelley, Nazi Empire. German Colonialism and Imperialism from Bismarck to Hitler (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
Bartov, Omer, Hitler’s Army. Soldiers, Nazis, and War in the Third Reich (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1991). 
Bartov, Omer, The Eastern Front, 1941-45, German Troops and the Barbarisation of Warfare 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001). 
Benz, Wolfgang, Hermann Graml and Hermann Weiß (eds.), Enzyklopädie des National Sozialismus 
(München: Deutscher Taschenbuch, 1997). 
Beorn, Waitman, ‘Negotiating Murder: A Panzer Signal Company and the Destruction of the Jews of 
Peregruznoe, 1942’, Holocaust and Genocide Studies, 23, 2 (2009), pp.185-203. 
Beorn, Waitman, ‘A Calculus of Complicity: The Wehrmacht, the Anti-Partisan War, and the Final 
Solution in White Russia, 1941-42’, Central European History, 44 (2011), pp.308-337. 
Beorn, Waitman Wade, Marching into Darkness. The Wehrmacht and the Holocaust in Belarus 
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2014). 
Bessel, Richard, ‘The “Front Generation” and the Politics of Weimar Germany’, in Mark Roseman 
(ed.), Generations in Conflict. Youth Revolt and Generation Formation in Germany 1770-1968 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp.121-136. 
Bessel, Richard (ed.), Life in the Third Reich (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). 
Best, Werner, Die Deutsche Polizei (Darmstadt: L.C. Wittich Verlag, 1941). 




Bialas, Wolfgang and Lothar Fritze, ‘Introduction’, in Bialas and Fritz (eds.), Nazi Ideology and Ethics 
(Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars, 2014), pp.1-12. 
Biber, Jacob, Survivors. A Personal Story of the Holocaust (San Bernardino, Cal: The Borgo Press, 
1989). 
Blood, Philip T., Bandit Hunters. The SS and the Occupation of Europe (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 
2006). 
Bloxham, Donald, Genocide, the World Wars and the Unweaving of Europe (London: Valentine 
Mitchell, 2008). 
Bloxham, Donald, The Final Solution. A Genocide (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
Brandon, Ray and Wendy Lower (eds.), The Shoah in Ukraine. History, Testimony, Memorialization 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008). 
Browder, George C., ‘Perpetrator Character and Motivation: An Emerging Consensus?’, Holocaust 
and Genocide Studies, 17, 3 (2003), pp.480-497. 
Browning, Christopher R., Nazi Policy, Jewish Workers, German Killers (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000). 
Browning, Christopher R., Ordinary Men. Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in 
Poland (London: Penguin, 2001). 
Browning, Christopher R., Collected Memories. Holocaust History and Postwar Testimony (Wisconsin: 
The University of Wisconsin Press, 2003). 
Browning, Christopher R., The Origins of the Final Solution. The Evolution of Nazi Jewish Policy 1939-
1942 (London: Arrow Books Ltd, 2005). 
Browning, Christopher R., ‘Problem Solvers’, in Peter Hayes and John K. Roth (eds.), The Oxford 
Handbook of Holocaust Studies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp.128-141. 
Carney, Amy, ‘Das Schwarze Korps and the Validation of the SS Sippengemeinschaft’, in Wolfgang 
Bialas and Lothar Fritz (eds.), Nazi Ideology and Ethics (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars, 
2014), pp.323-341. 




Cüppers, Martin, Wegbereiter der Shoah. Die Waffen-SS, der Kommandostab Reichsführer-SS und die 
Judenvernichtung 1939-1945 (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2005). 
Curilla, Wolfgang, Die Deutsche Ordnungspolizei und der Holocaust im Baltikum und in Weissrussland 
1941-1944 (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2006). 
de Mildt, Dick, In the Name of the People: Perpetrators of Genocide in the Reflection of their Post-
War Prosecution in West Germany (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1996). 
Desbois, Patrick, The Holocaust by Bullets. A Priest’s Journey to Uncover the Truth behind the Murder 
of 1.5 Million Jews (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). 
Dillon, Christopher, Dachau and the SS. A Schooling in Violence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2015). 
Earl, Hilary, The Nuremberg SS-Einsatzgruppen Trial, 1945-1958. Atrocity, Law, and History (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
Elkins, Caroline and Susan Pedersen (eds.), Settler Colonialism in the Twentieth Century. Projects, 
Practices, Legacies (London: Routledge, 2005). 
Evans, Richard J., The Coming of the Third Reich (Penguin Books: London, 2004). 
Frank, Dorothee, Menschen Töten (Düsseldorf: Patmos Verlag, 2006). 
Fritz, Stephen G., Ostkrieg. Hitler’s War of Extermination in the East (Kentucky: University Press of 
Kentucky, 2011). 
Fulbrook, Mary, Dissonant Lives: Generations and Violence through the German Dictatorships 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
Die geheimen Filmarchiv der Eva Braun, DVD, directed by Karl Höffkes (Essen: Polar Film and Medien 
GmbH, 2004). 
Ginsburg, Suzanne, Noike. A Memoir of Leon Ginsburg (Avenger Books, 2012). 
Goldhagen, Daniel J., Hitler’s Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust (London: 
Abacus, 1997). 
Grabitz, Helge, Klaus Bästlein and Johannes Tuchel (eds.), Die Normalität des Verbrechens. Bilanz und 
Perspektiven der Forschung zu den nationalsozialistischen Gewaltverbrechen. Festschrift für 
Wolfgang Scheffler zum 65. Geburtstag (Berlin: Ed. Hentrich, 1994). 
221 
 
Gutman, Yisrael, The Jews of Warsaw. Ghetto, Underground, Revolt (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1982). 
Haberer, Eric, ‘The German Police in Belorussia, 1941-1944, Part III: Methods of Genocide and the 
Motives of German Police Compliance’, Journal of Genocide Research, 3, 3 (2001), pp.391-403. 
Haberer, Patricia and Jürgen Matthäus (eds.), Atrocities on trial: Historical Perspectives on the 
Politics of Prosecuting War Crimes (Washington: USHMM, 2008). 
Haberer, Patricia and Jürgen Matthäus, ‘War Crimes Trials and the Historian’, in Haberer and 
Matthäus (eds.), Atrocities on trial: Historical Perspectives on the Politics of Prosecuting War Crimes 
(Washington: USHMM, 2008), pp.xiii-xxx. 
Haslam, S. Alexander and Stephen Reicher, ‘Beyond the Banality of Evil: Three Dynamics of an 
Interactionist Social Psychology of Tyranny’, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 33 (2007), 
pp.615-622. 
Harvey, Elizabeth, ‘Management and Manipulation: Nazi Settlement Planners and Ethnic German 
Settlers in Occupied Poland’, in Caroline Elkins and Susan Pedersen (eds.), Settler Colonialism in the 
Twentieth Century. Projects, Practices, Legacies (London: Routledge, 2005), pp.95-112. 
Hayes, Peter and John K. Roth (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Holocaust Studies (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010). 
Heer, Hannes and Klaus Naumann (eds.), War of Extermination: The German Military in World War 
II, 1941-1944 (New York: Berghahn Books, 2004). 
Heer, Hannes, ‘How Amorality Became Normality. Reflections on the Mentality of German Soldiers 
on the Eastern Front’, in Heer and Klaus Naumann (eds.), War of Extermination: The German Military 
in World War II, 1941-1944 (New York: Berghahn Books, 2004), pp.329-343. 
Heller, Karl-Heinz, ‘The Reshaping and Political Conditioning of the German Ordnungspolizei, 1933-
1945’ (PhD diss, University of Cincinnati, 1970). 
Herbert, Ulrich, Best. Biographische Studien über Radikalismus, Weltanschauung und Vernunft 1903-
1989 (Bonn: Dietz, 1996). 
Herbert, Ulrich, Karin Orth and Christoph Dieckmann (eds.), Die Nationalsozialistischen 
Konzentrationslager. Entwickling und Struktur (Göttingen: Wallstein, 1998). 
Herzog, Dagmar (ed.), Lessons and Legacies Vol VII: The Holocaust in International Perspective 
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2006). 
222 
 
Hoess, Rudolf, Commandant of Auschwitz, trans. Constantine FitzGibbon (London: Phoenix Press, 
2000). 
Höhne, Heinz, The Order of the Death’s Head. The Story of Hitler’s SS (London: Penguin Books, 2000). 
Jäckel, Eberhard and Jürgen Rohwer (eds.), Der Mord an den Juden im Zweiten Weltkrieg. 
Entschlußbildung und Verwirklichung (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1985). 
Jensen, Olaf and Claus-Christian W. Szejnmann (eds.), Ordinary People as Mass Murderers. 
Perpetrators in Comparative Perspectives (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). 
Justiz und NS-Verbrechen. Vol XXVII (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2003). 
Justiz und NS-Verbrechen. Vol XLV (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2011). 
Kallis, Aristotle, Genocide and Fascism. The Eliminationist Drive in Fascist Europe (New York: 
Routledge, 2009). 
Kater, Michael H., Hitler Youth (Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press, 2004). 
Kay, Alex J., Jeff Rutherford and David Stahel (eds.), Nazi Policy on the Eastern Front, 1941. Total 
War, Genocide, and Radicalization (Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 2012). 
Kay, Alex, J., ‘”The Purpose of the Russian Campaign is the Decimation of the Slavic Population by 
Thirty Million”. The Radicalization of German Food Policy in Early 1941’, in Alex J. Kay, Jeff 
Rutherford, David Stahel (eds.), Nazi Policy on the Eastern Front, 1941. Total War, Genocide, and 
Radicalization (Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 2012), pp.101-129. 
Kay, Alex, J., ‘Transition to Genocide, July 1941: Einsatzkommando 9 and the Annihilation of Soviet 
Jewry’, Holocaust and Genocide Studies, 27, 3 (2013), pp. 411-442. 
Kipp, Michaela, ‘The Holocaust in the Letters of German Soldiers on the Eastern Front (1939-44)’, 
Journal of Genocide Research, 9, 4 (2007), pp. 601-615. 
Klee, Ernst, Willi Dressen, and Volker Riess (eds.), “The Good Old Days”. The Holocaust as Seen by Its 
Perpetrators and Bystanders (New York: Konecky and Konecky, 1991). 
Klemp, Stefan, “Nicht Ermittelt”. Polizeibataillone und die Nachkriegsjustiz-Ein Handbuch (Essen: 
Klartext, 2005). 
Klemp, Stefan, ‘Ganz Normale Männer, ganz gewöhnliche Leben, ganz übliche Ermittlungen?’ in 




Klemp, Stefan, Vernichtung. Die deutsche Ordnungspolizei und der Judenmord im Warschauer Ghetto 
1940-43 (Münster: Prospero Verlag, 2013). 
Koonz, Claudia, The Nazi Conscience (London: Harvard University Press, 2003). 
Kopp, Kristin, ‘Constructing Racial Difference in Colonial Poland’, in Eric Ames, Marcia Klotz, and Lora 
Wildenthal (eds.), Germany’s Colonial Pasts (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 
2005), pp.76-96. 
Koslov, Elissa Mailänder, ‘”Going east”: Colonial Experiences and Practices of Violence among 
Female and Male Majdanek Camp Guards (1941-44)’, Journal of Genocide Research, 10, 4 (2008), pp. 
563-82. 
Krausnick, Helmut, ‘Hitler und die Befehle an die Einsatzgruppen im Sommer 1941’, in Eberhard 
Jäckel and Jürgen Rohwer (eds.), Der Mord an den Juden im Zweiten Weltkrieg. Entschlußbildung und 
Verwirklichung (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1985), pp. 88-106. 
Kroener, Bernhard, R., Rolf-Dieter Müller, Hans Umbreit (eds.), Germany and the Second World War: 
Volume V. Organization and Mobilization of the German Sphere of Power (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
2000). 
Kruglov, Alexander, ‘Jewish Losses in Ukraine, 1941-1944’, in Brandon, Ray and Wendy Lower (eds.), 
The Shoah in Ukraine. History, Testimony, Memorialization (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
2008), pp.272-290. 
Kühne, Thomas, ‘Male Bonding and Shame Culture: Hitler’s Soldiers and the Moral Basis of 
Genocidal Warfare’, in Olaf Jensen and Claus-Christian W. Szejnmann (eds.), Ordinary People as 
Mass Murderers. Perpetrators in Comparative Perspectives (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 
pp.55-77. 
Kühne, Thomas, Belonging and Genocide. Hitler’s Community 1918-1945 (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2010). 
Kushner, Tony, ‘Saul Friedländer, Holocaust Historiography and the Use of Testimony’, in Christian 
Wiese and Paul Betts (eds.), Years of Persecution, Years of Extermination. Saul Friedländer and the 
Future of Holocaust Studies (London: Continuum, 2010), pp.67-79. 
Lehnstaedt, Stephen, ‘The Minsk Experience. German Occupiers and Everyday Life in the Capital of 
Belarus’, in Alex J. Kay, Jeff Rutherford and David Stahel (eds.), Nazi Policy on the Eastern Front, 




Liulevicius, Vejas Gabriel, The German Myth of the East. 1800 to the Present (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009). 
Longerich, Peter, ‘Holocaust Perpetrators’ (conference paper presented at “Perpetrator Research in 
a Global Context”, Berlin, Jan 27-29. 2009). 
Longerich, Peter, Holocaust. The Nazi Persecution and Murder of the Jews (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2010). 
Longerich, Peter, Heinrich Himmler (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). 
Lower, Wendy, ‘”Anticipatory Obedience” and the Nazi Implementation of the Holocaust in the 
Ukraine: A Case Study of Central and Peripheral Forces in the Generalbezirk Zhytomyr, 1941-1944’, 
Holocaust and Genocide Studies, 16, 1 (2002), pp.1-22. 
Lower, Wendy, Nazi Empire Building and the Holocaust in Ukraine (North Carolina: University of 
North Carolina Press, 2005). 
Lower, Wendy, ‘”On Him Rests the Weight of the Administration”: Nazi Civilian Rulers and the 
Holocaust in Zhytomyr’, in Ray Brandon and Wendy Lower (eds.), The Shoah in Ukraine. History, 
Testimony, Memorialization (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008), pp.224-247. 
Lower, Wendy, ‘Living Space’ in, Peter Hayes and John K. Roth (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of 
Holocaust Studies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp.310-325. 
Lower, Wendy, ‘Male and Female Holocaust Perpetrators and the East German Approach to Justice, 
1949-1963’, Holocaust and Genocide Studies, 24, 1, (2010), pp.56-84. 
Lower, Wendy, ‘Pogroms, Mob Violence and Genocide in Western Ukraine, Summer 1941: Varied 
Histories, Explanations and Comparisons’, Journal of Genocide Research, 13, 3 (2011), pp.217-246. 
Lower, Wendy, Hitler’s Furies. German Women in the Nazi Killing Fields (London: Vintage, 2014). 
Mallmann, Klaus-Michael, ‘Vom Fußvolk der “Endlösung”. Ordnungspolizei, Ostkrieg und 
Judenmord’, Tel Aviver Jahrbuch für deutsche Geschichte, XXVI (1997), pp.355-91. 
Mallmann, Klaus-Michael, ‘Der Einstieg in den Genozid. Das Lübecker Polizeibataillon 307 und das 
Massaker in Brest-Litowsk Anfang Juli 1941’, in Archiv für Polizeigeschichte, 10 (1999), pp.82-88. 
Mallmann, Klaus-Michael and Bogdan Musial (eds.), Genesis des Genozids. Polen 1939-1941 
(Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2004). 
225 
 
Mallmann, Klaus-Michael, ‘”…Mißgeburten, die nicht auf diese Welt gehören”. Die deutsche 
Ordnungspolizei in Polen 1939-1941’, in Mallmann and Bogdan Musial (eds.), Genesis des Genozids. 
Polen 1939-1941 (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2004), pp.71-89. 
Mann, Michael, ‘Were the Perpetrators of Genocide “Ordinary Men” or “Real Nazis”? Results from 
Fifteen Hundred Biographies’, Holocaust and Genocide Studies, 14, 3 (2000), pp.331-366. 
Mann, Michael, The Dark Side of Democracy. Explaining Ethnic Cleansing (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005). 
Mannheim, Karl, Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1952). 
Morsch, Günter, ‘Oranienburg-Sachsenhausen, Sachsenhausen-Oranienburg’, in Ulrich Herbert, 
Karin Orth and Christoph Dieckmann (eds.), Die Nationalsozialistischen Konzentrationslager. 
Entwicklung und Struktur (Göttingen: Wallstein, 1998), vol. 1, pp.111-129. 
Matthäus, Jürgen, ‘What About the “Ordinary Men”?: The German Order Police and the Holocaust in 
the Occupied Soviet Union’, Holocaust and Genocide Studies, 10, 2 (1996), pp.134-50. 
Matthäus, Jürgen, Konrad Kwiet, Jürgen Förster, Richard Breitman (eds.), Ausbildungsziel 
Judenmord? “Weltanschauliche Erziehung” von SS, Polizei und Waffen-SS im Rahmen der 
“Endlösung” (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch, 2003). 
Matthäus, Jürgen, ‘Die “Judenfrage” als Schulungsthema von SS und Polizei’, in Matthäus, Konrad 
Kwiet, Jürgen Förster and Richard Breitman (eds.), Ausbildungsziel Judenmord? “Weltanschauliche 
Erziehung” von SS, Polizei und Waffen-SS im Rahmen der “Endlösung” (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer 
Taschenbuch, 2003), pp.35-86. 
Matthäus, Jürgen, ‘Historiography and the Perpetrators of the Holocaust’, in Dan Stone (ed.), The 
Historiography of the Holocaust (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), pp.197-215. 
Matthäus, Jürgen, ‘Anti-Semitism as an Offer: The Function of Ideological Indoctrination in the SS 
and Police Corps During the Holocaust’, in Dagmar Herzog (ed.), Lessons and Legacies Vol VII: The 
Holocaust in International Perspective (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2006), pp.116-128. 
Matthäus, Jürgen, ‘Controlled Escalation: Himmler’s Men in the Summer of 1941 and the Holocaust 
in the Occupied Soviet Territories’, Holocaust and Genocide Studies, 21, 2 (2007), pp.218-42. 
Matthäus, Jürgen, ‘”No Ordinary Criminal”. Georg Heuser, Other Mass Murderers, and West German 
Justice’, in Patricia Haberer and Jürgen Matthäus (eds.), Atrocities on trial: Historical Perspectives on 
the Politics of Prosecuting War Crimes (Washington: USHMM, 2008), pp.187-209. 
226 
 
Matthäus, Jürgen, Jochen Böhler and Klaus-Michael Mallmann (eds.), War, Pacification, and Mass 
Murder, 1939. The Einsatzgruppen in Poland (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2014). 
Mazower, Mark, Hitler’s Empire. Nazi Rule in Occupied Europe (London: Penguin, 2008). 
Megargee, Geoffrey P. and Martin Dean (eds.), Encyclopedia of Camps and Ghettos 1933-1945 
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2012). 
Mineau, André, ‘SS Ethics within Moral Philosophy’, in Wolfgang Bialas and Lothar Fritze (eds.), Nazi 
Ideology and Ethics (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars, 2014), pp.307-321. 
Moses, A. Dirk, German Intellectuals and the Nazi Past (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2007). 
Moses, A. Dirk, ‘The Forty-fivers. A Generation between Fascism and Democracy’, in Moses, German 
Intellectuals and the Nazi Past (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp.55-73. 
Moses, A. Dirk and Dan Stone (eds.), Colonialism and Genocide (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007). 
Moses, A. Dirk (ed.), Empire, Colony, Genocide. Conquest, Occupation, and Subaltern Resistance in 
World History (New York: Berghahn Books, 2008). 
Moses, A. Dirk, ‘Empire, Colony, Genocide. Keywords and the Philosophy of History’, in Moses (ed.), 
Empire, Colony, Genocide. Conquest, Occupation, and Subaltern Resistance in World History (New 
York: Berghahn Books, 2008), pp.3-54. 
Moses, A. Dirk, ‘Paranoia and Partisanship: Genocide Studies, Holocaust Historiography, and the 
“Apocalyptic Conjuncture”’, The Historical Journal, 54, 2 (2011), pp.553-583. 
Mühlhäuser, Regina, ‘A Question of Honor: Some Remarks on the Sexual Habits of German Soldiers 
during World War II’, in Wolfgang Bialas and Lothar Fritze (eds.), Nazi Ideology and Ethics (Newcastle 
upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars, 2014), pp.149-174. 
Neitzel, Sönke and Harald Welzer, Soldaten. On Fighting, Killing and Dying. The Secret Second World 
War Tapes of German POWs (London: Simon and Schuster, 2013). 
Neufeldt, Hans-Joachim, Jürgen Huck and Georg Tessin, Zur Geschichte der Ordnungspolizei Koblenz: 
Schriften des Bundesarchivs, 1957). 
Newman, Leonard S. and Ralph Erber (eds.), Understanding Genocide. The Social Psychology of the 
Holocaust (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). 
227 
 
Newman, Leonard S. ‘What Is a “Social-Psychological” Account of Perpetrator Behaviour. The Person 
Versus the Situation in Goldhagen’s Hitler’s Willing Executioners ’, in Understanding Genocide, The 
Social Psychology of the Holocaust (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp.43-67. 
Nix, Phil and Georges Jerome, The Uniformed Police Forces of the Third Reich 1933-1945 (Stockholm: 
Leandoer and Ekholm, 2006). 
Noakes, J. and G. Pridham (eds.), Nazism 1919-1945 Vol.3 Foreign Policy, War and Racial 
Extermination. A Documentary Reader (Exeter: University of Exeter, 1988). 
Orth, Karin, Die Konzentrationslager-SS. Sozialstrukturelle Analysen und biographische Studien 
(Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2000). 
Overy, Richard, ‘”Ordinary Men,” Extraordinary Circumstances: Historians, Social Psychology, and 
the Holocaust’, Journal of Social Issues, 70, 3 (2014), pp.515-530. 
Paul, Gerhard (ed.), Die Täter der Shoah. Fanatische Nationalsozialisten oder ganz normale 
Deutsche? (Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2003). 
Paul, Gerhard, ‘Die Täter der Shoah im Spiegel der Forschung’, in Paul (ed.), Die Täter der Shoah. 
Fanatische Nationalsozialisten oder ganz normale Deutsche? (Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2003), 
pp.13-90. 
Peukert, Detlev, ‘Youth in the Third Reich’, in Richard Bessel (ed.), Life in the Third Reich (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2001), pp.25-40. 
Pieper, Henning, Fegelein’s Horsemen and Genocidal Warfare. The SS Cavalry Brigade in the Soviet 
Union (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015). 
von Plato, Alexander, ‘The Hitler Youth generation and its role in the two post-war German states’, 
in Mark Roseman (ed.), Generations in Conflict. Youth Revolt and Generation Formation in Germany 
1770-1968 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp.210-226. 
Pohl, Dieter, ‘The Murder of Ukraine’s Jews under German Military Administration and in the Reich 
Commissariat Ukraine’, in Ray Brandon and Wendy Lower (eds.), The Shoah in Ukraine. History, 
Testimony, Memorialization (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008), pp.23-76. 
Reese, Dagmar, ‘The BDM Generation: A Female Generation in Transition from Dictatorship to 
Democracy’, in Mark Roseman (ed.), Generations in Conflict. Youth Revolt and Generation Formation 
in Germany 1770-1968 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp.227-246. 
228 
 
Reicher, Stephen D. S. Alexander Haslam, Arthur G. Miller, ‘What Makes a Person a Perpetrator? The 
Intellectual, Moral, and Methodological Arguments for Revisiting Milgram’s Research on the 
Influence of Authority’, Journal of Social Issues, 70, 3 (2014), pp.393-408. 
Rein, Leonid, ‘Das 322. Polizeibataillon und der Mord an den Weißrussischen Juden’, in Wolfgang 
Schulte (ed.), Die Polizei im NS-Staat (Frankfurt am Main: Verlag für Polizeiwissenschaft, 2009), 
pp.219-237. 
Rempel, Gerald, Hitler’s Children. The Hitler Youth and the SS (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1989). 
Ripley, Tim, The Wehrmacht. The German Army of World War II 1939-1945 (New York: Routledge, 
2003). 
Roseman, Mark (ed.), Generations in Conflict. Youth Revolt and Generation Formation in Germany 
1770-1968 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). 
Roseman, Mark, ‘Introduction’, in Roseman (ed.), Generations in Conflict. Youth Revolt and 
Generation Formation in Germany 1770-1968 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp.1-
46. 
Roseman, Mark, ‘The Lives of Others – Amid the Deaths of Others: Biographical Approaches to Nazi 
Perpetrators, Journal of Genocide Research, 15, 4 (2013), pp.443-461. 
Roth, Paul A., ‘Heart of Darkness: “Perpetrator History” and Why There is No Why’, History of the 
Human Sciences, 17, 2/3 (2004), pp.211-251. 
Rossino, Alexander B., Hitler Strikes Poland. Blitzkrieg, Ideology, and Atrocity (Kansas: University 
Press of Kansas, 2003). 
Rubenstein, Joshua and Ilya Altman (eds.), The Unknown Black Book. The Holocaust in the German-
Occupied Soviet Territories (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010). 
Schulte, Wolfgang (ed.), Die Polizei im NS-Staat (Frankfurt am Main: Verlag für Polizeiwissenschaft, 
2009). 
Schultz, Andreas, Günter Wegmann and Dieter Zinke (eds.), Die Generale der Waffen-SS und der 
Polizei, vol 2 (Bissendorf: Biblio-Verlag, 2005). 
Shaw, Martin, War and Genocide (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003). 
229 
 
Shepherd, Ben, War in the Wild East. The German Army and Soviet Partisans (Cambridge, Mass: 
Harvard University Press, 2004). 
Smith, Woodruff D., The Ideological Origins of Nazi Imperialism (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1986). 
Snyder, Timothy, Bloodlands. Europe Between Hitler and Stalin (London: The Bodley Head, 2010). 
Spector, Shmuel, The Holocaust of Volhynian Jews 1941-1944 (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 1990). 
Ervin Staub, ‘The Psychology of Bystanders, Perpetrators, and Heroic Helpers’, in Leonard S. 
Newman and Ralph Erber (eds.), Understanding Genocide. The Social Psychology of the Holocaust 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp.11-42. 
Stone, Dan (ed.), The Historiography of the Holocaust (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004). 
Stone, Dan, Histories of the Holocaust (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). 
Streim, Alfred, ‘Zur Eröffnung des allgemeinen Judenvernichtungsbefehls gegenüber den 
Einsatzgruppen’, in Eberhard Jäckel and Jürgen Rohwer (eds.), Der Mord an den Juden im Zweiten 
Weltkrieg. Entschlußbildung und Verwirklichung (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1985), pp.107-
119. 
Theel, Christopher, ‘The Moral Rigor of Immorality: The Special Criminal Courts of the SS’, in 
Wolfgang Bialas and Lothar Fritze (eds.), Nazi Ideology and Ethics (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge 
Scholars, 2014), pp.343-363. 
Waller, James, Becoming Evil: How Ordinary People Commit Genocide and Mass Killing (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2002). 
Weinberg, Gerald, ‘Two Separate Issues? Historiography of World War II and the Holocaust’, in David 
Bankier and Dan Michman (eds.), Holocaust Historiography in Context. Emergence, Challenges, 
Polemics and Achievements (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 2008), pp.379-401. 
Welzer, Harald, ‘Mass Murder and Moral Code: Some Thoughts on an Easily Misunderstood Subject’, 
History of the Human Sciences, 17, 2/3 (2004), pp.15-32. 
Welzer, Harald, ‘On Killing and Morality: How Normal People Become Mass Murderers’, in Olaf 
Jensen and Claus-Christian W. Szejnmann (eds.), Ordinary People as Mass Murderers. Perpetrators in 
Comparative Perspectives (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), pp.165-82. 
230 
 
Welzer, Harald, Täter. Wie aus ganz normalen Menschen Massenmörder werden (Frankfurt am 
Main: S. Fischer Verlag, 2013). 
Westermann, Edward B., ‘”Ordinary Men” or “Ideological Soldiers”? Police Battalion 310 in Russia, 
1942’, German Studies Review, 21, 1 (1998), pp.41-68. 
Westermann, Edward B., Hitler’s Police Battalions. Enforcing Racial War in the East (Kansas: 
University Press of Kansas, 2005). 
Wette, Wolfram, The Wehrmacht. History, Myth, Reality (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University 
Press, 2006). 
Wiese, Christian and Paul Betts (eds.), Years of Persecution, Years of Extermination. Saul Friedländer 
and the Future of Holocaust Studies (London: Continuum, 2010). 
Wildt, Michael, ‘The Spirit of the Reich Security Main Office (RSHA)’, Totalitarian Movements and 
Political Religions, 6, 3 (2005), pp.333-349. 
Wildt, Michael, An Uncompromising Generation. The Nazi Leadership of the Reich Security Main 
Office; trans. Tom Lampert (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2009). 
Wildt, Michael, Hitler’s Volksgemeinschaft and the Dynamics of Racial Exclusion. Violence Against 
Jews in Provincial Germany, 1919-1939 (New York: Berghahn Books, 2012). 
Wittmann, Rebecca, ‘Tainted Law. The West German Judiciary and the Prosecution of Nazi War 
Criminals’, in Patricia Haberer and Jürgen Matthäus (eds.), Atrocities on trial: Historical Perspectives 
on the Politics of Prosecuting War Crimes (Washington: USHMM, 2008), pp.211-229. 
Zimmerer, Jürgen, ‘The Birth of the Ostland out of the Spirit of Colonialism: A Postcolonial 
Perspective on the Nazi Policy of Conquest and Extermination’, in A. Dirk Moses and Dan Stone 
(eds.), Colonialism and Genocide (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007), pp.101-23. 
